Population characteristics and settlement changes in the Gaza Strip. by Dahlan, Ahmed Said Mohammed
Durham E-Theses
Population characteristics and settlement changes in
the Gaza Strip.
Dahlan, Ahmed Said Mohammed
How to cite:
Dahlan, Ahmed Said Mohammed (1987) Population characteristics and settlement changes in the Gaza
Strip. Doctoral thesis, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online:
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1172/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS AND SETTLEMENT 
CHANGES IN THE GAZA STRIP 
By 
Ahmed Said Mohammed Dahlan 
(Graduate Society) 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written consent and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 
Faculty of Social Science, Department of Geography. 
University of Durham. UK 
June 1987 
-i- 
TO 
MY PARENTS, SISTER AND BROTHERS 
-ii- 
Abstract 
This study is the first academic analysis of population and 
settlement patterns in the Gaza Strip, the third most densely populated 
entity in the world (area : 364 square kilometres, 1985 population 
525,500) after Hong Kong and Singapore. The research involved a sample 
survey of 2604 respondents carried out by the author between October 1985 
and January 1986. 
The Gaza Strip emerged as a territorial unit in 1948 after the 
creation of the State of Israel in Palestine. Huge numbers of 
Palestinians took refuge in the Gaza Strip, resulting in radical changes 
in its population characteristics and settlement geography. 
The study firstly analyses the Strip's population growth, population 
distribution, population/area relationships and settlement geography. 
Particular emphasis is put on identifying the impact of Israeli colonial 
policy in the Gaza Strip. Secondly, the population structure is analysed, 
including the effects of fertility, mortality and family planning on the 
youthfulness of the population, and the effect on population structure of 
the population displacement after the 19.67 war. The employment 
composition of Gaza's labour force is examined, along with the 
contribution to Gaza's economy from migrant workers abroad and 
commuter-workers to Israel. Finally, the study shifts to concentrate on 
Israeli policy and its impact on Gaza's population and settlement since 
the 1967 occupation. Demolition of Gaza's dwellings, the 
Israeli -sponsored resettlement programme for the refugees, its political 
aims, the refugees' response to this programme, the housing conditions and 
public services in the Strip as a whole, and in the refugee camps in 
particular, are all examined. 
The study concludes with an analysis of the future prospects of 
Gaza's population and the refugee camps. Various solutions to the 
population problems in the Gaza Strip are considered, bearing in mind the 
area's political uncertainty. 
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Author's Preface 
For nearly forty years since 1948, a huge volume of literature on the 
Israeli-Arab conflict and the Palestinian question has been produced. 
This has repeatedly adopted a political and legal perspective to the 
conf 1i ct. Furthermore, both scholars and politicians have rather 
neglected the Gaza Strip and paid little attention to it. However, this 
study of the population and settlement of the Gaza Strip breaks through 
the usual approaches. 
ýuite often, when the Palestinian question and the Israeli occupation 
of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is discussed, reference is made to the 
West Bank but not to the Gaza Strip, despite the fact that the Strip is 
proving to be a key factor in any future settlement of the Palestinian 
p rob 1 em. So, it is not surprising that it is described as the forgotten 
man in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
The above situation and the unique individuality of the Gaza Strip, 
particularly the composition of its population have sustained the author's 
interest in carrying out this research. For example, over 70% of Gaza's 
population are Palestinian refugees from 1948 and some 48% of the total 
population live in refugee camps, largely separated from the indigenous 
population. Also, the population is economically dependent on work inside 
Israel or abroad. 
This work has involved three years of research, although it began as 
early as 1982, when the researcher started to gather information and 
documents to cover the planned research. Bearing in mind the severe 
shortage of data on the Gaza Strip, two fieldtrips were made to the study 
area. The first was carried out during July-August 1984,, aiming to set 
up a solid background about the subject under analysis, and to produce the 
basic maps. The second was held between October 1985 and January 1986, 
when a large-scale questionnaire survey was undertaken. However, 
throughout this research regular contact has continued with the author's 
family in Gaza in order to provide all the up-to-date information needed. 
It is a difficult task to conduct research on the Gaza Strip, because 
the chances of success are low. Several people in the Gaza Strip advised 
the author to stop thinking of doing this research as no data were 
available and no access to them is allowed. These constraints could have 
jeopardized the author's academic future if the attempt had failed. 
Despite this pessimistic viewpoint, the research has come to light and 
become a fact. 
Being a member of the Gaza Strip population and having lived there 
all my life assisted greatly in understanding the population dynamics of 
the area, particularly since the 1967 occupation. As the subject is 
sensitive, the author has, hopefully, attempted to provide an objective 
analysi's of this vital subject, supporting the study by all available 
docum6nts and statistics, as well as by the viewpoints of the population 
sampled with some review in particular circumstances. 
It is hoped that this work will be the starting point toward more 
research on the Gaza Strip as the area has its particular problems, 
needs, desires, and political demands which are generally overlooked. 
However, it is of great value to mention that during 1985-86, three books 
were published on the Gaza Strip (Locke and Stewart, 1985; Cossali and 
Robson, 1986; and Roy, 1986; see the bibliography). These books 
consitute an encouragement to start further research, even though they 
focus on the political and historical development of the Gaza Strip rather 
than analysing the population characteristics, the socio-economic problems 
of the Gazan people, and the patterns of settlement. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
1.1 Research Strategy and Aims 
The prime purpose of this research is to depict the population 
characteristics in the Gaza Strip and to identify the changes in its 
settlement geography. In fact, since the establishment of the Strip as an 
artificial geographical unit in 1948, both population characteristics and 
patterns of settlement have been hugely affected by the Israeli-Arab 
conflict both militarily and politically. The influx of Palestinian 
refugees into the area in 1948 has led to several socio-economic problems: 
increasing population pressure upon the very limited and poor land, and 
the altering of the population balance of the Strip between refugees and 
indigenous inhabitants. 
However, the most radical changes in population structure and 
settlement patterns occurred in the Gaza Strip after the Israeli 
occupation of 1967. Mass out-migration from the Strip happened, 
distorting the normal distribution of population structure. Also, 
population resettlement schemes and demolition of Gazan dwellings have 
taken place. On the other hand, the Israelis are allowed to colonize the 
Gaza Strip through land acquisition and confiscation. 
The Gaza Strip population is continuing to increase by a high annual 
growth rate without indications of a demographic transition in sight, 
coinciding with no efforts toward improving the socio-economic standard of 
the residents. Economically, the Gaza Strip relies heavily on work inside 
Israel and remittances from relatives abroad, where more than 50% of 
Gaza's workforce are employed. 
Since rapid population increase has been a universal concern, 
"geographers came to realize that it was not enough to know about 
population numbers and their increase, but one should know about the 
process of demographic transition from high to low vital rates as well as 
the changes in population characteristics" (Clarke, 1984). With this in 
mind, the researcher wanted to study the main characteristics of the Gazan 
population to find out to what extent they have been affected by the 
611'! " - 
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political situation and fertility behaviour of Gazan couples over the 
years. Several demographic variables have been considered in this study 
in order to discover their impact on future population growth. 
Furthermore, the changes and expansion in Gaza's geography of settlement 
have led to several problems such as : housing, public services and 
environmental health. Several case studies have been considered to 
pinpoint the main problems facing Gaza's population in general and the 
refugees in particular. 
Considering the above-mentioned aim of this research, there are many 
other aims in studying the population characteristics and settlement 
changes in the Gaza Strip, such as: - 
(a) The first goal of this research is to fill a gap in the literature. 
An examination of the bibliography shows that very few papers have 
focused on the Gaza Strip in general and on population and settlement 
in particular. Quite often, the term Gaza Strip appears in the title 
of several articles, but an examination of the texts shows that not 
more than one or two paragraphs actually mention it. For this reason 
it appears important that a study should be carried out on this 
subject and on this area. 
(b) Analysis is necessary of the components of population growth and 
factors affecting it since 1948, the causes and trends of migration, 
the mode of distribution, and the population structure and employment 
composition in this most densely populated entity. 
(c) The study must also examine the territorial conflict between the 
Palestinians and the Israeli colonists which could transform the Gaza 
Strip demographic map and settlement geography in the future. 
(d) The Israeli -sponsored resettlement programme for Gaza's refugees is 
an important subject in this research. Its procedures and aims, its 
impact on housing conditions of the resettled refugees, and the 
Israeli policy and the refugees' response are all very significant 
issues for analysis. 
(e) The core of this research is to provide a clear picture about housing 
conditions and public services in the Gaza Strip in general and the 
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refugee camps in particular. The thesis attempts to answer the 
following questions: 
- Have the housing conditions in the Gaza Strip been 
comfortable for living? 
What is the average housing occupancy ratio in the Gaza 
Strip, and what is the degree of overcrowding? 
Have Gazan people been provided with adequate public 
services? 
Finally it is hoped to pinpoint the elements of the population 
problems and to try to suggest solutions to cope satisfactorily 
with them, particularly the problems of population growth, housing 
and public services. However, it can be recognized that such 
solutions have very few chances of success, because no national 
authority exists to carry them out. 
1.2 The Unique Nature of the Study__ýrea 
The Gaza Strip represents a unique phenomenon in the Palestine 
problem. Despite about two decades of Egyptian rule (1948-67), the 
Strip's land and population remained Palestinian. In contrast, the 
Jordanians claimed sovereignty over the Palestinian land of the West Bank 
and annexed it to the Transjordan which became later the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan. Hence the Palestinians of the West Bank were granted Jordanian 
citizenship. This situation has complicated efforts to identify the world 
Palestinian population and their numbers. However, it is of interest to 
quantify the size of Gazan population relative to the Palestinian 
community as a whole, aiming to demonstrate the weight of the Gazan 
population. 
"The regional total of Palestinians is difficult to estimate because 
several Arab host countries (e. g. Jordan and Saudi Arabia) are unwilling 
to encourage an identifiable Palestinian community in their midst, and are 
reluctant to publish separate statistics about Palestinians. In addition, 
intermarriage and prolonged residence outside Palestine can make the 
definition of the nationality of offspring difficult at times. Recently, 
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the PLO has taker, the initiative by publishing an annual abstract of 
statistics, as well as sponsoring some researchers on Palestinians in 
Kuwait and the refugee camps of Lebanon and Syria. The Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon in June 1982 has seriously damaged the highly regarded work 
begun by the Palestine Research Centre in Beirut, and indirectly has 
resulted in the cancellation of the Palestinian census project being 
conducted by the Population Division of the UN Economic Commission for 
Western Asia" (Hill, 1981 and 1983). 
"Furthermore, every author writing on Palestine or the Palestinians 
faces, the same set of insoluble problems connected with the definition of 
"Palestine" and the "Palestinians". Probably the nearest we can come to a 
set of definitions acceptable to the Palestinians themselves is to use 
those put forward by the PLO. The area of Palestine accepted by the PLC, 
is the territory administered under British Mandate. Anyone born or 
living in this area before 1948 or descended in the paternal line from 
these original inhabitants is recognized as a Palestinian by the PLO" 
(Hill, 1983). 
Table 1 .1 shows that in 1982, the world total of Palestinians 
numbered more than 4.7 million. Of this total some 59.69% were residing 
outside the territory of mandatory Palestine as defined above, while the 
remaining proportions lived either inside so-called Israel or in the West 
Bank or in the Gaza Strip. The majority of Palestinians in the diaspora 
were living in Jordan, where Palestinians represent over half of the total 
population. On the other hand, the Gaza Strip accommodates over 10% of 
the Palestinian community. 
In terms of Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA (for the 
definition of refugees see chapter Four), the Gaza Strip has the second 
largest comunity in the region after Jordan, with more than 427,000 
refugees residing there, giving Gaza 20.4% of the total refugee population 
(see Table 1.2). 
As demonstrated in Figure 1.1, there are 61 refugee camps in the 
UNRWA's area of operations, of which only 8 are located in the Gaza Strip. 
This low number of camps is disproportionate with the large numbers of 
refugees in the Strip, compared with the situation in the other areas (see 
Table 1-2). So. the Gaza Strip can be described as the Strip of refugees. 
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Table 1.1. Estimate of Palestinian People by Place of Residence, 1982 
Place of residence No. of population % 
Arab States: 2ý564,633 54.35 
Jordan 1,189,600 25.21 
Syria 229,868 4.87 
Lebanon* 492,240 10.43 
Kuwait 308,177 6.53 
Iraq 21,284 0.45 
Libya 23,759 0.50 
Egypt 35,436 0.75 
Saudi Arabia 147,549 3.13 
United Arab Emirates 38,665 0.82 
Qatar 25,372 0.54 
Other Arab States 52,683 1.12 
Rest of the world: 251,825 5.34 
U. S. A. 1089045 2.29 
Other states 143,780 3.05 
Total outside Palestine (a) 21,8163,458 59.69 
Total inside Palestine (b): 199029000 40.31 
Israel( 1) 554,100 11.74 
The West Bank 
(2) 871,600 18.47 
Gaza Strip 476,300 10.10 
Total Palestinian population 4,718,458 100.00 
Source : (a) Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics, 1983 
(b) Central Bureau of Statistics, 1983 
(1) The total population of the Syrian Golan Heights (12,200) annexed by 
Israel on 14 of December 1981, and the total population of Arab East 
Jerusalem (124,100) annexed in 1967 and made official on 30 July 1980 by 
the Israeli Knesset (parliament) have been deducted. 
(2) The 124,100 persons deducted from the figure for Israel (see note 1) 
have been added to the West Bank population as Palestinians. 
* The 1961 figure is used here due to lack of data 
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So far, a significant proportion of refugees registered with UNRWA 
are maintained in camps, separated largely from the indigenous 
populations. Table 1.2 demonstrates that 35.2% of the overall registered 
refugees in the UNRWA's area of operations were living in camps. The 
lowest percentages of camps refugee were found in Jordan (25.2%) and the 
West Bank (25.5%), while the highest is in the Gaza Strip where 55.3% of 
registered refugees were still living in the 8 camps (see also Fig. 1.2). 
This individuality of the Gaza Strip has produced various socio-economic 
problems in the area. 
1.3 Sources of Data and 
_Technical 
Problems 
This research relies on official data published by : (a) the 
Egyptians during their administration of the Gaza Strip 1948-1967, (b) the 
Israelis from 1967 onward, and (c) the UNRWA who have issued annual 
bulletins concerning numbers of Palestinian refugees, including Gaza's 
refugees, from 1950 onward. In fact, the Gaza Strip had no experience of 
population enumeration until September 1967, when the Israeli Army held 
the first ever census after their occupation of the area in June 1967. 
Although the demographic characteristics of the Gazan population 
derived from the 1967 census are largely affected by the heavy losses of 
population, either because people were trapped abroad at the time of the 
1967 war or emigrated after it, the census still constitutes the only 
available comprehensive source of data for analysis. Following that 
census, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics has published annual 
comprehensive data (mainly economic) on the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. 
Unfortunately, there has been no separate and complete publication of 
population data which could be of value for carrying out any detailed 
demographic analysis on Gaza's population. The Bureau publishes data 
concerning the total size of the Gazan population and their age-sex 
structure only, compiled from vital registration data which still remain 
incomplete. 
Also, access to data is not allowed in the Gaza Strip. Roy (1986) 
reported that disclosure of information about Gaza is prohibited by the 
Israelis, where employees of Israeli-administered offices, both 
governmental and non-governmental, are unable to release information on 
the territorys and numerous requestsby her to obtain such information were 
-9- 
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denied. She said that official procedures do exist for securing the 
release of information which require permission from the appropriate 
government officials. However, this permission can take months or years 
to acquire, with absolutely no guarantee of approval. 
It is with this difficulty and the lack of complete published 
population data in mind that the researcher has conducted a large-scale 
questionnaire survey to gather the data needed. The survey procedure and 
methodology are described in full detail in chapters five, nine and ten. 
Throughout the undertaking of this research, the author has 
encountered three technical problems: 
Firstly, up to the end of 1981 , all data publ i shed by the Israeli 
Central Bureau of Statistics on the Gaza Strip were combined with data on 
North Sinai. Therefore, the appropriate deductions, from all population 
data used in this research, have been made to arrive at figures for the 
Gaza Strip alone. The researcher assumed that the population of North 
Sinai had the same demographic characteristics as Gaza's people. Hence, 
the percentage of the North Sinai population of the total population, was 
deducted from aspects of the total population in order to remove the North 
Sinai element. This method is similar to that used by the Israeli Central 
Bureau of Statistics when the data of North Sinai were deducted in 1982. 
According to the Israeli Bureau (1983) North Sinai data were deducted from 
the total number of inhabitants of the Gaza Area by age group and sex. 
Distribution by sex and age was assumed according to the distribution of 
the total population of the Gaza Strip. 
Secondly, there is a severe shortage of data on the Gaza Strip among 
Palestinian sources. Roy (1986) attributed that, according to the local 
people, to the ongoing Israeli occupation, whereby specific military 
restrictions were placed on Palestinians prohibiting any form of research, 
survey, study or plan to be conducted on the Gaza Strip. Also, indigenous 
research is furthermore constrained by a severe lack of academic 
facilities inside the Strip. 
Thirdly, there are clear discrepancies in the data published by the 
Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. If its publications are examined, 
conflicting results can be detected. For example, the CBR for 1976 was 
52.1%owhen calculated from the Statistical Abstract of Israel of 1977,, 
while it becomes 49.8%oaccording to the Judea, Samaria and Gaza Strip area 
Statistics of 1984 (see Chapter 2, Table 2.6). Considering this problem, 
the author has decided to avoid such contradictions as much as possible, 
and to rely on newly issued publications instead of older ones in his 
research. 
1.4 The Thesis Framework 
This volume is in three main parts. The first examines the 
population and settlement patterns of the Gaza Strip, where chapter two 
concentrates on reviewing the history of the Gaza Strip as a territorial 
unit, and analysing the population growth and the individuality of the 
Strip. Chapter three deals with population distribution and man-land 
relationships, while in chapter four patterns of settlement, nomads, rural 
and urban settlements, refugee camps and Israeli colonies are examined. 
The second part is concerned with population structure. Chapter five 
explains the methodological procedures of four formats of questionnaire 
used in this section of study. Chapter six examines the age and sex 
structure., levels of fertility and mortality in general and infant and 
childhood mortality in particular, family planning, the impact of the 1967 
war on age structure of the population, age index and dependency ratio. 
Employment composition of the Strip's labour force, their main 
characteristics, employment and unemployment, occupation, Gaza labour 
force working inside Israel and abroad and their impact on Gaza's economy 
are considered in chapter seven. 
The third part concentrates on identifying the relationship between 
the Israeli authorities and the Gazan people since the 1967 occupation. 
Chapter eight deals with the effect of Israeli policy upon the inhabitants 
of the Gaza Strip; the demolition of Gaza's dwellings and the 
Israeli -sponsored rehousing projects for refugees are analysed. Chapter 
nine continues to deal with the Israeli resettlement projects and one of 
these projects (Al-Amal) has been taken as a micro-study; survey methods, 
resettlement procedures, housing conditions and the policy and response 
are discussed. Chapter ten explores in more detail the housing conditions 
in the Gaza Strip as a whole and the refugee camps in particular. Then a 
-12- 
micro-study is carried out to identify housing conditions in Khan Yunis 
camp, where the survey and methods, housing conditions, public services 
and refugee attitudes toward resettlement are treated. 
Logically, the study should be preceded by an introduction and ended 
by a conclusion. So, the introduction in chapter one provides background 
to the research strategy and aims, the unique nature of the study area, 
and the technical problems facing the author in carrying out this 
research. The concluding chapter (eleven) demonstrates the future 
prospects of Gaza's population, refugee camps, patterns of settlement and 
the territorial and demographic conflict. It includes suggested solutions 
to th, e population problems and a political overview for the Strip's 
future. 
Finally, the researcher has benefitted from his experience as a 
cartographer in mapping the available statistics and the data gathered in 
the 1985 survey, which greatly strengthened the value of this research. 
However, these maps can be considered as the first attempt to produce 
population maps for the Gaza Strip. 
1.5 Data Analysis 
Computer analysis of the samples and their responses had been carried 
out inside the Gaza Strip using the computer unit of the Islamic 
University of Gaza. The analysis proceeds in two steps: in the first, 
samples were analysed as a whole; while in the second, several variables 
were correlated with each other, aiming to examine the relationship 
between them and identifying the main characteristics of each group under 
analysis. Nevertheless, the author has used the computer centre of Durham 
University as well for re-analysing the questionnaire on housing problems 
in Khan Yunis camp. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSSX) had been used in all steps concerning data processing, 
crosstabulation and analysis. 
-13- 
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PART ONE 
The Population and Settlement Patterns of the Gaza 5jLj: p 
CHAPTER TWO 
Gazj Strip : Its Reg onal_Emraycl and_Pppylatiyn_ Growth 
2.1 The Emergence of the Gaza Stri as a Political 
The British mandate of Palestine officially terminated on 14 May 
1948, and the British government completed the withdrawal of its troops 
from Palestine. On the same day the Provisional State Council in Tel Aviv 
(the forerunner of the Knesset, the Israeli parliament) proclaimed the 
establishment of a zionist state in Palestine. As a consequence, "the 
political committee of the Arab League decided to send the Arab armies 
into Palestine" (Khlousi, 1967) with the aim of preserving the permanent 
rights of the Palestinian Arab people in their homeland. 
As a result of the ensuing war, the Zionists succeeded in the 
establishment of the State of Israel covering 20,700 sq. kms (Orni and 
Efrat, 1980) about 77.9% of Palestine. Meanwhile the Arab armies 
dominated two areas: the first was the land in the eastern part of 
Palestine comprising some 5505 sq. kms (Orni and Efrat, 1980) about 20.7% 
of Palestine, which was initially put under Jordanian protection, but it 
was later officially annexed to transjordan after the Jericho conference 
of lst December 1948. This was called the West Bank, and on 13 December 
1948, the Jordanian Parliament supported the annexation of Palestinian 
land (Salman, 1980). Thus, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was 
transformed. 
The second area remaining under Arab control was the Gaza Strip. Its 
364 sq. kms (1.4% of Palestine) remained under the domination of the 
Egyptian army, and received its political validity in the Armistice 
Agreement which was signed between Egypt and Israel on 24 February 1949 on 
Rhodes Island (The Geographer Office of Research in Economic and Science, 
1965; Al-Dib, 1979). 
The 1948 Israeli-Arab war resulted in the destruction of the 
demographic unity of the Palestinian people and the fragmentation of the 
geographical entity of Palestine (see Fig. 2.1). 
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After the Armistice Agreement of 1949, the Government of Egypt 
continued to provide the Gaza Strip with protection and a military 
administration, headed by a Governor-General. who carried out the policy 
of the central government in Cairo. This area was described as "the 
submissive Palestinian land under the supervision of Egyptian military 
forces". This term continued in use until the publication of basic law 
number 55, in 1955, whereby the tern-, Gaza Strip appeared according to the 
first item of the aforementioned law (Khlousi, 1967). 
The Egyptian army remained in control of the Gaza Strip, except for 
an interlude of Israeli occupation between 29 October 1956 and 7 March 
1957 as a result of the Suez military campaign, until Egyptian control was 
terminated by the war of June 1967, which brought the Strip back under 
Israeli military occupation. Israel also occupied the West Bank, the 
Golan Heights and Sinai. Consequently, by June 1967, all Palestinian 
lands had fallen under Israeli occupation (Fig. 2.2). 
2.2 Geographical ChaUýý_ýnd 
_Eopýylation 
Movement in the Gaza Sub-District 
of Palestine, 1948 
The area which is presently called the Gaza Strip was formerly part 
of the Gaza sub-district of Palestine, one of its 18 sub-districts (see 
Fig. 2.3). Its area was 1111.5 sq. kms of which 49.3 sq. kms were Jewish 
owned. It included three towns (Gaza, Khan Yunis and Majdal) and 54 
villages (Fig. 2.4) (Dabbagh, 1966 and Hadawi, 1970). 
Most of the residents of Gaza sub-district depended for their 
livelihood on agriculture and a majority of them were Arabs (Table 2.1). 
As a result of the Israeli-Arab conflict in 1948, their ties with the 
remainder of Palestine were abruptly broken. 
"Due to the prevailing unrest in Palestine, the influx of refugees 
into neighbouring Arab countries had begun as early as 1947, although the 
mass movement occurred during the period between April and August 1948" 
(UNRWA, 1983a). In a period of months, the Palestinian Arab majority 
became a minority; the composition was 67% Arabs, 31% Jews and 2% others 
before the Israeli-Arab conflict according to the racial classification of 
1945. Some researchers estimated the Palestinian displacement from 
Palestine to be between 700,000 and 900,000 persons (Godwin, 1982). 
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FIG-2-3 ADMINISTRATIVE LEBANON) 
DIVISIONS OF PALESTINE 
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FIG-2.4 THE EMERGENCE OF THE GAZA 
STRIP FROM GAZA SUB-DISTRICT, 1948 
-----Gaza SubDstrictof 
Palestine 
....... Gaza Strip 
Arab Tbiwns 
o Arab Villages 
Railway 
ýMain Roads 
1 
N 
Kilometres 
10 20 
Mdes 10 
- t.. 
¼? 
'/ 
"P 
GAIA 
s s 
s 
000 0 
0 
4t4 
S 
Arab el 
Surnein mI 
YS 
0 
,. 
Abasan 
o 
Ftafah s '1114ý 
AD 
El'Imars 
0 
BEER SHEBA 
BEER SHEBA 
Vr 
44, 
C-5 1 
"".... 
.. 
- 
, -. " 0rA,..., 
A, ab 
ukreir 
El heý 
0. rq '. -El Bo asur :I.. 01 KhLim arv 0 Gh6fV 0 
a 1.0 Sh Sagtvrx 
0 
t Tell ef Sal 
ya. SlIm 
Jbds 0ý Surrrx4 
0 - juu. 4r. 
ýcx? jama Zikr 
0... I -. - Fli 
z 
eitatn 
alu a 
........... 
.... ... Qubeiba tr El, 
oBureir Jrn % 
", 
0* 
2)d 
nun Arab el Jubara 
A-f 
0 
Ed r4w ul & Dorý 
. 
4-rna 
co 
0 "ha LLJ 
S, 
o"", El Muharraqa 
% 
Arab el Hanapra 
-20- 
The population of the northern zone of Palestine from the 
sub-districts of Acre, Haifa, Safad and Nazareth weni ' north into Lebanon 
and Syria; the majority of residents from Tiberias, Beisan, and Safad 
sub-districts crowded into Jordan; the inhabitants of Ramleh, Jerusalem 
and the coastal plain of Palestine fled to the West Bank and Jordan, while 
a large proportion of the residents of Gaza, Jaffa, Beer Sheba and Ramleh 
sub-districts poured into the Gaza Strip, and a small proportion poured 
into Egypt (Fig. 2-5). 
Table 2.2 presents various estimates of the scale of population 
displacement into the Gaza Strip after the Israeli-Arab conflict of May 
1948. The most important observation is the equality of Israeli (Efrat, 
1977) and UNRWA estimates (UNRWA 1962 and 1983a), but on the whole, 
Israeli sources have tended to minimize the scale of the displacement. 
Thus, the Gaza Strip became overcrowded by some "200,000 refugees, 
including 30,000 Bedouins from the Negev desert in southern Palestine 
(UNRWA, 1962). The refugees were settled near their occupied land, 
confidently expecting to return to their homes within a few weeks or 
months. These huge number of refugees were added to the indigenous 
residents of Gaza area - which became the Egyptian - controlled Gaza Strip 
- who numbered some "80,000 Palestinians by the end of 1948" (Abu Lughod, 
1982). 
Thus the Gaza Strip was crowded by approximately 280,000 persons on 
its limited land (364 sq. kms). The broad consequences of the Israeli-Arab 
war of 1948 were as follows: 
(a) Gaza sub-district of Palestine lost 67% of its area, that is to say 
the Gaza Strip comprised 33%; 
(b) The population increased more than threefold from 80,000 to 280,000 
persons; 
(c) About 70% of the Gaza Strip's inhabitants lost their livelihood in 
the hinterland of Palestine; 
(d) The Gaza Strip contained the largest concentration of refugees (about 
70% of the Gaza Strip population at the end of 1948); and 
(e) The indigenous residents of the Strip also lost their livelihood in 
occupied Palestine. 
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Table 2.1 :A Classification of the Population of the Gaza Sub-District of 
Palestine by Nationality 
Palestinian Arabs Jews 
Year No. % No. % Total 
(a) 1922 71,765 99.5 330 0.5 72,095 
(b) 1931 87,465 99.8 220 0.2 87,685 
(C) 1945 134,290 98.0 2,890 2.0 137,180 
Source : Calculated by the researcher from the following sources: 
(a) Barron, 1922. 
(b) Dabbagh, 1966. 
(C) Hadawi, 1970. 
Table 2.2 : Various Estimations of the Palestinian Population Displacement 
into the Gaza Strip, 1948 
Source 
Estimated 
Displacement 
UNRWA 200,000 
Efrat 200,000 
Issa 1902000 
Sayigh 200,000 
Salman 1989000 
Abu Lughod 201,100 
Harris 190,000 
Kossaifi 185,600 
Gilbert 190,000 
Source : UNRWA, 1962 and 1983a; Efrat, 1977; Issa, 1979; Sayigh, 1979; 
Salman, 1980; Aub Lughod, 1982; Harris,, 1980; Kossaifi, 1980; Gilbert, 
1984. 
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2.3 The IndividualltLof the GLýa 
_ý, _p 
The Gaza Strip first came into existence 39 years ago in 1948, after 
the first round in the Israeli-Arab wars, amidst extremely traumatic 
economic and political conditions. Geographically, the Gaza Strip is a 
part of the Palestinian coastal plain stretching from Haifa in the north 
to Rafah in the south. Situated in the south west of Palestine, it forms 
a long and narrow rectangle. "Its length is approximately 45 krns; its 
width 5.7 kms in the northern section, attaining a maximum of 12 kirls at 
the southern end" (Orni arie Efrat, 1980). 
Sand dunes, geomorphologically called bctrchans, cover roughly 33% of 
its 364 sq. kms stretching along the Strip's coast. Despite this chronic 
hindrance, Palestinian farmers have succeeded to a large extent, in the 
reclamation process by the continuous removal of sand to gain access to 
the fertile soil and to the water table which lie beneath. Fa rrr., s 
cultivated by the above-mentioned agricultural method are generally dubbed 
"Mawasi". Vegetables and fruits such as dates and guavas constitute the 
main produce of the Flawasi. 
Economically, agricultural lands constitute 74% of the overall area 
of Gaza Strip. "Out of 364 sq. kms of the Gaza Strip, 267 were under 
cultivation in 1967" (Orni and Efrat, 1980), but this was reduced in 1982 
to 210 sq. kms (Sawalha, 1983). 
The reasons lying behind this decline in the amount of the cultivated 
land are: 
(a) the Israeli's confiscated about 120 sq. kms to build their colonies 
(Dawud, 1982) because they were formerly partly government property; 
(b) as a result of the rapid growth of the Palestinian population in the 
Strip and the limited land available, people were forced to buy 
agricultural lands for the sake of housing projects and industrial 
purposes, such as building small factories, workshops, repair shops 
and service stations; 
(c) as a consequence of the sharp decline in agricultural income and the 
extremely high increase of land prices, landowners started selling 
their valuable lands (e. g. the price of one sq. metre in Gaza city 
was US $ 100-130 in 1982). 
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Mineral resources are non-existent, and industry is very limited and 
poor. 
The broad population characteristics of the Gaza Strip are strongly 
influenced by political phenomena which have played a significant role in 
the growth and population distribution of the Strip. A new pattern of 
settlement evolved with the formation of the eight refugee camps in the 
Gaza Strip after 1948. 
It is obvious that the Gaza Strip was extremely and negatively 
influenced by the Israeli-Arab conflicts which have stigmatized its 
population dynamics. 
2.4 The High Growth Rate of the Gaza Strip Population 
As a result of the unique political circumstances of the Gaza Strip 
which led to different administrations (an essential tenet if this is to 
be understood), the evolution of population growth in the Gaza Strip can 
be divided into two periods: 
(a) the Egyptian period from 1948 
distinguished by huge numbers 
the Strip after the Palestine 
(b) the Israeli occupation period 
present time, characterized b 
of June 1967. 
to the 5th of June 1967, which was 
of displaced Palestinians pouring into 
tragedy; and 
from the 10th of June 1967 until the 
y external migration following the war 
By 1948, the Gaza Strip was transformed as a territorial unit under 
the Egyptian administration. In 1922, the population of the Gaza area 
(which contracted later into the Gaza Strip) reached 28,708 inhabitants 
(Barron, 1922). But by 1945, the area had been populated by about 64,970 
(Hadawi, 1970). Thus the population increased by about 81.67% in that 
period, or 3.55% per annum. 
Before the 1948 war, Gaza Strip was estimated to have a population of 
only 80,000 indigenous inhabitants. But the beginning of the actual 
quantitative extension and qualitative change was in 1948, when a flood of 
Palestinian refugees crowded into the Strip from occupied Palestine. 
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Those displaced were estimated to be roughly 200,000 refugees, who 
contributed to raise the Strip population to 280,000 (71% refugees and 29% 
indigenous). This displacement roughly quadrupled Gaza's population 
"0 
within a year. 
2.4.1 The Egyptian Period 1948-67 
During the decade 1948-58, the population of the Gaza Strip grew by 
24.43%, with an average annual rate of 2.44%. In 1959 the total 
population decreased by 1.64% as a result of emigration, mainly, from the 
indigenous population, while the refugees increased by 4.0% in the same 
year. Then between 1960 and 1964 there was another rise in the rate of 
increase to 3.36% annually, so that the total population rose to 412,400 
(see Table 2.3 and Fig. 2.6). 
On the other hand, the refugee population went up from 200,000 in 
1948 to 295,000 by 1964, with an annual rate of increase of 2.43%, despite 
the decrease of their numbers to 199,600 persons in 1950. This decrease 
has been attributed to emigration and the Veasles epidemic which caused a 
high death rate of children after the Palestinian flight. At the same 
time, the indigenous population increased by 38.4% during 1948-1964, with 
an annual rate of increase of 2.4%. 
Finally, between 1950 and 1964 the total population of the Gaza Strip 
apparently increased by 38.72%; an annual rate of 2.42%. 
In a nutshell , the above discussion reveals that there was no 
significant difference between the population growth rate of the 
indigenous Gazans and the refugee population in the Gaza Strip. 
2.4.2 The Israeli Occupation Period Followinq the_. War of June 1967 
As a consequence of the 1967 war, the Gaza Strip fell under Israeli 
military occupation, the war having resulted in the termination of the 
Egyptian administration period of the Gaza Strip. Between 10 and 14 
September 1967, the Israeli army held the only census in the Gaza Strip, 
and it reported the population as being about 354,674 inhabitants. But 
according to the Egyptian estimate for 1966 there were 454,900 inhabitants 
(Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967). 
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Table 2.3 : Average Annual Rate of Population Change in the Gaza Strip, 
1948-1984 
End of Indigenous Refugees Refugees Total of % Period (000's) (000, S) % population annual 
(000's) change 
1948 80.0 200.0 71.0 280.0 
1950 88.5 199.6 69.3 288.1 1.43 1951 90.8 204.1 69.2 294.9 2.33 
1952 93.3 206.0 68.8 299.3 1.48 
1953 97.1 209.2 68.3 306.3 2.31 
1954 100.2 212.6 68.0 312.8 2.10 
1955 102.5 216.2 67.8 318.7 1.87 
1956 108.7 227.3 67.5 336.0 5.29 
1957 112.2 233.6 67.5 345.8 2.87 
1958 115.6 241.9 67.7 357.5 3.33 
1959 99.9 251.8 71.6 351.7 -1.64 1960 102.3 258.2 71.6 360.5 2.47 
1961 105.4 264.8 71.5 370.2 2.66 
1962 109.1 273.0 71.5 382.1 3.16 
1963 111.1 284.0 71.5 397.1 3.85 
1964 117.4 295.0 71.5 412.4 3.78 
1965 121.9 306.0 71.5 427.9 3.69 
1966 129.6 325.3 71.5 454.9 6.12 
1967(Sept) - - - 354.7 -24.88 1968 - - - 326.0 -8.44 1969 - - - 332.7 2.03 
1970 - - - 338.2 1.64 
1971 - - - 346.1 2.31 
1972 - - - 354.1 2.29 
1973 - - - 367.9 3.82 
1974 - - - 379.6 3.13 
1975 - - - 390.5 2.83 
1976 - - - 401.6 2.80 1977 - - - 414.3 3.11 
1978 - - - 425.9 2.76 
1979 - - - 437.9 2.78 1980 - - - 449.6 2.64 
1981 - - - 462.0 2.72 
1982 - - - 476.3 3.05 
1983 - - - 493.7 3.59 
1984 - I- 1 
509.9 3.23 
Sources :1- Egyptian period: Abu el-Hajaj, 1966; Baddran, 1981; Issa, 
1979; and Khlousi, 1967. 
2- Israeli period: 
1984a and 1984b. 
Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967; 1983; 
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Note: These figures need some clarification: The figures up to 1966 were 
collected from several sources and have been rounded to the nearest 
hundred. The figures from 1968 until 1978 included the population of 
North Sinai (Al-Arish and Rafah Salient) which was occupied by Israel 
until the first withdrawal from Al-Arish (30,, 000) in 1979 under the Camp 
David Accords. The figures from 1979 to 1981 also include the population 
of Rafah Salient (7000). Israel withdrew from this area in April 1982, 
the second phase of Camp David Accords. 
The total population of North Sinai increased from 33,539 in 1967 to 
37000 in 1978, an annual rate of increase of about 0.89%. Therefore, the 
appropriate deductions, rounded to the nearest hundred have been made to 
arrive at a figure for the Gaza Strip. 
To allow for thosepopulation affected by the second place of the 
withdrawal (1982), similar deductions have been made for the years 
1979-81. 
*** 
The discrepancy of 2, '2% or about 1009000 persons between the Egyptian 
estimate for 1966 and the Israeli census result was attributed by Israeli 
sources to "systematic errors in drawing up the annual estimates; for 
instance, greatly exaggerated figures of natural increase due to defective 
registration of deaths" (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967). The only 
Israeli justification of this lower figure was illogical given the length 
of Egypt's experience of population censuses and estimation, which 
exceeded one century. Therefore, it seems impossible for the error in the 
Egyptian estimate to reach the aforementioned rate, particularly as the 
Gaza Strip was populated by 412,000 inhabitants by 1964 (see Table 2.3). 
If we project forward the population of the Strip using the annual 
increase rate of 3.36% for the period 1960-64, the projected figure of the 
Strip population reaches 426,500 in 1965 and 441,100 by 1966, with the 
hypothesis of stability of births, deaths and migration rates through the 
above-mentioned period. This period has been recommended because it is 
characterised as the best interlude of population constancy in the Gaza 
Strip. The dissimilarity between the 1966 Egyptian estimated figure and 
the calculated one was also 13,800 inhabitants; or in other words, the 
Egyptian figure of 1966 was overestimated by 3.1%. 
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The drop of about 84,800 in Gaza's recorded Population, suggested by 
my calculation estimates and the Israeli census which was conducted by the 
Israeli army in the Autumn of 1967 was attributed to a number of different 
groups: 
(a) at the time of the 1967 war, many people were trapped abroad and not 
included in the 1967 census. They were students, merchants, visitors 
and employees in the Arab oil countries. The 1967 census reported 
that 27,697 persons were trapped outside the Strip (Central Bureau of 
Statistics, 1968); 
(b) the recruits of the Palestinian Liberation Army who were obliged to 
evacuate the Strip to Egypt; 
(c) the civilians and soldiers who were killed in the 1967 war; 
(d) the displacement of the masses towards Jordan during the period from 
the 10th of June to the 10th of September 1967, that is to say before 
the census which was done by the Israeli army, and estimated by Abu 
Lughod (1982) to be around 25,000 persons; 
(e) some of the Gazans remained in the Strip for a while but were not 
included in the Israeli census, because they were afraid of the 
Israeli army and then fled out of the Strip, or clung to the land so 
as to resist the Israeli occupiers; 
(f) the Israeli authorities imposed a curfew on the Strip during which 
several thousand young people were collected and exiled to Egypt; and 
(g) some errors in the Israeli census occurred because the census did not 
cover the overall number of residents -a few weeks later the 
excluded people were added to the census, giving a total population 
of 356,261 (see Table 6.15). 
The geographical differences of population distribution which 
appeared between"the Egyptian estimates and the Israeli census are 
indicated in Table 2.4 and Figure 2.7. The most important point of note 
is the gain in Deir el Balah's population according to the Israeli census. 
This gain may be attributed to the mobility of the neighbouring rural 
residents who left their temporary nomadic shelters and mudbrick huts and 
returned to their homes in the city looking for safety and security. 
On the other hand, all the remaining localities lost different 
proportions of their inhabitants (Table 2.4 and Figure 2.7). Khan Yunis 
lost about 29.4% of its total population. This decrease reflected the 
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population - wide dread of the probability that the Israeli army would 
perpetrate a massacre against the city's inhabitants, as happened in 1956 
when the Israeli army occupied the Strip. At the same time Rafah lost 
24.7% and Gaza lost 22.6%. The lowest decrease can be observed in the 
three refugee camps : between 10% and 13.6%. 
The Israeli figure for the Gaza Strip population declined from 
354,700 inhabitants in 1967 to 326,000 by 1968, as a result of the 
displacement towards Jordan, whereas the total population went up to 
367,900 by 1973 (see Table 2.3). So that the population increased by 
3.65% in the 1967-73 period, equivalent to an annual rate of 0.61%. This 
sharp decline of population growth in the above-mentioned period can be 
attributed to the role of emigration, particularly if we know that the 
average rate of natural increase during 1968-1973 reached about 4_8.3%ý 
Later, this trend was reversed, and the population figures mounted again 
to reach 509,900 in 1984 (Table 2.3) with an annual rate of increase of 
2.13% during 1967-84. 
Table 2.4 The Different Figures of the Gaza Strip Population According to 
the 1967 Israeli Census and Egyptian Estimate for 1966 
Principal Location Egyptian estimate 
(1966) 
Israeli census 
(Sept. 1967) 
% change 
ratio 
Total of the Gaza 454,900 354,700 -22.0 
Strip population 
Gaza 152,776 118,272 -22.6 
Jabalya camp 49,009 43,604 -11.0 
Deir el Balah 15,002 18,118 +20.8 
Bureij camp 14,204 12,786 -10.0 
Nuseirat camp 20,416 17,638 -13.6 
Khan Yunis 75,100 52,997 -29.4 
Rafah 66,181 49,812 -24.7 
Source : Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967. 
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However, between 1968 and 1984, the total population of the Gaza 
Strip grew by 44.73% with an annual growth rate of about 2.79%; in 
contrast to 2.42% during the Egyptian administrative period 1948-67 
(excluding 1948-49 and 1965-66 because accurate data are unavailable). 
2.4.3 The Refugees' Population_Growth 
To analyse the population growth of the Palestinian refugees in the 
Gaza Strip through the Israeli period, we must examine the disparity 
between the UNRWA figures and the Israeli ones. As of the thirtieth of 
June 1978, there were 354,103 Palestinians refugees registered with UNRWA, 
of which 199,050 were living in camps (Table 2-1.5). But according to 
Israeli estimates as of December 1978, the total number of refugees was 
242,900, of whom 151,900 were living in camps (Directorate of Interior of 
Gaza, 1979). 
The first inconsistency between the UNRWA registration figures ankhe 
Israeli ones arises from the question who is a refugee? The Israelis 
apparently consider Palestinians to be refugees if they were born in what 
is now Israel or if the head of their family was born there (Rowley, 
1977). 
On the other hand, UNRWA defines a Palestinian refugee for relief 
purposes, as a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum 
of two years immediately before the outbreak of the conflict in 1948 and 
who, as a result of that conflict, lost both his home and means of 
livelihood. To be eligible for UNRWA assistance, refugees (and 
descendants born after 14 May 1948) must be registered with UNRWA, living 
within an area of UNRWA operations (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, The 
West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip) and in need by the specified definitions 
(UNRWA, 1984 
and Rowley, 1977). 
The second factor contributing to the discrepancy is that the 
UNRWA 
registration figures often include refugees who left the 
Gaza Strip after 
the war of June 1967. UNRWA resources estimate this 
displaced roughly 
38,500 refugees (UNRWA, 1983b). 
However, the only source which gives us specific inforniation about 
the Palestinian refugees is UNRWA. Therefore, we shall depend, 
in the 
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Table 2.5 The Evolution of the Palestinian Refugee Population in the Gaza 
Strip and Its Refugee Camps as Given by UNRWA Registration Data : 30 June 
1968 - 30 June 1985 
End of period Total refugees 
Total refugees 
in camps 
refugees in 
camps 
30 June 1968 313,152 199,774 63.8 
30 June 1969 307,714 195,446 63.5 
30 June 1970 311,814 1983,919 63.8 
30 June 1971 318,103 201,670 63.4 
30 June 1972 324,567 205,734 63.4 
30 June 1973 327,629 199,255 60.8 
30 June 1974 322,133 193,895 60.2 
30 June 1975 329,108 1979549 60.0 
30 June 1976 339,824 2005751 59.1 
30 June 1977 346,007 1975594 57.1 
30 June 1978 354,103 1999050 56.2 
30 June 1979 363,006 201,672 55.6 
30 June 1980 3679995 202,810 55.1 
30 June 1981 370,629 205,445 55.4 
30 June 1982 377,292 208,662 55.3 
30 June 1983 3829549 210,625 55.1 
30 June 1984 410,745 226,937 55.3 
30 June 1985 427,892 236,486 55.3 
Source : UNRWA, 1987 and Table 4.7. 
study of the population growth of refugees, on the figures which are 
published by UNRWA during the Israeli period, because the Israeli 
Department of Statistics did not publish separate statistics for the 
refugees as a whole and camp refugees in particular, but included them 
in 
with all the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip. 
As indicated in Table 2.5, the growth of the refugees has been 
steadily upward from 313,152 refugees in June 1968, to 329,108 in June 
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1975, to 367,995 in June 1980,, and to 427,892 in June 1985. The annual 
growth rate of 0.71% for the period of June 1968 to June 1975 increased to 
2.23% in June 1975-June 1980 and to 3.02% in June 1980-June 1985 (see Fig. 
2.8). This increase can be attributed to the sharp decline of emigration 
which took place after the Israelis occupied the former Egyptian 
administered "Gaza Strip" in 1967. This effect of the 1967 out-migration 
can be clearly seen in the 1968 figure, where the number of refugees 
dropped to 307,714 by June 1969, or decreased by 1.75%. 
Moreover, the proportion of refugees who were living in the camps 
reportedly declined from 63.8% in June 1968 to 55.3% in June 1985 (see 
Table 2.5). On the other hand, according to the Israeli figures for the 
census of 1967, there were 206,212 refugees who comprised 58.1% of the 
total population of the Gaza Strip and 148,564 (41.9%) were living in 
camps. By 1978, the refugee population had not changed as a percentage of 
the total population (58.2%), but the percentage living in camps had 
fallen to 36.4% according to the same sources. 
During the above discussion, it can be observed that there was 
unanimity between the Israeli and UNRWA sources about the decline of the 
proportion of refugees residing in camps. This decline can be summarized 
as due to: 
(a) a displacement from the camps toward Jordan after the 1967 war; 
(b) the Israeli demolition programme of refugees shelters which has been 
carried out under several grounds such as : road widening, collective 
punishment measures, town planning, and resettlement of camp refugees 
in the governmental -sponsored rehousing projects (see Chapter eight); 
and I 
(c) the alternative removal to private houses in nearby villages and 
towns. 
From the above historical analysis of the population growth in the 
Gaza Strip, it may be described as a Strip of refugees. This is not 
surprising, if we know that the Gaza Strip is a concentrate of eight major 
refugee camps stretching along the area. 
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2.5 Components of ýhejqp tj 
.y1L _ýý 
Growth 
Tables 2.3 and 2.6 show that the Gaza Strip increased its population 
at an abnormal rate of growth in 1948, but subsequently the population 
growth in the Strip is attributed mainly to natural increase. Al so, 
migration has greatly affected population growth negatively; for instance, 
Gazan emigration toward Jordan after the war of June 1967. 
2.5.1 Natural Increase 
It is of great value to study natural increase and its participation 
in the population growth of any region. So, as illustrated in Table 2.6, 
we can perceive that the average annual rate of natural increase during 
1950-1964 was 30.0 per thousand. In comparison, the average annual rate 
of population growth was 2.56% during the same period, which indicates 
that out-migration has led to losses of some 4.4 per thousand per annum 
during 1950-64. 
The high natural increase during the Egyptian administrative period 
resulted frow, the high birth rates which became even higher in the Israeli 
occupation period. Table 2.6 shows that during the Egyptian period the 
average CBR was estimated at 40.6 per thousand, while the CDR reached 
10.6 per thousand also. But the main point in this period was the 
variability in the CBR reported from year to year (see Fig. 2.9). For 
instance, the CBR began to decrease in 1954 and reached its lowest figure 
in 1960 despite the unusual rise of 1958; after that the rate began to 
rise again, whereas the CDR continued in its decline yet reached then its 
lowest figure in 1962, when the average of natural increase reached 39.0 
per thousand. 
The decline in CBR during 1954-60 may be attributed to the labour 
force's mobility outside the Gaza Strip towards the oil states, especially 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, after the discovery of oil and its exploitation, 
particularly because the Strip was s-uffering from an enlarged labour 
force 
as the result of the huge concentration of refugees. This mobility 
included 
only the head of the family, thus affecting, indirectly the birth rate. 
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Table 2.6 Gaza Strip: Charges in Birth, Death, Natural Increase Rates 
and Net Migration During the Egyptian Period 1950-64 and the Israeli Period 1968-84 
Year CBR CDR Natural 
Increase 
Net 
Migration 
A) Average rate (1950-64) 40.6 10.6 30.0 
1950 42.2 9.2 33.0 
1951 40.1 12.3 27.8 - 2730 1952 40.6 12.7 27.9 - 3900 1953 41.1 13.7 27.4 - 1300 1954 39.8 10.5 29.3 - 2590 1955 36.0 12.1 23.9 - 1650 J956 37.6 10.3 27.3 + 8350 
1957 35.6 9.5 26.1 + 910 
1958 39.5 9.9 29.6 + 1300 
1959 36.1 9.7 26.4 -15370 1960 34.7 9.8 24.9 - 430 1961 41.3 9.0 32.3 - 2230 1962 48.9 9.0 39.0 - 3000 1963 48.5 10.8 37.7 + 30 
1964 46.7 9.9 36.8 + 130 
B) Average rate (1968-84) 47.2 13.1 34.1 
1968 42.0 19.5 22.5 -30300 1969 46.6 18.9 27.7 - 2710 1970 43.6 18.0 25.6 - 3080 
1971 46.7 16.8 29.9 - 2250 
1972 47.8 15.7 32.1 - 3740 
1973 48.4 16 .2 32.2 + 1590 1974 49.8 14.7 35.1 - 1680. 
1975 49.6 13.8 35.8 - 3270 
1976 49.8 12.5 37.3 - 3930 
1977 48.2 11.5 36.7 - 2710 
1978 48.2 11.2 37.0 - 4390 
1979 46.7 10.4 36.3 - 4720 
1980 47.5 10.0 37.5 - 5020 
1981 47.3 9.1 38.2 - 5220 
1982 45.5 8.5 37.0 - 3100 
1983 45.9 8.4 37.5 - 1000 
1984 48.3 8.0 40.3 - 4800 
Sources : 1. Egyptian Period : Figures for the period 1950-60 are 
calculated from Khlousi, 1967; and those for 1961-64 quoted 
from Issa, 1979. 
2. Israeli Period : Calculated from : Central Bureau of 
Statistics, 1984(a) and 1985. 
Note: Net migration figures for the Egyptian period have beet) calculated 
from vital registration and rounded to the nearest ten. Morover, net 
migration figures during 1968-81 have been modified and rounded to the 
nearest ten, because deductions have been made to exclude the North Sinai 
figures and to arrive at figures for the Gaza Strip only. 
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Another factor which may be considered to have effected the CBR 
during this period is that during the Israeli occupation of October 
1956-March 1957 930 young men were massacred and 215 were reported 
missing, lowering the male married population by 1145 (Palestine 
Liberation Organization, 1983). But in the period 1961-64 the CBR went up 
again to an annual rate of 46.3 per thousand, and the CDR remained 
stationary around its lowest levels (see Table 2.6). 
The broad characteristics of vital registration during the Egyptian 
period were distinguished by the palpable decline in the CDR, where the 
average attained 10.6 per thousand. In fact, the registration of 
mortality in the Gaza Strip was deficient and incomplete, particularly if 
we make a comparison with the average death rate of 13.1 per thousand 
reported during the Israeli period, which was characterized by better 
registration in the field of mortality. 
In the Israeli period, which started after the 1967 war, the Israeli 
Central Bureau of Statistics began to publish data about the population of 
the occupied territories, and, as illustrated in Table 2.6, the average 
rate of natural increase amounted to 34.1 per thousand which is 4.1 per 
thousand higher than the former Egyptian natural increase figure. This 
increase was imputed to the increase in the CBR, to an average of 47.2 per 
thousand whereas the average CDR reached 13.1 per thousand. 
From Table 2.6, we can discern that while the average annual rate of 
natural increase during 1968-84 was 34.1 per thousand, the average 
population growth amounted to 2.79% per annum in the same period; the 
disparity of 6.2 per thousand annually being imputable to the impact of 
out-migration. 
In the period 1968-70, there was a variable CBR which resulted from 
the continuation of emigration from the Strip, but subsequently the CBR 
rose and remained stable (Fig. 2.9). While the CDR is reported as a 
continuous decline, even reaching 8.0 per thousand in 1984 
(Table 2.6). 
However,, the decline of death rates in the Gaza Strip during the 
Israeli period is not a consequence of good medical care, but of 
increasing hygiene awareness, higher education, the increase in the number 
of local doctors, the improvement in housing conditions relative to 
the 
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1950s and 1960s and a modest improvement in the economic situation due to 
the transfer of earnings from Palestinian employees in the oil states to 
their relatives as well from work in Israel. In addition, there was a 
sharp decline in the illiteracy rate (see Chapter Six). On the other 
hand, most of Gaza's residents found that the health service in the 
Israeli period deteriorated from the standards of the former Egyptian 
period. 
As a consequence of the declining mortality rate combined with the 
continuation of the higher fertility rate, the natural increase of the 
Strip has been described as one of the highest rates in the Middle East 
and Muslim countries. In 1977, for instance the following rates of 
natural increase were recorded: Gaza Strip (136.7), Egypt (31.0), Libya 
(34.0), Tunisia (25.0), Mauritania (28.0), Bahrain (29.0), Jordan (36.0), 
Qatar (22.0), Syria (38.0), U. A. E. (23.0), Iran (31.0), Pakistan (30.0), 
Indonesia (17.0) (Clarke, 1985) and the West Bank (32,9) (Central Bureau 
of Statistics, 1984a). 
2.5.2 Migration 
With the exception of the abnormal population growth of the Gaza 
Strip caused by the huge displacement from Palestine after the 1948 war, 
migration had 
(a 
limited effect upon population change during the Egyptian 
peri od. 
Due to the unavailability of specific data about net migration during 
the Egyptian period, the researcher is forced to calculate the net 
migration rate from vital registration data (Table 2.6) and the actual 
figures of the population as given in Table 2.3. This method may be 
criticized because it is affected by the accuracy of the vital 
registration data, but it was the only available method and we must rely 
on it, particularly since we do not have specific information about net 
migration. 
However, Table 2.6 and Figure 2.10 show that the rate of net 
migration during the Egyptian time was unsettled and fluctuating between 
plus 8350 (1956) and minus 15370 (1959). Emigration continued until 1955 
at a very low rate. In fact, refugees with money or skills left the 
Strip, leaving behind the dispossessed villagers who had ne. alternative 
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but to stay. In 1952,2000 labourers and teachers from the Strip were 
allowed to go to Saudi Arabia (Lesch, 1984). In 1956, the Strip gained 
8350 persons which may be due to the return of some migrants, or to errors 
in the estimated population figures. In 1959, however, the area lost a 
large number of its population : 15 370 persons. Actually most of them 
were from the indigenous population (Table 2.3) and they went to the oil 
states for work. After the emigration continued at a very slow rate until 
1962, and in the next two years the area gained 160 persons, which may be 
imputed to marriages to partners from Egypt or to estimation errors. 
When the Israeli army occupied the Gaza Strip in June 1967, the 
Palestinian Arab population of the Strip decreased dramatically through 
increased emigration. Table 2.7 presents various estimates of the scale 
of population displacement out of the Gaza Strip. Despite the disparity 
of the various estimates, we can observe that the Strip lost between 
50,000 and 70,000 persons by the end of 1967. "Most of the displaced 
persons moved eastward toward Amman, although smaller numbers found their 
way into Lebanon, Syria and Egypt" (Abu Lughod, 1973). 
This displacement from the Gaza Strip continued on a large scale 
until July 1968, when the Government of Jordan refused entry to the East 
Bank to people who were leaving the Gaza Strip after the aforementioned 
date (UNRWA, 1972), and according to the Israeli figures, the Gaza Strip 
lost only 30,300 inhabitants during 1968 (Table 2.6). 
Nevertheless, the Gaza Strip has been described as the region with 
the lowest population losses of all the territories occupied by the 
Israeli army (Table 2.8). 
As illustrated in Table 2.8, Harris (1980) has estimated the Gaza 
Strip population in pre-war 1967 at about 400,000, and the proportion of 
losses at about 17.5%. whereas the author calculated that 
the Strip was 
populated by 441,100 persons, which means that the population 
losses 
reached 15.9%. Therefore the differentation was not significant. 
However, Harris attributed the relatively low losses 
from the Gaza 
Strip population as compared with the remainder of the occupied regions, 
to the role of distance constraints: Gaza was furthest 
from any potential 
sanctuary. This justification is illogical, particularly 
if we know that 
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Table 2.7 Various Estimates of the Scale of the Population Displacement 
Out of the Gaza Strip as a Result of the War of June 1967 
Source Scale 
UNRWA 50,000, Thereof: 38,500 
refugees of 1948 war 
Abu Lughod 50,000 
Harris 70,000, loss June-December 
1967 
Central Bureau of Statistics 41,740 * until the end of 1968 
Source : UNRWA, 1972 and 1983b; Abu Lughod, 1973; Harris, 1980; and 
Central Bureau of Statistics, 1984a. 
About 2760 persons have been deducted to arrive at a figure for the 
Gaza Strip only, by excluding the North Sinai figure. 
Table 2.8 West Bank, Golan, Gaza-Sinai: Out-Movements of Arab Residents, 
1967 
Area 
Pre-war 
Population 
(1967 
estimates) 
Estimated Population 
loss June-Dec. 1967 
Loss as a 
proportion 
of pre-war 
population 
Gaza 400,000 70,000 17.5 
Golan 1009000 939,000 93.0 
Sinai 56,017 15,000 26.0 
West Bank Highlands 758,484 175,000 23.0 
West Bank Valley 84,779 75,000 28.0 
Total 1,399,280 428,000 31.0 
Source : Harris, 1980. 
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the Israeli authorities encouraged Gazan people to leave the area for 
Jordan and provided them with bus fares to Amman (Kanovsky, 1970). 
Furthermore, a more plausible explanation lies in the structure of the 
Strip's population, where refugees comprised about 70% . These people had 
suffered from the bitter experience of their first displacement in 1948. 
Therefore, they rejected emigration and preferred to remain in the Strip, 
despite the possibility of being killed or persecuted. The majority of 
those who left the Strip emigrated either to join the heads of their 
families abroad or had no previous experience of being refugees. 
During 1969 and up to 1984, migration continued on a small scale; as 
figure 2.10 outlines net migration has levelled off, fluctuating between a 
net migration of plus 1590 (1973) and minus 5220 (1981). The cumulative 
magnitude of emigration since 1969 has totalled 50,030 persons. 
In other words, the Gaza Strip has lost 80,330 persons during 
1968-1984. This displacement has been caused by a variety of phenomena: 
(a) the mass displacement after the 1967 war under dreadful pressure from 
the Israeli army; 
(b) to join the heads of families in the Arab countries where they were 
working before the outbreak of war; 
(C) emigration under the pressure of educational aims; the Israeli 
authorities provided students as well as all Gazan people with 
permission to leave for just one year, after which they must come 
back to renew their exit permits, but if they cannot do that and 
their permits expire they become migrants. Since the early 1980s 
these permits have become longer (three years); 
(d) emigration to find work opportunities; 
(e) escape from the hardships of living under occupation; and 
M enforced exile from the area,, intended to stamp out population 
resistance to the Israeli occupation. 
Nevertheless, the Israeli authorities allowed a few people who had 
been displaced in 1967 or trapped out the area at the time of war to 
return again to the Strip, under the programme for family reunion and 
hardship cases. According to the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, 158 persons returned to the Strip in 1967,2032 in 1968 and 330 in 
the first three months of 1969 (United Nations, 1969). According to UNRWA 
(1974) "up to June 1973 about 6200 displaced refugees returned from East 
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Jordan to the Gaza Strip. In addition, about 1000 displaced persons 
returned from Egypt". However., in 1984, only 15 persons (Akhbar Ghazza, 
1984) were permitted to return to the Strip under the programme of family 
reunion and hardship cases. From the aforementioned discussion we can 
explain the gain of the Gaza Strip population in 1973 (Fig. 2.10). 
According to Godwin (1982), "the low rates of emigration from the 
Gaza Strip can be attributed to the problems of entrance into other Middle 
Eastern states and overseas countries for Gazans holding "Laissez passer" 
papers". However, although all Gazans have access to Egyptian travel 
documents, it has been difficult for Gazans to travel before and after 
1967. This is because the Arab States have tried to discourage 
Palestinians from leaving their homeland, or they do not want to have 
large Palestinian communities on their soils. Another important factor is 
the role of the social structure of Gaza's people, the majority of whom 
are refugees and villagers who dislike migration. So, the Strip can be 
characterized as a conservative society which abhors migration and does 
not encourage its members to migrate. 
2.6 Summary 
Despite the 1967 population losses from the Gaza Strip, which have 
been estimated at 115,100 persons (between 1966 and 1968) from the 
calculated figure of 1966 recommended by the author, the population of the 
Strip increased by 5.14% per annum between 1948 and 1984. This is a high 
rate of growth which cannot be explained solely by high natural increase 
rates. A large proportion of this growth was caused by the inflow of 
Palestinian refugees into the Strip in 1948, aggravating the 
socio-economic, situation of the indigenous population who were totally 
unready for, and unfit to cope with, this mass influx of refugees. 
The analysis shows that from 1949 onward the population growth of 
the 
Gaza Strip was almost entirely due to the forces of natural 
increase, 
while migration only contributed with a negative role. 
However, 
emigration before 1967 was the direct consequence of the 
imbalance between 
labour supply and economic development, and of the huge increase of 
population as a result of the immigration from occupied 
Palestine which 
occurred after the 1948 catastrophe. But emigration from the 
Strip after 
the 1967 war predominantly due to the Israeli policy of pressuring people 
to leave the occupied territories. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Population Distribution arid Hich Density 
It is the purpose of this chapter to provide a factual description of 
population distribution and density in the Gaza Strip. The object is to 
accommodate a basis and an introduction for the analysis of those 
causative factors which have brought about the detailed distribution and 
variation in density. 
3.1 Evolution of Population DistriýuýjjcLnL, 
-1945-82 
Before we start our discussion about the evolution of population 
distribution, it will be useful to provide a brief idea about the 
important factors which have had an impact on population distribution in 
the past and present. The climate and soil formerly had a very 
significant influence on the population distribution of the Strip, but 
later political factors were to become more powerful. 
Climatologically, the Gaza Strip can be described as one of short 
wam, rainy, winters - when the coldest period of the year is 
January-February (12-14'C) and the annual average rate of rainfall is 300 
mm (Meteorological section of Gaza, 1984) - and long, moderately-hct, dry 
summers, when the hottest month is August and the average of temperature 
reaches 26'C. Although the Strip has a limited area (364 sq. kms), 
rainfall is unevenly distributed: while the annual average remains below 
LOO nv-; at Rafah in the southern zone, the area located north of Gaza town 
received roughly 370 mm per annum (Fig. 3.1). 
Soils can be characterized as sandy in the west (along the coast), 
alluvial in the east and sandy alluvial in the south. As a result of this 
soil distribution, the northern and central zones are more fertile than 
the southern zone (Fig. 3.1). Moreover, sandstone ridges can be observed 
hidden beneath the fertile soil in the eastern section of the Gaza Strip. 
Owing to the aforementioned geographical conditionss the population 
has tended to concentrate in the agricultural lands in the northern zoneý 
which was inhabited by 65.5% of the total population of Gaza area in 1945 
(Table 3.1 and Fig. 3.2) which later formed the Gaza Strip. In contrast, 
in the semi arid central and southern zones most of the Strip's local 
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residents depended for their livelihood on working in the surrounding 
countryside of Palestine before 1948. After the Palestine disaster, the 
Gaza Strip received a huge influx of refugees who were distributed 
throughout the area. This displacement led to an increase in the amount 
of cultivated land by using the surplus labour force in the reclamation of 
the Strip's less fertile lands. 
The effects of climate and soil on population concentration 
diminished after the war of 1948, when political factors began to assume 
the most important role in the distribution of population. The Gaza Strip 
population increased by 168.63% between 1945 and 1967 (Table 3.1). This 
abnormal increase has been attributed to the Palestinian displacement from 
occupied Palestine into the Strip in 1948 (see Chapter Two). 
At the zonal level , the central and the southern zones populations 
increased during 1945-67 at very high rates of 315% and 179.73% 
respectively, while the northern zone increased by a lower rate of 139.2%. 
This abnormal increase resulted in the overpopulation of the Strip's 
localities. For instance, Jubalya and Nazla villages together increased 
from 4850 persons in 1945 to 43,314 in 1967 (218.95%), Rafah increased 
from 2220 to 51,480 (314.37%) and Deir el Balah increased by 195.69%. At 
the same time, the Palestinian influx resulted in the appearance of new 
localities like Bureij, Mughazi and Nuseirat refugee camps in the central 
zone, while other refugees camps were joined to existing localities (Fig. 
3.2 and Fig. 4.1). 
In addition, the Palestinian displacement had a strong effect in 
changing the proportions of population distribution by zones, and 
localities. The population percentage in the northern zone declined from 
65.5% in 1945 to 48.8% in 1967, while the central zone share increased 
substantially from 3.9% to 17.0% and the southern zone increased slightly 
from 30.6% to 34.2% (see Table 3.1). On the other hand, the proportion of 
the population living in Gaza city went down from 52.7% in 1945 to 
33.6% 
in 1967, and Khan Yunis city's share decreased by 1.9% during the same 
period. 
Between 1967 and 1982, the evolution of population distribution did 
not change much relative to the former period 1948-67, but was affected 
by 
two main factors: Firstly, emigration to Jordan, which started directly 
-54- 
Table 3.1 Evolution of Population Distribution in the Gaza Strip, 
by Locality, 1945-1982 
1945 Census of 1967* 
__ 
1982 
F___7 
Zones % of % of % inc- % of % inc- 
and Nos. total Nos. total crease Nos total rease Localities POP. POP- 1945-67 . pop. 1967-82 
Northern 42,530 65.5 171,100 48.8 139.20 250,567 52 6 38 15 Zone . - 
Gaza city 34,250 52.7 117,913 33.6 123.63 180,416 37.9 42.53 
and its camp I 
Beit Ranum 1,730 2.7 4,756 1.4 101.13 9,067 1.9 64.52 
Beit Lahiya 1,700 2.6 5,117 1.5 110-19 11,172 2.3 78.08 
JabalYa 3,520 5.4 
43,314 12.3 218.95 49.912 10.5 14.18 
Nazla 1,330 2.0 
Central 2,560 3.9 59,748 17.0 315.00 72,246 15.2 18-99 
zone 
Deir el Balah 2,560 4.0 18,118 5.2 195.69 25,078 5.3 32.51 
and its 
camp 
Nuseirat - - 20,221 5.7 - 22,434 4.7 10.39 
; Bureij - - 12,626 3.6 - 13,045 2.7 3.26 
iMughazi - - 8,783 2.5 - 9,231 1.9 4.97 
Zawaida - - - - - 2,458 0.5 - 
Southern 19,880 30.6 119,943 34.2 179.73 153,487 32.2 24.66 
zone 
Khan Yunis 11,220 17.3 52,789 15.0 154.86 73,630 15.5 33.27 
city and 
its camp 
Rafah city 2,220 3.4 51,480 14.7 314.37 58,819 12.3 13.33 
and its 
camp 
Bani 3,220 5.0 7,561 2.2 85.36 8,854 1.8 15.79 
Suheila 
Abasan 3,730 1.1 6,034 1.3 48-10 
el Kabira 2,230 3.4 84.88 
Abasan 1,481 0.4 3,301 0.7 80-15 
el Saghira 
Ikhza'a 990 1.5 1,534 0.5 43.79 2,849 0.6 61-91 
Bayuk - - 1 368 0.3 - - - 
jotal 64,970 100.0 : 350,791 100 .0 ; 
476,30 168-63 ý 100.0 
, 
30.59 
Source: Calculated from : Hadawi, 1970; Central Bureau of Statistics. 196/; 
and Directorate of Interior of Gaza, 1983. 
* c*-, Iiiriinn those livinq as nomads and in outside localities. 
-55- 
co 
all 
0 
z 
LLJ 
Ln 
. ........... .. 
............... 
%% 
Z-4---+- >- 
Lf) 
lir 
cr% 
a- 
ck: 
N 
4: 
(2 
LL) 
a: 
F- 
z 
z 
a- 
cy- 
z 
z 
LU 
-i 9 
LU 
r 
LL 
0 
Z 
0 
Co 
V) 
5 
r. 4 
LL 
-56- 
after the Israeli occupation of the Strip in 1967. Secondly, the 
Israeli -sponsored rehousing projects for Gazan refugees which were 
established near the Strip's cities and villages (see Fig. 4.1 and part 
three for details). 
As a result of these factors, some localities increased at very low 
rates between 1967 and 1982: Bureii 3.26%, Mughazi 4.97%, Nuseirat 10.39% 
(all aforesaid localities are refugee camps) and Rafah city and its camp 
by 13.33% (see Table 3.1 and Fig. 3.3). However Beit Lahiya increased by 
64.52% during the same time, following the establishment of one of the 
refugee dwelling projects in this village (Fig. 4.1) to which some of 
Jahalya's refugees were moved. 
In contrast, the zonal distribution of population appeared to show an 
increase in the proportion of the inhabitants of the northern zone, from 
48.8% of the total population in 1967 to 52.6% in 1982, while the other 
two zones decreased their share of the population (Table 3.1). This means 
that the population of the Gaza Strip is tending to settle in the northern 
zone, particularly in the main city of the Gaza Strip (Gaza) which was 
inhabited by 33.6% of the total population in 1967 and by 37.9% in 1982. 
3.2 Population Distribution, 1978-82 
Despite the fact that the Gaza Strip comprises a total of 364 sq. kMs 
inhabited by 509,900 persons in 1984, the permitted residential area for 
its Palestinian inhabitants which lies under the authority of the 
municipalities and local villages is only 138.6 sq. 
kms or some 38.1% of 
the total area (Fig. 3.4 and Table 3.2). 
However, the remaining 61.9% is largely uninhabited, and can 
be 
classified into two groups: 
Firstly, about 120 sq. km are directly controlled 
by the Israeli military 
authorities and Israeli colonists, and have been used 
for Israeli colonial 
purposes; and 
Secondly, the remainder is administered by the Israeli 
Directorate of 
Interior, although all of this part 'is owned by the 
Gazan people. 
The salient phenomenon in the pattern of population 
distribution in 
the Strip is the heavy pressure upon the municipalities and 
local village 
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Table 3.2 Changing Population Distribution of the Gaza Strip, 1978-1982 
Area 1978** 1982 % Zones sq. km 
and % of Dens i ty - - % of Density pop. 
ýocalities Nos. total per sq. Nos. total per sq. change 
pop. km. POP. km. 
Northern 66.25 211,90 50.7 3198 250,567 52.6 3782 16.76 
zone 
1 
, aza city 36.0 148,80 35.6 4181 180,416 37.9 5012 19.27 
and its camp 
3eit Hanun 12.0 6,400 1.5 533 9,067 1.9 756 34.83 
Beit LahiYa 7.25 7,100 1.7 979 11,172 2.3 1541 45-33 
Jabalya-Nazla 11.00 49,600 11.9 4509 49,912 10.5 4537 0.63 
and Jabalya 
camp 
Central 24.5 62,600 15.0 2555 72.246 15.2 2949 14-33 
zone 
Deir el Balah 12.05 21,700 5.2 1800 25,078 5.3 2081 14.48 
and its camp 
Nuseirat 1.00 19,400 4.6 19400 22,434 4.7 22434 14.53 
Bureij 1.65 12,300 2.9 7454 13,045 2.7 7900 5.88 
Mughazi 2.35 9,200 2.2 3915 9,231 1.9 3928 0.34 
Zawaida 7.45 - - - 2,458 0.5 330 - 
Southern 47.85 143,200 34.3 2993 153,487 32.2 3206 6.94 
zone 
Khan Yunis 16.45 66.400 15.9 4036 73,630 15.5 4476 10.33 
city and 
its camp 
Rafah city 15.2* 58,400 14.0 3842 58,819 12.3 3870 0.71 
and its 
camp 
Bani 6.55 9,800 2.3 1496 8,854 1.8 1352 -10.15 
Suheila 
Abasan 4.2 4,800 1.2 1143 6,034 1.3 1337 22.88 
el Kabira 
Abasan 1.25 1,900 6.5 1520 3.301 0.7 2641 55.24 
el Saghira 
Ikhza'a 4.2 1,900 0.5 452 2,849 0.6 678 40.51 
Gaza Strip 138.6 417,700 100.0 3014 476,300 100.0 3437 13.13 
Source : Directorate of Interior of Gaza 1979,1980 and 1983 
The area of Rafah municipality decreased from 19-75 to 15.2 sq. 
km as a 
result of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in 1982. 
Excluding those living outside the administrative areas of the 
municipality and village councils. 
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administration areas. This pressure can be attributed to the rapid 
population growth and in addition to Israeli restrictions against the 
Palestinian residents, whereby the Israelis prevent the Gazans from 
constructing any housing outside the municipality and village boundaries. 
From the above facts, we can understand the extensive urban sprawl 
around the municipalities which can be observed most distinctly in the 
Gaza-Beit Lahiya sector : here the urban and rural localities coalesce and 
nearly comprise one urban centre (see Fig. 3.2). In the near future, the 
same thing will happen to Deir el Balah-Nuseirat sector, and to Khan Yunis 
and its surrounding villages. 
Figure 3.5 and Table 3.2 show that the Gaza Strip localities recorded 
different rates of population growth compared with the Strip average 
annual rate of 3.28% reported between 1978 and 1982. These localities can 
be classified according to their population growth into five groups: 
I. A Very High Annual Population Growth (12%+) 
In Abasan el Saghira village, the population increased by an annual 
rate of 13.81%. Some of this increase may have been caused by population 
mobility from the adjac, ent villages. 
2. High Annual Population Growth (6-11.99%) 
This group included Beit Lahiya (11.33%), Ikhza'a (10.13%) and Beit 
Hanun (8-71%), all of which are villages located at a distance from the 
main urban centres (see Fig. 4.1), so that they have low 
land prices which 
encourage the residents to buy small plots of land to set up 
their own 
dwel 1i ngs. 
3. Moderate Annual Growth (4-5.99%) 
This group comprises Abasan el Kabira village which 
increased by 
5.72% and Gaza town and its refugee camp which went up 
by 4.82%. 
Population increase here was caused by mobility towards Gaza town 
from the 
Strip's localities while in Abasan el Kabira the mobility was 
from the 
surrounding areas. 
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4. Low Annual Growth (0-3.99%) 
Nuseirat camp which increased by 3.63%, Deir el Balah and its refugee 
camp (3.62%). Khan Yunis city and its refugee camp (2.58%), Bureij camp 
(1.47%), Rafah city and its refugee camp (0-18%), Jabalya-Nazla and 
JabalYa camp (0.16%), and Mughazi camp (0.08%) fall into this group. 
Population growth in this group is strongly affected by rsovenient of its 
population within the Strip's localities, particularly to the 
Israel i -sponsored rehousing projects for refugees, and toward Gaza City as 
well . This group includes six refugee camps from a total of eight in the 
Gaza Strip (see Fig. 4.1). Moreover, Rafah city lost a small proportion 
of its population, and 4.55 sq. kms (23%) of its municipal administrative 
area (Municipality of Rafah, 1985), as a consequence of Israeli withdrawal 
from the Egyptian Sinai in April 1982. 
Decline (Zero to minus 3% per annum) 
The only locality which recorded a decline in population was Bani 
Suheila village (minus 2.54%), caused by mobility towards the neighbouring 
villages and towns, particularly Abasan el Saghira and Khan Yunis, or by 
out-migration. 
In summary eight localities experienced higher annual rates of 
population growth than the Strip average of 3.28%, while six localities 
experienced lower rates. 
Figure 3.6 reveals that 40% of the 1982 population were living upon 
22% of the inhabited area, 60% upon 39%, 80% upon 56%, and 90% upon 70% of 
the total inhabited area - not a markedly uneven distribution, as the 
Lorenz curve of population distribution demonstrates in Figure 3.6 and 
Appendix 1). 
Moreover, the zonal population distribution is also very even in the 
Gaza Strip. In 1982 about 52.6% of the total population was living 
in the 
northern zone which comprises 47.8% of the inhabited area, while 
the 
southern zone comprises 34.5% of the total area and was populated 
by 
32.2%. The two zones together constitute 84.8% of the inhabited area and 
they contained 82.3% of the total population (see Table 3.3). 
Similarly, 
the central zone was populated by 15.2% upon 17.7% of the inhabited area. 
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Consequently, the zonal distribution of the Strip's population is more 
even than the distribution by localities (see Fig. 3.7 and Appendix 1). 
The outstanding feature of population distribution in the Gaza Strip 
is that the inhabitants of Gaza city including Beach camp, numbering 
180,416 in 1982, amount to about 37.9% of the total population while the 
two main cities (Gaza and Khan Yunis and their refugee camps) comprise 
approximately 53.3%. This fact clarifies the disparity between the 
population distribution by localities, as illustrated in the Lorenz curve, 
and the zonal distribution as demonstrated in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.7. 
Moreover, the Gaza Strip population can be classified according to 
population groups into indigenous and refugee populations, of which the 
refugees make up an absolute majority. The 1967 census (Central Bureau of 
Statistics, 1967) reported their numbers at some 206,212 refugees - 
according to the Israeli definition - or 58.1% of the total population, 
while that proportion rose to constitute about 60.4% by the end of 1978 
(Table 3.4). The aforesaid increase is due to the higher percentage of 
refugees to the total population, and probably to the higher birth rate of 
the refugees compared with the indigenous Palestinian of Gaza. 
According to the 1967 census, the zonal distribution of population 
emphasized the prevalence of refugees in the central and the southern 
zones, where they comprised 76.6% and 60.6% respectively of those zones 
total populations. At the same time, the proportions of refugees and 
indigenous population in the northern zone are approximately equivalent. 
Significantly, Table 3.4 shows that the percentage of the refugees 
increased in all the zones of the Gaza Strip by 1978. 
Moreover, it can be noted that 41.6% of the total refugees were 
concentrated in the northern zone in 1967; this percentage rose to 42.9% 
in 1978. While in 1967 the proportion of the indigenous population who 
were resident in the northern zone was 58.2% and this rose to 62.7% 
in 
1978. 
This concentration of the indigenous Gazans in the northern zone 
is 
strongly connected to the historical factors of their settlements, 
particularly before the Palestine disaster of 1948. 
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Table 3.3 Gaza Strip : Population Distribution and Density by 
Geographical Zones, 1982 
Total Area Zone population % pop. (sq. km) % area Density 
Northern 250,567 52.6 66.25 47.8 3782 
Central 72,246 15.2 24.50 17.7 2949 
Southern 153,487 32.2 47.85 34.5 3206 
Gaza Strip 476,300 100.0 138.6 100.0 3437 
Source : Calculated from Table 3.2. 
Table 3.4 Population Distribution in the Gaza Strip, by Population 
Groups and Geographical Zones, 1967-1978 
Census of 1967 Estimates 1978 
Zone 
Refu- Indig- Total % Refu- Refu- Indig- Total % Refu- 
gees enous gees gees enous gees 
Northern 85,689 86,372 172,061 49.8 108,300 103,600 211 900 51.1 
Central 47,284 14,425 61,709 76.6 51,200 11,400 62,600 81.8 
Southern 73,239 47,665 120,904 60.6 92,900 50,300 143,200 64.9 
Gaza Strip 206,212 148,462 354,674 58.1 252,400 165,300 417,700 60.4 
Source : Calculated from: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967; and 
Directorate of Interior of Gaza 1979. 
The figures of the refugee population and proportions are according to 
the Israeli definition of refugees. 
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As demonstrated in Figure 3.8, the proportions of refugees were different in the various localities of the Strip. They constituted the 
greatest majority in the camps, but were in much more varied proportions in the remaining localities. For instance, in Beit Lahiya village, the 
refugees comprised about 18% of the population in 1978, while in Rafah 
city their percentage reached 70%. Another important point which we can 
perceive from Figure 3.8 is the differential rate of change in locality 
size and proportion of refugees. Whereas most of the cities and villages 
reported a rapid increase in their size during the period of 1967-78, the 
refugee camps recorded either a negative growth rate, especially Rafah, 
Beach, and Deir el Balah camps, or a very slow growth rate. The cause of 
this sharp decline and decrease is attributed to the Israeli policy 
imposed against the refugee camps (see chapter 8). 
The Gaza Strip is characterized by creed as an Islamic region, where 
out of 354,674 persons registered in the 1967 census, 352,532 or 99.4% 
were Muslims, while only 2,305 were Christians and 1,424 either belonged 
to other religious, avowed no religion or did not give a clear answer. 
The majority of the Christians are concentrated in Gaza city, numbering 
1,649: 71.5% of the, total Gaza Strip Christian community (Central Bureau 
of Statistics, 1967). 
3.3 A Very High_EoLulation De! jsiýy 
The concept of density has been a target of criticism by several 
scholars because it reflects a superficial representation of the real 
pressure of population upon the resource base. As Trewartha (1970) 
indicates, this simple ratio is unsatisfactory because it expresses a 
quantitative relationship between two elements which in themselves are 
highly inconstant. The numerator, or total population, represents men of 
greatly contrasting cultures and stages of economic development, whose 
demands upon the physical earth stand in great contrast. The denominator 
of the ratioý expressing units of area, fails to take into consideration 
the variable capacities of different environments for supporting human 
life and satisfying human wants. 
Consequently, most researchers recommend the use of the physiological 
density rate, which has been calculated by dividing the total population 
by the arable area. Thus all land not capable for cultivation is 
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eliminated from the denominator. This leads to a great difference between 
the general and physiological densities. The difference between the two 
formulae is extremely important, particularly in the cases of countries 
characterized by substantial dissimilarities in their physiographic 
structures. Most of the world's countries, including the Arab countries, 
are distinguished by a distinctive concentration of their population in 
certain areas, while the remaining areas are unsettled. 
In the case of the Gaza Strip, the difference between the two 
previous formulae does not indicate an essential difference as found in 
the other Arab countries. This can be attributed to the limited area of 
the Strip (364 sq. kms) and to the ncr-existence of physiographic 
structural disparity: the Gaza Strip is a flat plain area, with its 
highest point Tal el Montar located east of Gaza city only 85 metres above 
sea level (Municipality of Gaza, 1972). 
According to the Israeli census of September 1967, the general 
density of population in the Strip was 977 persons per sq. km; if only 
cultivated land is taken into consideration, the density was 1,328 per sq. 
km. 
The general population density rose rapidly so that by 1982 it 
reached 1,312 per sq. km, while the physiological density was 21,268 per 
sq. km, or three persons per 1.3 dunum. The physiological density 
doubled 
between 1967-82, despite the out-migration which happened after the 
Israeli occupation of the Strip in 1967. This increase was attributed 
to 
rapid population growth, and on the other hand, to the 
decrease in the 
area of the cultivated land from 267 sq. kms in 
1967 to 210 sq. kms in 
1982. However, the density of inhabitable land reached 3,437 persons per 
sq. km in 1982 and 3,612 in July 1984. 
So, all of the Strip localities recorded an increase 
in density 
during the period of 1967-82 (see Figures 3.9 and 3.10). 
With such high densities, the Strip can be characterized as one of 
the most populous small areas in the world. 
In 1982, the population density in the administrative areas of 
municipalities and village councils ranged from 2,949 persons per sq. 
km 
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in the central zone to 3,782 in the northern zone, which recorded a higher density than the average Strip density (see Table 3.3). 
The population density in each locality is set out in Table 3.2, from 
which various conclusions can be drawn. Consequently, we can categorize 
the Strip's localities according to their 1982 densities into the 
following four groups: 
Firstly, the very high density group, with 6,000 inhabitants and over 
per sq. krii includirg Nuseirat and Bureij, where the density reaches 22,434 
and 7,900 inhabitants per sq. km respectively. Both localities are 
refugee camps. 
Secondly, the high density group includes five localities of 
above-average density ranging between 3,000 and 5,999 inhabitants per sq. 
km : the three main cities in the Strip - Gaza (5,012 persons per sq. km), 
Khan Yunis (4,476) and Rafah (3,870) - and Jabalya-Naz1a and Mughazi with 
densities of 4,537 and 3,928 per sq. km respectively. The higher 
densities in this group also result from the concentration of the major 
refugee camps. 
Thirdly, the moderate density group, with densities ranging between 
1,000 and 2,999 inhabitants per sq. km includes Deir el Balah city (2,081) 
and four villages, Abasan el Saghira (2,641), Beit Lahiya (1,541), Abasan 
el Kabira (1,337), and Bani Suheila with (1,352) persons. 
Fourthly, the low density group, with densities less than 1 000 
persons per sq. km comprises localities found in all three zones of the 
Strip, represented by Beit Hanun in the northern zone (756 persons per sq. 
km), Ikhza'a in the southern zone (678) and Zawaida in the central zone 
(330), all distant from the main urban centres in the Strip (Gaza, Khan 
Yunis and Rafah) while the low density in the third village is also due to 
its new creation in 1978. 
The population density in the refugee camps reflects the overcrowding 
of its residents. According to the UNRWA figures at 30 June 1985, there 
were 236,486 refugees living in the eight refugee camps in the Strip 
(UNRWA, 1985), the average density of which was 14,799 persons per sq. kni, 
the lowest density being in Mughazi refugee camp (8,541 per sq. km) and 
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Table 3.5 : The Population Density of the Gaza Strip Refugee Camps, 
30 June 1985 
Camp 
Area in Dunums 
when established 
by UNRWA 
Present area 
in dunums 
1985* 
Pop. as at 
30 June 
1985 living 
in camps 
Density per 
sq. km 
Jabalya 1448 4000 51 225 12 806 
Beach 747 2000 40 359 20 180 
Bureij 478 1000 16 057 16 057 
Nuseirat 588.7 1000 26 400 26 400 
Mughazi 547.7 1230 10 506 8 541 
Deir el Balah 131.6 750 9 854 13 139 
Khan Yunis 564.0 3000 33 269 11 090 
Rafah 1364 3000 48 816 16 272 
Total 5869 15980 236 486 14 799 
Source : UNRWA, 1983 and 1985. 
* The present area of the camps were given by the village councils and 
municipalities. 
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the highest in the Nuseirat refugee camp (26,400) (see Table 3.5). So th e density of population in the refugee camp is higher than any other locality in the Strip. 
Another way of expressing the density of population is by a "density discrepancy index" (Abd El-Aal, 1977), this index being the ratio between 
the size of locality as a percentage of the total inhabited area and the 
proportion of the population it holds. A density discrepancy index was 
calculated for each locality (Table 3.6) and results vary considerably. 
Nuseirat camp for example was found to have a discrepancy index of 6.7 
(0.7% of the inhabited area with 4.7% of the total population in 1982). 
By contrast, Beit Hanun and Zawaida, the two largest villages, afforded 
indices of 0.22 and 0.09 respectively. (Beit Hanun with 8.6% of the 
inhabited area by only 1.9% of the total population; analogous figures for 
Zawaida were 5.4% and 0.5%). Other localities characterizee by a high 
density discrepancy index were, in descending order, Bureij, Gaza city and 
its camp, Jabalya-Nazla and its camp, Khan Yunis and its camp, Rafah city 
and Rafah camp and Mughazi (see Table 3.6). 
3.4 Summary 
From the previous discussion about population distribution and 
density, we can observe the following points: Firstly, the Gaza Strip is 
characterized as a region having a relatively even population 
distribution, particularly at a zonal level of analysis. Secondly, the 
influx of refugees to the Strip after the Palestine disaster led to the 
emergence of new settlements and expansion of all localities. Thirdly, 
the heavy pressure of population upon the municipal administrative areas 
has led to intermingling of urban and rural centres. Fouýcthly, the 
continuity of the population envelope, which stretches to every place, 
with gaps only due to the existence of Israeli colonies and agricultural 
lands. And finally, the Gaza Strip is distinguished by a very high 
population density, with disparities between the localities, being very 
high in the urban centres and refugee camps and much lower in the 
villages. 
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Table 3.6 Density Disc repancy Index of the Gaza Strip Loc alities, 1982 
Local i ty of inhabited % of total 1982 Density discrepancy 
area population index (1) (2) (2 
/1) 
Nuseirat 0.7 4.7 6.70 
Bureij 1.2 2.7 2.25 
Gaza city and 
Beach Camp 26.0 37.9 1.46 
Jabalya-Nazla and 
Jabalya Camp 7.9 10.5 1.33 
Khan Yunis city and 
Khan Yunis Camp 11.9 15.5 1.30 
Mughazi 1.7 1.9 1.12 
Rafah city and 
Rafah camp 10.9 12.3 1.13 
Abasan el Saghira 0.9 0.7 0.77 
Deir el Balah city and 
Deir el Balah Camp 8.7 5.3 0.61 
Beit Lahiya 5.2 2.3 0.44 
Abasan el Kabira 3.0 1.3 
0.43 
Bani Suheila 4.7 1.9 0.40 
Beit. Hanun 8.6 1.9 0.22 
Ikhza'a 3.0 0.6 
0.20 
Zawaida 5.4 0.5 
0.09 
Source : Calculated from Table 3.2. 
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ýHAPTER FOUR 
Patterns Of LýtLlemept 
This chapter aims to look over the evolution of patterns of 
settlement in the Gaza Strip, to examine whether new types of settlements have occurred, and why. 
In July 1984, the total Arab population of the Gaza Strip was 500,600 
inhabitants (Akhbar Ghazza, 1984), distributed amongst 23 main 
settlements, 4 of which were towns, 11 villages and 8 refugee camps. In 
addition, there were some population localities not defined by municipal 
boundaries. A few of these localities have officially created local 
committees, which will be treated as villages; for instance, Khirbat el 
Adas and Musabah which are located around Rafah town. 
The population of the Gaza Strip is concentrated in and around a 
series of 4 main towns, which form an almost straight line from north-east 
to south-west; Gaza in the northern zone, Deir el Balah in the central 
zone, and Khan Yunis and Rafah in the southern zone (Fig. 4.1). This 
longitudinal concentration of the Palestinian settlement clusters may be 
incorrectly attributed to the rectangular shape of the Strip; it existed 
before the creation of the Strip in 1948. "The longitudinal distribution 
was influenced by the passing of an ancient military highway through the 
Strip. Without doubt, the aforementioned historical highway was one of 
the most deep-rooted highways in the world. Pharoah Thutmoses III 
(1479-1436 BC) followed this highway with his army and recorded it upon 
the Amoun Temple in the ancient Egyptian city of Al Karnak. The ancient 
Egyptians called it the Houras highway" (Dahlan, 1981). In addition, 
Thutmoses III subjugated Gaza's Philistine king and used Gaza as his base 
of operations against Syria. Gaza became a tributary land to Assyria in 
735 BC (UNRWA, 1972). Further, in the Arab era, caravans passed through 
the Gaza region towards Syria and Egypt from Arabia. 
The continuation of settlement in the Strip can be determined by 
present day town and village names which are still close to their 
historical names, although phonetic changes have taken place. For 
instance, Rafah town was called Raffia by the Greeks and Rafah by the 
Arab s. "Gaza was a canaan city and one of the oldest cities in the world 
at 4000 years old" (ANERA, 1984), while Khan Yunis was built in 1387 AD 
by 
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Prince Yunis el Noruzi (one of the Egyptian Mamluk slave dynasty 1250-1517 
AD) who built a caravanserai (a Khan or inn) which still stands despite 
the weathering of war and history (at the present there is just one wall). 
In addition, there are some localities whose names date back to the Arab 
era such as Bani Suheila, Abasan and Ikhza'a villages. 
Like the people of many Arab countries, the people of Gaza Strip can 
be categorized into: (a) nomads, (b) village residents, (c) urban 
settlers, and (d) residents of refugee camps. The emergence of the 
refugee camps was a direct result of the massive population displacement 
from occupied Palestine in 1948. Also, as a result of the Israeli 
occupation of the Gaza Strip in 1967, a new pattern of settlements made 
its appearance, which may be called Israeli colonies (Fig. 4.1). 
4.1 Nomads 
As reported in the census of September 19671, there were 1105 persons 
classified as nomads, who comprised about 0.3% of the total population of 
the Strip. This mode of settlement has nearly disappeared now, but no 
precise data are available. The census of 1967 also reported that there 
were 1778 persons (0.5% of the total population) living dispersed in small 
groups outside settlements with the characteristics of a locality (Central 
Bureau of Statistics, 1967). They were distributed throughout the whole 
Gaza Strip area. 
4.2 Rural Settlements 
According to the 1945 village statistics, there were only 9 villages 
in the area which later formed the Gaza Strip. The location of these 
villages can be characterized by: 
(a) The concentration around both sides of the main road or railway 
connecting Palestine and Egypt; 
(b) The cluster around two towns, Gaza in the north, and Khan Yunis 
in 
the south; and 
(c) The clumping in and around the fertile lands and water supplies, 
which can be distinctly seen near Khan Yunis, with villages all 
located to the east of the town, while the western area has been left 
unsettled because of the presence of sand dunes. 
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The Gaza area was populated by 64,970 persons in 1945, of which 30% 
lived in the villages while 70% were concentrated in the two existing 
towns; Gaza with 34,250 persons, and Khan Yunis with 11,220. The nine 
villages can be categorized according to their population size into two 
main groups: 
(a) villages with populations over 2000 inhabitants, including Jabalya, 
Bani Suheila, Deir el Balah, Abasan and Rafah; and 
(b) villages with population less than 2000 persons, including Beit 
Hanun, Beit Lahiya, Nazla and Ikhza'a (Table 4.1). 
As a result of the displacement from Palestine 1948, all Gaza's 
villages expanded and their populations rapidly increased. The Israeli 
census of 1967 classified Gaza's villages according to population size 
into two main groups (see Table 4.2): 
(a) one large village with more than 5000 inhabitants: Bani Suheila; and 
(b thirteen small villages which were inhabited by less than 5000 
inhabitants (Fig. 4.2). Consequently, the researcher has combined 
Jabalya and Nazla villages (excluding Jabalya refugee camp, but if we 
add the camp to the village it will become an urban settlement) to 
group (a), because it is administered by a village council up until 
the present (The Israeli definition of the concept of village is :a 
rural locality in which production, consumption, purchases and sales 
are generally on a private basis). 
Despite the out-migration from the Strip after the 1967 war, all the 
Gaza Strip's village populations have been increasing, though by different 
rates and principally by natural increase (except for Bani Suheila which 
recorded a negative growth, the causes of which were discussed 
in Chapter 
Two) . By 1978 there were 
four large villages populated by more than 5000 
inhabitants and this figure rose to five by July 1984 
(Table 4.1). In 
addition, during the Israeli period, there were some changes 
in the status 
of rural settlements, which led to the creation of new villages 
like 
Dahyna in 1977, Zawaida 1978 and Qarara 1984, which were established 
by 
the ordinance of the Israeli General Commander of Gaza. 
Moreover, some 
small villages merged together and were governed by one village council, 
like Saifa and Atatra which joined Beit Lahiya (see Figs. 4.2 and 4.3), 
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Table 4.1 The Growth of Rural Settlements in the Gaza Strip, 1945-July 
1984 
Number of Population 
Rural Settlements 1945 Sept. 1967 1978 July 1984 
Beit Hanun 1,730 4,756 69400 99500 
Beit Lahiya 1,700 5sll7* 79100 11,700 
Jabalya (excl. Jabalya camp) 3,520 
105508 131,800 15,200 
Nazla 19330 
Zawaida - - - 2,600 
Deir el Balah 29560 - - - 
Bani Suheila 39220 7,561 95800 99200 
Abasan el Kabira 39730 43800 69300 
2,230 
Abasan el Saghira 13,481 1 9900 3,500 
Ikhza'a 990 1 9534 1,900 3,000 
Qarara - - 
Bayuk - 1,368 29800 
Rafah 2,220 - 
Dahyna - 
Total 199500 369055 459700 639800 
Source : Derived from Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Akhbar Ghazza, 1984. 
Including the residents of Saifa and Atatrah. 
Figures unavailable, Newly established village (1984). 
Figures unavailable (except for 1979,5200 as it appeared in the 
Report of the Directorate of Interior of Gaza, 1979). Number reduced 
after the overall Israeli withdrawal from Sinai (Egypt) in 1982 
(Camp 
David Accords). After that time, there are no official figures for 
the inhabitants of Dahyna. 
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Table 4.2 Gaza Strip : Population of Rural Settlements According to the 
Israeli Census of September 1967 
while Sheikh A'gelin and Sheikh Ahmed became the outskirts of 
Gaza town. 
Figure 4.3 shows the concentration of' rural settlements in the southern 
and northernzones. 
Source : Central Bureau of Statisticss 1967. 
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FIG-4-3 GAZA STRIP: RURAL SETTLEMENTS GROWTH, 1945 -JULY 1984 
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4.3 Urban Settlements 
The characteristics of urban Centres differ sharply from those of 
villages in the Arab world and in developing countries as a whole. But 
due to the special characteristics of the Gaza Strip town and village 
structure, the gap between them is slightly less large; for instance we 
can find villages more modern in their planning than towns (e. g. the new 
village of Zawaida). 
As reported in the Israeli census of September 1967, there were some 
settlements statistically and officially defined as "urban" which are,, 
however, no more than fairly large villages. Deir el Balah, Rafah and 
Jabalya are functionally rural, not urban (excluding the inhabitants of 
their refugee camps). During the Egyptian period 1948-1967, the three 
localities were villages and the Egyptians left the refugee camps under 
the authority of UNRWA and separate from the municipalities and village 
councils administrative systems. After the Israeli occupation of the 
Strip (1967) the refugee camps were joined to the local council's 
authority and consequently their population status changed to urban. 
Rafah and Deir el Balah kept their definition as villages until they 
officially gained the status of towns in September 1972 and January 1973 
respectively, but Jabalya is still administered by a village council. 
It is not easy to draw the line between towns and villages, or 
between urban and rural communities, and the statistical approach is often 
unsatisfactory from a geographical point of view (Clarke, 1975). However, 
in this research we will depend on the Israeli definition of the urban 
localities*. So far, the Gaza Strip has four urban settlements with the 
status of towns ruled by municipal councils - Gaza, Khan Yunis, Rafah and 
Deir el Balah - whereas Jabalya, functionally still has the status of 
urban settlement, but is administered by a village council. 
The definition of urban for non-Jewish localities is 5000-10,000 
inhabitants, of whom less than half of the employed persons work in 
agriculture, or localities granted the status of town (Town: a locality 
with the status of a municipality). In contrast, the definition for 
Jewish localities is 2000-10,000 inhabitants of whom less than half of 
the employed persons work in agriculture. 
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An examination of Table 4.1 shows that sta 
(Jabalya-Nazla and Beit Lahiya) are eligable to 
Nevertheless, they remain villages and amruled 
Israeli authorities are unwilling to grant them 
the Israeli subsidies to the municipal councils 
provided to the village ones. 
tistically two villages 
have the status of towns. 
by village councils. The 
the status of towns since 
are higher than those 
Gaza Strip towns are primarily communities of traders, who have 
congregated around an outdoor market. The influx of Palestinian refugees 
led to the expansion of the Strip towns in particular and of the Gaza 
Strip l, ocalities as a whole. The political situation has affected both 
positively and negatively the development of Gaza's towns. 
"During 1948-56, the Egyptians were primarily concerned about 
maintaining security and reducing the refugee burden. But during the 
second decade of Egyptian rule (1957-67), greater attention was paid to 
the economic problems and political needs of the residents in the Strip. 
The port at Gaza was improved and allowed to serve as a "free port" for 
the import of consumer and industrial goods. These were then transported 
- legally or illegally - across Sinai to the population centres of Egypt" 
(Lesch, 1984). As a consequence, Gaza's towns flourished from this 
commercial exchange, particularly Gaza town, with Egypt. In addition, the 
Egyptian government had provided financial assistance to the Strip which 
amounted to 3.183 million Egyptian pounds in the financial year 1965-66 
(Madhlum, 1978). 
In the Israeli period, trade activities have suffered from economic 
slowdown particularly since the early 1980s, because the Strip's economy 
is integrated within the Israeli economy which has been suffering from a 
yearly inflation rate close to 1000%, one of the world's highest (Middle 
East Research Institute, 1985). 
Furthermores Rafah town has suffered severely from the 
Israeli -Egyptian (Camp David) Accords which divided the town into two 
parts (see Plates 4.1 and 4.2), as a consequence of the re-establishment 
of the international borders in April 1982. Rafah had constituted the 
main market for the Egyptian Sinai bedouin villages which stretch between 
Rafah and Al-Arish city along the Sinai coast. 
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Plate 4.1 : The gate dividing the city of Rafah resulting from the 
Camp David Accords. Palestinians (left) waiting to greet 
relatives on the other side of the Rafah city divide. 
Photo: The author 
- .4 --, 
Plate 4.2 : Canada rehousing project. Since April 1982, its inhabitants 
(5,000 Palestinians) have been stranded on the Egyptian side 
and waiting, patiently, resettlement inside the Gaza Strip. 
- 
Photo : The author 
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4.3.1 Phases of Urban Settlement Growth 
Without doubt, the greatest urban growth in the Caza Strip has taken 
place since the Israeli-Arab war of 1948, due to the Palestinian exodus 
from occupied Palestine. Table 4.3 and Figure 4.4 clearly show this 
growth in spite of emigration from the Strip after the 1967 war (separate 
data on the Strip towns and the Strip localities as a whole during the 
Egyptian period, 1948-67 are not available). 
Except for Gaza and Khan Yunis, which are the oldest towns in the 
Strip,, the other three centres have developed into urban centres after the 
Israeli occupation of the Strip in 1967. Table 4.3 indicates that the 
number and size of the urban centres has increased dramatically since the 
1948 war, when there were only two. This increased to five by 1967. All 
the three urban centres of Rafah, Jabalya and Deir el Balah, have been 
developed subsequent to the annexation of their refugee camps under their 
village councils. For instance, until the huge population influx, Rafah 
was no more than a border train station populated by 2220 inhabitants in 
1945 and with 61,200 by July 1984. So it increased by 331.66% during this 
period. 
In 1948 the two towns of Gaza and Khan Yunis occupied a more or less 
symmetrical position in relation to the groups of villages. Gaza 
constituted the focal point for connections to Jaffa and Beer Sheba, while 
Khan Yunis played a similar role in respect of north Sinai and Egypt 
(Efrat, 1977). In addition Gaza town was the district capital of the Gaza 
sub-district of Palestine. Beer sheba sub-district used Gaza port for 
exporting its production of grain. Gaza port continued to play the same 
role during the Egyptian period and in the first stage of the Israeli 
occupation period. However, the Israeli authorities closed it in January 
1976 after two ships sank near the shore. 
Up to 1967, Gaza and Khan Yunis were the only two administrative 
towns in the Strip, but after the Israeli occupation in 1967, Rafah and 
Deir el Balah villages were transformed into towns and consequently 
administrative centres in their areas. Deir el 
Balah became the 
administrative town for the central zone. 
-90- 
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FIG-4-4 THE EVOLUTION OF THE URBAN SETTLEMENTS IN THE GAZA STRIP. SER 1967-JULY 1984 
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4.3.2 Urban Settlement Pattern 
Table 4.3 and Figure 4.5 indicate that Gaza Strip urban settlements 
have maintained their size hierarchy from 1945 to July 1984 and may 
continue to do so in the future. In all four censuses and official 
estimations Gaza town was the largest, Khan Yunis the second largest, 
while Rafah, Jabalya and Deir el Balah were the third, fourth and fifth 
respectively. 
As demonstrated in Figure 4.5. the population size of the first town 
was rather more than double that of the second from 1945 to July 1984. If 
we order all urban settlements in the Gaza Strip (July 1984) they look 
quite similar to Zipf's (Logarithmic) rule: 
Rank 12 3 4 5 
Gaza Strip 1 0.41 0.32 0.28 0.14 
Zipf's rule (rank-size rule) 1 0.5 0.33 0.25 0.20 
Khan Yunis and Deir el Balah are still small and dominated by the 
first city, while Jabalya is enlarged by its refugee camp (Jabalya village 
is inhabited by 15,200 and its camp by 37,000 according to the Israeli 
source). In addition Rafah town conforms approximately to the rank-size 
(Fig. 3.5). 
As illustrated in Figure 4.4, the spacing of the towns is nearly 
regular, and the distance separating the first town (Gaza) from the second 
(Khan Yunis) does not exceed 25 kms while the third (Rafah) is only 35 kms 
and the fourth (Deir el Balah) 19 kms away. The fifth (Jabalya) is 
located near to the first and can nearly be described as a suburb of it. 
The minimum distance between one town and the next is 6 kms (that between 
Gaza and Jabalya). The maximum spacing is about 40 kms, between Jabalya 
and Rafah. These urban centres are linked with their villages and 
localities by a network of roads (Fig. 4.1). 
The zonal distribution of the urban centres is demonstrated in Figure 
4.4 where the northern zone has two urban centres (Gaza and Jabalya), the 
central zone has Deir el Balah and the southern zone has Khan Yunis and 
Rafah. 
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4.3.3 Changes in Rural and Urban Population 
It is now appropriate to discuss and to analyse the changing patterns 
of rural-urban population in the Gaza Strip. But before that, it will be 
useful to mention a few brief facts about the rural-urban population in 
the Gaza Sub-district of Palestine, which later shrank into the Gaza 
Strip. 
The socio-economic and cultural background of the Gaza sub-district 
of Palestine gave it a distinctive rural pattern. The primary rural 
nucleus was a close collection of houses related by tradition, economic 
activities and socio-religious links. All such villages of Gaza 
sub-district were eradicated after the emergence of Israel in May 1948 
which caused the exodus of their Palestinian inhabitants. Village links 
can be evidently noted in the refugee camps where UNRWA distributed 
clusters of shelters according to the refugees family ties (Hamouleh) and 
places of origin. 
A study of village statistics in 1945 has revealed that the total 
population of Gaza sub-district of Palestine totalled 137,180; thereof 
55,380 (40.4%) lived in the three urban centres: Gaza (34,250), Khan 
Yunis (11,220) and Majdal (9910) (Hadawi, 1970). But if the smaller area 
which later formed the present Gaza Strip is taken into consideration, the 
urban population formed 70% (Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4 indicates that the growing tendency towards urban 
concentration is clearly evident from data on population distribution in 
1945 and the subsequent censuses and official estimations. Only 28 years 
after the village statistics of 1945, the rural population amounted to 30% 
of the total population, while urban population accounted for 70%. This 
rapidly increased to 91.8% in the Israeli census of September 1967, caused 
by the new Israeli classification of settlements in the Strip after the 
1967 occupation. Previously the Egyptians had reserved the status of 
settlements as they had been before 1948. 
The percentage of urban population slightly decreased from 91.8% in 
1967 to 91.5% in 1978,89.9% in 1982 and fell to 89.3% by July 1984 (Table 
4.4) which may be attributed to the out-migration from urban centres after 
the 1967 war, or to the removal of Palestinian refugees into Israeli 
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Table 4.4 Population in Urban and Rural Localities, 1945 - July 1984 
Year 
Urban Population Rural Population 
Total 
Size Size % 
1945 45,470 70.0 19,500 30.0 64,970 
1967 284,833 91.8 25,547 08.2 310,380 
(Sept. 
1978 344,900 91.5 31,900 08.5 376,800 
1982 387,855 89.9 43,735 10.1 431 590 * 
July 1984 405,200 89.3 48,600 10.7 453,800 
Source : Calculated from Table 3.1,3.2 and 4.2 
Excluding the residents of the three refugee camps of Nuseirat, 
Bureij and Mughazi since these are not technically urban or rural 
centres. 
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dwelling projects. Further, we can add the role of the Camp David 
Accords, whereby Rafah town divided into two parts, leaving Canada 
rehousing project for Gazan refugees (about 5000 persons in 1985) inside 
the Egyptian territory (see Plates 4.1 and 4.2. Also see Chapter Eight). 
The rapid increase in the proportion of the urban population in the 
Strip as a whole was due to the political situation, which resulted in the 
shrinking of Gaza sub-district of Palestine into the Gaza Strip, and the 
mass exodus from Palestine as well. 
In absolute terms, both population groups increased between 1945 and 
July 1984, the total population grew by 388,830 or 194.37%9 but the rural 
population increased by 29,100 or 91.32% only. This decline in the 
proportion of rural population was due to the limited number of refugees 
who moved into the villages, and to the transformation of some villages 
into urban centres (Rafah, Deir el Balah and Jabalya). In addition, the 
total urban population increased by 359,730 or 218.73% in the 
aforementioned period (Table 4.3). 
However, as far as the zonal distribution of rural-urban population 
is concerned (Figure 4.6 and Table 4-5). the total urban population in the 
northern zone increased by 206,650 persons or 195.07% between 1945 and 
July 1984. In the same period the southern zone grew by 126,880 persons 
or 251.0%, while the central zone grew by only 8,082 or 36.89% between 
September 1967 and July 1984 (it did not have any urban centres before 
1967 and its urban population rate does not include the residents of the 
refugee camps of Nuseirat, Mughazi and Bureij who were situated in the 
central zone). In the same period, 1945-July 1984, the rural population 
increased by 94.0% in the northern zone, 105.21% in the southern zone 
while the central zone was affected by the transformation of settlements 
from rural to urban status and by the advent of a new village (Table 4.5). 
Moreover, the zonal distribution of the rural population, changed 
comparatively more in 1967; the three zones showed sharp decreased in 
their proportions of rural population at different rates: in the northern 
zone it decreased from 19.5% to 5.7%. in the southern zone from 43.5% to 
13%, and in the central zone from 100% to zero. After 1967 the proportion 
of rural population rose slightly in all zones reaching 15.2% in the 
-97- 
FIG-4.6 GAZA STRIP: CHANGING PATTERNS OF RURAL-URBAN 
POPULATION- BY GEOGRAPHICAL ZONES, 1945 -JULY 1984 
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Table 4.5 Changing Rural-Urban Population by Zones, 1945 - July 1984 
Y 
Northern zone Central zone Southern zone 
ear 
Rural Urban % rural Rural Urban % rural Rural Urban rural 
1945 8,280 34,250 19.5 2,560 - 100 8,660 11,220 43.5 
1967 9,873 162,192 05.7 - 18,118 - 15,674 104,523 13.0 
Sept. 
1978 13,500 198,400 06.5 - 21,700 - 18,400 124,800 12.9 
1982 20,239 230,328 08.0 2,458 25,078 8.9 21,038 132,449 13.7 
July 21 200 240,900 08.0 2,600 261,200 9.0 24,800 138,100 15.2 
1984 
Source : Calculated from Table 3.1,3.2 and 4.2 
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southern zone by July 1984,9% in the central zone and 8% in the northern 
zone. This slight increase can be attributed to these causal factors: 
(a) in the northern zone, to the existence of one of the refugee dwelling 
projects between Beit Lahiya and Jabalya villages (Fig. 4.1); 
(b) in the central zone, to the new establishment of Zawaida village; 
and 
(c) in the southern zone, to the loss of an estimated 5000 Palestinian 
refugee (1985) residents in Canada rehousing project and several hundred 
people living in the divided city of Rafah on the Egyptian side of the 
international border (see Plates 4.1 and 4.2). 
It has been suggested the Gaza Strip will comprise a conurbation area 
in the near future. Consequently, we can summarise that nearly nine out 
of every ten people in the Gaza Strip now live in urban centres with an 
urbanization level of 89.9% (1982). This rate is one of the highest in 
the Middle East, comparable with other small countries: Israel (86.7% in 
1980), UAE (80.9% in 1981) and Bahrein (80.7% in 1981) (United Nations, 
1985). 
4.3.4 City-Size in the Gaza_Lý! jp 
By using the threshold of 10,000 persons as a lower limit of urban 
status according to the Israeli classification, roughly 81.0% of the total 
population of 500,600 persons in July 1984 were living in the five urban 
centres. This figure includes the three refugee camps of Nuseirat, Bureij 
and Mughazi, which were populated by 23,500,13,700 and 9600 persons 
respectively (Akhbar Ghazza, 1984). Nearly 5.2% of the total population 
lived in one locality of 10,000 to 50,000 size, 38.1% in three localities 
of 50,000 to 100,000 and 37.7% in the Strip capital (Gaza town). 
As manifested in Table 4.3, we can note the 
Gaza town compared to rest of the urban centres. 
the urban population has increased continuously 
43.15% in 1978 and 46.55% in July 1984 (the Gaza 
population decreased from 75.3% in 1945 to 41.6% 
of the transformation of new urban settlements). 
extraordinary growth of 
Also, its proportion of 
From 41.6% in 1967 to 
town share of the urban 
in September 1967 because 
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Migration from all the Gaza Strip localities was the predominant 
factor in the rapid growth of Gaza town. In fact those migrants who moved 
to Gaza town were distinguished by being more educated people such as 
doctors, engineers, advocates and teachers or skilled workers seeking 
better living conditions and the opportunity to improve their social 
status. The concentration of Israeli governmental and other non 
governmental offices (e. g. UNRWA, Red Cross etc. ) in Gaza town encouraged 
this population mobility towards the town. 
4.4 Refugee Camps 
4.4.1 Political and Historical-Background 
The UN General Assembly's partition resolution 181 (11) of Palestine 
on 29 November 1947 (see Appendix 2) recommended the establishment of two 
independent states, one for Palestinians and the second for Jews, while 
the holy city of Jerusalem would be left as an international zone ruled by 
a special international regime. The two states would be connected 
together by economic union and transit relation. 
As a consequence, serious clashes erupted between the Palestinian 
Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine. As the fighting spread and 
intensified, some hundreds of thousands of frightened Palestinians were 
uprooted from their homes and took refuge in the neighbouring Arab 
countries, in addition to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. About 200,000 
refugees were piled in on top of an indigenous population of around 80,000 
in the Gaza Strip. The lucky refugees were able to find shelter of some 
kind. Some huddled into mosques, ancient ruins and former army barracks, 
a few found simple tents, and others erected make-shift shacks as best 
they could (Plate 4.3), many even lived in the open and suffered great 
hardship during the bitter winters of 1948-52. 
The Egyptian government took de facto control of the Gaza Strip, 
after signing an armistice treaty with Israel in February 1949. By virtue 
of it, the borders between the Strip and the new state of Israel 
had been 
drawn. The erection of frontiers on the northern and eastern sides of the 
Strip, which cut off the area from its normal sources of supply and 
its 
normal markets has been described 
by one of the former UNRWA economic 
advisers as an economic disasters and 
the influx of the refugees produced 
-1 O"I- 
an economic catastrophe (Baster, 1955). Also UNRWA itself recognized that 
the Strip was too small and too barren to provide a satisfactory 
livelihood even for the indigenous population. In addition the influx of 
refugees accelerated the dissimilarity between natural and human resources 
which is the source of poverty in the Strip. 
Despite the dire living conditions of the refugees in the diaspora, 
they positively contributed to the development of the Strip's economic and 
agricultural infrastructure. This fact has been stressed by Baster (1954) 
when he reported that the refugees were more urbanized than any of the 
host populations, thus the more enterprising and better trained workers 
among them were soon established in regular employment or in farming or 
business, to the mutual advantage of themselves and their hosts. The 
occupational distribution of refugees who were arrivals to the Strip in 
1949 can be extrapolated from a sample of 20,000 refugees: it was 
indicated that 18% were skilled and semi-skilled workers, 17% 
professionals, merchants and "landowners", and the rest labourers and 
unskilled workers (Baster, 1955). 
However, the refugees' influx coincided with a fall in wage rates, 
for both skilled and unskilled. Skilled wages, previously in the region 
of 100 Egyptian piastres a day, fell down to 30 piastres a day. Also 
unskilled wages fell down from 30 piastres to less than 10 piastres a day. 
This sharp decline in wages led to out-migration especially of skilled 
workers and professionals such as doctors; on the other hand thi s 
assisted in the expansion of the cultivatable area from 136 sq. kms after 
1948 (Baster, 1955) to 267 sq. kms in 1967. 
As a result of the Palestinian catastrophe, the refugees overnight 
found themselves without sufficient food, medical care and shelter or many 
other necessities of life. Also they suffered from psychological 
confusion and agitation. Consequently different local and foreign relief 
and humanitarian agencies participated in providing sustenance for the 
refugees, in addition to a voluntary contribution from the host 
governments. For instance, "in Egypt a special committee, in which the 
Red Cross participated, raised large sums of money and provided medical 
and hospital services, as well as the cost of maintaining a camp for 8000 
persons in the Strip" (Aubin, 1949). On the other hand some foreign 
relief agencies contributed food, tents, and medical supplies. 
f y#2 
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4.4.2 The Responsibi 1i ties of the UN for the Palestine Refugees 
The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund was 
considered the first international body that contributed n)Oney and 
dispatched some of its personnel in early August 1948. Following UNICEF 
action, Count Folk Bernadotte - the Swedish UN mediator on Palestine - 
established a disaster Relief Project under the control of a UN Director 
of Disaster Relief assisted by World Health Organization and other 
voluntary agencies. This relief project aimed to provide basic food and 
shelter. Bernadotte noted the inability of the Arab governments to care 
for the Palestinian refugees, and appealed to all nations for assistance 
for the refugees on humanitarian grounds. Their conditions were desperate 
and the UN mediator called for immediate action (UNRWA, 1983). 
After the assassination of Count Bernadotte with Colonel Serot in the 
Jewish sector of the city of Jerusalem, the UN General Assembly adopted 
resolution 212 (111), which established the United Nations Relief for 
Palestine Refugees, an organization designed to plan and implement a 
relief programme in conjunction with the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies, and the American Friends 
Service Committee who undertook to carry out the distribution of relief 
supplies. The AFSC (Quakers) undertook its responsibility in the Gaza 
Strip only (Gama, 1972). 
In December 1948, the General Assembly adopted resolution 194 (111), 
which created a United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine with 
the aim of creating contact between the disputing parties and "taking 
steps" to help them in reaching a final settlement of all questions 
outstanding between them, including the economic development of the area, 
repatriation and resettlement of the refugees, and the payment of 
compensation to those electing not to return as had been recommended in 
Bernadotte's-report to the UN General Assembly. But in August 1949, it 
became evident to the UNCCP that Israel rejected the principle of 
repatriation in total, and compensation in part (UNRWA, 1983; Peretz, 
1954). 
In August 1949, the UNCCP established the United Nations Economic 
survey Mission - under the chairmanship of Mr. 
Gordon Clapp, formerly of 
the Tennessee Valley Authority - to examine the economic situation in the 
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countries affected by the Israeli-Arab war. After three months of 
exhaustive study in the field (until November 1949), it submitted an interim report to the UN General Assembly. The UNESM recommended the 
creation of a new agency, which would not only carry out relief on a 
diminishing scale, but would inaugurate a works programme in which 
able-bodied refugees could become self-supporting and at the same time 
create works of lasting benefit to the refugees and the countries 
concerned (UNRWA, 1951). It is clear that the UNESM wished to put an end 
to relief by creating projects that would employ the refugees and make 
them self-sufficient. 
As a consequence of the UNESM recommendation, the UN General Assembly 
unanimously adopted resolution 302 (IV), on 8 December 1949, which 
established UNRWA for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to carry out, 
in collaboration with local regimes, the direct relief services, social 
assistance, education, health care and works programme. This programme 
contracted by June 1982 except for education, very limited health care, 
social assistance and environmental sanitation. 
UNRWA started its programme after taking over all operations from 
UNRPR on first of May 1950. Originally UNRWA was set up for only eighteen 
months with the idea that the Palestinian problem would be resolved in a 
matter of months. Following that, the mandate of UNRWA was extended 
fourteen times as a temporary agency, serving Palestinian refugees as they 
awaited a just settlement. The present mandate will expire on 30 June 
1987. 
4.4.3 The Role of UNRWA for the Gaza Strip Refuqees 
As a result of the enforced migration of refugees toward the Strip, 
temporary tent camps were established as soon as possible with the 
assistance of several voluntary relief agencies. When UNRWA took its 
responsibility for the Strip refugees, it initiated an intensive programme 
of accommodation to resettle the Palestinian refugees, in cooperation with 
the Egyptian government, particularly after the decisions of the Egyptian 
government not to accept refugees in their own land, and to prevent their 
movement unless they had received perniission (Stevens,, 1952). The 
Egyptian government (practised these decisions by) transfering six 
thousand Palestinians from the Qantara refugee camp - an Egyptian city 
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located east of the Suez Canal - into the Gaza Strip in September 1949 
(Baster, 1955). 
The refugee camps established by UNRWA were constructed generally 
near the existing Gaza's settlements. These camps were built on sand 
dunes, and on private lands provided by local people in exchange for the 
infrastructure after the repatriation of the Palestinian refugees. 
Moreover, Nuseirat, Bureij and Mughazi were set up in the former derelict 
camps of the mandatory British army. 
At the time of their establishment, the refugee camps were built as a 
temporary measure, in a pattern of narrow intersecting streets, closely 
packed one-storey houses, covered by fragile cement tiles. These shelters 
were distributed according to the family size. Each six persons were 
provided with nine square metres of living space, without toilet, private 
water supply, electricity or kitchen facilities. However, the refugee 
camps were provided with communal water supplies and toilets (Plate 4.4), 
the communal toilets being removed in 1971-72, and the communal water 
supplies after 1976. 
In 1952, there were nine camps of tents, but later - after the 
creation of the concrete housing units by UNRWA - their number contracted 
to eight following the consolidation of Zaitoun canip into the body of Gaza 
town. The fundamental point which can be noted from Table 4.6 is that in 
1952 only 11.8% of refugees were settled in concrete barracks created by 
UNRWA, in contrast to 46.3% in tents and 41.9% in houses. The limited 
share of the barracks residents was due to the early stage of the 
programme of accommodation for refugees. Also we can note the higher 
percentage of tent residents in the Strip as a whole and in the southern 
zone in particular. In the southern zone they accounted for 58,734 or 63% 
of the total tent inhabitants, in contrast to 21% in the northern and 16% 
in the central zones respectively. The reason for that can be attributed 
to the influx of bedouins from Beer Sheba sub-district who camped in the 
southern zone (see Table 4.6 and Fig. 4.7). 
Moreover,, about 54.7% of the house dwellers were concentrated in the 
northern zone and especially in Gaza town, where most of them had enough 
money to rent or construct a private house, while the more unfortunate 
refugees - who did not have enough time to carry away their property at 
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Plate 4.3 : Palestinian refugees arriving in the Gaza Strip had only simple tents to shelter themselves and 
their meagre belongings after the 1948 Israeli-Arab war. 
Source : UNRWA. 
ý- 11ý ý -- . 
Communal Water Supply 
Plate 4.4 : In 1952, a large scale building programme for the replacement of tents with concrete houses was initiated 
by UNRWA, in cooperation with the Egyptian government. For example Beach camp shown above. 
Source: UNRWA. 
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Table 4.6 Gaza Strip: Distribution of Palestinian Refugees According to 
Viode of Accommodation and Geographical Areas: February 1952 
Area No. of 
Camps 
In houses In Bar- 
racks 
In tents Total 
Rimal 2 15,281 1,476 16,558 33,315 
Zaitoun 1 30,869 - 3,015 33,884 
Nuseirat 2 1,731 14,501 8,817 25,049 
Deir el Balah 2 17,061 4,251 6,002 27,314 
Khan Yunis 1 14,588 708 10,137 25,433 
Khan Yunis Bedouins - - - 32,308 32,308 
Rafah 1 4,82,5 2,758 16,289 23,872 
Total 9 84,355 23,694 93,126 201,175 
Source : Stevens, 1952 
the time of their displacement - waited to receive their shelters from 
UNRWA. In January 1955, the UNRWA programme of accommodation was 
substantially achieved when the last tents were replaced by concrete 
housing units. 
4.4.4 The Distributic)ri of Refugee Camps 
- -- --- I- 
The refugee samps which were constructed during 195,2-55 constituted a 
significant part of the population settlement pattern of 
the Gaza Strip. 
Each canip covered c- liu; ited area and was overcrowded 
by enormous numbers 
()f concrete huts. 
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By 30 June 1985, the eight camps in the Strip varied in population 
from Deir el Balah (9,854) to sprawling Jabalya (51,225) and Rafah 
(48,816), these last two camps being two of the largest refugee camps in 
UNRWA's area of operations. 
The present distribution of the camps by geographical zones is 
illustrated in Figure 4.8, where there are four large camps, two in the 
northern zone - Jabalya and Gaza Beach, and two in the southern zone - 
Khan Yunis and Rafah. In addition, there are another four intermediate 
and small camps : Nuseirate, Bureii, Mughazi and Deir el Balah in the 
central zone. The large camps were built near the main towns to supply 
labourers for agricultural and service activities, while the second group 
were concentrated in the uninhabited area (abandoned army camps). 
The factors of overpopulation, poor employment opportunities and the 
high proportion of refugees to the indigenous population resulted in a 
high proportion of the refugees living in the eight UNRWA camps. The 
camps accommodated a total of 236,468 on 30 June 1985 or 55.3% of the 
total refugee population (Tables 2.5 and 4.7). 
4.4.5 The Camps' Population Growth 
During the Egyptian period of administration of the Gaza Strip, the 
camps' population growth in general was recorded as continuously 
increasing. On 30 June 1961, the total population of the camps amounted 
to 155,592. This figure rose by 28.04% to reach 205,946 by the end of 
June 1967, or by 4.67% per annum. Table 4.7 and Figure 4.9 indicate that 
all of the Strip's camps recorded positive increase - with different rates 
- in their population with the slight exception of 
Rafah camp during June 
1961-62. However, during the period June 1961-June 1967, four camps 
reported an annual rate of increase higher than the general annual 
average, Jabalya (6.13%), Khan Yunis (5.75%), Gaza Beach 
(5.05%) and 
Bureij (4.89%), while the other carps of Mughazi, Rafah, Nuseirat and Deir 
el Balah increased by lower rates of 3.77%, 3.59%, 3.56%, and 2.47% 
respectively. 
During the Israeli occupation period, the camps' inhabitants declined 
below the figure of 205,946 recorded on 30 June 1967. The population fell 
to 193,895 by 30 June 1974 and did not rise above the 
1967 figure until 30 
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Table 4.7 Gaza Strip : The Evolution of the Camp Refu2ees as Given by UNRWA Registration 
Data : 30 June 1961 - 30 June 1984 
amp 
Year 
Jabalya Ga za 
Beach 
Nuseirat Bureij Deir el 
Bal ah 
Mughazi Kha n 
Yuni s 
Raf ah Total 
30.6.1961 28,669 24,721 16,152 11,142 6,710 7,964 21,250 38,984 155,592 
30.6,1962 31,594 25,918 16,606 11,546 6,822 8,135 23,519 38,620 162,760 
30.6.1964 379147 28,874 18,314 13,404 7,203 8,666 27,177 43,057 183,842 
30.6.1966 40,387 32,536 19,793 14,646 7,542 9,710 29,084 46,989 200,687 
30.6.1967 41,417 33,468 19,993 14,944 7,783 9,985 30,002 48,354 205,946 
31.12.1968 41,062 33,155 18,861 12,316 7,456 9,037 28,813 45,198 195,898 
30.6.1970 42,447 35,862 19,035 12,035 7,573 8,805 28,829 44,333 198,919 
30.6.1972 43,745 36,971 19,885 12,300 7,879 8,947 29,953 46,054 205,734 
30.6.1974 40,179 34,551 19,877 11,783 7,910 8,288 29,295 42,012 193,895 
30.6.1975 41,427 35,450 20,347 12,435 8,106 8,434 29,694 41,656 197,549 
30.6.1976 43,258 36,192 20,610 12,783 8,251 8,559 30,141 40,957 200,751 
30.6.1977 41,484 33,802 20,730 12,702 8,347 8,684 30,592 41,253 197,594 
30.6.1978 42,263 32,949 21,226 12,957 8,569 8,826 30,195 42,065 199,050 
30.6.1980 43,927 34,000 21,856 13,389 8,685 9,071 29,027 42,855 202,810 
30.6.1982 44,946 34,971 22,927 14,065 8,949 9,338 29,726 43,740 208,662 
30.6.1984 49,400 38,424 25,367 15,459 9,626 10,125 31, b9l 46,845 22b, 937 
30.6,1985 51,225 40,359 26,400 16,057 9,854 10,506 33,269 48,816 
1 
236,486 
11 
Source UNRWA, 1985 
Note Figures from 1968 onward include some refugees living in camps without 
being 
either officially registered with UNRWA or eligible for UNRWA assistance 
(about 2"', of the total camp population). 
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June 1982 (208,662) before increasing to 236,486 by 30 June 1985. Thi s 
gives an annual average growth of only 0.77% between 1967 and 1985 (Table 4.7). During this period, four camps increased annually by a higher rate 
than the average - Nuseirat (1.54%), Deir el Balah (1.31%), Jabalya 
(1.18%) and Gaza Beach (1.04%). Khan Yunis, Bureij, Mughazi and Rafah 
increased only slightly by 0.57%9 0.40%5 0.28% and 0.05% respectively. 
In fact, the camp population growth during the Israeli period 
increased very slightly in comparison with the Egyptian period, the causes 
of which were discussed in chapter two. Their numbers fluctuated from 
year to year during the Israeli period with decreases identified during 
three phases as shown in Figure 4.9. 
The war of June 1967 initiated the first phase which resulted in 
out-migration from camps toward Jordan. The highest rates of decrease 
during the period of 30 June 1967 - 31 December 1968 were recorded in 
Bureii (-19.34%), Mughazi (-9.98%), Rafah (-6.75%), Nuseirat (-5.83%), 
Deir el Balah (-4.29%) and Khan Yunis (-4.04%), while the lowest were 
reported in Gaza Beach (-0.94%) and Jabalya (-0.86%). The UN 
Secretary-General U Thant's report (S/8124) of August 18,1967, stated 
that the densely populated Gaza Strip had suffered considerably more 
civilian casualties and property damage than any other area (Khouri, 
1968). For instance hundreds of shelters in Khan Yunis and Rafah refugee 
camps had been destroyed by the heavy bombardment from Israeli artillery 
and tanks, although later they were rebuilt. 
The second phase took its effect in the second half of 1971 with its 
results appearing by 1972 (see Fig. 4.9). This phase was caused by the 
Israeli security roads plan which aimed to improve Israeli military 
control over the refugee camps by making them less congested, as the 
refugee camps represented the main bases of the underground Palestinian 
guerrillas (see chapter 8). 
The third phase began in 1976 with distinctive effects, even though 
it started in some refugee camps at an earlier period. This phase was 
designed to resettle the camp refugees into the Israeli -sponsored 
rehousing projects (see chapters 8 and 9 for details). The effect of 
phase three had been negligible by 30 June 1982 when the sum of refugee 
camp inhabitants began to rise again. 
-113- 
Notwithstanding, the high natural increase in the Strip's refugee 
camps has compensated for the loss of their inhabitants by means of 
out-migration or resettlement in the Israeli -sponsored rehousing projects. 
As a consequences the total housing stock in the camps has decreased since 
the resettled refugees must demolish their shelters as a pre-condition for 
a housing unit in these rehousing projects (see chapter 9). 
However, the amount of usable space in the camps decreases as the 
population continues to increase (Table 4.7), since no new building is 
permitted either on the sites of demolished shelters or on derelict areas. 
As a consequence, the camp refugees began to add new rooms and other 
facilities to the courtyards of their shelters causing even more 
congestion. Today, the majority of camp inhabitants have replaced the 
tiled roofs of their shelters with asbestos to prevent the leakage of rain 
in spite of the dangers of asbestos to the occupant's health. 
4.5 The Israeli Colonies 
This study will focus on the Israeli colonies in the Gaza Strip which 
have made a significant impact on the Strip. It would be a legitimate 
question to ask why the word colony is used instead of settlement. 
Further to this, it is pertinent to ask when they were established, how 
many there are, what are their aims, and to what extent is their 
establishment politically-motivated and what impact they have had and will 
have on the Gaza Strip's demography. Indeed, these questions cannot 
easily be answered but an attempt will be made to analyse the colonies. 
This framework of study constitutes the heart of political geography, 
but in the case of the Gaza Strip in particular and in Palestine as a 
whole, politics have been the primary and distinctive 
force playing an 
important role in the transformation of the demographic map of 
Palestine 
since the 1948 war and before. 
"Colony" was the term used to define Jewish residential centres which 
were set up before the war of 1967 in the part of 
Palestine occupied after 
the war of 1948. After the war of 1967 which resulted 
in the full Israeli 
domination of the whole of Palestine, the Israelis have been very active 
in implanting their colonies upon the Palestinians' lands. The 
Israelis 
themselves have used the term settlement to describe these exclusively 
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Jewish residential centres which they have created on the occupied 
Palestinian lands. There are two reasons why the researcher has chosen 
the term "colonies". Firstly, from a linguistic viewpoint, settlement 
implies a certain legality which is refuted here. Secondly, Article 49 
(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that the occupying power shall 
not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the 
territory it occupies (National Lawyers Guild, 1978). Consequently, the 
Israeli colonies in the Gaza Strip are illegal under international law. 
4.5.1 Israeli Occupation from Conquest to Col. 2an 
The issue of the Jewish colonies in Palestine as a whole and in the 
occupied territories (The West Bank and the Gaza Strip) in particular does 
not form a new political problem, but they have constituted the focal 
point of the Israeli-Arab conflict over the past nine decades. Throughout 
all phases of the Israeli-Arab conflict, the Jewish colonies in Palestine 
have been both the tools and goals for the Israeli decision-makers who aim 
to create a Jewish society in Palestine, besides which they intend to 
exterminate the pre-existing Palestinian society. In 1948, the Zionists 
had partly reached their goal when they applied their ideology by creating 
their Jewish state in Palestine, and uprooted the Palestinians from their 
homeland. 
The war which broke out in 1967 prepared the way for the advent of a 
new phase of Israeli colonization, when they had succeeded in taking over 
the area comprising the remaining parts of Palestine (The West Bank and 
Gaza Strip), the Israelis continued their policy of implanting more 
colonies in those territories. Following the war of october 1973, the 
Israelis focussed their efforts on confiscating more lards from the 
Palestinians. As a result an upsurge in the number of Jewish colonies and 
the number of their colonists was reported. 
Consequently, the Israeli colonies in the occupied territories have 
recently become much more central to the whole Israeli-Arab conflict. 
Our 
purpose is to reveal whether the Israeli colonies in the Gaza 
Strip are 
similar to those created before the Palestinian catastrophe of 
1948. 
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4.5.2 The Geographical Dirtribution of Israeli Colonies in the Gaza 
Stri in 1985 
The distribution of Israeli colonies in the Gaza Strip is shown in 
Figure 4.1 where the southern zone is characterized by the intense 
concentration of colonies, and the northern and central zones contain 
smaller numbers. The clusters of Israeli colonies in the southern zone 
are due to: 
(a) the widening of the Strip's area in the southern zone; 
(b) from the strategic point of view, the Zionists aim to create a buffer 
zone close to the Egyptian border; and 
(c) availability of the uninhabited sand dunes which were classified as 
"state land". helping the Jewish colonists to take it over and uproot the 
pre-existing sand dune forest and flatten it for their colonial projects. 
The most evident observation which can be interpreted from Figure 4.1 
is the distinctive selection'of the Israeli colonies relative to the sites 
of the existing Palestinian settlements. These sites are characterized by 
the following important points: 
(a) the colonies cover large areas, particularly in the areas not 
inhabited by the Palestinians, and lie a short distance from the most 
fertile agricultural lands; 
(b) they are concentrated in the vicinity of the Palestinian settlements; 
(c) the colonies occupy prominent sites in the Strip in order to overlook 
and control the main axes of roads; 
(d) they are close to the international borderland and to the sea coast; 
(e) they are located in the militarily strategic positions; and 
(f) they are exploited agriculturally with a view to self-sufficiency in 
the future. 
These factors are similar to those influencing colonial settlement 
before the Zionist take over of Palestine in 1948. 
Consequently, the sites of Israeli colonies have been chosen to 
implement their tactical and strategic goals for full domination of the 
Gaza Strip land. Also the Israeli decision-makers want to achieve the 
final goal of demographic transformation in the Strip 
for their benefit. 
4.5.3 The Strategy of thýý lSrýýlj ýoloni. ýs in the Gaza Stri 
The Israeli colonial programme on the Palestinian lands has formed 
the vital basis of the Zionist movement over nine decades, since the First 
Zionist Congress which was held in Basle (Switzerland) in 1897, when the 
Zionists ultimately decided to set up a national home for the Jewish 
people in Palestine. Following that, the Zionist colonial programme has 
constituted one of the most important pillars in creating the Zionist 
project in Palestine; in fact it constitutes the pragmatic face of its 
implementation. This is not surprising, specifically, if we know that 
Zionism was described by Z. Jabotinsky in 1933 as "a colonial process, 
thereby it will grow and weaken with the issue of military power" (Abu 
Arafa, 1981). 
The strategy of the Israeli colonies plan in Palestine (before the 
1948 war) was characterized by two main factors which identify its 
strategic patterns and axes. These factors can be summarized as 
encirclement and containment (Tawfiq, 1977). But following the Israeli 
occupation of the Gaza Strip and West Bank in 1967, the surveillance 
factor has also played a distinctive role. 
4.5.3.1 The Surveillance Factor 
Shortly after the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip in 1967, the 
military operation of the Palestinian resistance movement against the 
Israeli troops expanded and intensified. Consequently, the Israelis 
established three para-military colonies in order to improve their 
military control over the Strip's indigenous settlements during 1970-72. 
They also wanted to follow and observe the mobility of Palestinians 
between their localities, specifically because the Strip had contained the 
primary bases of Palestinian guerrillas between 1967 and 1972. 
The colonies were set up at strategic sites and close to the main 
traffic arteries. The purpose of these colonies was to separate the 
populated Palestinian settlements in the southern zone of the Strip from 
the central zones and the central zone from the northern zone. Another 
aim was to cut them off from the bases of the Palestinian resistance 
movement. 
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Up to 1972, there were four Jewish colonies in the Strip: Nahal 
Nezarim (1972). Kefar Darom (1970), Nahal Morag (1972) and Erez (1969). 
The last colony is an uninhabited industrial village. The distance 
between these colonies was approximately 9 kms and they were spaced at 
more or less regular intervals between Gaza town and the refugee camps of 
the central zone (Nuseirat, Bureij and Mughazi), between the refugee camps 
of the central zone and Khan Yunis and Rafah in the northern zone (Fig. 
4.1). 
4.5.3.2 The Encirclement Factor 
The Israeli authorities continued to implant more colonies in the 
Strip in order to achieve their second aim of full encirclement of the 
existing Palestinian localities. This aim can be easily noted from the 
statement of Yigal Allon, the architect of the Israeli colonies plan and 
the Deputy Prime Minister of Israel 1968-77, when he emphasized that the 
Israeli settlements are placed in strategically important areas along 
existing borderlines or in the vicinity of areas likely to become 
borderlines in the future (National Lawyers Guild, 1978). We can 
interpret from this statement that the Israeli colonies had been 
established to encircle and isolate the Palestinian communities. 
As illustrated in Figure 4.1 and 4.10, we can observe six axes 
(belts) of encirclement inside the Strip which can be classified as 
f ol I ows: 
(a) Nevets Sala-Nisanit, which encircles the Strip from the north side; 
(b) Tal el Montar-Nezarim, which isolates Gaza town and its villages 
in 
the northern zone from the remaining Palestinian localities 
in the south; 
(c) Kefar Darom-Qatif, which separates Deir el Balah and the refugee 
camps in central zone from the southern zone 
localities; 
(d) Qatif-Nahal Morag, which isolates Khan Yunis and its villages from 
Deir el Balah in the north and Rafah in the south; 
(e) Nahal Morag-Rafah Yam, which makes a large curve encircling Rafah 
town and its refugee camp; and 
(f) Netzer Hazzani-Rafah Yam, which makes a longitudinal belt 
isolating 
the southern zone localities 
from the sea coast. 
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However, there is another belt which stretches along the Armistice line (Green Line) inside the border of pre-1967 occupied Palestine and faces towards the Strip border (Figs. 4.1 and 4.10). It was built in the 
early 1960's and expanded by the beginning of the 1970's, and was intended 
to constitute an advance line of colonies in the vicinity of the Strip 
border and to encircle the Strip as well. 
The objectives of these southern axes are also to sever the 
Palestinian settlements from the Egyptian frontier and to create a buffer 
zone between them. In addition, they aim to encircle them by creating a 
cordon on the southern zone. The Israeli colony blocks which surround the 
main Palestinian towns in the Strip are intended to prevent the expansion 
of the Palestinian population and to ghettoize them psychologically (Fig. 
4.10). Further, they aim to isolate the Arab population into little 
pockets surrounded by Jewish colonies. Consequently, the Israeli 
authorities have carved new highways in the sand dunes to connect their 
colonies to make for easier control and encirclement. They also plan the 
establishment of more colonies, specifically in the southern area of Rafah 
town toward the aim of full encirclement of the Palestinian community. 
"The political and strategic role of settlement in key areas in order to 
establish a permanent Jewish presence was a second stage in the early 
settlement process. It led to colonisation over a wider area owing to the 
need physically to control areas of land" (Newman, 1982). 
4.5.3.3 The Containment and Judaization of the Strip 
Containment and Judaization constitute the more serious process in 
the strategy of the Zionist colonial programme in Palestine and the 
occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. From the 
Israeli viewpoint, the containment and Judaization of Palestinian land has 
been a central tenet and practice of the Zionist movement since the waves 
of Jewish immigration began in the early 20th century. The Zionists 
succeeded in achieving their ideology when they had created the state of 
Israel in 1948 with a majority of Jewish inhabitants. They uprooted the 
Palestinian people from their homeland forcing them to become refugees in 
several Arab countries. Following the Israeli occupation of the Strip in 
1967 in addition to the West Bank, the Israelis started to impose their 
new colonial programme upon the rest of Palestine. By the end of 1985, 
the Israeli colonisation prograwirre nearly fulfilled its surveillance and 
encirclenent aims while still 
intending to reach the aim of Judaization. 
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In the Gaza Strip, the Israelis desire to implement the Judaization 
goal by two methods: 
(a) The evacuation of the inhabitants of areas which have been encircled, 
or the dissolution and assimilation of them into Jewish society which 
would make the Strip a less densely populated region. The Israelis tried 
to do this in 1971 when they transferred several thousands into the Sinai 
and West Bank. But after the Israeli -Egyptian Camp David Accords all of 
them came back to the Strip except the Canada camp residents. 
(b) The acceleration of the Israeli colonial programme in the Strip, 
whereby the Israelis have doubled their colonies and the numbers of 
colonists in a very short time. In addition, they confiscated more lands 
from Palestinian owners under several pretexts. Later we will evaluate 
the Israeli programme in the Strip and whether it will be able to achieve 
the Judaization goal or not. 
The Israeli strategy of Judaization on the Strip can be observed from 
the statement of Mr. Yigal Allon who said that he would be very glad to 
see the southern zone of the Gaza Strip become an area pulsating with 
Jewish life (MERIP, 1977). However, Gush Emunim considers that the 
effective colonial movement in the occupied territories should not 
colonize the occupied Palestinian lands through building in areas where 
the Palestinians are thinnest, but by confronting and supplanting the 
Palestinians. In addition, the former military intelligence chief General 
Aharon Yariv, in a speech at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, warned 
recently that some people already hope to exploit a situaton of war to 
expel 7-800,000 Palestinian Arabs ...... 
(National Lawyers Guild, 1978). 
Finally, we can conclude that the Israelis are still waiting to reach the 
Judaization goal of their strategy of colonization whenever the chances 
become as favourable as they were in 1948. Now, it is a legitimate 
question to ask whether the Israelis will implement this goal and when. 
4.5.4 Phases in the Evolution of the Israeli Colonies in the Gaza 
Strip 
To follow the evolution and growth of Israeli colonies in the Gaza 
Strip during the period of 1967-1985, it would be useful to study this 
phenomenon in two separate stages: 
-121- 
(a) The pre-June 1977 government (Labour) 
(b) The June 1977-October 1984 government (Likud) 
The aforesaid separation aims to identify the strategy of both Israeli governments twoard the colonization of the Gaza Strip. However, 
from October 1984, Israel has been governed by a coalition government made 
up from the Labour and Likud parties who alternate for the premiership 
during the four years period of government. 
"The Israeli colony location and colony type are both seen to have 
influenced the Jewish colonization over the past 100 years in Palestine. 
The election of the Likud government in 1977 represented the culmination 
of a gradual process of change in the dominant ideology of Israeli 
soci ety; this has resulted in a new set of priorities and relationships 
regarding the nature of colonies and colonization" (Newman, 1984). 
However, the process of Israeli colonization in the Strip has been 
distinguished by a dramatic increase in the numbers of colonies and their 
areas, and a slight increase in the number of colonists from 1977 onward 
(Table 4.8). 
4.5.4.1 The Colonies Established under Labour Rule until June 1977 
Under the rule of the Labour government of 1967-June 1977, the 
Israeli colonial programme in the Strip was restricted to creating advance 
military positions. These positions aimed to support the presence of the 
Israeli military forces in the Strip, and to provide them with logistic 
assistance against Palestinian guerrilla attacks. These colonies (most of 
the Israeli colonies in the Palestinian occupied territories are 
established as military positions which later shift to civilian colonies) 
occupied the most desirable positions in the Strip from the Israeli 
strategic point of view. This can easily be noted from the name of these 
colonies, which were called Nahal. 
Up to June 1977, the Israeli Labour government created five colonies, 
three of them Nahal colonies, one an industrial village, and the last the 
core of the Qatif bloc. Further, the public strategy of the Labour 
government was stressed by the Prime Minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin in 
1977, when he declared that the Israeli settlements increased Israel's 
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security and provided a firm basis for defensible borders. Moreover, he 
outlined the government's settlement priorities: strengthening the 
"confrontation lines" along the borders of Arab countries (Lesch, 1977). 
4.5-4.2 The Israeli Colonization Programme under Likud from June 
1977 - October 1984 
After the victory of the Likud coalition in the election of June 1977 
which resulted in the reins of power being transferred to them, the 
features of the strategy of Israeli colonization were identified, and its 
secret goals were drawn. This strategy had been concealed under the 
security argument during the previous Labour government. 
Under Likud rule, religio-historic factors initiated a stronger hold 
(see Plate 4.5), whereby they implanted several colonies close to 
Palestinian localities in the Gaza Strip. However, the Likud government 
itself decided that the West Bank and Gaza Strip are parts of the ancient 
homeland of the Jewish people, since both formed part of the land of 
biblical Israel. In addition, the government of Israel stressed that Jews 
had the right to establish a presence anywhere in "Eretz Ysrael" (Land of 
Israel). Begin himself described all of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
as liberated not occupied territory (National Lawyers Guild, 1978 and 
Wills 1980). Consequently, that clearly meant that the Jewish people did 
have rights to settle anywhere in the occupied territories from the Likud 
point of view. 
Furthermore, the Israeli government concentrated its attention on 
practising its overt ideology of full colonization upon the Strip as well 
as the West Bank. Ariel Sharon (the former minister of Agriculture and 
settlements) implemented an intensive plan of colonies in the southern 
zone of the Gaza Strip and in the Rafah salient. Up to 1979, the Israelis 
established 15 colonies inside the Egyptian land (Yamit bloc) and added 
some colonies to those already existing in the Strip. 
"When the Egyptian-Israeli talks began, the Sinai colonies were 
placed "on hold", since Egypt expected to regain all her lost territories 
following the process of piecemeal Israeli withdrawal. The Israelis 
considered their presence in the Rafah salient absolutely essential 
in 
order to tighten the encirclement of 
Gaza and to ensure that the Strip 
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would never again have administrative or geographic links with Egypt" (Abu 
Lughod, 1982). 
The steady intensification of the numbers of colonies in the Strip 
was reported between 1979 and 1985 when 14 colonies were set up and the 
existing ones were expanded. Moreover, the type of colonies had changed 
from Nahal positions to Moshavim and Kibbutzim in order to practise the 
Likud ideology of full and fast colonization of the Palestinians' land, 
and to achieve the Judaization goal later. The acceleration of the 
Israeli colonization process was due to two reasons. 
Tirstly, the Israeli -Egyptian Accords of Camp David, which had 
emphasized the full Israeli withdrawal from Sinai including the removal of 
their colonies, resulted in the collapse of the Israeli presence in the 
Rafah salient alongside the southern Gaza Strip borders. Consequently, 
the Israelis intensified their colonies between Khan Yunis and Rafah and 
the coast in order to compensate their loss in Sinai and to create a new 
buffer zone in the vicinity of the Egyptian border (see Fig. 4.1 and 
4.10). Furthermore, the Gaza Regional Council of settlements (198-3. ) 
proclaimed that many of the residents of the Gaza Strip colonies had lived 
in various cities and Vioshavim in Sinai before the final withdrawal in 
1982. Eli Sinai and Matsibh Atsmona are essentially transplanted 
communities whose residents were removed from Egyptian territory. 
Secondly, the Palestinian autonomy proposal led to an acceleration in 
the process of colonization in the Strip and the West Bank, particularly 
when the Egyptians conceived a plan to implement the so-called Palestinian 
self-government proposal of the Camp David Accords in the Strip as an 
initial phase. The concept of self-government from the Israeli viewpoint 
does not mean an end of military occupation, but the municipal authorities 
would be given greater authority to run local affairs, while the Israeli 
army would retain jurisdication over security. Mr. Begin 
(The former 
Israeli Prime Minister) stressed that several times when he stated that 
the autonomy would apply only to people, not to water and 
land. The 
Israeli autonomy concept was completely rejected by the Egyptians who 
thought that se lf-government should lead to an independent state for the 
Palestinians later. 
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4.5.5 The Evaluation of the Israeli CojLnj Plan in the Gaza Strip 
It is now appropriate to analyse and evaluate the Israeli 
colonization plan in the Gaza Strip and whether the implementation of the 
Israeli strategy of demographic transformation would be for their benefit. 
Further to thise, it is pertinent to relate it to a comparative study of 
the close colonization plan for the occupied West Bank. 
"At the turn of the century,, Jews made up less than 10% of the total 
population of Palestine, and owned less than 2% of the land. Year after 
year since then, these percentages have increased, so that by 1948, a 
Jewish state could be declared, and the indigenous Palestinians had been 
driven out" (Mattar, 1984). The Israeli occupation of the Palestinians' 
West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 initiated the second phase of the Israeli 
process of colonization of the Palestinians' land. The aims of their 
colonization have remained the same: the creation of an exclusive Jewish 
presence in the Israeli -occupied Gaza Strip and the West Bank until those 
areas could be integrated into Israel. Consequently, we can note that the 
territorial conflict between the Palestinians and Jews in the occupied 
Palestinian territories is based on the demographic superiority of 
Palestinians in the two areas. 
Table 4.9 summarizes the magnitude of the Jewish presence in the Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank, as well as their estimated numbers up to the year 
2000. The number of Jewish colonists in the Gaza Strip has increased 
during 1978-84 from 500 to 2000 or by 300%, while they increased from 7800 
to 42,600 (446.2%) in the West Bank. 
During the period 1982-84, a sharp increase in the colonists and 
colonies numbers was reported. In the West Bank, by the end of 
1982 there 
were a total of 20,600 colonists, living in 71 colonies. 
This figure rose 
in 1983 to 27,500 colonists, living in 99 colonies, and went up to 42,600 
living in 114 colonies in 1984. These increases mean an average annual 
growth rate of 53.4% and 30.3% in the numbers of colonists and colonies 
respectively. On the other hand, the Strip's colonies 
have increased from 
15 in 1983 to 20 by 1984, or by 25%, but the number of colonists in 1983 
is unavailable. 
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Despite the actual steady increase in the number of Israelis,, their 
percentage share in the total population is still very limited and 
consequently the demographic transformation has not been achieved yet. In 
the West Bank the Israelis formed 1.1% of the total Arab population in 
1978. This percentage rose to 2.8% in 1982,3.6% in 1983 and reached 5.4% 
in 1984. In the meantime their percentage in the Gaza Strip went up 
slightly from 0.1% in 1978 to 0.23% in 1979 and reached 0.39% in 1984 (see 
Table 4.9). From these increases we can conclude that the percentage of 
Israelis among the total Arab population has increased in both the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, but at a greater rate in the West Bank than in 
the Strip. 
Moreover,, according to the Israeli colonial plan up to the year 2000, 
the percentage of Jews will rise markedly, particularly in the West Bank 
where their percentage should reach 11.3% in 1990 and 36.9% in the year 
2000. On the other hand, in the Strip, it should grow from 0.39% in 1984 
to 1.6% in 1990 and reach 2.3% in the year of 2000 (Table 4.9). From the 
aforementioned plan, we can easily interpret that the Israelis will 
continue to implant more colonies in both the Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank, and expand the existing colonies by seizing more and more lands from 
the Palestinian owners. Up to 1984, about 50/1, of the total area of the 
West Bank was under the Israeli colonial process, but in the Gaza Strip 
some 30% of the total area was being colonized or confiscated. 
The present and forthcoming Israeli colonial network in the West Bank 
reveals more successful than in the Gaza Strip (Table 4.9), which will 
result in the modification of the demographic composition for the 
Israeli's benefit. Success in the West Bank can be attributed to a 
variety of factors. 
Firstly, the geographical setting of the West Bank constitutes a-very 
strategic site which can threaten the security of the densely inhabited 
region in Israel - namely the coastal region stretching from Tel Aviv in 
the south to Haifa in the north. Therefore, the presence of the Jewish 
colonies in the West Bank is very important and vital for Israeli 
security. Also this presence will lead to the fragmentation of the 
demographic characteristics of the Palestinian population in the West 
Bank. 
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Secondly, the West Bank area comprises 5505 sq. kms, which would aid the colonists in creating and implementing their forthcoming colonial 
plan. 
Thirdly, there is an abundance of permanent employment in the West 
Bank colonies, where the Israeli authorities have established some Jewish 
urban-industrial sites to secure continuous employment for the Israeli 
colonists (which has been considered the distinctive problem of the Gaza 
Strip colonies). 
Fourthly, the geographical setting of the West Bank in the vicinity 
of the Israeli main administrative and industrial centres (West Jerusalem, 
Tel Aviv and Haifa) was preferred by the Israeli colonists; 71.5% of the 
West Bank colonists live close to the Jerusalem and Tel Aviv areas 
(Benvenisti, 1985). 
Finally, the most distinctive role in the colonization process in the 
West Bank was that the Jews considered it as part of the biblical land of 
Israel "Eretz Ysrael", hence the new Israeli names of Judea (the southern 
section of the West Bank) and Samaria (the northern section of the West 
Bank) instead of the current name of West Bank. The religio-historical 
effect can be observed from the percentage share of religious colonists 
among the entire population, as well as their percentage in the Jerusalem 
area. Benvenisti (1985) reported that 50% of the colonists in the West 
Bank were religious, 41% were living in close proximity to Jerusalem, and 
25% of them were living in one colony, namely Ma'ale Adumim township east 
of Jerusalem. 
The demographic conflict between the Palestinian Arabs and Jews in 
the Gaza Strip has a different basis, because there is no possibility of 
attaining a Jewish majority there. It is estimated by the World Zionist 
Organization that in 1990 the planned Jewish population of the Strip will 
be 10,000 and in the year 2000 it will be 20,000. Projections show that 
the Palestinian population, in contrast, will be 625,290 in 1990 and 
878,500 in the year 2000 (Table 4.9). Thereby, the small Israeli minority 
would have to focus their attention on the control of the Palestinian 
majority. Consequently, the issue of colonies in the Strip is far more 
intricate than in the West Bank. 
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The Israeli colony plan in the Gaza Strip has faced several physical 
and human obstacles. The overpopulation problem has characterized the 
Strip as one of the most densely Populated regions in the world, and the 
Strip has been distinguished by a very high rate of natural increase which 
has reached 3.41% per annum (1968-84). This means that by the year 2000, 
the number of Israeli colonists will never exceed more than the 
inhabitants of a small refugee camp or village. 
Then there is the problem of limited area (364 sq. kms), a physical 
obstacle which has restricted the development of Israeli colonies. 
Furthermore, agricultural land is very limited (210 sq. kms) relative to 
the total population of Palestinians (509,900 persons in 1984), and most 
of the fertile and cultivable lands are already utilized by them. 
Another major problem is that the only water resource in the Strip is 
groundwater, and underground flow is from the east. Their replenishment 
was estimated at 40 million cubic metres and 10-20 million cubic metres 
per year respectively, in addition to about 20-30 million cubic metres 
replenishment annually by the return flow from irrigation and cesspools. 
On the other hand, water consumption is estimated at 100 million cubic 
metres per year, of which 90% is used for irrigation. As a result of this 
imbalance between replenishment and consumption, the water table dropped 
by 0.5-2.5 metres between 1978 and 1982. So the salinity of the 
groundwater has risen and ranged from 600 to 1300 ppm chloride (Schwarz, 
1982). We can conclude that the Strip is suffering from a current 
shortage in water supply, which will be aggravated in the future under the 
pressure of the local population growth, and additionally by the increase 
in the numbers of Israeli colonies which are located in the sand dunes and 
are based on agricultural production. 
These colonies are located at a great distance from the main Israeli 
cities outside the Strip border. For instance, the distances between the 
Qatif bloc colonies and Tel Aviv and Jerusalem cities are about 100 kms 
and 110 kms respectively. In the meantime, the nearest city to them is 
Ashqelon which is located at a distance of 50 kms. Consequently, several 
families of Jewish colonists were eventually forced to leave their new 
accommodation in the Strip colonies and return to Israel in order to be 
closer to the main Israeli cities. 
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The economic base of the Israeli colonies is generally in 
agricultural production as well as in tourism (except for the uninhabited 
colony of Eerz). The agricultural production is based on vegetables (tomatoes, peppers, corn and aubergines) and flowers for export. This 
work covers only eight months of the year while the other four months will be considered as unemployment time. In addition, the colonies soil 
structure has to be completely transformed from the local soil of the sand dunes, leading to an increase in the cost of reclamation. 
The Israeli authorities insist on solving these main problems to 
their own advantage, so since the Israeli occupation of the Strip in 1967, 
they have been trying to reduce the population density in the Gaza Strip. 
They have exerted some effort to lure the Palestinians to emigrate to 
Jordan and the West Bank. Moreover, in 1977 they forced some thousands to 
move to Al-Arish Town (in Sinai desert) by destroying their camp shelters 
in a so-called "thinning out" process (see Chapter 8). Remarkably, the 
magnitude of this mobility has not counteracted the annual rate of natural 
increase in the Strip. 
Moreover, despite the severe shortage of water resources in the Gaza 
Strip [the, present over-exploitation amounts to about 30-60 million cubic 
metres per year, caused by the lack of water replenishment and the 
increase in the evaporation rate, which has been estimated at between 
1800-1900 mm per year. Consequently, the moisture balance of the soil is 
negative throughout the summer (Schwarz, 1982)], the Israelis have dug 
between 35 and 40 wells to irrigate their colonies' agricultural land and 
they also transfer some of the water to their colonies inside the Green 
line (Fig. 4.10). On the other hand, they are tightening control over 
Palestinian use of water, with intensified watersaving measures imposed 
against the Palestinian inhabitants. Palestinians are forbidden to 
increase the pumping capacity of their existing wells despite the increase 
in population numbers, and meters have been placed on Arab Palestinian 
wells to keep a daily check of their output. Consequently, all of these 
restrictions are imposed to save sufficient water for the Israeli colonies 
inside and outside the Strip. However, recently all of the Strip 
localities have been suffering from a chronic problem of water shortage 
for agriculture and domestic use (see Chapter 10). 
The Israeli military authorities have confiscated the more fertile 
'Ard cz from their Palestinian owners to support their colonies, in order to 
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create a permanent agricultural base. In January 1985 for example the 
Israeli army confiscated about 350 dunums from the rich Gaza valley area 
close to Nezarim colony in order to expand its area (Al Fajr, 1985). 
However, the Israelis also desire to create a permanent economic 
infrastructural basis to raise daily employment in their colonies and to 
prevent return migration to Israel. Therefore, in December 1985 the 
security forces began levelling some hundreds of dunums of land to the 
west of Khan Yunis refugee camp in order to establish a regional 
industrial centre there. They have built a storage area for vegetables 
cultivated in the Israeli colonies and an airstrip which, it is claimed, 
is to be used for their exportation. Hotels are also to be built on this 
land to encourage the tourist industry and a riding school has already 
been completed. In the meantime they have approved the establishment of 
Kefar Dayagim, a fishing village which is expected to be north of Gaza 
Beach camp. 
From the previous discussion, it is evident that the Jewish presence 
in the Strip has been facing several obstacles, and the future magnitude 
of their colonists will be very limited relative to the Palestinian Arab 
population. But this presence is very important and vital from the 
Israeli political point of view. Roznbelt, the chief of the Gaza Regional 
council of Israel colonies, described the presence of Israeli colonies in 
the Strip as very important to set up a security buffer zone between the 
Strip and Egypt, and to prevent the possibility of the establishment of an 
independent state in the region (Davar, 1984). 
Mattityahu Drobless, co-head of the WZO settlement department, has 
admitted it is really more a political settlement. In fact, all the 
colonies are political. They may have their economic bases in greenhouse 
agriculture and tourism, but they have not been conceived simply to boost 
Israel's poor economic performance. The cost - $2,000 to prepare one 
dunum of land for a colony - is prohibitive, but the political idea is to 
be absorbed into Israel. An autonomous Palestinian state is the last thing 
Israel intends to see here (Smith, 1985). 
Furthermore, the Israelis insist on intensifying new colonies and 
expanding the existing ones which have swallowed up the surrounding land 
bit by bit., The recommended areas for the forthcoming colonial plan are: 
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east of Rafah City, Nezarim area, the coastal plain north of Gaza town and 
east of Bureij refugee camp. Moreover, the Israeli colonists have been 
touring Gaza town with the intention of building a Jewish residential area in the heart of the city as they have done in the heart of Hebron city in 
the West Bank. 
Consequeptly, the demographic and territorial conflict between the 
Palestinian Arabs and the Jewish colonists will intensify in the future, 
when most of the natural resources (water and land) will be captured by 
the Israelis, while the Palestinians will suffer from very serious 
problems of accommodation, lack of water and land confiscation. These 
problems will threaten the continuous presence of Palestinian society in 
the Strip. 
In summary, the Israeli plan in the Strip would not result in 
demographic transformation to their advantage by the year 2000, though 
they would be successful in the West Bank. Now, it would be a legitimate 
question to ask whether the Israeli authorities will have to recourse to 
expelling the Palestinians from the Strip and the West Bank as they did in 
1948. This would not be surprising, since we know that there are some 
colonial movements and parties (Gush Emunim, Kach and Ha Tehiya) who 
irregularly hold demonstrations and appeal to the Israeli government to 
expel the Palestinians to Jordan. Here a new question has been raised: 
whether this will happen in the future : We will wait to know the answer. 
4.6 Summary 
The political situation which has taken place in the Gaza Strip since 
the wars of 1948 and 1967 has greatly affected all aspects of Gazan 
population structure as well as transforming the status of settlements. 
In fact, the 1948 displacement from occupied Palestine led to population 
expansion in the Strip localities, increasing the percentage of urban 
dwellers: the percentage rose from 70% in 1945 to about 90% in 1982, and 
reducing the proportion of rural population from 30% to 10% during the 
same period. Also, the 1948 displacement increased the population 
pressure on the poorest economic base of the Gaza Strip, adding eight 
refugee camps to the pre-existing Palestinian settlement. 
Following the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip in 1967, three 
villages have developed into urban centres, taking advantage of the new 
-134- 
Israeli definition of the concept of urban centre. In addition, s ome 
small localities have been transformed into villages and local committees 
by the Israeli authorities. 
The inhabitants of the refugee camps increased by 4.67% per annum 
during June 1961 - June 1967 (The Strip was governed by the Egyptians) in 
contrast to 0.77% during June 1967 - June 1985 (The Israeli occupation 
period which continues so far). The decline during the Israeli period was 
due to the Israeli policy imposed against the refugee camps which aimed to 
evacuate the inhabitants from the camps (see part 3). Moreover, as a 
consequence of population growth, the living space in the refugee camps 
has decreased and the shelters have become more congested. 
Up to 1985, the Israelis implanted 21 colonies, of which two sites 
are under construction, which embodied their previous strategy of full 
domination of the Palestinians' land. So, the process of their colonial 
plan in the Strip and the West Bank has remained closely similar to those 
which practised before the 1948 catastrophe, aiming to destroy the 
Palestinian character by a systematic policy of Judaization whereby the 
Israelis have succeeded in encircling the Strip with a series of Jewish 
colonies. In fact, the Israeli colonies in the Gaza Strip have 
assimilated all the lands, particularly the sand dunes, which could solve 
the housing problem of Gaza's people. Hence the Strip inhabitants will be 
forced to set up their new dwellings on the reduced agricultural land, 
which already has fallen over the years. 
Finally, the comparative study of the Israeli colonial plan in the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank allowed for a maximum contrast between the 
two Palestinian territories occupied by the Israeli army. In both 
territories, the strategy of the Israeli colonial plan is closely similar, 
where they aim to ensure Israeli Jewish predominance and hence sovereignty 
over the occupied territories. The Israeli government is striving to 
change the demographic balance to their advantage by transplating tens of 
thousands of Israeli Jews into the Strip and the West Bank. The Israelis 
roughly will reach this goal in the West Bank by the end of this century 
(see Table 4-9); but in the Strip their aim will be impossible to 
implement. This circumstance has forced the Gaza Regional Council of 
Settlement (1983) to make intensive advertising to encourage Jewish 
colonists to colonize the Gaza Strip, by describing the Strip as the 
"Hawaii of Israel". 
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PART TWO 
Survey of the ýopýlatjon Structurýe 
Owing to a lack of new complete data covering the population 
structure of the Gaza Strip by a census,, a sample survey was conducted by 
the researcher between October 1985 and January 1986 in order to cover the 
scope of the work. Six formats of questionnaire were utilised in the 
survey, four of them concerning the population structure while the other 
two dealt with refugee rehousing projects and the housing problem in the 
refugee camps. The results of the last two formats of questionnaire will 
be treated in part three. 
In part two,, the analysis of the population structure will be 
restricted to two main subjects. The first concerns the analysis of 
age-sex structure and factors operating on them, and will be discussed in 
chapter six and supported by two formats of questionnaire on population 
structure and fertility, mortality and family planning. The second 
subject concerns analysis of the employment composition, and will be 
analysed in chapter seven assisted, also, by two formats of questionnaire 
concerning Gazan workers in Israel, and Gazan employees in the Arab and 
non-Arab countries. 
Theoretically, there are three major methods which can be utilised to 
elicit information from respondents: personal interviews, a postal 
questionnaire and a telephone survey (Nachmias, D. and Nachmias, C. 1981). 
In this study, personal interviews with heads of households and wives 
(wives were only interviewed in the fertility, mortality and family 
planning survey) have been used. In addition, postal questionnaires 
have 
been used in this study and restricted to one question concerning salaries 
of Gazan workers in the Arab countries, since there was no chance to 
have 
direct contact with them in the Strip, particularly when most of them were 
likely to be at their jobs at the time the survey was conducted. The 
survey procedure for each format of questionnaire is explained separately 
in chapter five. 
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CHALTER FivE 
The Survey and Methods 
"Carrying out research in the occupied territories has been likened 
to conducting an investigation, due to the population's extreme reluctance 
to disclose information that could be used against them. People in Gaza 
were suspicious, and material was collected only after a very slow 
courting of their trust. Some questions, especially those concerning 
salaries and employment inside Israel, could not always be broached since 
people feared the information would be reported to the Israeli Labour 
Office" (Rockwell, 1985). 
In spite of the above-mentioned difficulties, most of the contacted 
respondents were willing to be interviewed. A few of them refused to be 
engaged in the survey. These difficulties have been successfully solved, 
partly because the research is one of the Strip's population which led to 
a full co-operation and welcome from the contacted respondents, and partly 
because the researcher had the benefit of his job as a lecturer of 
geography in the Islamic University of Gaza, where a number of students 
were enlisted to help in the survey process. 
The 1985 survey was coincident with the new security crackdown 
imposed by the Israeli military authorities against the Strip population 
in August 1985, when the iron fist policy was re-introduced. This 
authorized the Israeli military governor to arrest anybody without trial 
(administrative detention) or to eject anybody outside the Gaza Strip. At 
the same time, the Israeli Amy launched a bitter campaign against the 
Gazan people. Hirst (1985) reported that the Israeli army began its 
security crackdown in Gaza. In addition to their standard practice of 
thrusting people, hands up, against a wall with insults or forcing them 
face down on the asphalt, troops on stepped-up patrols have developed a 
technique which can be only intended to humiliate. 
Owing to the above-mentioned difficulties which took place throughout 
the time of conducting the survey, the researcher decided to reduce 
travelling between the Strip's localities as much as possible to keep 
himself away from the military roadblocks, in order to prevent possible 
confiscation of questionnaires which may be considered by the Israelis as 
illegal work. 
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The university students' assistance in the questionning process led to a full co-operation from the interviewed respondents. Also some benefits resulted from their help in this study. First, the researcher's 
problem of travelling between the Strip's localities was reduced. 
Secondly, the respondents disclosed accurate answers, particularly when 
they were interviewed by persons well-known to them, which resulted in 
courting their trust. Thirdly, the survey was completed in a relatively 
short time, with the interviewing process and computer analysis of the 
collected data being accomplished in 4 months. 
Prior to the administration of the survey, the interviewers were 
trained and given instruction by the author in order to achieve the 
desirable goals of the survey. The interviewers benefitted from the 
questionnaire layout which was determined by the need for speed of 
interviewing, for one item to lead logically to the next, and for easy 
filling in of questionnaires. Furthermore, three days before starting 
interviewing, a random cluster were selected for a sample study to examine 
the ability of respondents to answer the questions, and to provide more 
chance for the engaged students to build up practical experience on the 
nature of the survey. 
Four formats of questionnaire were employed as the tool in this 
study, of which three were distributed across the Strip: a questionnaire 
on population structure, one dealing with Gazan workers in Israel, and one 
concerning Gazan employees in the Arab and non-Arab countries. In the 
aforesaid questionnaire, Gaza University students participated in 
interviewing respondents across the Strip, and each one of them had the 
three formats of questionnaire. On the other hand, the 4th format of 
questionnaire on fertility, mortality, and family planning was restricted 
to interviewing respondents from Khan Yunis area as a case study, and was 
managed by the researcher himself and six other persons from the Khan 
Yunis area. 
Throughout the survey care was taken to ensure that the population 
sample was made up entirely of the Strip population, and results derived 
from it can be generalized and considered as the characteristics of the 
Strip's population as a whole. 
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The sample selection for all questionnaires was based on a random 
method, particularly when the residential areas had been chosen as a basis 
of this study. Then all the eligible surrounding respondents were taken 
as clusters and interviewed. 
Details follow about the four questionnaires. 
5.1 The Survey of Population Structure 
The only data to hand concerning the Gazan population age structure 
is the Israeli census of September 1967 which was conducted by the Israeli 
army three months after the war of June 1967. The population age 
structure was divided into five age groups, and presented in absolute 
numbers for each locality. Since then, the Israeli Central Bureau of 
Statistics has published an annual estimate covering the Strip's 
population age-sex structure as a whole, and the population has been 
divided into quinquennial age-sex groups. 
Since there are no locality data for the Gazan population structure 
in general and population age-sex structure in particular, a sample survey 
has been carried out in 1985 with this object. 
The purpose of the sample survey of population structure was to 
collect the necessary data concerning the population age-sex structure of 
the Strip's localities considering each one separately. It also aimed to 
examine possible spatial differences in the age-sex structure between the 
residents of cities, refugee camps, and villages. The survey focused 
particularly on measuring the impact of the 1967 war on the population 
age-sex structure in order to ascertain some of the consequences of 
emigration from the Strip. 
This enabled a comparison to be made between the age-sex structure of 
the population in 1967 and in 1985, which helped in identifying the impact 
of the war, and in examining the role of natural increase in compensating 
for the loss in the Strip's population. 
5.1.1 The Sample Coverage 
The sample survey covers all those households selected from different 
quarters and blocks within the boundaries of 21 Gazan localities. These 
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localities can be classified as: 4 cities,, 8 refugee camps, and 9 
vi 11 ages. The term "household" is used here to describe a person or group 
of people living in one house of which the members share their food and 
other like requirements. The members may consist of parents, grandfather, 
grandmother, children, married sons and their families, and any other 
relatives who are living with the family. 
It was decided to take 1200 households from the Gaza Strip as a 
sample to examine the population structure in general and age-sex 
structure in particular. In the final form this covered 1149 households, 
encompassing 10,044 persons who represent about 2% of the Strip's total 
popul-ation (Table 5.1), and about 95.8% of the contacted households were 
successfully interviewed. 
5.1.2 The Questionnaire 
The questionnaire concentrated on the population structure, namely 
age, sex, marital status, occupation, employment, place of work, education 
level and literacy (see Appendix 3). These characteristics have been 
greatly affected by the abnormal population growth of the Gaza Strip since 
1948 (see Chapter two). 
The population growth of Gaza Strip was greatly affected by the 
influx of Palestinian refugees in the Strip in 1948 and by the 
displacement from the Strip after the 1967 war. There is no doubt that 
the political situation of the Gaza Strip, which has orientated population 
movements in the last forty years, had a great impact on population 
structure, particularly age-sex, occupation, employment and place of work. 
Therefore, it was obviously essential to deal with these characteristics. 
On 10 October 1985, a pilot survey was conducted by the researcher 
himself to test the questionnaire. Ten households from Khan Yunis refugee 
camp were interviewed. The pilot led to one modification in the 
questionnaire. A new format of questionnaire concerning Gazan workers 
in 
the Arab and non-Arab countries was added to complete the gap of "place of 
work" question in the population structure questionnaire 
(Appendix 3). 
This addition was proved necessary by the fact that a significant part of 
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Table 5.1 Selected Clusters and Households in Each Locality for the 1985 
Sample Survey of the Gaza Strip Population Structure 
Local i ty Sample Households No. of People No. of Clusters 
Gazan cities: 
Gaza 135 1107 7 
Khan Yunis 82 766 4 
Deir el Balah 50 395 2 
Rafah 60 575 3 
Total 327 2843 16 
, Gazan Refugee Camps: 
Rafah 73 6522- 4 
Khan Yunis 63 592 5 
Deir el Balah 37 344 3 
Mughazi 45 395 3 
Bureij 51 404 2 
Nuseirat 59 495 3 
Beach 70 625 4 
Jabalya 61 611 4 
Total 459 4118 28 
Gazan villages: 
Jabalya-Nazla 43 395 2 
Beit Lahiya 45 329 2 
Beit Hanun 58 504 3 
Zawaida 52 410 2 
Bani Suheila 43 351 2 
Abasan el Kabira 24 232 
2 
Abasan el Saghira 28 246 
2 
Ikhza'a 30 247 1 
Qarara 46 369 
2 
Total 363 3083 
IS 
Gaza Strip as a whole 1149 10044 
62 
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the Gazan labour force, specifically the more highly educated people, were 
employed in the Arab states. 
5.1.3 Sample Selection 
The most important criterion in sample choosing, in view of the 
purpose of the survey, was to achieve an equal representation of the 
population. Consequently, it was decided to select a reasonable sample 
entirely representing the Strip population, but which did not conflict 
with the savage political condition in the Strip, or with the researcher's 
financial problems. Hence, the sample has been selected randomly from 21 
localities in order to gather reasonable statistics concerning the 
! population structure of the Gaza Strip, and to provide credible results. 
The Gaza Strip localities are divided into quarters in the cities, 
blocks in the refugee camps, and into streets in the villages. But due to 
the incomplete housing numbers, and to the bitter political situations of 
the Strip at the time of survey, it was thought very difficult to follow a 
systematic method in selecting the sample across the Strip. 
The problem could not be circumvented because the political and 
financial constraints militated against it. The Israeli intelligence and 
army campaign against the residents, and the re-introduction of the law of 
emergency produced a tense atmosphere in all the Gaza Strip's localities. 
Consequentlyq although the campaign might have made the survey impossible, 
it appeared best to complete the main task as fast as possible. So the 
researcher used his extensive personal experience of the Gaza Strip as a 
resident to deal with the aforesaid difficulties. 
Therefore, the sample was chosen at random in the first stage5 
particularly when the first households in each stratum 
had been selected 
from each localitys and interviewing began on the 
basis of questioning all 
the surrounding households as a cluster in the second stage. 
This was 
intended to produce a wide representation of the sample and aimed 
to 
minimize biasing errors as well. 
Consequently, a relatively small sample was selected randomly across 
the Strip. 16 clusters were chosen from the 
Gazan cities,, 28 clusters 
from refugee camps, and 18 clusters 
from Gazan villages, giving a total 
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of 62 clusters to give a good spatial spread and a reasonable 
representation of the Strip's population. Also, the number of selected 
clusters varied from 7 clusters covering 135 households in Gaza city to 1 
cluster encompassing only 30 households in Ikhza'a village. Table 5.1 
sunnarises the magnitude of household clusters, and the people included in 
the sample survey in each locality. 
Overall co-operation from the sampled population was excellent, there 
being very few who refused to be engaged in the interviewing, and then 
they were followed by their neighbours. The fact that Gazan University 
students were actively involved in the survey clearly minimized the 
population's suspicions. 
5.1.4 Interviewing. 
Since the volume of work needed more than one interviewer, the 
researcher received significant assistance from the students of geography 
in the Islamic University of Gaza, where numbers varied from four 
interviewers in Gaza city to one interviewer in Ikhza'a village. 
The survey began on 15 October and continued until 30 November 1985. 
Interviews were conducted in the selected blocks and quarters on Friday 
and Saturday afternoons, and between 6 p. m. and 8 p. m. each evening in the 
other days, specifically, when household-heads were most likely to be at 
home. The interviewers (including the researcher) scattered into groups, 
each operating in a different locality, and within each locality, each 
interviewer operating in a different residential block. The questionnaire 
was addressed to the household-heads and answers were derived from what is 
written on their identity cards and from the household member's birth 
certificates. During the interview most of the contacted respondents were 
co-operative, and the questionnaires were checked by the researcher 
directly after interviewing. 
Through the interviewing proceSS9 another pilot survey was conducted 
by the researcher to examine the questionnaires accuracy of completion. 
Between 6 and 10 households from 22 localities were interviewed. 
As a 
result, 51 questionnaires of the sample were suspected because 
they were 
incomplete or respondents gave inaccurate answers. Consequently, 
the 
total number of effective responses was 1,149 households. 
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5.2 The Survey of Fe Mortal iV and_ Family Planninq 
The principal objective of this survey which was conducted by the 
researcher in Khan Yunis area (Gaza Strip) between 25 October - 10 
November 1985, was to analyse the effect of the three variables of 
fertilitys mortality, and family planning on the population age structure, 
specifically their impact on the age group of young people (0-14), so that 
data derived from the survey appeared to be acceptable for the purpose of 
studying retrospective fertility and mortality ratios in general, and 
infant and childhood mortality in particular. Moreover, womens' attitude 
toward family planning was engaged as a new variable in this study in 
order to examine its impact on population age structure. 
I 
In a nutshell, widespread knowledge and use of contraception for the 
sake of achieving birth control or achieving birth spacing should have led 
to a reduction in the percentage of young people and vice versa. 
Consequently, four questions have been added to the questionnaire to 
elicit the fertility behaviour of Gazan couples and their attitude towards 
contraceptive use. 
This framework can be considered as a new 
geographers. Fuller (1984) underlined that thi 
engaged in family planning research are few in 
scattered. He asked for a greater recognition 
specialized organization of population studies 
quality of research and to have greater impact 
field for population 
e number of geographers 
number and widely 
and support from the 
in order to have a high 
on the problem. 
Khan Yunis area, the second largest population concentration in the 
Gaza Strip, was chosen as the survey site because it is characterized by 
the following points: 
(a) It has the largest . concentration of villages in the Gaza Strip -5 
villages out of the 9 villages of the Gaza Strip - which enabled a good 
representation of the Strip's rural society in the survey. 
(b) the population characterized as average standard of 
living of the 
Gaza Strip as well as the socio-economic, political and religious 
conditions. 
(c) The survey included some sensitive questions, especially 
the last 4 
questions (Appendix 4) which were designed to 
discover women's attitude 
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toward knowledge and use of contraception, and required direct contact 
with females which contradicts with the traditions of Gazan society. Khan 
Yunis area provided a reasonable solution for this problem, because the 
researcher has extensive personal knowledge of the area as a resident in 
Khan Yunis refugee camp, and gained full co-operation from the wives 
contacted. 
5.2.1 The Survey Coveraqe 
The sample survey of fertility,, mortality, and family planning covers 
all those married wives selected from different places within the 
boundaries of 7 localities in Khan Yunis area :1 city, 1 refugee camp, 
and 5 villages (Table 5.2). 
It covered 235 currently married women of child-bearing age, between 
15 and 49 years old, who gave definite answers to the questionnaire. The 
spatial distribution of contacted women was 90 women from Khan Yunis city, 
85 from Khan Yunis refugee camp, and 60 from Khan Yunis villages. The 235 
married women have had 1,559 births throughout their marriage, of whom 
1,372 children are still alive. 
5.2.2 The Questionnaire 
The questionnaire consisted of 17 questions aimed in broad terms to 
identify four objectives as follows: 
1 questions designed to identify the fertility trends in Khan Yunis 
area during 1950-1985; 
2) questions designed to identify the mortality rates in general and 
infant and childhood mortality rates in particular during the 
aforesaid period; 
3) questions designed to investigate women's attitude toward 
family 
planning, the extent of their knowledge and use of contraception, 
the 
effect, if any, of contraception use on fertility; obstacles 
of using 
contraception; and to test their future attitudes 
toward 
contraceptive-use; and 
4) questions designed to test the relationship between 
the educational 
level and residential place of husbands and wives with 
fertility, 
mortality, and use of contraception. 
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Table 5.2 Selected Clusters and Respondents of Currently Married Women by 
Population Community for the 1985 Sample Survey of Fertility, Mortality 
and Family Planning, Khan Yunis Area. 
Local ity No. of res- 
pondents 
% of 
total 
No. of 
clusters 
Khan Yunis city 90 38.3 7 
Khan Yunis refugee camp 85 36.2 6 
Khan Yunis villages: 
Bani Suheila 16 6.8 2 
Abasan el Kabira 14 5.95 2 
Abasan el Saghira 10 4.25 2 
Ikhza'a 5 2.1 1 
Qarara 15 6.4 2 
Total of Khan Yunis villages 60 25.5 9 
235 100.0 22 
5.2.3 Sample Selection 
Khan Yunis area was recommended as the survey site because of its 
proximity to the researcher's accommodation in Khan Yunis refugee camp. 
Its population was estimated to about 103,000 as at June 30 1985. Roughly 
47,000 (45.6%) lived in Khan Yunis city, 32,000 (31.1%) in Khan Yunis 
refugee camp, and 24,000 (23.3%) in the 5 Khan Yunis villages of Bani 
Suheila, Abasan el Kabira, Abasan el Saghira, Ikhzaa, and Qarara. 
It was decided originally to take a large sample, but due to the 
limited financial facilities and political problems, the number of 
respondents was restricted to 235, sampled to represent the three 
Khan 
Yunis communities (city dwellers, refugees, villagers) according 
to their 
proportion of the total. Table 5.2 shows that 38.3% of the 
total 
contacted respondents were chosen from Khan Yunis city, 
36.2% from Khan 
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Yunis refugee camp and 25.5% from Khan Yunis villages, so the 
representation is nearly similar to that of the communities' populations. 
The sample selection was based on a random method, and the selected 
samples were interviewed individually. 7 clusters were chosen from Khan 
Yunis city, 6 clusters from Khan Yunis refugee camp, and 9 clusters from 
Khan Yunis villages, a total of 22 (Table 5.2). Throughout the sample 
selection, care was taken to ensure that the sample was representative 
entirely of Khan Yunis area wives and then Gaza Strip wives as a whole. 
On the other hand, sample selection from the three communities of Khan 
Yunis area should enable us to make a comparison between their observed 
results; 
An individual questionnaire was addressed to each married woman 15-49 
years who was interviewed. Also the duration of marriage of the selected 
women varied from less than 5 years to more than 30 years. At the Khan 
Yunis area level of analysis, 34 married women who had been married for 
more than 30 years were included in the survey, to find out what the 
completed fertility of Gazan women was. 
5.2.4 Interviewing 
Since the nature of the survey was very sensitive, requiring the 
interviewing of married women, the researcher was assisted by 6 
interviewers from the Khan Yunis, 3 males and 3 females. 
It was thought possible to carry out the survey in the morning or 
afternoon since women's involvement in non-domestic work was very low, but 
later this was ruled out because the traditions of Gazan Society forbid 
direct conta-ct with females without the presence of their husbands or 
relatives. Consequently, interviews were carried out between 6 p. m. and 8 
p. m. each evening, when husbands were likely to be at home. The 7 
interviewers (including the researcher) split into three groups working in 
a different locality, each group including 2 interviewers, one male and 
one female, the first group operating in Khan Yunis refugee camp, the 
second in Khan Yunis city, and the third in Khan Yunis villages. The 
researcher's work was concentrated mainly on interviewing respondents 
from 
both Khan Yunis refugee camp and Khan Yunis city, and in supervising 
the 
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three groups of interviewers. Here, it is very important to mention that 
the interviewers operated in a different residential blocks within each 
locality. 
The questionnaire was administered to the married wives, who 
answered solely on the basis of the situation throughout her period of 
marriage. One difficulty arose with regard to women's knowledge and use 
of contraception. A significant proportion of the contacted women were 
reluctant to answer these questions, partly because they considered them 
as a familial matter and that their attitudes should be kept confidential, 
and partly because the question had some political, religious and social 
overtones, and their answers might have disturbed their family life or 
caused problems with the Israeli occupying authority. But this problem 
was solved when a guarantee was given to the interviewed wives that their 
names and the numbers of their houses would not be reported. 
In short, all of the contacted respondents were co-operative, and the 
questionnaires were filled in correctly and completely. 
5.3 Survey of Ga-nn Workers in Israel 
Owing to unavailability of data concerning conditions of work of 
Gazan workers in Israel, a personal survey was carried out between 15 
October and 15 November 1985. It focused on identifying the main working 
sectors enlisting Gazan workers, and on naming and ranking the favourite 
places of work for them. In addition, the survey aimed to assess whether 
there was a relationship between the income value and the place of work. 
The importance of the survey can be derived from the fact that a 
significant proportion of Gaza's labour force is working in Israel, and 
their numbers have been gftwing since the Israeli occupation of the Gaza 
Strip in 1967. For instance, about 10% (5350 workers) of the total labour 
force of the Strip worked in Israel in 1970, while the proportion had gone 
up dramatically to 46.1% (40,200 workers) by the end of 1984. Since 
little is known about them, it is very important to deal with this subject 
in order to achieve the desired aims. 
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5.3.1 The Sample Coverage 
Gazan workers in Israel have been taken as a case study in order to 
underline their work conditions in the Israeli economic sector. The 
sample includes those who were employed by the Labour Office (legal 
workers) as well as the illegal labourers. Hence, 300 workers were 
selected across the Gaza Strip: 120 from the northern zone, 70 from the 
central zone, and 110 from the southern zone. 
5.3.2 The_Questionnaire 
The questionnaire concerning Gazan workers in Israel , which can be 
found in Appendix 5, consisted of 15 questions designed to obtain the 
necessary data on Gazan workers in Israel In broad terms the questions 
are of four kinds: 
(a) those designed to derive the characteristics of the Gazan workers in 
Israel, like their population status (refugee or indigenous), sex, marital 
status, age, and level of education; 
(b) those designed to identify the major places and types of work for the 
Gazan workers in Israel and their worktrip destinations, so as to compute 
the daily worktrip distance from home to work; 
(C) those designed to test the magnitude of legal and illegal workforce 
and to know why the illegal workers refused to be employed by the labour 
office; and 
(d) those designed to obtain information about the net income and number 
of days worked per month. 
5.3.3 SampleSelection 
As mentioned befores the University students who assisted in 
questioning respondents across the Gaza Strip were provided with three 
formats of questionnaire concerning population structure, workers in 
Israel, and Gazan employees in the Arab and non-Arab countries. 
Instructions were given to them before the beginning of interviewing 
respondents to fill in the three formats of questionnaire when eligible 
respondents were found. 
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Consequently, the task began with the filling in of the questionnaire 
on population structure in the first stage. But when the contacted 
respondents were asked the question concerning their place of work (see 
Appendix 3) and they gave an answer indicating that they or their family 
members are working in Israel or in the Arab and non-Arab countries, then 
they were asked to answer questions on one of the other two formats of 
questionnaire. Hence, we can conclude that the sample was based on the 
random method which was explained before. 
5.3.4 Interviewinq 
The questionnaire was administered to the Gazan workers, who answered 
solely on the basis of their work conditions in Israel. The sample 
covered both males and females who were working in Israel at the time of 
survey; 53 (17.7%) respondents out of the 300 sampled respondents were 
females. 
250 respondents were interviewed in their houses by the university 
students and the researcher, across the Gaza Strip, while the remaining 50 
respondents were selected randomly from the workers congregating in 
Al-Shuja'aya square of Gaza city (see Plate 7.1) and then interviewed by 
the researcher himself. The researcher made two separate visits to 
"Al-Shuja'aya" (some Israelis and Palestinians call the place an "Arab 
slave market") from dawn onwards in order to interview them. Meanwhile, 
it is very important to mention that the workers gave accurate answers 
for 
the questions including particularly those concerning income and 
the 
average number of days worked per month in Israel. This outcome was 
concluded when the questionnaire were checked by the researcher 
directly 
after interviewing, and results were compared with the researcher's 
experience of workers' in Israel. 
Finally, during the, interviews just 2 female respondents decided 
to 
give up the interview when they were asked about 
their monthly income, 
because they thought that the researcher was an Israeli Labour 
Office 
employee. They thought that this information would 
be reported to the 
office and that they would be enforced to pay 
the Value Added Tax (VAT). 
Hence these 2 respondents were replaced by another 
2. 
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In conclusion, most of the selected sample were successfully 
interviewed, and the 300 questionnaires were filled in correctly and 
completely. 
5.4 Survey on the Gazan LmLl2yýtes in the Arab and Non-Arab Countries 
In the absence of any information about Gazan employees in the Arab 
and non-Arab countries, a pioneer survey was conducted by the researcher 
across the Gaza Strip. The prime purpose of the survey was to underline 
the main characteristics of those employees since their emigration was 
largely unplanned, unregulated and unexamined. Who are the migrant 
workers - where do they go, what do they earn, and what are the effects of 
migration on the Gaza Strip? The 1985 survey should answer these 
questions. 
5.4.1 The Questionnaire 
The questionnaire formulated 6 questions (Appendix 6) which can be 
categorized in three types: 
(a) those to determine the characteristics of Gazan workers such as sex, 
marital status, and family size; 
(b) those to identify the main activities in which they are employed; 
and 
(c) those to identify their destinations. 
In addition, there was another question concerning their earnings but 
this was not included in the questionnaire since it was completed by the 
workers' relatives. From Durham, several letters were mailed in order to 
collect answers from the workers themselves concerning their salariess and 
this attempt has succeeded. 
5.4.2 The Sample Coverage 
The sample covers all those workers selected across the Gaza Strip. 
The term "worker" is recommended to be used here to describe a worker who 
was working in the Arab and non-Arab countries at the time Of survey, 
including a single, married, divorced, or widowed person. The survey 
covered 550 respondents, of which 102 were single, 2 widowed, 
1 divorced 
and 445 married. 
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5.4.3 Sample Selection 
The same method of sample selection which was practised in the former 
surveys was used, then the sample was based on a random method. The 
questionnaire was distributed across the Gaza Strip, and results derived 
from it generalized to represent the Gaza Strip migrant workers. 
Meanwhile, it is very important to mention here that this format of 
questionnaire was distributed throughout Khan Yunis refugee camp and 
Al-Amal rehousing project when the survey of the housing problem in the 
refugee camps and refugee rehousing projects was conducted. Also, in many 
cases, 3 copies of the questionnaire were filled in by a household since 3 
members of the household had been found working as migrant workers in the 
Arab and non-Arab countries. This situation led to the accomplishment of 
the work in a relatively short time. 
To sum up, the sample covered 550 respondents across the Strip which 
suggests an excellent spatial spread and a good representation of the 
Strip's migrant workers. 
5.4.4 Interviewing 
The survey was started on 15 October and carried on until 20 November 
1985. The questionnaire was administered to Gazan migrant workers and 
answers were collected from their relatives on behalf of them since 
the 
desired information can easily be answered. There was an individual 
questionnaire for each respondent, and the contacted respondents were 
successfully interviewed by the researcher and the university students. 
The same steps of interviewing which were followed in the 
former 
questionnaires have been practised here. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Analysis of. ALe and Sex Structure of the Population 
This chapter aims to play a role in expressing the general features 
of the age-sex structure of the population of the Gaza Strip, as well as 
analysing the age structure index and sex ratio. Further to this, it is 
very important to examine the impact of the 1967 war on the population 
age-sex structures and to what extent the population phenomenon was 
influenced by the war. Moreover, it is essential to explore the 
probability of the existence of a significant relationship between the 
youthful structure of the population and socio-political factors. In 
fact, these issues cannot easily be analysed but an attempt will be made 
to deal with them. 
6.1 Youthfulness of the ? opulation 
The population of the Gaza Strip, like most of the Arab and Moslem 
countries, is very young, and as may be known, the age structure of any 
population is the outcome of three basic variables, specifically 
fertility, mortality and migration. These three variables have played a 
significant role in shifting the age and sex structure of the Strip's 
population since 1967. Out-migration significantly influenced the 
population structure between 1967 and 1968, while fertility and mortality 
eventually contributed their significant effects later. 
I 
As demonstrated by the age and sex pyramids (Fig. 6.1), which reveal 
a broad base typifying the experience of most third-world, the population 
of the Gaza Strip is distinguished by a notable youthfulness. In 1985, 
46.6% of the total sample population were under 15 years of age, and the 
percentage of adults (15-64) is 51.0%, while the aged (65+) accounted for 
only 2.4%. The comparable percentages at the 1967 Israeli census of the 
Gaza Strip were 50.6%, 44.6% and 4.8%, indicating a significant decline 
in 
the percentage of young people (less than 15 years) and the aged 
(65+) and 
a rise in the percentage of adults by 6.4% between 1967 and 1985, 
from 
44.6% to 51.0% respectively (Table 6.1). 
The shifting of the Gaza Strip age structure is attributed to 
out-migration from the Strip after the 1967 war. Nevertheless, 
both the 
1967 census and 1985 sample survey revealed high percentages under 
15 
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Table 6.1 A ge-Sex Composition of the Main Groups of the Pp m, latio f n o the Gaza Stri 
in 1967 and 1985 
The 1967 Census (1) 
Locality Age Group 
Numbers Percentage Sex 
Males " Te--mal es -T-otal 7 Males Te-ma 1es -To ta I 
Ratio 
males 
Age 
Index 
per 1000 
Females 
Cities Less than 15 35497 32235 67732 25.7 23.4 49.1 1101 
15 - 64 28766 35032 63798 20.8 25.4 46.2 821 
65 and over 3529 2961 6490 2.6 2.1 4.7 1192 
Total 67792 70228 138020 49.1 50.9 100.0 965 9.6 
Refugee Camps Less than 15 46138 42396 88534 26.9 24.8 51.7 1088 
15 - 64 31278 43251 74529 18.3 25.3 43.6 723 
65 and over 4140 3950 8090 2.4 2.3 4.7 1048 
Total 81556 89597 171153 47.6 52.4 100.0 910 9.1 
Villages Less than 15 11117 10062 21179 26.7 24.1 50.8 1105 
15 - 64 8053 10144 18197 19.3 24.4 43.7 794 
65 and over 1251 1038 2289 3.0 2.5 5.5 1205 
Total 20421 21244 41665 49.0 51.0 100.0 961 10.8 
Gaza Strip Less than 15 92752 84693 177445 26.4 24.2 50.6 1095 
as a whole 15 - 64 68097 88427 156524 19.4 25.2 44.6 770 
65 and over 8920 7949 16869 2.5 2.3 4.8 1122 
Grand Total 169769 181069 350838 48.3 51.7 100.0 938 9.5 
1985 Sample Survey (2) 
Cities 
Refugee Campsl 
Villages 
Less than 15 
15 - 64 
65 and over 
Total 
634 635 1269 22.3 
756 752 1508 26.6 
31 35 66 1.1 
1421 1422 2843 50.0 
Less than 15 1019 
15 - 64 1012 
65 and over 45 
Total 2076 
Less than 15 697 
15 - 64 798 
65 and over 34 
Total 1529 
967 1986 
1019 2031 
56 101 
2042 4118 
727 1424 
787 1585 
40 74 
1554 3083 
Gaza Strip Less than 15 2350 2329 4679 
as a whole 15 - 64 2566 2558 
5124 
65 and over 110 131 241 
Grand Total 5026 5018 10044 
Sources : (1) Cen tral Bureau of Statistics, 1967. 
(2) The 1985 Sample Survey. 
24.7 
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1 .1 
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22.3 44.6 998 
26.5 53.1 1005 
1 .2 2.3 
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1.1 1.3 2.4 850 
49.6 50.4 100.0 984 
23.4 23.2 46.6 1009 
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5.2 
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years of age, not only as a direct result of rapid Population growth 
dominated by a high fertility, but also as the output of a rapid decline 
in mortality. 
However, the 1985 figure of 46.6% of the total population being under 
15 years of age is 1.1% lower than the official Israeli figure reported in 
1984, and also 2.1% lower than the 1983 figure (Central Bureau of 
Statistics, 1984 and 1985). It appears that the percentage of young 
people is going down towards stability after the removal of the massive 
emigration factor. In addition, the percentage of aged people has been 
diminishing from 2.8% in 1983, to 2.7% in 1984, and to 2.4% in the 1985 
survey. On the other hand, the percentage of adults has been increasing 
from 48.6% in 1983 to 49.6% in 1984, and to 51% in 1985 survey. 
The 1985 age composition survey indicates that there were slight but 
significant variations between the refugee camp's inhabitants and the 
Strip's as a whole. The population of the refugee camps was significantly 
younger (48.2% under 15 years) than that of the Strip (46.6%), and 
slightly higher by 0.1% in elderly folk. This may reflect a higher birth 
rate in the refugee camps (see Table 6.2). On the other hand, the 
proportion of adult city dwellers was 53.1% and slightly above the Strip 
average (51.0%), while the percentage of aged and young people were lower 
by 0.1% and 2% than the Strip's average respectively (see Table 6.1). 
Also, the villages' population age structure and the Strip's as a whole 
indicate fairly similar results with a small variation of 0.4% lower than 
the average for young people and 0.4% higher in the adult people, while 
the percentages of aged were similar (Table 6.1). 
A comparative study between the refugee camp inhabitants, city 
dwellers and village residents age structure in the 1967 census and the 
1985 sample survey shows that the proportions of the young and aged people 
are decreasing in the three population groups, while the adult percentages 
are increasing (Table 6.1). 
Furthermore, the youthfulness of the population can be noted from the 
higher percentage of the population being under 30 years of age, which 
amounted to 76.3% in the 1985 survey. This implies a population of 
high 
fecundity; 40.7% of the Strip's females are of child-bearing age 
15-44 
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years (The percentage of females of child-bearing age was accounted as 
36.1% in 1982,39.6% in 1983, and 40.8% in 1984 according to the official 
figures). 
From the above discussion, the age structure of the Gaza Strip 
population is very young, and it is now ne cessary to identify the reasons 
for this situation. 
6.1.1 Changing Levels of Fertilit 
-y 
and Mortality 
Overall fertility rates of the Gaza Strip population are very high, 
and they have registered continuous increases from 42.0 per thousand in 
1968, to 48.2 per thousand in 1978 (Table 2.6, Chapter two), to 48.3 per 
thousand in 1984. While the CDR dramatically declined from 19.5 per 
thousand to 11.2 per thousand, and closed at 8.0 per thousand for the same 
period respectively. These trends are confirmed by the data collected in 
the 1985 survey, which shows a very high child/woman ratio*. This ratio 
was calculated as 836 children per 1 000 women in the Gaza Strip as a 
whole. Furthermore, the survey concluded that the overall child/women 
ratios in the Strip's refugee camps, cities, and villages are all very 
high - 8919 744 and 857 respectively. Consequently, we can generalize 
that the overall fertility of the three aforesaid groups show no major 
di ff erences. 
Table 6.2 shows that the fertility (the number of live births per 
1000 women) of Khan Yunis camp for each five-year cohort of marriage 
duration is greater than that of Khan Yunis city and Khan Yunis villages, 
particularly in the cohorts of 15 years and over. Furthermore, Gazan 
women have one of the highest average fertility rates in the world. 
Cumulative fertility of married women is 6.6 live births per woman by the 
time they have lived roughly one-third of their reproductive married 
lives. Completed fertility of older cohorts (30 years of marriage and 
over) is extremely high, where it reached aboutl0.5live births per 
married woman (Table 6.2). This outcome has been supported 
by 
Friedlander, Eisenbach, and Goldscheider (1979) when they concluded that 
the completed fertility amounted to 9 to 10 births per married woman 
in 
the Administered Areas (The West Bank and the Gaza Strip). 
No. of children under 5 years x 1000 Child/Woman Ratio = ---- No. of VOWr; -T-5---4T years 
-163- 
Table 6.2 Cumulative Fertility of Currently Married Women in Khan Yunis 
City, Khan Yunis Refuqee Campq Khan Yunis Villaqes, and Khan 
Yunis Area by Years of Marriaqe, 1985 
F 
Live births per 1000 women 
Years of a s 
rrii iage ma rr Khan Yunis Khan Yunis Khan Yunis Khan Yunis 
City refugee camp villages area as a 
whole 
5 38 37 43 118 
(18) (16) (14) ý 4-8 
2,111 2,312 3,071 2,458 
5-9 85 45 65 195 
(20) (12) (14) T4-6 
4,250 3,750 4,643 4ý239 
10 - 14 105 135 42 
282 
- - T-15 ) ý -2-1 ) (-6)7y ý 4 2) 
7,000 6,428 7,000 6,714 
15 - 19 57 (6) 
76 
(9) 
73 
(10) 
206 
(25) 
9,500 8,444 7,300 8,240 
20 - 24 84 -F9 
58 
F6 ) 
45 
(ýT 
187 
ý 2-0 
9,333 9,667 9,000 9,350 
25 - 29 75 78) 
125 
ý -11 ) 
13 
01-T 
213 
ý 2-0 
9,37 5 11,136 13,000 
10,650 
30+ 134 
T1-4 ) 
106 
T -10 ) 
118 
Ti -0) 
358 
T 3-4 ) 
9,571 10,600 11,800 10,529 
Total No. of 
births 578 582 399 
1559 
Total No. of (90) (85) (60) (235) 
women 
overall mean 6,422 
6,847 6,650 6,634 
1 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey 
it 
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6.1 .2 Decline of Infant and Childhood Mortality 
Since the Israeli occupation of 1967, data on mortality levels for 
the Strip can be gathered from three sources : Israeli official 
statistics, UNRWA, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, each of 
which has its own version. If the publications of these sources are 
compared, contradictions in the results can be detected between them. 
Meanwhile "it should be stated that infant mortality figures that have 
been published by both Israeli and Palestinian sources represent only 
estimates of reality. The reason is simply that birth and death 
registration in the occupied territories is incomplete and defective. 
This fact is well known and accepted by those working within the military 
government's health apparatus and the Israeli Central Bureau of 
Statistics" (Giacaman, 1983). 
Based on the Israel i-publ ished health statistics, infant mortality 
rates in the Gaza Strip dropped sharply from 67.1 per thousand in 1974 to 
43.5 per thousand in 1982, and then reached 38.6 per thousand in 1983 
(Ministry of Health of Israel, 1985). On the other hand, figures derived 
from surveys carried out by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics put 
IMRs in the Strip at higher levels, estimated to be 100 per thousand in 
the mid-seventies and recently re-estimated at around 70 per thousand for 
the early 1980s (Gabriel and Sabatello, 1986). 
Taking UNRWA published figures into account (UNRWA provides free 
primary health care to the refugee population), IMRs in the refugee camps 
are higher than those reported by the Israeli Ministry of Health for the 
Strip as a whole. Based on reported deaths from Bureij refugee camp 
1975-1984, Dr. Geniena - 1975-82 - concluded that IMRS were 92 per 
thousand in 1975,88 per thousand in 1980, and 65 per thousand in 1982. 
Moreover, Dr. El-Alem's (UNRWA Field Preventive Medicine Officer) figures 
display IMRs of 50 per thousand in 1983, and 46 per thousand in 1984 for 
the same camp (El-Alem, 1986). 
It can be concluded that the 1983 figure of 38.6 per thousand 
published by the Ministry of Health of Israeli is clearly 
lower than those 
calculated by Drs. Geniena, El-Alem and the Israeli Central 
Bureau of 
Statistics. This difference may be attributed either to errors in 
calculating IMRS, or sampling biases, or to modification 
in the Israeli 
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Ministry of Health Published figures since IMRS have been considered as an 
indicator of the standard of Health Services in the Strip. 
In fact, there are no reliable figures on infant and childhood 
mortality in the Gaza Strip. However, in the early 1970s, IMRS in the 
Gaza Strip were about 130 per thousand. Furthermore, some child mortality 
measures for UNRWA refugee camps in the Gaza Strip revealed mortality 
rates of 98 per thousand in 1967-69 and 69 per thousand in 1970-72 (Hill, 
1983). 
To provide recent estimates of child mortality in the Gaza Strip, a 
sample survey was conducted in Khan Yunis area in 1985 and interviewing 
was restricted only to currently married women, aiming to match the method 
of estimating child mortality from data on children ever born and 
surviving, classified by marriage duration of mothers. It should be noted 
that data are often only tabulated for groups of marriage durations of 
15-19 or 20-24 years and must span exactly five years. In this method 
data referring to an open-ended duration interval should not be used to 
estimate child mortality. Consequently, Khan Yunis area's data classified 
by duration of marriage can be seen in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 Children Ever Born and Children Dead, and Marriage Duration of 
Mother : Khan Yunis Area, 1985 
Marriage duration Currently Married Women Children 
Ever born 
Children 
Dead 
04 48 118 13 
59 46 195 21 
10 - 14 42 
282 26 
15 - 19 25 
206 27 
20 - 24 20 
187 30 
Total 181 988 117 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey. 
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In this study, "the Brass* technique of estimating child mortality 
from data on children ever born and children surviving classified by age 
of mother has been applied to estimate child mortality. According to the 
Brass technique, child mortality can be estimated from proportions dead 
D(i) among children ever born to women in successive five-year age groups. 
He developed a set of multipliers k(i) to convert observed values of D(i) 
into estimates q(x) (the probability of dying between birth and exact age 
x), the multipliers being selected according to the value of P1 /P 2-a 
good indicator of fertility conditions at young ages - where P(i) is the 
average parity or average number of children ever born reported by women 
in an age group (i). Brass estimated the k(i) multipliers by using a 
third-degree polynomial of fixed shape but variable age location to 
represent fertility, the logit system generated by the general standard to 
provide the mortality element, and a growth rate of 2% per annum to 
generate a stable age distribution for females" (United Nations, 1983 - 
see footnote). 
The estimated infant and childhood mortality rates together with 
their approximate reference dates (reference date estimates have been 
calculated by subtracting the t(x) given in column (8) from 1985.92, the 
average date of the survey) are given in Table 6.4. It is clear that the 
data appear to be of acceptable quality, where the average parities 
(column (3)) increase monotonically with duration of marriage. On the 
other hand, although the proportions of children dead in the duration 
group 10-14 are too low, which may be resulted from responses error, the 
general trend of D(i) increased with marital duration. This trend can be 
easily seen from column (10) where child mortality (5qo or the probability 
of dying between birth and exact age 5) has been improving slowly. Also, 
column (11) shows that infant mortality lqo has been improving slowly in 
the 9 years preceding the 1985 survey. It is quite clear that the infant 
mortality figure of 58 per thousand for marriage duration group 10-14 
years is spurious and biased downward by poor reporting by mothers coupled 
with the small sample size. In fact the infant mortality estimates in 
Table 6.4 display close results to those figures reported in the preceding 
pages and higher than those official figures published by the Israeli 
Ministry of Health. 
For more details on computational procedure see : United Nations 
(1983) 
Indirect Techniques for Demographic Estimation, Manual 10, Department 
of International Economic and Social Affair , Popul 
Studies No. 
81,, New York, pp. 73-85. 
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In a nutshell, there is a slow but steady improvement in infant and 
childhood mortality over the 9 years before the 1985 survey (see Fig. 
6.2), but the levels are still way above those for Palestinians now living 
in pre-1967 occupied Palestine. Hill (1983) concluded that infant 
mortality rates for non-Jews (Palestinians) living in Israel were about 
39.5 per thousand in 1975 and 27.4 per thousand in 1978. These low levels 
may have resulted from their benefitting from the advanced health services 
provided to residents inside Israel itself. 
Another indication of the inaccuracy of the Israeli published IMR of 
38.2 per thousand for the Strip in 1983 is seen by comparing it with IMRs 
in other Arab states. For instance, oil-rich Qatar and UAE had IMRs in 
mid-1986 estimated to be 38 per thousand and 45 per thousand respectively, 
and the IMRs of other states in 1986 were in Saudi Arabia : 100 per 
thousand, Libya : 97 per thousand, Jordan : 63 per thousand and Egypt 
100 per thousand (Population Reference Bureau, 1986). 
From the point of view of Gaza's people, health services in the Gaza 
Strip have deteriorated over the past 20 years of Israeli occupation which 
has left its impact on levels of mortality in the area. This conclusion 
can be extrapolated from figures published by the Israeli Central Bureau 
of Statistics on the numbers of beds in hospitals. While in 1974 the 
Gazan people had one hospital bed per 378 persons this ratio dropped to 
one bed per 560 persons in 1984. Despite the insufficiency of health 
services in the Strip, which have not begun to approach the standard in 
Israel itself and even in the Israeli -occupied West Bank, the Gaza Strip 
has experienced a continuous decline in infant and childhood mortality. 
This decline can be explained in a number of ways. 
Firstly,, the population of Gaza Strip has gained advantages from the 
slight improvement in the health services during the last 15 years, which 
has resulted from the increasing number of local doctors and nurses, 
hygiene awareness, and the establishment of infant and childhood health 
units in the government hospitals and UNRWA clinics. In addition, the 
Near East Council of Churches runs three mother and child health centres 
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in Gaza town, while the Palestinian Red Crescent Society and some small 
foreign societies are supplementing their services to the people. This 
has led to a decrease in infant and childhood mortality despite the fact 
the government hospitals are characterized by a shortage of funds, 
overcrowding (two people in a bed is not unheard of), understaffing, 
outdated equipment and a shortage of specialized facilities (Locke and 
Stewart, 1985). 
Secondly, there is increasing incidence of hospital births. The 
number of hospital deliveries has increased from 13.1% in 1968, to 20.5% 
in 1975, to 29.4% in 1980, and to 53.6% in 1984, since the Strip's women 
are following the modern trend of having their babies in hospitals. On 
the other hand, the training of UNRWA - supervised "dayahs" (traditional 
mid-wives) has improved and they are qualified by the UNRWA sponsored 
training courses, since home deliveries are still very common, estimated 
at 41% in the refugee camps. 
Thirdly, the Gaza Strip's housing conditions have been improving over 
the last 15 years compared with its conditions in the 1950s and 1960s, 
particularly in the refugee camps and the villages since their connection 
with water supply and electricity in 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, there 
is a modest improvement in the economic situation due to the remittances 
from Gaza's employees abroad to their relatives, which has led to the 
improvement in the nutrition state of Gazan people. 
L 
Finally, since the 1950s, the Gaza Strip population has had a free 
educational scheme offered by the Egyptian government and UNRWA (since 
1967 the governmental schools have been directed by the Israeli occupation 
authori ties) . Consequently, a rapid 
decrease in illiteracy rates for the 
Strip's population as a whole and Gazan females in particular has been 
reported. From the 1985 survey of fertility, mortality, and family 
planning, it is seen that the percentage of illiterate married men and 
women decreased from 48.1% and 67.3% in 1960, to 30.7% and 44.7% in 1970, 
to 17% and 26.2% in 1980, and to 14% and 22.55% in 1985 respectively. 
On 
the other hand, the percentage of women in higher education increased 
from 
3.6% in 1960, to 7.8% in 1970, to 12.6% in 1980, and to 15.75% in 1985. 
Furthermore, the 1985 survey of population structure indicated that 15%, 
17.4%, 19.8% and 17.4% of the total population aged 12 years and over of 
Gazans cities, refugee camps, villages, and the Strip as a whole 
-1 71- 
respectively were illiterate. This trend of declining illiteracy has 
helped to reduce infant and childhood mortality during the past 35 years. 
Numerous studies indicate that raising the average level of education 
for women could reduce IM substantially (Population Reports, 1985). The 
Gaza Strip experience is strongly supporting the aforesaid outcome, as a 
strong correlation was found between decreasing IMRs and declining female 
i 11 i teracy. The correlation between the percentage of illiterate women 
aged 15-49 and the percentage of IMRs of married women for the same age 
group during 1950-1985 is positive and significant at the level of 5% (r 
0.77). Consequently, we may conclude that the formal education of girls 
corresponds strongly with the decline in the IMRs. 
6.1.3 Attitudes toward Family PlanELnj 
In this discussion an attempt is made to examine the attitudes of 
Gaza women towards family planning, and its impact on fertility trends and 
then on population structure. For this aim, the researcher has employed a 
survey in order to collect enough information about it, since no data 
presently at hand would be sufficient to cover the scope of work. The 
researcher concentrates his attention on analysing the impact of three 
socio-economic factors determining fertility, namely level of educational 
attainment of parents, type of place of residence, and female employment. 
These three factors have attracted the most attention in the research 
carried out to date (Singh and Casterline, 1985). 
6.1.3.1 Characteristics of the Sýmple Gr 
A summary description of the status of wives and husbands by selected 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics has been illustrated in 
Table 6.5. From this we can interpret that Gazan women marry at an early 
age which was extrapolated to be below 20 years in all Khan Yunis 
communities, with a high rate of reproduction resulting from a long period 
of fecundity. Also the average age difference between husbands and wives 
varied from 3.4 years in Khan Yunis villages to 3.7 years in Khan Yunis 
refugee camp. Furthermore, the women's participation in labour force is 
very low amounting to 15.3%, while the percentage of housewives is still 
high accounting for 84.7% in Khan Yunis area. In demographic terms, 
this 
high percentage of housewives promotes high fertility. 
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Table 6.5 Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics of the 1985 
Sample for Khan Yunis A 
Refugee Camp, and Khan Yunis Villages 
Characteristics 
Number in sample 
Local i ty 
Khan Khan Khan Khan 
Yunis Yuni s Yunis Yuni s 
City Refugee Villages Area 
Camp 
90 
Mean age of wives when married 19.2 
Mean age of husbands when married 22.6 
Mean duration of marriage 15.0 
Mpan nijmhpr nf children ever born 6.4 
per a woman 
Mean number of living children 
per a woman 
Mean number of children born 
to women aged 45-49 years and 
still alive 
Per cent of 
as housewi, 
Per cent of 
status 
Per cent of 
indigenous 
women wholly occupied 
ves 
husbands with refugee 
husbands with 
status 
5.8 
8.6 
85 
19.3 
23.0 
15.7 
6.9 
6.1 
9.6 
60 
19.9 
23.4 
13.8 
6.6 
5.5 
9.6 
235 
19.5 
23.0 
14.8 
6.6 
5.8 
9.2 
83.3 82.3 90 
15.6 100.0 28.3 
84.4 1 0.0 1 71.7 
84.7 
49.4 
50.6 
Source: The 1985 Sample Survey. 
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The 1985 survey shows that the average number of living children born 
to married women aged 45-49 years was 9.2 in Khan Yunis area as a whole. 
This figure is higher than those reported in the 1967 census for the 
indigenous and refugees married women in the same age group, where it 
amounted to 8.7 and 8.3 live childs per married woman respectively 
(Central Bureau of Statistics, 1968). This increase can be attributed to 
an increase in birth rates during the 1970s and 1980s which can be easily 
seen in Table 2.6. 
The refugee and indigenous status of husbands constitutes 49.4% and 
50.6% respectively in Khan Yunis area, while the refugee proportion varied 
widely from 100% in Khan Yunis camp to 15.6% in Khan Yunis villages. 
Table 6.6 displays the educational level of the study group for Khan 
Yunis area and its communities. At Khan Yunis level of analysis, the 
difference between educational attainment of husbands and wives is 
pronounced. At the top of the education ladder, about 27.3% of husbands 
had attended higher institutes or universities, compared with 15.7% of 
wives. At the bottom, nearly 29.7% of husbands and 36.2% of the wives 
were illiterate or have had less than 6 years of schooling. Moreover, the 
education standard in Khan Yunis city is better than in both Khan Yunis 
camp and Khan Yunis villages, with higher percentages who had attended 
higher institutes and universities and lower percentages of illiterates 
(Table 6.6). 
6.1.3.2 Women's Attitudes toward Contracqtion 
"In developing countries a conscious decision by couples to control 
their fertility is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to limit 
fertility. The social, religious and even legal restriction on 
contraception, as well as ignorance of the existence of correct use of 
contraception methods, may prevent such decisions from being made 
effective" (Zurayk, 1979). In the Gaza Strip there is no 
anti -contraception legislation, but abortion is permitted only when 
pregnancy is a risk to the mother's health. 
UNRWA is the only institution which delivers contraception services 
in the Gaza Strip. Its family planning programme was started in 1978, 
where contraception services were delivered to both refugees and 
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Table 6.6 Proportional Distribution of Husbands and Wives Level of 
Education &mong Khan Yunis Area and 
Khan Yunis Communities, 1985 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey. 
People who were unable to read newspapers and write simply 
were 
classified as illiterate, 
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indigenous people as an integral part of the MCH programme (UNRWA, 1985a 
and 1985b). On the other hand, family planning services are available 
from private physicians and chemists, as can be deduced from the UNRWA 
figure of current usage of family planning, which was only 1637 married 
women (15-49) in 1984, or less than 2% of the total married women of 
child-bearing age compared with 27.2% of married women who are 
contraception users in Khan Yunis area according to the 1985 survey. 
"In most countries fertility and family planning surveys have found 
that the great majority of women know of at least one family planning 
method, usually a modern one. Women's knowledge of family planning is 
slightly influenced by age, very little influenced by parity, somewhat 
influenced by rural/urban residence, and greatly influenced by education" 
(Population Reports, 1985). The women in Khan Yunis area and Khan Yunis 
communities demonstrated a wider knowledge of contraception methods. As 
illustrated in Table 6.7, the differences are not great. Only 2.2% and 
4.7% of the women of Khan Yunis city and Khan Yunis camp did not know 
about contraception compared with 20% of Khan Yunis villages women. At 
the other extreme, 97.8% of respondents in Khan Yunis city, 95.3% in Khan 
Yunis camp, and 80% in Khan Yunis villages had heard about contraceptive 
methods. In short, about one-quarter of Khan Yunis area women had heard 
of and used contraception while two-thirds of them had heard of and not 
used contraception (Table 6.7). 
The correlation between the educational attainment of couples in 
general and wives in particular and the knowledge and practice of 
contraception is crucial. Table 6.8 indicates that the better educated 
wives are more knowledgeable about it and used contraceptive methods more 
than the less educated wives. For instance, we found that 72.3% of wives 
and 66.7% of husbands who had not heard about contraceptive methods were 
illiterate or had below 6 years of schooling, while the percentage of the 
higher educated wives and husbands were 11.1% and 5.6% respectively. In 
contrast, only 36.6% of wives and 26.8% of husbands who had heard about 
contraception but not used it were illiterate or had just 6 years of 
school enrolment or below. But the higher educated proportion amounted to 
16.3% for wives and 27.4% for husbands in the aforesaid group. 
Furthermore, the education level of the respondent who had heard and used 
contraception was better than the previous two categories. Only 25% of 
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Table 6.7 Distribution of the Study Group by K owledqe and Practice of 
Contraceptive Method, and Wife's Occupational Status in Khan 
Yunis Area and Khan Yunis Communities, 1985 
NN,, Knowl edge 
and 
pract- 
Has not heard 
I 
Heard and not 
used 
Heard and used 
I; 
Wife's Occupat - ional Status 
i 
Locality 
ce No. % No. % No. % % employed out- 
side the home 
Khan Yunis 2 2.2 63 70 25 27.8 16.7 
City 
Khan Yunis 4 4.7 56 65.9 25 29.4 17.7 
camp 
Khan Yunis 12 20.0 34 56.7 14 23.3 10.0 
villages 
Khan Yunis 18 7.7 153 65.1 64 27.2 15.3 
Area I I 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey 
Table 6.8 Knowledge and Use of Contraceptive Methods amonq Currently 
Married Women by Level of Education of Husbands and Wives 
in Khan Yunis Area, 1985 
7-- 
Knowledge and 
pr ti practice 
Has not heard 
1 
Heard and not 
used 
Heard and used 
Level of Husband I Wife Husband Wife Husband Wife Education 
Illiterate 22.2 55.6 16.3 22.9 6.3 12.5 
Elementary 44.5 16.7 10.5 13.7 20.3 12.5 
Preparatory 11.1 0.0 21.6 17.7 18.7 23.4 
Secondary 11.1 22.2 24.2 29.4 23.4 34.4 
Technical & Teachers 0.0 5.6 9.1 8.5 9.4 10.9 
Institutes 
University 11.1 0.0 
.4 
18.3 
- 
7.8 21.9 6.3 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey 
-177- 
wives and 26.6% of husbands were illiterate or had 6 years of schooling or 
below, and the percentages of wives and husbands who were more highly 
educated were 17.7% and 31.3% respectively (Table 6.8). 
The survey of married women of reproductive age (15-49) shows slight 
variations and low participation in the labour force by wives' place of 
residence, only 17.7%, 16.7%, and 10% of wives were employed from Khan 
Yunis camp, Khan Yunis city, Khan Yunis villages respectively (Table 6-7), 
but their participation amounts to just 15.3% at Khan Yunis area level of 
analysis. On the other hand, we found a positive relationship between 
wives' employment status and their knowledge and use of contraceptive 
methods in Khan Yunis area. For instance, 25% of wives who had heard of 
and used contraceptive methods were employed and only 13.1% had heard of 
contraceptives and did not use them. In general, we can elicit that the 
employed wives are more knowledgeable about contraception and practise 
contraception more than the unemployed wives. 
6.1.3.3 Obstacles to Practising Contracýpýjon 
It is obvious that the attitude of married women who had heard about 
contraceptive methods and not used them is attributed to the 7 main 
variables illustrated in Table 6.9. These variables indicate the impact 
of socio-economic, religious, and political factors upon a wife's decision 
to practise contraception. 
The religious consideration is the strongest obstacle against 
practising contraception; 69.8%, 53.6%, 55.9% and 60.8% of the wives of 
Khan Yunis city, Khan Yunis camp, Khan Yunis villages, and Khan Yunis area 
stated that they disapproved because it is forbidden by Islam, though 
Islam as a religion is not against contraceptive practice for the sake of 
family spacing, but is against it if the aim is to achieve birth control. 
The relationship between political reasons and women's reproduction 
is very important and gained a similar response from the Khan Yunis 
communities; 42.9%, 41.1% and 44.1% of the respondents of 'Khan Yunis city, 
Khan Yunis camp, and Khan Yunis villages thought that the Strip's 
population should be increased in order to compensate losing numbers 
because of the war, which should help them to continue their struggle 
against the Israeli occupiers until they obtain their rights as an 
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Table 6.9 Obstacles Against Practisinq Family Planninq Among 
Currently Married Women in Khan Yunis Area and Khan 
Yunis Communities. 1985 
Attitude to 
Co nt raception ontraception 
t ti e to % heard and not used contraception 
Variab 1 es 
[ 
Khan Yunis Khan Yunis Khan Yunis Khan Yunis 
description city camp villages area 
Islamic relýgion forbids 69.8 53.6 55.9 60.8 
Pol itical reasons 42.9 41.1 44.1 42.5 
Harmful to health 34.9 19.6 47.1 32.0 
Husband wants more 46.0 41.1 55.9 46.4 
children to improve his 
social standing 
Wants more children to 11.1 10.7 26.5 14.4 
prevent husband from 
thinking about getting 
married again 
Help in old age 39.7 35.7 32.4 36.6 
Others 6.4 12.5 8.8 9.2 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey 
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independent Palestinian state. The Gaza Strip residents consider the 
demographic factor is one of the most important tools to achieve their 
national goals. 
The socio-economic variables play a distinctive role in restricting 
contraceptive practice. These variables can be classified into three main 
categories: variables relating to the husband, variables relating to the 
wife, and variables relating to the couples (Figure 6.3). Husbands are 
unwilling to permit their wives to practise family planning, because they 
wish to improve their social standing in the Strip's society. This tenet 
is more common among the village inhabitants than in the cities and 
refugee camps; 55.9%, 46% and 41.1% of the respondents of Khan Yunis 
villages, Khan Yunis city, and Khan Yunis camp supported the 
aforementioned outcome. Also wives are willing to have more children to 
inhibit their husbands from thinking about getting married again, by 
increasing the economic burden on their husband; the survey results range 
from 26.5% in Khan Yunis villages, to 11.1% for Khan Yunis city, to 10.7% 
for Khan Yunis camp, and to 14.4% for Khan Yunis area. The high 
percentage for Khan Yunis villages is due to increasing evidence of 
polygyny in the area, though it is low in the city and even lower in the 
Khan Yunis camp. 
Furthermore, the two classified variables of "help in old age" and 
"others" are relating to the attitude of couples. The survey shows that 
39.7%, 35.7% and 32.4% of couples of Khan Yunis city, Khan Yunis camp, and 
Khan Yunis villages respectively expect to be supported by their sons in 
their old age. On the other hand, 6.4%, 12.5% and 8.8% of respondents of 
Khan Yunis city, Khan Yunis camp and Khan Yunis villages disapproved of 
the practice of family plannin-g due to bashfulness of wives, lack of 
knowledge of a source or method of contraception, or considered it 
immoral. In addition sons are preferred to daughters which leads to 
higher fertility rates as well as discouraging women from using 
contraception. 
Finally, the side effects of using contraception play a negative 
rol e; 32% of Khan Yunis area wives thought that contraception 
is harmful 
to health. 47% in Khan Yunis villages, 34.9% in Khan Yunis city, and 
19.6% in Khan Yunis camp. 
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The previous discussion shows that fertility behaviour of Gazan 
couples is tended to have large families to small ones. In fact most of 
the Middle Eastern societies have the same tenet. Hill (1981) concluded 
that wives, especially the uneducated, probably feel pressurized by 
society into having large families both because this is the traditional 
social norm and because it provides some protection against early divorce. 
In addition, it may make good economic sense to have a large family in 
order to provide insurance destitution in the face of mishape, illnesses 
or retirement in countries where social security provisions are just 
beginning. 
6.1.3.4 Reasons for UsingContraception 
The survey shows that 64 respondents in Khan Yunis city, Khan Yunis 
camp, and Khan Yunis villages had heard about contraception and used it 
(Table 6.7). Family spacing, medical reasons, birth control and other 
factors were aims and reasons for the use of contraception. 
As indicated in Table 6.10, family spacing and medical reasons 
accounted for 92%, 96%9 78.6% and 90.6% of the reasons given by 
respondents -in Khan Yunis city, Khan Yunis camp, Khan Yunis villages and 
Khan Yunis area respectively for using contraception, while only 8%, 4%, 
7.1% and 7.8% of respondents of the above areas used it for birth control 
purposes. In Khan Yunis villages 14.3% used it for unspecified reasons 
(Table 6.10). 
Family spacing was favoured by people as it matches Islamic religion 
rules which recommend two year interval for child breast-feeding in 
accordance with Quranic verse: "And We have enjoined on man (To be good) 
to his parents: In travail upon travail Did his mother bear him, And in 
years twain Was his weaning: (hear The command), "Show gratitude To Me and 
to thy parents: To Me is (thy final) Goal (Holy Quran, sura Luqman, No. 
31, verse14). Also the high occurrance of medical reasons in all Khan 
Yunis communities and particularly in Khan Yunis camp was associated with 
the high maternal health risks caused by increased numbers of pregnancies. 
Roughly 700Z of the wives with medical reasons had undergone compulsory 
sterilization, which was mostly found in women aged 40 years and over. 
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It must be taken into consideration that the percentage of 
respondents who used contraception has no significant effect in reducing 
fertility trends in the area. For instance, 63.6% of Khan Yunis area 
respondents who used contraception with family spacing aim practised it 
after having 6 live births and over, while only 15.1% used it after having 
2 live births. 
The attitudes of Khan Yunis area couples toward the use of 
contraception have been classified and ordered in Figure 6.3, based on 
their influence upon the decisions of couples. 
Table 6.10 Reasons for Using Contraceptive Method's among Currently 
Married Women in Khan Yunis Area and Khan Yunis Communities, 1985 
Attitude to % Heard and used contraception 
contraception 
Variable Khan Yunis Khan Yunis Khan Yunis Khan Yunis 
ipti description city camp villages area 
Family spacing 60.0 36.0 42.9 46.9 
Birth control 08.0 4.0 7.1 6.3 
Medical reasons 32.0 60.0 35.7 43.7 
Others 00.0 00.0 14.3 3.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey. 
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Figure 6.3 Schematic Diagram Displaying Khan Yunis Couples Attitudes and Knowledge 
for Practising Contraception 
Attitudes and Knowledge I 
of contracept4on 
I 
Khan Yunis Area 
Has not heard IH Heard and not used II Heard and used 
Obstacles II Reasons 
Related to husband Related to Related to Family plannin( 
and w- wife d -Medical reason! 
-Birth control 
-Other reasons 
-Islamic religion -Harmful to health 
-Political reasons -Prevent husbands 
-Help old age from getting 
-Others married again --ýImprove social standing 
Occupational status of Wife's literacy Occupational status of 
wife (13.1% employed) (22.9% illiterateý 
I 
wife (25% employed) 
Occupational status of wife 
(Zero employed) 
I Wife's literacy (55.6% illiterate) II Wife's literacy (12.5% illiterate) 
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6.1.3.5 Women's Attitudes to Practising Contraception in the Future 
On questioning about future attitudes for using contraception, 32.2%, 
30.6%, 18.3% and 28.1% of respondents of Khan Yunis city, Khan Yunis camp, 
Khan Yunis villages and Khan Yunis area respectively will be using 
contraception in the future, while 41.1%, 49.4%, 56.7% and 48.1% of 
respondents in the above areas will not be using contraception at all. 
The remaining percentages of respondents were not sure whether they will 
or will not be using contraception in the future (Table 6.11). 
From these observations, we conclude that there will be no change 
between the present percentage (27.2%) of current contraceptive users and 
the percentage (28.1%) of future ones at Khan Yunis area level of 
analysis. 
Assuming these trends in family planning and fertility behaviour of 
the Gaza Strip population, the youthfulness of the population will persist 
at least into the near future. Should the Palestinian problem come to a 
settlement, and a local council be established to set up a population 
policy for the Palestinian society, population trends may come to change. 
Table 6.11 Future Attitudes to Using Contraceptive Methods among 
CurrentlY Married Women, Khan Yunis Area, 1985 
Description Future attitudes to using co traception 
Community Will use Not sure No 
No. % No. % N o. % 
Khan Yunis city 29 32.2 24 26.7 37 41.1 
Khan Yunis camp 26 30.6 17 20.0 42 49.4 
Khan Yunis villages 11 18.3 15 25.0 34 56.7 
Khan Yunis area 66 28.1 56 23.8 113 48.1 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey. 
-184- 
6.2 Changing Age Structure and the Impact of the 1967 War 
Following the 1967 war, a massive migration from the Gaza Strip was 
reported which led to distortion of the normal distribution of the age-sex 
structure of the population. The Gaza Strip migration was characterized 
by family movement as well as movement of selected individuals caused by 
the socio-political factors after the war. This matter has been discussed 
deeply in chapter two. Consequently, migration affected specific age 
groups of the population, particularly the young adult age group of 15-29 
years (Figure 6.4 and Table 6.12). 
The obvious feature is the continual decrease in the proportion of 
young people (0-14) between 1967 and 1980, while the proportion fluctuated 
from 46.1% in 1980 to 46.6% in 1985. In other words, the percentage of 
young people dropped by 4.1% during 1967 and 1985. This trend indicates 
that the young people's proportion is moving towards a more normal age-sex 
structure after the absence of migration role. In addition, the 
proportion of younger adults (15-29) is continuously increasing, from 
21.4% in 1967 to 29.7% in the 1985 sample survey, while the percentage of 
aged people has continuously decreased from 4.8% in 1967, to 3.0% in 1974, 
to 2.8% in 1982, and 2.4% in 1985 (Table 6.12). However, the middle aged 
group (30-44) decreased from 14.2% to 11.5% during 1967 and 1985, while 
the older adults group (45-6ý), slightly increased from 8.9% to 9.8% in 
this period. 
However, a radical change in the age-structure at a locality level of 
analysis has been reporteds as set out in Table 6.13 and Figure 6.5 in 
which it may be interpreted that: 
(a) the proportion of young people (0-14). aged (65+), and middle age 
adults (30-44) declined significantly in their proportions in all 
localities between 1967 and 1985; and 
(b) the proportion of younger adults (15-29) increased dramatically in 
all localities. Consequently, we can observe that the age group 
(15-29) is the greatest group influenced by the 1967 emigration. 
6.3 Differential Age Structure 
Despite a high proportion of the sample population of the Gaza Strip 
being under 15 years of age, there are significant variations of 
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Age Groups of the Gaza Strip 
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Table 6.12 The Changing Percentagesof Five Aqe-Groups in the Gaza 
Strip between September 1967 and the End of 1985 
r 
r roup 
r Age 
oup 
Yýe 
ýar 
0-14 15-29 30-44 45-64 65+ 
Sept. 1967 50.6 21 A 14.2 8.9 4.8 
1968 50.6 23.0 13.6 8.6 4.2 
1969 49.9 23.9 13.6 8.6 4.0 
1970 49.7 24.7 13.5 8.4 3.7 
1971 49.5 25.6 13.3 8.3 3.3 
1972 49.0 25.3 12.7 9.2 3.8 
1973 48.7 26.5 12.5 8.9 3.4 
1974 49.0 27.0 12.1 8.9 3.0 
1975 49.6 25.8 12.7 9.1 2.8 
1976 47.7 28.1 12.6 9.0 2.6 
1 GIOI 77 47.4 27.9 11 A 9.9 3.4 
1978 46.4 28.9 11 .8 9.8 
3.1 
1979 46.5 29.0 12.0 9.8 2.7 
1980 46.1 29.2 12.3 9.9 2.5 
1981 46.6 28.9 12.5 9.7 2.3 
1982 47.8 29.1 10.6 9.7 2.8 
1983 48.7 28.0 11.0 9.6 2.7 
1984 47.7 29.2 11.0 9.4 2.7 
1985* 46.6 29.7 11 .5 
9.8 2.4 
Source : Calculated from: 
Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967 
Central Bureau of Statistics 1969-1985, Nos. 20-36. 
The 1985 Sample Survey 
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proportions between the Strip's communities and localities. Comparing the 
age structure of each community and locality to that of the Strip as a 
whole (Table 6.14), considerable differences are revealed in juvenility 
and child-woman ratio. While in the cities as a whole 44.6% of the total 
population are under 15 years, 48.7% and 47.4% of the total population of 
Rafah and Deir el Balah cities respectively are children, and only 41.7% 
and 44.5% in Gaza and Khan Yunis cities. A similar comparison between the 
four cities and the cities as a whole, with respect to the proportions of 
children under 5 years shows a range from 14.2% in Gaza to 18.6% in Rafah 
city. The highest child-woman ratios are 884 and 839 in Rafah and Deir el 
Balah respectively, and the lowest is reported in Gaza (621). 
Considering the camps, 48.2% of their total population are under 15 
years, ranging from 47% in Bureij to 49.6% in Mughazi. Similarly, the 
percentages of children under 5 years vary from 16.6% in Beach camp to 
18.8% in both Nuseirat and Khan Yunis camps, the average for the camps 
being 17.6%. The highest child-woman ratios are 958,941,936 and 903 in 
Mughazi, Khan Yunis, Jabalya and Nuseirat respectively, while the lowest 
are found in Rafah (826) and Beach (846). 
Moreover, analysis of villages by age structure shows that 48.2% of 
the total population of villages are less than 15 years of age, ranging 
from 48.3%, 47.4%, 42.2% and 47% of the total populations of both 
Jabalya-Nazla and Beit Lahiya, Ikhza'a, Qarara and Bani Suheila villages 
respectively to 43.8% and 44.1% in Beit Hanun and Zawaida. A similar 
comparison between each village and the villages as a whole, with 
particular reference to the proportions of children being under 5 years 
shows a range from 16% in Jabalya-Nazla to 19% in Abasan el Kabira. The 
highest child-woman ratios are 939,900, and 899 in Qarara, Jabalya-Nazla 
and Bani Suheila respectively, while the lowest are found in Zawaida 
(805), Ikhza'a (816), and Beit Hanun (819) (Table 6.14). 
Meanwhile, wide variations between the age structures of the 
refugees, villagers, and city dwellers and the Strip as a whole have been 
noted. In 1985,46.6% of the total population of the Strip were under 15 
years, but 48.2% of the total camp population, and 44.6% and 46.2% in the 
cities and villages respectively. A comparison between the three 
communities and the Strip as a whole with respect to the proportions of 
children less than 5 years vary from 17.6% in the refugee camps to 16.1% 
-190- 
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in the cities. The highest child-woman ratio is 891 in the refugee camps 
also, and the lowest is 744 in the cities. 
The above figures suggest that the highest child-woman ratios tend to 
be found in the refugee camps and villages, which may be described as the 
most youthful, while the lowest rates are found in the Strip's cities 
(Table 6.14). 
Finally, with respect to the aged Population, Rafah camp, Ikhza'a 
village, Zawaida, Gaza, and Beit Hanun have accounted for the lowest 
percentages of the population over 65 years, while the highest percentage 
were found in Qarara and both Mughazi and Jabalya refugee camps (see Table 
6.14), though obviously all percentages are low by world standards. 
6.4 Age Index 
Many age indices are possible to analyse the age structure of any 
population, but the age index* which has been selected to be used here 
relates to the two extreme age groups (elderly and children), by 
expressing the number of persons age 65 and over as a percentage of those 
aged 0-14. Thus a high index figure indicates an elderly population, with 
a large proportion of old people to children, and a low index, a youthful 
one, with a relatively small proportion of elderly people (Dewdney and 
Rhind, 1975). Hence, the Strip's age index has been calculated and gave a 
low index value particularly when compared with the age indices in the 
developed countries. For instance, the Great Britain and County Durham 
age indices were 55 and 49.2 respectively in 1975, while the age index of 
the Strip was 9.5 in 1967 and only 5.15 in 1985. Consequently, it can be 
concluded that the population of the Gaza Strip was youthful in 1967 and 
became more youthful by 1985 (See Table 6.1). 
6.5 Changing Sex Balance 
We aim here to examine the variation in the sex ratio between the 
Strip's communities (refugees, villagers, and city dwellers), as well as 
to explore the preponderant factors that have operated on them. Males 
Age Index _ 
Population age 65 an over = 100 
-Population aged -D-14 
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slightly outnumber females in the age groups 35-65+ years. It is explicit 
from Table 6.1 that in 1967 Gaza Strip as a whole comprised a high 
perponderance of females, 938 males per 1000 females. On the other hand 
there were substantial variations in the sex ratios between the Strips 
three communities and the Strip as a whole. The sex ratio of 910 in the 
refugee camps was lower than the Strip's ratio, while the sex ratios in 
the Strip's cities and villages were higher, 965 and 961 respectively. 
This outcome can be attributed to the possibility that the number of 
migrants from the refugee camps was higher than those from cities and 
villages, although the fact remains that the Gaza Strip lost a lower 
proportion of its total population compared with the other occupied 
regioný (see Chapter Two). 
Another feature concerning sex ratio is the sharp decline in the 
proportion of males in the age group 15-64, owing to the displacement from 
the Strip after 1967 war. 723 males per 1000 females was reported in the 
refugee camps, while the sex ratio amounted to 794,821 and 770 in the 
Strip's villages, cities, and the Strip as a whole respectively (Table 
6.1). 
The 1985 survey shows a significant improvement in the sex ratio in 
all Gaza's communities and age groups. At the Strip level of analysis, 
both age groups 0-14 and 15-64 had a slight preponderance of males, 
amounting to 1009 and 1003 per 1000 females respectively, while the ratio 
in the Strip as a whole was nearly balanced (1002 males per 1000 females). 
Also, the same trend has been reported in the Strip's communities of 
refugees, villages, and city-inhabitants. 
Migration is sex-selective as well as age-selective, influencing one 
sex and specific age groups more than the others. The out-migration 
experience of the Gaza Strip supports this generalization, which is 
characterized by family displacement as well as selective individuals in 
the aftermath of the June 1967 war. 
However, the variations of sex ratio do not operate regularly 
throughout the age structure, as mentioned above. Reflecting associated 
effects of variations in sex ratio on birth, which favour males, and the 
preponderance of male migrants, the sex ra ' 
tio tends to be irregular among 
different age groups. Consequently, as indicated in Table 6.15, the high 
-193- 
proportion of females is clearly evidenced in the marked excess of feriales 
with regard to males in the ages of 20-44,50-54, and 60-64 years of age, 
quinquennial sex ratios ranging from 469 to 881 males per 1000 females. 
This imbalance in the sex ratio was influenced by sOcio-political factors 
after the 1967 war, the majority of displaced Gazans who fled from the 
Strip emigrated, either to join the heads of their families abroad, or 
from the fear of occupier's tyranny, or were expelled by the Israeli 
occupying force (see Chapter Two). 
Furthermore, the age groups of 20-29 years are the major age group 
affected by the 1967 war and by the subsequent political situation. This 
imbal-ance in male/female ratio was affected by severe Israeli repression 
in Gaza in the late 1960s and early seventies, when many of the refugees 
participated in PLO resistance activities. Death, deportation of segments 
of the Strip population, and imprisonment or deportation of Palestinian 
men was the Israeli reaction to these military resistances (Rockwell, 
1985). It was only in the older age groups 55-59 and 65 and over that men 
outnumbered women (Table 6.15). 
In contrast,, the 1985 survey indicates a much more normal demographic 
situation, with males outnumbering females in all but one quinquennial age 
group up to 34, owing to a preponderance of male births over females 
births. On the other hand, females outnumber males in all age groups of 
35 years and over (Table 6.16). This outcome is one direct result of the 
1967 displacement from the Strip leading to females outnumbering males in 
the age groups 20-44 years and as a result of higher male mortality as 
well, and 18 years after the displacement its effect should appear in the 
age groups 35-64 years. But in 1985 there was a remarkable improvement in 
the sex ratio of Gaza Strip whereby the people had achieved a sex balance 
18 years after the 1967 war. 
In 1985, among the three broad age groups of the population, less 
than 15 years, 15-642 and 65 and over in each locality in the Strip, the 
sex ratio varies slightly. Male children outnumber female children in the 
eight refugee camps, probably because male births exceed female births, or 
female deaths exceed male deaths, while in the Strip's villages female 
children outnumber male children except in Abasan el Kabira. In addition, 
fenale children in Gaza and Khan Yunis cities outnumber male children 
while both Deir el Balah and Rafah the opposite occurs. In the age groups 
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Table 6.15 A_ge-Sex Composition of the Population of the Gaza Strip, 
September 1967 
Number of inhabitants Percentage Sex 
Ratio 
Age males Groups Males Females Total Males Females Total per 1000 
females 
0-4 36,796 33,430 70,226 10.4 9.4 19.8 11100 
5-9 29,421 27,318 56,739 8.3 7.7 16.0 1,077 
10 - 14 27,298 24,579 51,877 7.7 7.0 14.7 1,111 
15 - 19 17,914 17,610 35,524 5.1 5.0 10.1 1,017 
20 - 24 9,161 14,440 23,601 2.6 4.1 6.7 634 
25 - 29 5,350 11,418 16,768 1 .5 3.2 4.7 469 
30 - 34 7,703 10,361 18,064 2.2 2.9 5.1 743 
35 - 39 6,688 10,533 17,221 1.9 3.0 4.9 635 
40 - 44 6,620 8,322 14,942 1 .9 2.3 4.2 
795 
45 - 49 4,591 4,592 9,183 1 .3 1 .3 2.6 
1 1000 
50 - 54 3,828 5,215 9,043 1 .1 1 .5 2.6 
734 
55 - 59 2,772 2,152 4,924 0.8 o. 6 1 .4 
1 288 
60 - 64 3,982 4,520 8,502 1 .1 1.3 2.4 
881 
65 and 8,999 8,004 17,003 2.5 2.3 4.8 1,124 
over 
Total 171 123 182,494 353,617* 48.4 51.6 100 938 
Source : Central Bureau of Statistics, 1969 
* There were 2,644 persons classified as age group unknown 
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Table 6.16 Age-Sex Composition of the Sample Population of 
the Gaza Strip, 1985 
Age Number of Inhabitants Percentage Sex Ratio 
Groups Males per 
Males Females Total Males Females Total 1000 Fem- 
ales 
0-4 859 852 1711 8.55 8.45 17.0 1008 
5-9 795 803 1598 7.9 8.0 15.9 990 
10-14 696 674 1370 6.95 6.7 13.65 1033 
15-19 600 581 1181 6.0 5.8 11.8 1033 
20-24 544 508 1052 5.42 5.05 10.47 1071 
25-29 385 364 749 3.85 3.6 7.45 1058 
30-34 263 248 511 2.6 2.5 5.1 1060 
35-39 180 190 370 1.8 1.9 3.7 947 
40-44 130 150 280 1.3 1.5 2.8 867 
45-49 133 150 283 1.32 1.5 2.82 887 
50-54 127 139 266 1.25 1.4 2.65 914 
55-59 101 115 216 1 .0 1 . 14 
2.14 878 
60-64 103 113 216 1 .0 1 . 
12 2.12 912 
65 and 110 131 241 1 .1 1 .3 
2.4 840 
over 
Total 5026 5018 10044 50.04 49.96 100 1002 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey. 
-196- 
15-64 years, the males outnumber the females in two refugee camps, two 
cities and six villages, they are similar in both Bureij and Jabalya 
refugee camps, while in the remaining localities the females outnumber 
males (Table 6.14). This fluctuation in the sex ratio may be attributed 
to the emigration from the area and the variation in mortality rates of 
the two sexes. 
Females over 65 years of age predominate in all Gaza Strip localities 
except Khan Yunis city, Mughazi refugee camp., and Beit Lahiya, Beit Hanun, 
Bani Suheila, and Abasan el Saghira villages. But in the Gazan three 
communities aged females predominate over aged males (Table 6.14). The 
highest sex ratio for the aged was found in Abasan el Saghira village 
(1500), while the lowest recorded was in Jabalya-Nazla village (375). 
In conclusion, the Gaza Strip sex ratio has improved dramatically 
from 938 males per 1000 females in 1967 to 953 in 1970,978 in 1975,988 
in 1980,997 in 1984, and to 1002 in the 1985 sample survey. 
6.6 DependenU Ratio 
The Strip's dependency ratio is high, owing to the youthfulness of 
the population brought about by emigration after the 1967 war and the high 
fertility rate. This can be stressed from the fact that the Strip's 
population age group of 15-64 years constituted only 44.6% of the total 
population in 1967 and 51% in 1985 (Table 6.1). 
Indeed, not all the population 15-64 years are economically active, 
especially among females. On the other hand, a considerable proportion of 
the population aged 15-19 and 65 years and over are economically active. 
In the next chapter this matter should be discussed. 
The crude dependency ratio for each locality, community, and for the 
Strip as a whole is demonstrated in Table 6.17. In 1967 there were about 
124 dependants for each 100 persons in the productive ages in the Strip as 
a whole, 113 of these were children and youths, and 11 were in the old age 
category. Simultaneously, both refugee camps and villages as a whole had 
an appreciably higher dependency load 
(130%, and 129% respectively) than 
either cities as a whole or the Strip's average 
(Table 6.17). 
Furthermores the ratio varied from 114 in Gaza city to 142 in Bani Suheila 
village. The disparity of dependency ratios 
between the Strip's 
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Table 6.17 Crude Dependency Ratio* for the 1967 Population Census and the 
1985 Sample Survey of the Gaza_ Strip, 
-by 
Locality and Community 
Community 
Dependency Ratio, 1967 Dependency 
(2) 
Ratio, 1985 
Youth Old Total Youth Old Total 
Age Age 
Cities 
Gaza 104 10 114 74 3 77 
Khan Yunis 108 11 119 85 6 91 
Deir el Balah ill 11 122 95 5 100 
Rafah 122 11 133 99 4 103 
Cities as a whole 106 10 116 
. 
84 5 89 
Refugee camps: 
Rafah 121 9 130 93 2 95 
Khan Yunis 121 12 133 100 5 105 
Deir el Balah ill 11 122 97 5 102 
Mughazi 109 10 119 106 8 114 
Bureij 112 10 122 92 4 96 
Nuseirat 112 11 123 96 4 100 
Beach 126 11 137 95 5 100 
Jabalya 120 11 131 105 7 112 
Refugee camps as a whole 119 11 130 5 103 
Villages: 
Jabalya-Nazla 116 14 130 99 6 105 
Beit Lahiya 121 13 134 98 4 102 
Beit Hanun 128 10 138 81 3 84 
Zawa i da - - - 81 3 84 
Bani Suheila 128 14 142 92 4 96 
Abasan el Kabira 108 12 120 87 6 93 
Abasan el Saghira 118 16 134 85 4 89 
Ikza 'a 115 16 131 98 3 101 
Qarara - - - 91 9 
100 
Villages as a whole 116 13 . 
129 90 5 95 
Gaza Strip Ll 3 11 124 91 5 96 
Dependency Ratio 
Population less than 15 + 65 and over x 100 Population 15 - 64 
Source : (1) Calculated from . Central Bureau of Statistics, 
1967 
(2) The 1985 Sample Survey 
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localities and communities resulted from differences of out-migration 
rates in 1967. Relating to the percentage of old-age dependency, the 
populations of both Abasan el Saghira and Ikhza'a villages had the 
heaviest load (16%), while the lowest was found in Rafah refugee camp 
M), but this has resulted from the 1967 displacement which led to high 
dependency in the Gaza Strip as a whole. 
On the contrary, the 1985 survey reflects a lower dependency ratio 
than that reported in 1967, after the reduction of the impact of 
out-mi g ration. In the Strip as a whole, there were about 96 dependants 
for every 100 persons in the productive ages, 91 of these are under 15 
years., and only 5 are 65 or more years of age. Moreover, the less 
youthful localities Gaza city, Zawaida and Beit Hanun villages, and Khan 
Yunis city, have a significantly lower dependency load than the more 
youthful localities, Mughazi and Jabalya camps. The ratio ranges from 77 
in Gaza city to 114 in Mughazi refugee camp, and is strongly connected 
with the youth proportion of the dependency ratio. 
Moreover, in Gaza city and both Beit Hanun and Zawaida villages the 
youth dependency percentage of their entire dependency ratios are only 74 
and 81 respectively, while in Mughazi and Jabalya camps the youth 
dependency percentages are 106 and 105 respectively. In conclusion, in 
both 19V and 1985, the productive populations in the refugee camps are 
forced to hold up a heavier burden of dependant youth than in the cities, 
villages, and in the Strip as a whole (Table 6.17). 
Relating to the percentage of old-age dependency, the population of 
Qarara village has the heaviest load, more than four and a half times the 
proportion of the old-age dependency in Rafah camp. But the most 
important observation of old-age dependency is the similarity between the 
Strip's three communities and the Strip as a whole, all four old-age 
dependency ratios amounting to 5 (Table 6.17), although there are 
significant variations of the localities level of analysis. The same 
trend can be noted in old-age dependency ratio in 1967 with higher results 
than observed in 1985, and is attributed to the effect of out-migration. 
Compared with the ratio of 124 for the 1967 census, the dependency 
ratio for the population of Gaza Strip had fallen dramatically to 115 in 
1970, to 114 in 1975, to 102 in 1984 and to 96 dependants for 100 persons 
in the productive ages in 1985. 
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In conclusion, the dependency ratio for the Population of Gaza Strip 
indicates that a heavy load of dependency has to be carried by the 
economically active population, since the Strip is characterized by a high 
fertility rate. 
6.7 Summry 
The discussion concerning the age-sex structom and the dependency 
ratio of the population of the Gaza Strip asserts its youthfulness. The 
massive emigration caused by the 1967 war greatly distorted the age-sex 
structure of the population. But later the high natural increase balanced 
out the effect of the out-migration as indicated by the population 
pyramids in Figure 6.1. 
The high fertility rate, continuous decline in mortality rates in 
general and infant and childhood mortality rates in particular, and the 
limited practice of family planning in order to reduce the fertility 
trends substantially are all factors which have led to the general 
youthfulness of the population. However, the age structure"s spatial 
distribution reveals some difference between the Gaza Strip communities. 
These can be generalized as follows: 
Firstly, lower fertility rates, lower percentages of children, lower 
infant and childhood mortality rates, lower impact of out-migration on sex 
ratio balance resulting from the 1967 war, and higher dependency ratios 
are the characteristics of the population of the Gaza Strip cities. 
Secondly, the population of both refugee camps and Gazan villages are 
loaded by a heavy burden of children, owing to highfertility rates and are 
distinguished by a remarkable youthfulness. 
Thirdly, although 27.2% of Khan Yunis area wives used contraception, 
we found that the family planning programmes did not have any significant 
effect upon fertility trends. Socio-economic, socio-religious, and 
socio-political factors are obstacles in the way of family planning. 
Consequently, the fertility transition in the Gaza Strip has not even 
begun, despite the long-term changes in standards of education, health 
awareness and living conditions. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Analysis of the Employment Composition of the Gaza Strip Popul ation 
The crude dependency indicator mentioned earlier in chapter six 
reveals a very high rate of dependency in the Gaza Strip. In 1984, this 
ratio was estimated at 102 dependents for every 100 persons in the 
productive age groups. If only the active population groups are taken 
into account, the real dependency ratio* would be as high as 479 
dependents for every 100 active persons. 
Consequently, this study aims to investigate in depth the 
economically active population and the effects of the youthfulness of the 
population on the labour force. In addition, it will focus on underlining 
the characteristics of Gaza's labour force after the Israeli occupation of 
the Strip in 1967, as well as the degree of labour absorption in various 
branches of economic activity. Furthermore, two pilot studies will focus 
on analysing the work conditions of Gazan workers in Israel and in the 
Arab and non-Arab countries. 
7.1 Characteristics of the Gazan Labour Force 
"The total population of any community reveals little about the 
available labour force. A better indicator is the proportion of the 
population over 14 years of age, which includes all potential workers in 
the economy. The rate of female participation in the labour force also 
affects the overall labour force participation rate" (UNECWA, 1981). 
Hence, Table 7.1 displays the Strip's total population aged 14 years and 
over and its distribution by sex, labour force participation rate, 
participation of males and females in the labour force, and employment and 
unemployment rates over the period 1968-84. 
As concluded in chapter 6. the 1967 emigration distorted the 
demographic composition of the population of the Gaza Strip since large 
numbers of adult males, mostly young, emigrated to Jordan and then, part 
of them, to the Arab states. Consequently, females have outnumbered males 
Real Dependency Ratio = 
Population not in the labour force x 100 
Population '15FItYe7la6bur force - 
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since the postwar period; females comprised 56.2% of the total population 
aged 14 years and over in 1968 while their percentage dropped to 51.9% in 
1984. 
The labour force in the Gaza Strip constitutes a small proportion of 
the total population, amounting to only 15.1% of the total population in 
1968, rising slowly to 18% in 1979,, while the 1985 survey revealed a 
higher proportion of labour force in the total population amounting to 
20.2%. Nevertheless, the labour force size in the Strip is very small. 
The low percentage can be attributed to the fact that 46.6% of the total 
population were under 15 years of age inl985, and that only a small 
proportion of Gazan females participate in the labour force (Table 7.1). 
Moreover, the 1985 survey shows that 79.8% of the total population were 
classified as economically inactive. Table 7.6 indicates that 42.1% of 
the total population were students, 19.4% were housewives, and 18.3% were 
old people, children less than 6 years of age or handicapped. 
The Gaza Strip labour as a percentage of the total population aged 14 
years and over has remained constant at around one-third, while figures 
derived from the 1985 survey give a labour force percentage of 35.7%. 
The Strip's total population aged 14 years and over has increased 
from 165,600 in 1968 to 264,900 in 1984 with an annual rate of increase of 
3.7%. In contrast, the labour force has increased by a higher percentage, 
amounting to 5.1% per annum during the same period, with the size of 
workforce growing rapidly from 48,600 to 88,000 (see Table 7.1). The 
expansion of the labour pool in the Strip has resulted from increasing 
Israeli demand for cheap labour from the occupied territories. The 
highest level of increase in the size of labour force was registered 
during the period 1968-74, when it increased by 6.4% per annum, coinciding 
with the Israeli period of economic boom. When the Israeli economy slowed 
down, the size of the workforce in the Strip slightly decreased, 
significantly, in 1975. But later it resumed its growth in the following 
years and it grew by 3% per annum during the decade 1974-84. 
In the occupied territories, the female participation rate in the 
labour force is very low, particularly when compared with the average, 
32%, in developed countries. Women constitute about 10% of the total 
labour force in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (UNECWA, 1981). In the 
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meantime, the 1985 survey shows that 6.6% of Gazan's female were 
economically active. This figure nearly matches the average female 
workforce participation rate in the Arab World which was estimated at 8% 
(Omran, 1984). Further to this, it is pertinent to compare the Strip's 
female participation rate in the workforce with those of Palestinian women 
outside the occupied territories. Accurate and usable statistics 
concerning Palestinian women's participation in the workforce are 
virtually non-existent. The most complete data to hand is yielded by 
Sirhan (1975), based on an unpublished 1971 Lebanese survey. He concluded 
that only 3.2% of Palestinian women were economically active. Later, 
Sirhan's figures were revised by Arafat (1984) in order to obtain a closer 
approximation to the UN definition of labour force. Hence the revised 
figure picked up to 5%. Consequently, it can be concluded that overall 
Palestinian female participation in the labour force is very low in the 
occupied territories as well as outside occupied Palestine. 
As illustrated in Table 7.1 . the Strip's female participation in the 
workforce evidently declined from 6.4% of the total female population aged 
14 years and over in 1968 to 3.3% in 1984. Comparable figure derived from 
the 1985 survey shows that 6.3% of females aged 14 years and over were in 
the labour force. Furthermore, the female proportion of the total labour 
force also dropped from 12.3% to 5.2% during the aforesaid period. 
Considering the labour force in absolute numbers, the female labour 
force dropped from about 6,000 in 1968 to some 4,600 in 1984, or decreased 
by 1 . 5% per annum. 
This decrease has coincided with a rapid increase in 
the number of females aged 14 years and more, when their numbers have 
jumped from 93,000 to 137,600 in the same period. 
Gharaibeh (1985) attributed the lower participation of Gazan females 
in the labour force to the fact that most males who lose their jobs in 
Israel try to find alternative employment in the Strip rather than 
emigrate, reducing opportunities open to women and the need for their 
labour. Moreover, the traditional constraints have been playing a 
negative role in pushing Gaza's women away from the labour pool. 
Rockwell 
(1985) stated that in the Gaza Strip, families tend to hide or deny the 
fact that female members work, since that will bring social stigmas to the 
family, particularly if they work in Israel. Reluctance for women 
to work 
outside the home stems from the patriarchal family structure, where men 
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have traditionally been responsible for all their female dependants. 
Another significant factor concerning the low participation of 
working women can be considered, that the Israeli figure could be an 
underestimate since it derives from surveys conducted regularly each 
quarter year since 1968. Roughly 1,400 households in the Gaza Strip are 
investigated (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1985b). The households 
contacted may be giving inaccurate answers particularly regarding female 
work status because they fear that this will be reported to the Tax Office 
and then they will be forced to pay income tax. Furthermore, this 
conclusion can be taken from a study carried out for UNECWA (1981) showing 
a female participation rate of 13.4% in the manufacturing sector, and from 
the 1985 sample survey which displayed figures higher than those of the 
Israeli official statistics of female participation in the workforce. 
Since work ability is affected by age, Table 7.2 illustrates the rate 
of male participation in the labour force by different age groups in the 
Gaza Strip over the period 1968-84. It can be seen that the proportion of 
economically active males 14 years and over has gradually increased from 
58.8% in 1968 to 65.5% in 1984. In comparison, the 1985 survey shows that 
68.1% of males aged 14 years and over were classified as economically 
active. The lowest index of participation in the labour force can be 
found in the age groups 14-17 and 65 years and over, while the highest 
index is found in the 25-54 age groups. Meanwhile, a significant increase 
has been noted in the age group 25-34 from 89% in 1968 to a peak of 97% in 
1973, but this dropped sharply to 80.8% by 1984, because of emigration 
toward the Arab oil-rich countries as a consequence of the Israeli 
economic recession. At the same time, it can be noted that the 
participation of the 14-17 age group grew substantially from 21.1% in 1968 
to the highest level of 30.2% in 1981 and then decreased to 26.8% in 1984. 
The increase can be explained by the fact that many potential secondary 
school students were dropping out of school and entering the labour 
market, particularly when the Israeli economy boomed in the early 1970s, 
but when the Israeli economy slowed down into a recession and the 
unemployment trends grew, the participation rate of this age group 
eventually decreased. 
It should be noted that the proportion of males in the labour force 
aged 14 years and more as given in Table 7.2 does not include those who 
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Table 7.2 Males Aged 14 and Over, bY Labour Force Characteri_stics 
and Age Qroup in the 
. 
Gaza Strip 1968-84 
Yea r 
14+ 
total 
% in 
abour 
% of the age group in the labour force 
000's 
I 
force 14-17 ' i 18-24 25-34 35-44 1 45-54 55-64 65+ 
1968 72.4 58.8 21 .1 63.7 89.0 84.7 76.1 54.8 23.4 
1969 76.5 61 .9 23.3 59.9 93.3 90.8 84.5 57.3 30.0 
1970 82.0 63.0 20.3 64.2 93.9 93.2 86.8 61 .4 34.8 
1971 84.0 61 .8 15.6 60.5 94.6 91 .7 86.7 76.6 31 .0 
1972 85.7 64.0 20.8 67.5 96.5 93.0 85.3 62.4 24.0 
1973 88.9 65.7 22.6 68.6 97.0 95.8 88.0 63.9 27.8 
1974 93.6 66.6 25.6 67.7 95.4 95.9 88.0 64.9 28.9 
1975 96.0 64.6 24.0 64.7 87.9 95.0 87.7 66.1 30.6 
1976 99.4 65.6 27.0 65.2 85.2 94.7 89.3 74.2 33.3 
1977 103.6 64.0 26.8 60.5 83.2 93.7 91 .8 76.5 36.9 
1978 108.9 64.1 28.0 62.0 82.3 94.2 91 .1 77.8 34.8 
1979 114.0 65.1 29.1 66.9 81.8 94.7 91 .7 74.3 29.8 
1980 114.1 65.5 27.3 65.5 82.5 93.7 93.4 77.8 32.1 
1981 116.6 66.0 30.2 64.8 81 ý1 92.8 91 .2 
76.3 28.0 
1982 118.4 66.0 30.1 64.4 79.8 93.5 91 .7 72.8 28.3 
1983 125.7 64.2 27.6 61 .2 79.1 
93.8 91 .9 73.9 31 .3 
1984 127.3 65.5 26.8 62.6 80.8 91 .5 91 .8 
70.6 34.8 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1970,1977 and 1985 
a 
Note : The workforce of North Sinai has been deducted 
(see Chapters 
one and two). 
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went to work abroad, but if their proportions are added, the rate of 
labour participation among them will rise to 70.2% and 69.4% in 1982 and 
1983 respectively (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1985b). 
7.2 Employment 
Following the 1967 war the Gaza Strip labour force significantly 
increased by 81% from 48600 to 88000 during the period 1968-84. 
Simultaneously, the total employment rose substantially by 115.8% from 
40400 to 87200 as a direct outcome of the expansion of employment in 
Israel (see Table 7.1). Hence, it can be interpreted that the employed 
persons have increased by a higher percentage than those who classified as 
economically active during that period. Obviously, the higher growth of 
employed persons has resulted from the continuous decrease in 
unemployment. Between 1968 and 1984, unemployment substantially decreased 
by about 90.2% of the original number of unemployed. The credibility of 
these official figures on unemployment will be treated later. 
In 1965, the total employment in the Gaza Strip was estimated at 
63,000 (Ben Shahar et al, 1971). From this figure, we can conclude that 
the total employment in the Gaza Strip up to 1973 was below the 1965 
figure (see Table 7.1). This decline mainly resulted from the Strip's 
loss of population after the 1967 war as well as from increasing 
unemployment levels caused by the war. Metzger, Orth and Sterzing (1983) 
and Locke and Stewart (1985) concluded that the immediate consequence of 
the 1967 war was a drastic deterioration in employment. The jobs in the 
service sector of the UN forces and the Egyptian army were gone. Trade, 
smuggling and tourism with Egypt cameto an end, the port was closed, and 
the fishing and construction industries were almost completely shut down. 
As a result of the Israeli occupation, re-structuring of the Gaza 
Strip's workforce happened primarily at the expense of agricultural 
employment, which dropped in both proportional and absolute terms. In 
1965, agriculture accounted for one-third of the labour force in the Gaza 
Strip, whereas services and construction engaged over 60% of the total 
workforce. Industrial employment was negligible (Gharaibeh, 1985). This 
distribution by sectoral employment was altered after 1967 when work in 
Israel was granted to Gazan workers in 1968. 
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Table 7.3 demonstrates the proportional distribution of the Gaza 
Strip workforce by employment sectors. Up to 1978, agriculture was a 
leading sector of employment in the Strip, although its proportion had 
already declined over the decade 1968-78. Since then its share has 
continued to decline which resulted in it losing its predominant position 
as the biggest employer sector. At the same time, its relative 
importance has steadily contracted to some 18.1% of total employment by 
1984. 
Decreasing agricultural employment is a worldwide phenomenon 
associated positively with improvement in agricultural technology and 
negatively with rural-urban migration. "In the Gaza Strip 40% of the 
cultivated land is under irrigation. New technology, improved methods of 
irrigation and other practises help to increase labour productivity and 
thus release workers from this sector" (UNECWA, 1981). Another 
significant factor is that the Strip's cultivated land was reduced by some 
25% during 1967-84,, preventing any opportunity of absorbing additional 
workers in this sector in the future. 
On the other hand, constructions share of total employment increased 
substantially by about 15.6% during 1968-84, and in the economy as a whole 
it jumped to some 25.5% in 1984 (Table 7.3). This upswing resulted from 
expansion in the construction sector within the Israeli economy which 
provided opportunities for hiring workers from the overcrowded Gaza Strip. 
Apparently, many agricultural workers found employment on construction 
sites in Israel, particularly since a high proportion of agricultural 
workers were only employed seasonally for picking fruit and vegetables. 
Hence construction was the convenient employment sector which was able to 
absorb unskilled and semi-skilled workers. 
With regard to the industry, mining and manufacturing sectors, 
employment in the Strip fluctuated from 16.2% in 1968 to 17.6% in 1984. 
Simultaneously, the service sector become less important than it was 
before the 1967 war, employing approximately 48% of the employed workforce 
in 1968 and only 38.8% by 1984 (see Table 7.3). 
7.3 Locational Distribut. ion of Emp oyed Labour Force 
Since the Gaza Strip has been characterised by an excess in manpower 
and a i)oor economic infrastructure which could not absorb 
the potential 
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labour force, a high proportion of its labour force are forced to migrate 
to the oil-rich states for professional and white-collar employment, or to 
commute to Israel for daily-paid unskilled and semi-skilled jobs. In the 
light of the 1985 survey, 522.3% of the Gaza Strip's workforce were 
employed domestically, 41.2% in Israel , and only 6.5% in the Arab and 
non-Arab countries (Table 7.4). If the workers who were working both in 
the Gaza Strip and in Israel are taken into account, the percentage of 
those working in Israel will rise to 44.1%. 
Initially, it is useful to deal with each group of workers separately 
according to their place of work, in order to bring to light their 
relative siie, their importance to the Strip's economy, and their 
conditions of work. 
7.3.1 Employment in the Gaza 
_ýýrjy 
Since 1967, patterns of employment in the Gaza Strip have changed 
substantially as a consequence of the shifts in the economy. The Gaza 
Table 7.4 Gaza Strip: Distribution of Labour Force According to Place of 
Work, 1985 
Employed persons 
Total of employ- 
Pl f k ment ace o wor 
Mal e % Male Female % female Total of % of 
male and aII 
emal e employed 
In the Gaza Strip 797 85.6 134 14.4 931 52.3 
In Israel 712 97.0 22 3.0 734 41.2 
In the Arab and 103 88.8 13 11.2 116 6.5 
Non-Arab countries 
Total 1612 90.5 169 9.5 1781 100.0 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey 
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Strip became attached to the high-income, capital intensive, industrial 
society of Israel, which was in direct contrast to its own low-income, 
labour surplus economy. Hence, additional people, mainly men, have been 
drawn into wage labour, on either a permanent or a temporary basis to meet 
the Israeli demand for cheap workers, so work in Israel has been granted 
to the Gazan inhabitants. This phenomenon has led to a re-structuring of 
the sectoral employment pattern in the Gaza Strip itself. 
Apparently, the number of workers employed domestically has shrunk 
slightly from about 47950 in 1970 to 47000 in 1984, a decline of a mere 
2%. As regards other sectoral employment, the picture has dramatically 
altered since 1970. Agriculture shows the greatest decrease, by nearly 
half of its workforce, while employment in industry has gradually 
increased by 5% during 1970-84. The Strip's industrial sector, however, 
mainly depends on craft industries, small factories such as plastics, 
paper, and non-metal production and textile workshops. Construction 
enlisted about 4100 workers in 1970 (8.5% of total employment), but this 
dwindled significantly in the early and mid- 1970s, then later regained 
its 1970 level by 1981 (Table 7.5). Meanwhile, the proportion of the 
Service sector (classified in Table 7.5, as 'others') increased from 47.8% 
in 1970 to 57.9% in 1984. 
The sectoral distribution of employment within the Gaza Strip shows 
that service is a leading economical sector. Services absorbed about 
three-fifths of the Strip's locally employed workers in 1964 (Fig. 7 . 1) 
In a nutshell , significant restructuring of 
the Gaza Strip workforce has-... 
occurred. A situation in the Gaza Strip has developed where unemployed 
and underemployed labourers have been absorbed into wage labour. Such an 
alteration manifested itself in the emergence of a sizeable wage labour 
proletariat in the Israeli construction and agricultural sectors (see 
Table 7.5). This was at the expense of the agricultural sector in the 
Strip where employment declined from 31.6% in 1970 to 16.5% in 1984. 
Based on the 1985 survey results, the rate of employed women within 
the Gaza Strip was 14.4% of the total employed workers, and higher than 
the Strip's total employed women's rate of 6.6% by 7.8%. The high rate of 
locally employed women matches Gazan society's traditions, which reveal an 
extreme reluctance for women to work outside the home. 
Only in cases of 
hardship they will seek service work locally. 
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7.3.2 Employment in Israel 
After the 1967 war, some major economic decisions were taken by 
Israel to promote selectively economic links between the occupied 
territories and Israel. One of the most significant links was the use of 
migrant labour from the territories to fuel the Israeli economy during its 
1970's boom. Van Arkadie (1977) has pinpointed that in 1968 Israeli 
LaboU'r Exchange Offices were set up in the territories, issuing labour 
cards to permit Palestinians from the territories to work in Israel, 
commuting daily from their normal places of residence. Israeli businesses 
were granted permission to place subcontracting work (primarily for 
textiles) with firms and individuals in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
Since 1968 workers from the Gaza Strip have been recruited through 
Labour Exchanges operated in the area by the Israeli Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs to meet an Israeli need for unskilled day labourers. 
From 1968 to 1971 . the number of Gazan workers in Israel was small 
estimated at some 3,000 workers in 1968 and 7,450 in 1971. Then their 
number grew dramatically till 1974, benefitting from Israeli economic 
prosperity. 
Up to 1971 employment in Israel accounted for a modest portion of 
total employment of the Strip's inhabitants, only 13.7%. One year later, 
the workforce size increased sharply by about 114%. This high increase 
resulted from the fact that the PLO military resistance had tried actively 
to prevent Gazans commuting to work in Israel between 1968 and 1971, but 
when the military resistance was defeated in 1972, the migrant workers 
grew dramatically, rising to some 40,200 by 1984, when 46.1% of the Gazan 
workforce were employed in Israel (Table 7.5). 
Indeed, throughout the period 1970-84 the Strip's workforce labouring 
in Israel increased by about 650%. with an annual rate of increase of 
46.5%. Nevertheless, the Israeli economic recessions which took place 
after the 1973 war and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon had a 
limited 
impact upon the level of the Gaza Strip workers. A slight reduction of 
300 workers occurred between 1974 and 1975. By 1976, however, significant 
improvements in employment had been reported and the total increased each 
year up to 1983 when it dwindled again by 500 workers 
in 1984 (Table 7.5). 
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In fact, the actual numbers of Gazan workers in Israel have always 
been significantly higher than those published at any given time, because 
many thousand workers commute 'illegally and have never been reflected in 
official estimates; many employees and employers prefer to bypass official 
placement to evade taxes and other wage deductions. Despite the 
difficulties in knowing how many people are working illegally in Israel, 
"Palestinians estimate that the number is about 40,000. A considerable 
number are under 17 and cannot work legally" (Locke & Stewart, 1985). 
Although the Israeli agricultural sector was a considerable employer 
of the first labour migrants from the Strip in the early 1970s (51.2% of 
the tttal workforce in 1971 were agriculturally employed), since then the 
sector share has declined, notably to 19.6% by 1984, being replaced in 
importance by growth in construction, industry and the services sectors 
(see Table 7.5 and Figure 7.1). 
The most conspicuous feature of Gazan commuter-mi grant labour force 
is the large number of workers recruited in construction. Since the early 
1970s construction has absorbed almost half the workers from the Gaza 
Strip, with its proportion only decreasing slightly during 1970-80 and in 
the last two years (Table 7.5). The high concentration of Gaza workers in 
the Israeli construction sector can be attributed to the higher wages 
which can be earned, compared with other economic sectors (see Table 7.8) 
and to its flexibility of absorbing both unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers. 
However, the proportions of migrant workers employed in industry and 
other sectors (services) have substantially increased. Industry 
has risen 
by 9.6% between 1970 and 1984, whereas service sectors have revealed a 
high proportional increase of some 14% during the same period. 
Graham-Brown (1984a) concludes that a noticeable percentage shift from 
agriculture to industry and services has occurred 
during the past 14 
years. Industry now makes up 18.1% of employment 
from the Gaza Strip, 
although these may not be the true proportions: more of 
the unofficial 
workers are probably in agriculture and construction 
than in industry, 
which may lower the real proportion of workers 
in the latter sector. 
The relative importance of the Strip labour in the 
total Israeli 
workforce has not been great. In 1983, Gazan workers 
in Israel 
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represented some 3.5% of Israel Is total employed workforce. However, the 
concentration of Gaza's labour in the construction and agricultural 
sectors has been very significant; roughly 25% and 12% of those involved 
in construction and agriculture in the Israeli economy in 1983 were from 
the Gaza Strip. 
In a nutshell . the previous indicators al 1 suggest that Gazan workers 
have played an important role in the expansion of the Israeli economy 
since the occupation of 1967. The workers numbers are not so great that 
withdrawal of this labour could be expected to cause economic collapse, 
but for the particular sectors that have become highly dependent on this 
laboui force, its absence would indicate difficulties and the need for a 
notable reallocation of the Israeli labour force. 
So far, Palestinian workers from the Strip are employed to do work 
which Jewish workers will not do because of the low pay and low status, 
putting labour mobility in Israel at one of the lowest levels in the 
world. This can be illustrated by the fact that in December 1984,3800 
Israelis refused jobs typically done by Palestinians, because the pay was 
too little above that of unemployment benefit, which migrant workers are 
not entitled to receive (ILO, 1985). 
According to the 1985 survey, only 3% out of the total Gazan employed 
workers in Israel were women (Table 7.4). The negligible proportion of 
employed women inside Israel reflects Gazan society's viewpoint toward 
this complicated subject. "For Palestinians, the issue of female 
employment becomes particularly sensitive, since the community perceives 
wage labour as an affront to a tradition already threatened by Israeli 
society and, especially if the women work inside the Green Line (Armistice 
Line), as the end of men's ability to control their lives under occupation 
(Rockwell, 1985). We shall return to this subject later on. 
Finally, "there can be no question that this phenomenon (work in 
Israel) has reduced unemployment among the unskilled and semi-skilled, 
helped increase adult male participation in the active labour force, and 
provided a major source of income to residents of the territories" (Van 
Arkadie, 1977). In contrast, local economic activity has failed to expand 
due to very low levels of investment. Therefore, the number of locally 
employed people slightly dropped from 47,950 in 1970 to 47,000 in 1984 
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(Table 7.5). Hence, many skilled and highly educated people have 
emigrated to the oil-producing countries. 
The work conditions of Gazan workers in Israel will be taken as a 
case study in order to present a complete picture. 
7.3.3 Employment in the Arab and Non-Arab Countries 
The 1985 sample survey of population structure shows that 116 persons 
out of the 1781 were employed in Arab and non-Arab countries. The 
majority were male, female participation constituting only 11.2% of the 
total'employed people (Table 7.4). Since no data to hand can be 
sufficient to deal with this subject, a fieldwork survey has been 
conducted. Consequently, the question of labour migration from the Strip 
towards the Arab and non-Arab countries will be analysed at length later. 
7.4 Occupation 
In the light of what has been derived from the 1985 sample survey, 
the occupational status of the economically active population in the Gaza 
Strip for those aged 14 years and over can be found in Table 7.6. Roughly 
48.4% of the workforce were classified as construction workers. Teaching 
and medical occupations (physicians, chemists and nurses) absorb about 
17.4% of the active population. At the same time, merchants, sales 
workers and public and community services account for a modest percentage 
of 11.4%. Of particular interest is that less than 1% of the workforce 
are manufacturing workers, which indicates that the Gaza Strip has 
suffered severely from a shortage of this vital economic sector. 
The occupational status of the economically active population 
in the 
Strip has been affected by the poor economic infrastructure of the area, 
the acute surplus in the labour force, work in Israel, and women's 
participation in the labour force. As a consequence, about 
half of the 
Gazan workforce were forced to search for any type of work they could 
find 
in Israel; construction is a leading employing sector of these migrant 
workers. As regards women's participation in the workforce, some 
variation in occupation between males and females can 
be found. 
Restricted by society's tradition, there are few sources of employment 
for 
professional women outside of teaching, textiles, and 
to some extent 
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Table 7.6 Occupation of the Economically Active* Population in the Gaza 
Strip, 1985 
Types of Employment** No. % 
Medical professions 61 3.0 
Teaching 292 14.4 
Agricultural workers 85 4.2 
Public and community services 128 6.3 
Construction (building and public works) 982 48.4 
Professional and technical workers 124 6.1 
Merchants and sales workers 103 5.1 
Manufacturing workers 18 0.9 
Unemployed graduates of university and 
teachers institute 83 4.1 
Other professions 152 7.5 
Total 2028 100.0 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey. 
The definition of economically active population here describes the 
working-age population including males and females either employed or 
unemployed. 
There were 8016 (79.8%) persons out of 10044 classified as inactive, 
namely, 1952 (19.4%) housewives, 4226 
(42.1%) students, and (18.3%) 
old people, children under 6 years and handicapped. 
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health care. The Gazan female occupational status will be dealt with at 
length later. 
7.5 Unemployment 
The accuracy of unemployment figures concerning the Gazan workforce 
in particular and the occupied territories workforce in general confuse 
most specialized organizations and individuals who are interested in this 
subject. The Israeli authorities have confirmed that unemployment in the 
Gaza Strip has been diminished since work in Israel has been permitted to 
the Gazan people. In addition they stated that unemployment during the 
Egyptian administrative period of the Strip was very high, estimated at 
43% for the Strip as a whole and 70% for those receiving welfare 
(refugees) (Ministry of Health of Israel, 1985). Therefore, our attention 
will focus on analysing the unemployment in the Strip during the Egyptian 
and Israeli occupation periods. 
The only data to hand concerning the unemployment during the Egyptian 
period (1948-67) was gathered by Khlousi (1967). He concluded that 
unemployment was at 35.5% and 83% for the indigenous and refugee 
populations in 1960 respectively, making an average of about 60% for the 
Strip as a whole. But on the eve of the 1967 war, unemployment was 
estimated at 44% (Van Arkadie, 1977). However, unemployment figures 
during the Egyptian period must be used with some reservation particularly 
when compared with those figures reported during the Israeli occupation 
period. 
Indeed, the high unemployment rates during the Egyptian period can be 
attributed to several reasons. Firstly, cut off from its hinterland, 
lacking natural resources except underground water supplies, with huge 
concentration of refugees in camps, severe shortages of capital, and a 
severely limited land area, the Gaza Strip was not able to offer full 
employment to its workforce. Secondly, the Egyptian rule of the Gaza 
Strip coincided with a period of slow economic growth in Egypt itself 
(Sandler and Frisch, 1982)9 which actually left its impact on the labour 
force market of the Gaza Strip. Thirdly, the unemployment rate was 
greatly influenced by the huge concentration of Palestinian refugees who 
were hoping to return to their homeland rather than seek work at 
that 
time. 
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In the postwar period,, employment of Gazan inhabitants in Israel was 
permitted in 1968 and since then employment has risen steadily, while 
unemployment decreased dramatically and has been virtually eliminated. 
Based on Israeli statistics, unemployment in the Strip fell from 8200 
(about 17%) in 1968 to only 800 (0.9%) in 1984 (Table 7.1). 
The above-mentioned conclusion contradicted what was reported by 
Kanovsky (1970) about the employment situation in the Strip in the early 
stage of the occupation. He stated that 19,000 job seekers were 
registered in the eight employment offices operating in the Strip in 1969, 
while jobs were provided for only 8000 many on a part-time basis. 
The credibility of official figures regarding unemployment in the 
Strip must be examined since many thousands of Gazan workers are not 
counted in the official statistics as unemployed. On the other hand, 
there were several thousands working in Israel illegally, who were also 
not included in the unemployment figures. This can be simply noted from 
the Israeli definition of unemployed people, as well as from their method 
of yielding data about employment in the occupied territories. 
Since August 1968, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics has 
conducted regular surveys concerning employment in the occupied 
territories. It is based on a sample drawn according to principles and 
definitions which are similar to those applied in the Labour Force Survey 
in Israel. Prior to 1973, the sample included about 4500 families which 
were surveyed every quarter year. But in 1974 the sample was enlarged to 
about 6500 families in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Central 
Bureau of Statistics, 1984). Simultaneously, the Israeli definition of 
unemployed persons include: "all those who had not worked at all during 
the determinant week (even for a single hour), and actively sought work 
during that week (the time of conducting the survey), by registration at 
the Labour Exchange of Employment Service or at any other labour exchange, 
by a personal or written application (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1984, 
1985b). 
Consequently, the Israeli definition of unemployment is suitable for 
use in Israel itself, because all of its workforce are registered with the 
Employment Service, but in the case of the Gaza Strip this definition is 
not capable of being accurate as a high proportion of the 
Strip's labour 
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force have been illegally employed in Israel. Some 30% of those working 
in Israel had not been registered with the Employment Service according to 
the Israeli official estimation (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of 
Israel, 1985). 
At the same time, figures obtained from the 1985 survey of Gazan 
workers in Israel show that about two-thirds of Gaza's workers commuted to 
work in Israel illegally, resulting from the growth of unemployment trends 
in Israel itself which was estimated at 6% in 1984. According to the 
Israeli statistics, since 1973 the unemployment figures had been found to 
be below 1% (see Table 7.1 Consequently, it can be concluded that the 
lower unemployment rates of the Gaza Strip than those reported in Israel 
itself are attributable to the inadequacy of adopting the Israeli 
definition of unemployment in the Gaza Strip. Hence, the unemployment 
figures which have been published by the Israeli Central Bureau of 
Statistics are incomplete and defective. 
In the light of 'the 1985 survey., 12.2% of the Gazan workforce were 
reported as unemployeds indicating a higher rate than that concluded by 
the Israeli official figures. On the other hand, some Palestinian sources 
in the occupied territories gave an estimate of an unemployment level of 
34% to 40% in early 1985 (ILO, 1985), while in May 1986 unemployment was 
estimated at 50% (Condie, 1986). Indeed unemployment has grown, and it 
has resulted from a continuing fall in employment in Israel, particularly 
when the Israeli economy cooled after the 1982 Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon. No doubt unemployment in the Gaza Strip has been dramatically 
reduced until 1982, but since then it has grown to its highest level in 
1986 and may now be higher than that reported in the 1985 survey. 
Another severe problem facing the Gaza Strip workforce is the high 
unemployment level for university graduates. Out of the 247 unemployed 
persons found in the 1985 survey, 83 (33.6%) of them were classified as 
unemployed graduates of university and teachers 
institute. Furthermore, 
the total of unemployed graduates was reported at about 3629 persons 
(Al 
Bayader Assiyasi, 1985). But if the graduates of the Islamic University 
of Gaza had been added, the number would rise 
to about 4800 in 1985. 
The problem of unemployed Gazan graduates can 
be attributed to two 
main causes: 
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Firstly,, the Israeli occupation of the Strip represents the main 
cause of the problem. The Israeli authorities never attempted to 
introduce any solution, their first consideration being security. Hence, 
they impose many restrictions, particularly against young adults, 
preventing them from travelling abroad even to seek jobs. Moreover, so 
far the Islamic University of Gaza has not yet been recognized by the 
Israel authorities as a university, which has led to the closure of any 
available opportunities of work for hiring its graduates locally, either 
in the government directed institutions or in UNRWA-administered 
establishments. 
'In view of the aforesaid difficulties and the unavailability of 
opportunities of domestic employment, the only accessible job prospects 
are for those who can travel abroad in order to be chosen by one of the 
Arab employment missions in Jordan and sometimes in Egypt. Persons who 
want to travel must obtain special permits, issued by the Israeli 
authorities. They provide all Gazan with exit permits valid for up to 
three years which entitle the holders to come back to the Strip at any 
time. But those who are aged less than 26 years and who wish to return to 
the Strip must spend at least six months outside the Strip beginning from 
their departure date, before they will be allowed to come back. At the 
same time, both the Jordanian and Egyptian authorities refuse to grant 
access into Jordan and Egypt for young adults holding those permits. In 
the light of these difficulties, graduates have no other alternatives 
except waiting until they reach the age of 26 years and over, when they 
are able to travel freely as long as they have no political problems with 
the Israeli occupation authorities. 
Secondly, despite the fact that the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia have 
traditionally been enthusiastic employers of highly skilled Palestinians 
(see Table 7.13), recently they do not want a large Palestinian working 
population in their homelands; partly, for their own internal security 
reasons, and partly as a response to the PLO's request to limit job 
opportunities in order to prevent a mass exodus from the occupied 
territories. In addition, the Gulf states as well as Saudi Arabia prefer 
to hire Palestinians from the West Bank who have Jordanian passports 
rather than hire those from the stateless Gaza Strip. Palestinians from 
the Strip travel on an Israeli Laissez-passer to non-Arab countries, and 
on an Egyptian Laissez-passer to the Arab states. Arab states' 
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recognition of the Egyptian laissez-passer depends on the political 
atmosphere between the Palestinians and the Arab states. 
Consequently, it can be concluded that the problem of graduate 
unemployment constitutes a serious problem in the Strip since the 
universities continue to be flooded with students, and available jobs for 
Gazan graduates in the Strip are quite limited. So far, all the Israelis 
have to offer for Gazan graduates is employment in Israel at unskilled and 
semi-skilled daily jobs, while it now appears that there will not be 
enough work in the immediate future. It is not surprising that many 
highly qualified graduates, such as lawyers, engineers and teachers, are 
amongst the groups of workers gathered to be picked over by potential 
employers. They are looking for labouring jobs on building sites or in 
the fields or as waiters (Condie, 1986). 1 
Many scholars attribute the unemployment problem to the role of the 
Israeli occupation and they suggest solutions lie in the elimination of 
the Israeli occupation and the establishment of the independent 
Palestinian state (Al Fajr, 1986). Finally, it can be realized that the 
problem is a direct result of the absence of a national authority that can 
plan and guide. 
7.6 Gazan Workers in Israel :A Case Study of Their Conditions of Work 
This study will focus on analysing the work conditions of the Strip's 
workers in Israel. The importance of this subject can be ascertained from 
the fact that work in Israel has attracted about half of the Gaza Strip 
labour force. This phenomenon is the most obvious 'cause and consequence 
of integration into the Israeli economy. As little is known about these 
workers and their conditions of work, a sample survey was employed in 
order to gather the required data, and to pinpoint the main 
characteristics of those workers. 
Initiallys when the Gaza Strip was occupied by Israel in June 1967, 
there was a reservoir of unemployed and underemployed labour 
in the Strip 
as a whole and in the Strip's refugee camps in particular. 
In such 
conditionst people would be willing to take any type of work which was 
offered. 
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Indeed, until July 1968, Gazan workers were not permitted to seek 
work in Israel as the authorities feared that such employment would 
aggravate employment problems in Israel. For instance, in 1967 and 1968, 
Israel unemployment levels amounted to about 11% and 7.7% of the total 
civilian labour force respectively. But when the Israeli economy enjoyed 
its period of sustained growth during 1968-73, producing after 1969 a 
tight labour market, the Israeli employment picture changed and labourers 
from the Gaza Strip were allowed to commute in increasing numbers for 
employment inside Israel. At that time, "the Histadrut (Israel Trades 
Union Federation) raised objections to this flow of cheap labour, but 
dropped this opposition when it became clear that these workers were 
mostly doing jobs their members would rather not do" (Graham-Brown, 
1984a). 
The pattern of migration to work in Israel essentially led to 
absorption of the unemployed and underemployed males of the Gaza Strip 
into the Israeli workforce and to the subordination of the Strip economy. 
But it is appropriate to mention here that the decision to allow Gazan 
workers to work inside Israel was issued to maintain a significant 
political aim, particularly when the Israeli leaders realized that 
economic activity would help distract refugee attention from the 
resistance struggle (Mandell, 1985). 
7.6.1 Characteristics of the Sample-Grou 
Table 7.7, which illustrates the main features of the Gazan workforce 
in Israel by sex and socio-economic characteristics, shows that women make 
up about 17.7% of the total. In this study, women's participation in the 
workforce indicates a higher share than that was reported earlier in this 
chapter, but this was a consequence of the enlargement of the sample of 
females, which was made in order to have reliable data wheý comparing 
female conditons of work with those of male workers. The key aim of this 
study is to investigate the conditions of work of Gazan females in Israel, 
rather than to identify their proportion in the labour force. 
Considering the workforce by sex, the proportion of female labourers 
varied widely according to their place of residence within 
the Strip. 
About 60.4% of the total female workforce were coming from the southern 
zone, while both northern and central zones contributed 
37.7% and 1.9% 
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respectively (Table 7.7). In contrast, the proportion of male labourers 
reveals a homogenous distribution by geographical zones, two-fifths of the 
total male labourers in Israel came from the northern zone. 
Viewed from another angle, the refugee and indigenous status of 
commuter-migravit workers were contrasted greatly, roughly 78.7% of the 
overall workforce being refugees while the indigenous workers constituted 
only 21.3%. Classification of the labour force according to sex reveals 
that some 88.7% of the total females workforce were classified as 
refugees, while the remaining proportion were reported as indigenous. In 
contrast,, male workers with refugee status constituted about 
three-quarters of the Strip workforce in Israel (Table 7.7). 
Analysis of the labour force by marital status shows that 62.7% of 
the workers are married, 26.7% single, while those widowed or divorced 
constituted only 10.6%. The picture shows large variation between male 
and feniale workers, and between females working in the Gaza Strip and 
those working inside Israel. For example, 97.1% of the total male workers 
were married or single, and only 2.9% were widowed or divorced,, while only 
39.6% of the total working females were married, 13.2% single and 47.2% 
were widowed or divorced (Table 7.7). On the other hand, the marital 
status of female workers working in Israel is extremely different from 
those working in the Gaza Strip. Rockwell (1985) concluding that the 
majority of female workers inside the Gaza Strip were single, and there 
were very few widowed and divorced women working. But she noted that 
married women rarely work: out of a sample of 156 working Palestinian 
women, she found only one woman was married. 
The low proportion of single females in the commuter labour force can 
be explained by the extreme traditions of society which are reluctant for 
single females to work in particular, and are against women's labour in 
general. Hence most working women work out of dire necessity. Mandell 
(1985) classified those women working in Israel as divorced and widowed 
women, those whose husbands or fathers were working abroad at the time of 
the 1967 war, and were not included in the 1967 census which determined 
residence status, and those whose husabands were in prison. 
The above-mentioned conclusion can be emphasised by analysing the 
mean age of female workers in Israel, which amounted to 
43.2 years against 
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able 7.7 The Main Characteristics of the Gaza Strip Workers Commutinq 
to W*ork Inside Israel by_ Sex Vccordinq to the 1985 Survey 
Characteristic Male Female Both sexes 
No. % No. % No. % 
Number of cases 247 82.3 53 17.7 300 100 
Residency place in the Strip: 
From the northern zone 100 40.5 20 37.7 120 40 
From the central zone 69 27.9 1 1.9 70 23.3 
From the southern zone 78 31.6 32 60.4 110 36.7 
Workers with refugee status: 189 76.5 47 88.7 236 78.7 
Workers with indigenous status: 58 23.5 6 11.3 64 21.3 
Marital status: 
Single 73 29.5 7 13.2 80 26.7 
Married 167 67.6 21 39.6 188 62.7 
Widowed 4 1.6 19 35.9 23 7.6 
Divorced 3 1.2 6 11.2 9 3.0 
Level of Education: 
illiterate 24 9.7 41 
77.4 65 21.7 
Elementary 58 23.5 8 15.1 66 
22.0 
Preparatory 75 30.4 4 7.5 
79 26.3 
Secondary 64 25.9 - - 
64 21.3 
Technical & teachers 20 8.1 
20 6.7 
institutes 
University 6 2.4 
6 2.0 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey. 
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an average of 29.7 years of males. In addition, about 73.6% of the total 
females were over 40 years of age and 30% over 50 years of age. In 
comparison, about 15.7% and 9.7% of males were over 40 and 50 years of age 
respectively. 
The difference between school enrolment of males and females is 
conspicuous (see Table 7.7). At the top of the educational ladder, some 
10.5% of male workers had obtained certificates from higher institutes or 
universities, compared with zero for female workers. At the bottom, 77.4% 
of female workers were illiterate compared with only 9.7% of males. On 
the other hand, the two sexes combined revealed that only 21.7% of the 
labou'r force were illiterate and 70% have had less than 9 years of school 
enrolment. To sum up, the education level of male workers is dramatically 
better than that of female workers. I 
7.6.2 Employment by Economic Sector 
Based on the 1985 survey, the distribution of Gazan migrant workers 
in Israel by economic sector has been illustrated in Table 7.8 and Figure 
7.2. Construction and agriculture still constitute the largest employment 
sectors, absorbing roughly 52.7% of the total workforce employed in 
Israel . These figures indicate a 
higher share by about than those of 
the official statistics reported in 1984 (see Table 7.3). This increase 
in the share of construction and agriculture may not have resulted from a 
changing of the employment composition between 1984 and 1985, but as a 
direct consequence of studying the workforce as a whole, including those 
working illegally in Israel (unofficial workers); particularly since most 
of the unofficial workers are employed in agriculture and construction 
rather than in the other economic activities. 
Industry accounted for about 16.7% of total employment in 1985 
compared with 17.6% in 1984, whereas the remaining economic sectors 
combined absorbed some 30.6%, which shows a drop of 8.2% from whatwas 
reported in 1984 (see Table 7.3). 
Initially, it is interesting to analyse the economic activity of the 
Gazan workforce working in Israel according to their places of work, 
aiming to pinpoint the major employment sectors 
in each place, and to 
conclude whether a relationship exists 
between the value of income, place 
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KEY TO LOCATION OF PLACES OF WORK 
I- Ashqelon and Qiryat Gat Area. 
2-Qiryat Malakhi Area. 
3- Ashdod. 
4- Netivot and Beer Sheva Region. 
5- Besor Area. 
6- Rishon Le Ziyyon, RehovoE and Yavne. 
7- Ramla and Lod Area- 
8 -Tel Aviv, Yafo and Petah Tiqwa. 
9- Kefar Sava, Netanya and Hadera. 
10 O(her Places 
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FIG-72. DISTRIBUTION OF GAZAN WORKERS IN ISRAEL 
BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND PLACE OF WORK. 1985. 
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of work, and type of economic activity. Also it is important to deal with 
the employment structure alongside the sex composition of the workforce, 
in order to explore the main employment sectors dominated by each sex. 
Analysis of employment structure by place of work shows that more 
than one-third of Gazan workers in Kefar Sava, Netanya and Hadera, Rishon 
Le Ziyyon, Rehovot and Yavne,, Tel Aviv, Yafo and Petah Tiqwa, Ashdod, and 
places classified as others were employed in construction; while in the 
remaining places of work the share of construction ranged from zero in 
Besor area to 30.8% in Ramla and Lod area (Table 7.8). 
Although agriculture is the second largest employment sector, its 
relative share varies greatly from one place of work to another. In five 
areas more than one-third of the employed workforce were engaged in 
agricultural jobs. In constrast the remaining areas of employment 
indicate percentages lower than the Strip's average of 24.7% of those 
working in Israel. 
Moreover, industry's share ranges from 6.3% in Kefar Sava, Netanya 
and Hadera to a peak of 28.6% in Besor area (an area where industry is 
entirely agricultural manufacturing). These figures display a narrower 
deviation from the overall share of employment in industry than in either 
construction or agriculture. 
In the meantime, the share of workers employed in restaurants, cafes, 
hotels and shops indicate a high concentration in both Ramla and Lod area, 
and Tel Aviv, 'Yafo and Petah Tiqwa, while the shares in the remaining 
places are lower than the general average of 9.3% for Gazan workers as a 
whole (Table 7.8). 
The composition of labour employed within a given place of work has 
provided differeing pictures. Although construction is a leading sector 
of employment in each of Tel Aviv, Yafo and Petah Tiqwa, Rishon Le Ziyyou, 
Rehovot and Yavne, Kefar Sava, Netanya and Hadera, Ramla and Lod area, and 
other places, agriculture is found to be the largest employer in Ashqelon 
and Qiryat Gat area, Besor area, Netivot and Beer Sheva region, and 
Qiryat 
Malakhi . At the same 
time, Ashdod reveals a balanced share between 
construction and agricultural employment 
(see Fig. 7.2 and Table 7.8). 
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Since construction and agriculture have constituted the largest 
employment sectors for Gazan migrant workers in Israel, a comparison has 
been made in order to identify the relationship between them, as a strong 
negative correlation was found between constructional and agricultural 
employment. The correlation between the percentage of Gaza workers 
employed in construction and percentage of those engaged in agriculture 
within each place of work is negative and significant at the level of 5% 
(r = -0.84). Hence it may be concluded that employment in construction 
corresponds negatively with employment in agriculture (see Fig. 7.3). 
A,,, breakdown of the workforce by gender reveals that only three 
econo6ic sectors were engaged by females. 79.2% of Gazan females working 
in Israel were employed in agriculture, 15.1% in transport, storage and 
communication, and some 5.7% in public and community services. In I 
contrast, only 13.0%, 7.7% and 9.7% of Gaza's males were employed in these 
three economic sectors (see Table 7.9). In essence, Table 7.9 shows that 
Gazan male workers tend to be recruited in construction and industry, 
while female workers prefer working in agriculture. 
To sum up, we can conclude that most jobs held by Gazan workers 
in Israel were classified as unskilled and semi-skilled jobs. 
Graham-Brown (1984a) noted that in December 1981, out of a total of 3,873 
positions filled by workers from the occupied territories, 3,299 (85%) 
were for unskilled workers. 
7.6.3. Worktravel and ýýes 
An overview of the major commuting linkages between the Gaza Strip 
and the Israeli labour markets is portrayed in Figure 7.2, where the 
principal worktravel destinations as well as the dominant centres of 
employment can be explicitly identified. More than a quarter of the total 
Gazan migrant workers in Israel commuted to work in Tel Aviv, Yafo and 
Petah Tiqwa alone. In contrast, Ashqelon and Qiryat Gat area and Rishon 
Le Ziyyon, Rehovot and Yavne combined, absorbed about another quarter, 
Ashdod employed about 11%, while the remaining destinations offered 
jobs 
for about one-third out of the total Gazan workers employed 
in Israel (see 
Table 7.8). 
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FIG-7-3-THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PERCENTAGE OF 
GAZAýS WORKERS EMPLOYED IN CONSTRUCTION AND 
AGRICULTURE ACCORDING TO THEIR PLACES OF WORK IN 
ISRAEL 
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Table 7.9 Classification of Gazan Workers in Israel by Economic Sector 
and Sex of the 1985 Sample Survey 
Type of Work Male Female 
No. % No. % 
Construction (building and public works) 84 34.0 0.0 
Industry (mining and manufacturing) 50 20.2 0.0 
Restaurants, cafes, hotels and shops 28 11.3 0.0 
Agriculture 32 13.0 42 79.2 
Transport, storage and communication 19 7.7 8 15.1 
Public and community services 24 9.7 3 5.7 
Other activities 10 4.1 - 0.0 
Total 247 100.0 53 100.0 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey. 
Based on the 1985 Survey, about 52.7% of workers living in the Gaza 
Strip had return journeys to work of over 140 km, some 32% had to travel 
for more than 180 km, while 13.7% had a worktrip of over 200 km. In other 
words, the average daily return work-trip for the Gazan workers in Israel 
was about 148.8 km. The distance was 155.8 km for male workers and about 
116.2 km for females, the lower figure for female workers resulting from 
their concentration in agricultural jobs close to the Gaza Strip (see 
Figure 7.2). 
Moreover, in theory, employment declines substantially with 
increasing distance from a given point. The experience of the Gaza Strip 
reflects evidence against this conclusion. For instant, despite the fact 
that the average daily return trip to work in Tel Aviv, Yafo and Petah 
Tiqwa is 197.6 km, more than a quarter of Gaza's workers were employed 
there (Table 7.8). Hence it is crucial to identify the relationship 
between wages, which may be orientating labour force movements, and places 
of work as well as types of economic activity. 
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It is frequently observed that earnings of Gazan workers employed in 
Israel differ greatly by place of work, employment sector, and sex. The 
1985 survey shows that the average daily pay for day labourers in Israel 
was about $8.3. The highest daily salaries were paid in Rishon Le Ziyyon, 
Rehovot and Yavne, and Tel Aviv, Yafo and Petah Tiqwa, amounting to $9.3 
and $9.2 respectively, while the lowest was $5 in Besor area (Table 7.8). 
Classification of wages by sex shows that the average wage for a 
female labourer was about 43% lower than that earned by a male worker. 
Based on the 1985 survey, the average monthly wages paid to Gazan workers 
(both sexes) were $181.3, $196.5 ($ 6.55 per day) for a male labourer, and 
only $110.7 ($3.69 per day) for a female worker. 
Considering wages by sectors of employment, the highest monthly 
earnings were gained from working in construction and industry, giving an 
average monthly income of $207 ($6.9 per day), and $204 ($6.8 per day) 
respectively. Simultaneously the lowest was $136.5 ($4.55 per day) earned 
from labouring in agriculture. This explains the high concentration of 
Gazan workers in the construction sector compared with other economic 
sectors. 
Roughly, similar results have been achieved by Roy (1986) for the 
Gaza Strip. According to her figures, in 1984, Gazan workers received an 
average daily wage of $5.71, or $171.0 a month. At the same time, the 
highest daily salaries were paid in construction ($6.25) and industry 
$5.9) and the lowest in agriculture ($4.2). 
Although the averag, 
considerably higher than 
economic sector coincide 
taken into consideration 
from rising wages during 
to the researcher by the 
e wages derived from the 1985 survey are 
those calculated by Roy, the earnings orders by 
between the two studies. However, it must be 
that the variation in wages may have resulted 
1984-85, or to more accurate answers being given 
contacted respondents. 
Comparing the relative wages of Gazan workers in Israel with those 
working in the Strip is crucial. Statistics published by the 
Israeli 
Ministry of Labour confirm that there has been a levelling out of 
the gap 
between the average daily wage paid to workers from the occupied 
territories on the spot and in Israel. During the first nine months of 
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1985, this wage was 20% higher in the Gaza Strip than in Israel (ILO, 
1986). 
Alongside the sectoral employment, Zakai (1986) concludes that in the 
construction sector the relative wages as a percentage were 313 in 1970 
for those working in Israel and declined sharply to 108 by 1984, while 
wages amounted to 214,283, and 168 in 1970, and decreased to 111,130, 
and 63 in 1984 in the sectors of agriculture, industry, and other 
industries respectively. However, the narrowing gap between wages paid in 
Israel and inside the Gaza Strip has resulted from decreasing wages in 
Israel,, rather than an increase in the Gaza Strip. As a consequence of the 
economic slow down in Israel and the rising unemployment ratio, Gazan 
workers in Israel accept less payment in order to secure their 
livelihoods. 
Roy (1986) rejected the Israeli claim that the daily wages for 
workers inside the Gaza Strip are higher than those paid to their 
counterparts in Israel, and she described the Israeli statistics as 
misleading. She introduced evidence that the proportion of Gaza's locally 
employed labour force working in agriculture received about $3.8 per day 
in 1984, significantly lower than the daily salaries paid to those 
employed in Israel. 
Wages paid to Gazan workers in Israel are notably lower than those 
paid to their Israeli counterparts, despite claims to the contrary issued 
in the 1985 annual report of the Israeli Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs. They claimed that one of the major goals guiding Israeli 
governmental policy with regard to the employment of workers from the 
occupied territories in Israel is the equality of wages, social benefits 
and working conditions. Van Arkadie (1977) concluded that the average 
wage for a labourer from the occupied territories stood at 50% of that 
received by an Israeli worker in 1972. But if the cost of transportation 
is added, the real wage drops to about 20-30% of those wages received 
by 
the Israeli workers. 
There is no doubt that earnings from working in Israel have 
largely 
contributed to the increase in the gross national products of the 
Strip 
since 1967. External payments, of which salaries earned in Israel are a 
large part, grew from only 2% of GNP in 1968, to about 31% 
in 1973 and to 
45% in 1983 (Roy, 1986). 
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Another factor which may be considered to have affected the 
variations in the actual daily wages between places of work is the average 
number of days worked per month. Although the highest monthly salary is 
earned from working in Tel Aviv, Yafa and Petah Tiqwa, the highest daily 
wage is paid in Rishon Le Ziyyon, Rehovot and Yavne (see Table 7.8). 
Analysis of monthly worked days by place of work shows that the 
highest number of days worked per months was in Ramla and Lod area, and 
Kefar Sava, Netanya and Hadera, amounting to an average monthly employed 
days of 23.9 and 23.8 respectively. The lowest was 19.4 days worked in 
Netivot and Beer Sheva region. Although the average monthly worked days 
was 21.9, about 18.7% of Gazan workers worked less than 20 days a month, 
and only 6% had worked below 15 days. 
The average working days for a female worker was 20.1 a month, but 
about 45.2% of females worked less than 20 days a month, and some 9.4% 
below 15 days. In contrast,, the average working days for a male worker 
was 22.3 per month. At the same time, 12.9% of males worked less than 20 
days, and only 7.2% worked below 15 days a month. 
7.6.4 Conditions of Work and Welfare Benefits 
Obviously, analysing the conditions of work of Gazan commuter-workers 
in Israel represents the most important aspect of this study. Its 
relative significance can be derived from the fact that very little is 
known about them and their daily suffering, which can introduce the whole 
problem of the teeming Gaza Strip. 
Officially, employment in Israel provided to Gazan workers must be 
organized and supervised by the Israeli employment offices, which were 
established in the Strip after the 1967 war. A worker who wishes to seek 
employment in Israel is required to register with one of these employment 
offices in his area of residency. Israeli fi rms report their needs for 
labourers to an employment office; after the worker in question has been 
checked by Israeli security, the employment office issues a work 
certificate indicating that he has gone through legal channels in 
obtaining his specific job. "These work certificates are issued for a 
period of 4 months, after which they must be renewed. However, since 
1981, tenured workers in industry need renew them only every 6 months" 
(Ministry* of Labour and Social Affairs of Israel, 1985). 
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Despite the above-mentioned regulations, a high proportion of Gazan 
workers have always commuted to work in Israel illegally (also known to 
the Israelis as irregular workers, or workers in irregular employment). 
Unfortunatelys there are no accurate figures for the numbers of those 
workers employed in Israel without permits. Hence, there are numerous 
estimates, some of them from Israeli sources, amounting to one-third of 
the workers from the occupied territories employed in Israel and about 50% 
in the building sector. Moreover, General Abraham Ben Yamin, the Israeli 
civil administration commander of the Gaza Strip in a televized broadcast 
on 27 December 1984 estimated the number of illegal workers from the Strip 
to be about 20,000, or some 50% of the total Gazan workforce employed in 
Israel (Akhbar Ghazza, 1985). In addition., the Central Employment Office 
in Gaza indicates that over 40% of workers from the Gaza Strip work in 
Israel illegally (ILO, 1986). 
In the light of the 1985 survey, about 37.3% of Gazan workers were 
employed in Israel legally. Analysing the data by sex, the percentage of 
male workers employed legally in Israel was higher than females, amounting 
to 43.4% and 9.41/o respectively. On the other hand, the percentage of 
Gazan workers commuting to work illegally was 62.7%. Classification by 
sex shows 90.6% and 56.7% of female and male workers were employed 
illegally. 
The percentage of illegal workers derived from the 1985 Survey is 
considerably higher than that estimated by Israeli sources. This can be 
justified by the fact that the 1985 survey was carried out during the 
season of picking citrus and vegetables; as a consequence the percentage 
of irregular workers may have risen. But no doubt the difficult economic 
situation in Israel and increasing unemployment ratios have forced 
job-seekers to turn away from official recruitment channels despite 
allegations to the contrary raised by the Israeli authorities and 
Histadrut. 
However, Gazan illegal workers who prefer to be employed in Israel 
unofficially have been questioned. Four main reasons have been given as 
causes of rejecting recruitment through the labour office. 
Firstly, out of the 188 illegal workers (140 males and 48 females) 
identified in this study, about 83% of them refused to be recruited 
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through official channels because they thought that they could earn more 
privately. The same reasons were given by both male and female workers, 
amounting to 82.85% and 83.3% respectively. In fact, wages paid to 
illegal workers are higher than those paid to their legal counterparts, 
amounting in many cases to 200% or more. If the cost of transportation is 
deducted, the real wage decreases substantiallys particularly as the day's 
work is not secure. On the contrary, legal workers were provided with 
transportation funded entirely or partly by their employers. 
Based on the 1985 survey, the net income per month for legal workers 
was $199.1, compared with $170.7 for their illegal counterparts. 
Simulýaneouslyj, the average days worked per month were 23.7 for legal 
workers and about 21.9 for illegal ones, giving actual daily wages of $8.4 
and $8.2 for the legal and illegal workers respectively. This trend 
ensures that the legal workers have more secure jobs than those illegally 
employed. 
Secondly, roughly 59% of the illegal workers disapproved of legal 
work in order to avoid a high deduction of taxes from their wages; 60.4% 
and 58.6% of female and male workers respectively gave this reason for 
working illegally. 
Significantly, Gazan legal workers are required to pay up to 30% of 
their earnings for taxes, namely national insurance, trade union fees, 
social security, income tax, and medical insurance. But workers who have 
earnings below minimum wages are required to pay about 11% of their wages 
for social benefits. According to the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs of Israel, Gazan workers who work in Israel pay tax at the same 
level as Israeli workers. Despite this they do not receive the same 
benefits, especially with respect to pensions, sick leave, widows 
pensions, unemployment benefit, and disability pensions. 
Although Gaza's workers pay these 
receive the benefits offered under the 
else they have a low probability of cl, 
Histadrut union refuses to admit Gazan 
about 1% of their wages in payment for 
provide (Roy, 1986). 
taxes, they are not eligible to 
schemes they are charged for, or 
aiming them. At the same time, the 
workers as members and deducts 
services which the union does not 
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Similarly, despite the fact that Gazan workers pay national insurance 
which amounts to some 6% of their wages, they are not eligible to receive 
the relevant benefits. The 1985 report published by the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs of Israel indicates that workers from the 
occupied territories receive all social benefits paid to their Israeli 
counterparts, with the exception of national insurance benefits which, 
according to the report, carry a legal requirement of residence in Israel. 
Moreover, the report claims that health services provided to Gazan 
legal workers are financed in part by a small additional deduction from 
the worker's paycheque, while the Israeli government provides the 
remai, nder of the budget needed for this purpose. However, this claim is 
somewhat misleading since legal workers contributions were equivalent to 
about 82% of the premiums of private health insurance. For instance, in 
July 1986, the monthly fee for private health insurance was about $20, 
while the health services deduction from the legal workers paycheque 
amounted to some $16.4. 
Thirdly, owing to the long return work-trip of Gazan workers in 
Israel , which was described earlier, about 
22.3% of the illegal workers 
refused to be officially recruited, as they were not willing to work 
throughout the year. Nearly similar answers were given by male and female 
workers, accounting for 23.6% and 18.75% respectively. 
Frequently, many Gazan workers (legal and illegal workers) travel for 
as much as 5 hours a day. They commute to work at about 4 a. m. and return 
back between 6 and 7 p. m. (Plates 7.1 and 7.2). In such conditions of 
work, they are not willing to be hired on a regular basis as the 
Israeli 
firms require. This group of illegal workers includes those who want 
to 
be hired temporarily, such as farm owners during specified periods when 
they are not busy with their crops, school and university students 
during 
their vacations, and some Gazan employees seeking extra workduring 
their 
holidays. 
Lastly, about 41.5% of the irregular workers preferred to be 
hired 
illegally but they did not provide specific reasons why. At the same 
time, this absence of reason was given by about 42.1% and 39.6% of male 
and female illegal workers respectively. 
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Plate 7.1 : Shuja'aya square : Workers congregate near Gaza townts 
central post office from dawn onwards. 
Photo : The author. 
Plate 7.2 : Gazan workers, gathering ready to travel to work in Israel and 
clearly showing boys aged under 16, therefore working illegally 
(The legal age for working in Israel being 17). 
Photo : The author. 
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Indeed amongst this group of irregular workers are girls and boys below the minimum legal age of work. Actually, workers from the Gaza 
Strip under the age of 17 are not issued with work certificates for 
employment in Israel, while in the Strip the minimum legal working age is 
14 according to a special ordinance issued in 1978 by the Israeli 
occupational authorities. 
Roy (1986) concluded that amongst the illegal workers employed in 
Israel are children aged between 8-15 years. This outcome can be clearly 
interpreted from Plate 7.2. The 1985 survey shows that about 1.3% of 
Gazan workers were under 15, and some 6% under 17 years of age. Moreover, 
the ILO asked the Israeli authorities to take particular care in order to 
conteol the clandestine employment of Gazan young people who are under the 
statutory minimum age, as this can easily give rise to abuse (ILO, 1986). 
It is regrettable that the Israeli authorities have been unwilling to curb 
the "irregular labour" phenomenon or to reduce it substantially, as they 
are not able to offer full employment to those workers, particularly since 
their economy slowed down into recession. 
The economic load of Gazan migrant workers is increased by the cost 
of transportation into Israel which is liable to eat up a major part of a 
daily wage, averaging between 30% and 60% of the salary according to the 
mode of transportation. Hence Gazan workers travel to work on different 
bases. 
Based on Israeli estimates, about 80% of the occupied territories' 
workers are commuters who return home daily. In contrast, the 1985 survey 
shows that some 72.3% of workers from the Gaza Strip commuted daily 
between their homes and their places of work in Israel, 19T make their 
return trip weekly, and about 8.7% make it less often. However, if the 
analysis is carried out by sex, the picture is considerably altered. The 
survey shows that 92.5% and 69% of female and male workers commuted on a 
daily basis, 3.75% and 23.3T weekly, and only 3.75% and 9.1% less often. 
Yet, staying overnight in Israel is prohibited for both legal and 
illegal workers between midnight and 4 a. m. A worker who wants to stay 
overnight has to be supplied with a lodging permit issued by the Israeli 
authorities after a request from his employer. But only a restricted 
number of these permits is granted to workers in special circumstances. 
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In the light of the 1985 survey, out of the 83 workers (79 males and 4 females) who commuted weekly or less between the Strip and Israel, only 25 workers (30.1%), all of them males, had lodging permits. In contrast the remainder (54 males and 4 females) were accommodated in Israel without 
permits. 
As a consequence, workers are forced to commute long hours or, under 
risk of punishment, illegally remain inside Israel. Lesch (1985) stated 
that employers and workers collude in circumventing the law so that the 
worker will not have to spend several hours every day commuting. Farmers 
let labourers sleep in huts, abandoned buses, or even in the open under 
the -orange trees - In town, workers jam into hostels, sleep on 
construction sites, or spread out on the floor in restaurants. There have 
been cases of disasters when workers locked into factories at night were 
unable to escape when fires broke out. In 1976 three workers from Gaza 
were burned to death when a fire swept through a factory. 
7.7 Gazan Employees Abroad: A Ca§e Study 
For a long time, people form Gaza have moved to work abroad, 
especially to the oil-rich Arab states. But their movements intensified 
and expanded after the economic boom in the oil producers' states 
following the dramatic 1974 increase in oil prices. "The vast increase in 
oil-revenues led to a huge explosion in the demand for foreign labour in 
the Gulf. The Gulf states designed programmes to provide their countries 
with a modern economic infrastructure. Inevitably such developments were 
also accompanied by a big expansion of government administration. All 
this could be managed only by importing a foreign workforce (Owen, 1985). 
Although, the number of Gazan workers in the Arab oil states relative 
to the total number of foreign workers is small, their number and 
particularly their remittances to the Gazan economy is crucial, as will be 
mentioned later on. Hence, this phenomenon of labour migration from the 
Gaza Strip should be subject to deep analysis, particularly since it has 
not been studied within this framework before. The analysis will focus on. 
answering the main questions underlined earlier in chapter five. The data 
presented here are drawn from a 1985 survey conducted by the researcher 
among a random sample of 550 migrant workers. 
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As no official or personal estimations concerning the number of 
Gaza's workers have been made by the Israelis or by Palestinians, the 
researcher has been obliged to make an attempt to achieve some reasonable 
estimates. 
Based on the 1985 survey of population structure, about 6.5% of 
Gaza's active population were employed abroad. At the same time, workers 
employed in the Gaza Strip and in Israel combined totalled about 91,000. 
Hence, if the proportion of 6.5% is adopted to represent those workers 
employed abroad, and then added to the whole Gazan labour force, the 
estimated number for those employed abroad will reach about 6,300 migrant 
workers. Consequently, it can be suggested that the number of migrant 
workers at the end of 1985 was within the range of 5000-10,000. 
Obviously, one important difference between Palestinian and other 
Arab workers in the oil-rich Arab countries lies in the pattern of their 
recruitment. Workers from the labour-exporting Arab countries can be 
employed in the labour-importing states either through official channels 
or by private recruiting agencies and labour contractors. On the other 
hand, Palestinians, including Gazans of course, must be recruited through 
official channels only, in order to be under the control of the Arab 
countries. For instance, Owen (1985) shows that in one Jordanian sample, 
about 60% of the migrants had a job arranged for them before they left 
Jordan. Whereas in another sample for the Egyptians, about half of them 
found employment in Kuwait through their relatives. In contrast, the 
stateless Gazans are forbidden to have access to the Arab states in order 
to seek work unless they have a valid contract of work issued by one of 
the employment missions in Jordan or Egypt. 
Indeed, most Arab governments share a fear of the Palestinians 
highly educated, highly needed, yet highly dangerous since their bitter 
experience from 1948 onwards has radicalized their political views 
(Minority Rights Group, 1984). 
7.7.1 Characteristics of the SaTp]e Group 
In the findings of the 1985 survey, nx)st of the Gazan migrant workers 
employed abroad were males. Out of the 550 workers sample4,489 
(88.9%) 
were males, while females accounted for only 61 or 11.1% of the sample. 
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It is important to report here that only 4 (0.73%) workers, all of them 
males, of the sample were employed in non-Arab countries. 
Considering the migrant workers by their marital status shows that 
about 18.55% were single, 80.9% married, and only 0.55% widowed or 
divorced. Furthermore, only a small proportion of the married migrant 
workers travelled and lived abroad without their families. Amongst the 
445 married workers, 63 (14.3%) travelled alone because they probably 
wanted to save a higher proportion of their earnings or because they 
emigrated for a short term. 
I Moreover, the average family size of Gazan migrant workers was 3.8, 
indicating a smaller family size compared with those families living 
within the Gaza Strip (see Chapter 6). Initially, about 29.1% of the 
married migrant workers had families consisting of less than 3 members, 
39.7% between 3 and 4,21.0% between 5 and 6, and only 10.1% had 7 members 
or more in their families. 
Significantly, it my be necessary to report here that the sample 
interviewed was restricted to those migrant workers with identity papers 
as permanent residents of the Gaza Strip, whereas those who left the area 
before the 1967 war or displaced after the war were excluded as they are 
considered by the Israeli authorities as emigrants. 
7.7.2 EmploZment and Occupation 
The main destinations of Gazan migrant workers abroad have been 
illustrated in Table 7.10 and Figure 7.4. In the light of the 1985 
survey, about half of the Gazan migrants were employed in Saudi Arabia 
alone, while only 2.5% were in both North and Southe Yemen. Together the 
four Gulf states mentioned in this study absorbed about three-quarters of 
Gazan migrants while the remaining countries absorbed only one-quarter. 
Analysis of sex showed Saudi Arabia alone has absorbed about 
two-thirds Gazan female employees, whereas the Gulf states combined 
attracted about 83.6% of female workers. In contrast, roughly 73% of male 
migrants from the Strip were recruited in the four Gulf states, and some 
45.8% of them were employed in Saudi Arabia alone (see Table 7.11). 
Obviously, Saudi Arabia represents the main recruitment country for Gazan 
migrants either males or females. 
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Table 7.10 Proportional Distribution of Gazan Migrant Workers in the 
Arab and Non-Arab Countries by Type of Work, 1985 
Type of work Total 
Country Teach- Medical Engin- Other 
ing Prof- eering Workers activit- No. % 
ession 
I 
ies * 
Number in sample 
Percentage 
256 
46.5 
66 
12.0 
78 
14.2 
33 
6.0 
117 
21.3 
550 
- 100 
Saudi Arabia 50.2 11.8 11.0 7.6 19.4 263 47.8 
U. A. E. 1 34.0 1 13.2 1 19.8 1 5.5 1 27.5 1 91 116.6 
Li bya 1 55.2 1 1.5 1 22.4 1 3.0 1 17.9 1 67 112.2 
Al geri a1 59.4 
1 25.0 1 9.3 116.3 1 32 1 5.8 
Kuwa it1 51 .7 
117.2 1 6.9 11 24.2 1 29 1 5.3 
Qatar 
1 40.0 1 8.0 1 16.0 11 36.0 1 25 1 4.5 
North & South 57.1 14.3 14.3 14.3 14 
2.5 
Yemen 
Other countries 13.8 17.2 17.2 20.7 
31.1 29 5.3_ 
Source: The 1985 Sample Survey. 
* Including accountants, businessmen, managers, governmental 
employees etc. 
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Classification of migrants by occupation shows that approximately half of Gaza's migrants were engaged in teaching, about a quarter in 
medical and engineering jobs, and only some 6% as skilled or semi-skilled 
workers (Table 7.10). Simultaneously, a breakdown of the migrant workers by gender shows that only three occupations involved females, led by 
teaching in which more than 90% were employed. In contrast, only 40% of 
the male sample were in teaching. At the same time, the medical and 
engineering professions combined employed more than a quarter of employed 
male workers (Table 7.12). The concentration of Gazan females in 
particular in the teaching sector reflects the culture of Gaza Strip 
society, particularly since the most likely job for women is teaching. 
The importance of teaching as the largest employer of Gazan migrants 
is shown in Table 7.10. In all labour-importing states, except UAE, 
Qatar, and those classified as other countries, over 50% of Gazan migrants 
were recruited in teaching. Employment in medical occupations varied from 
25% in Algeria to 1.5% in Libya, and in engineering work form 22.4% in 
Libya to 6.9% in Kuwait. One significant observation revealed from Table 
7.10 is that about 94% of Gaza's migrant workers do white-collar work, 
whereas only 6% of them were engaged in blue-collar work. Initially, it 
can be identified that highly educated people constitute the main 
proportion of Gazan migrant workers abroad. 
Apparently, the concentration of Gazan migrants in the Gulf states 
may be attributed to the high wages paid there. In addition, these 
countries practise a free economic policy which pemiits the migrant 
workers to transfer out as much as they can save from their salaries. On 
the contrary, in 1984, only 60% and 40% of salaries paid to the foreign 
workers in Libya and Algeria respectively were permitted to be taken out 
of these countries. Hence, a high proportion of Gazan workers in Libya, 
Algeria, as well as in North and South Yemen, resigned from their jobs 
when they had the chance to move into the Gulf states. 
Workers emigration has no negative impact on the Strip economy since 
the Strip has suffered from a severe problem of unemployment for 
university graduates. One minor effect is that in many cases, the better 
experienced people resigned from their jobs and emigrated, which by one 
means or another affected the services sectors in the Strip. 
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7.11 Distribution of Gazan Migrant Workers in the Arab and Non-Arab 
Countries by Sex, 1985 
Gender Ma 1e Femal e 
Destination No. % No. % 
Saudi Arabia 224 45.8 39 64 
U. A. E. 81 16.6 10 16.4 
Libya 62 12.7 5 8.2 
Algeria 30 6.1 2 3.3 
Kuwa it 28 5.7 1 1.6 
Qatar 24 4.9 1 1.6 
North and South Yemen 13 2.7 1 1.6 
Other Countries 27 5.5 2 3.3 
Total 489 100.0 61 100.0 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey. 
7.12 Distribution of Gaza's Migrant Workers by Sex and Type of Economic 
Activity, 1985 
Gender Male Fenial e 
Type of Work No. /C No. % 
Teaching 200 40.9 56 91.8 
Medical Profession 62 12.7 4 6.6 
Engineers 78 15.95 - - 
Workers 33 6.75 - - 
Other Activities 116 23.7 1 1.6 
Total 489 100 61 100.0 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey. 
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7.7.3 Waqes and Remittances 
As demonstrated in Table 7.13, the average monthly salaries paid to 
Gazan migrant workers varied from one type of economic activity to 
another, and from one country to another. The 1986 survey of income 
displays that the average monthly salary was $1012. The highest monthly 
salaries were paid in UAE ($1395). Qater ($1284) and Saudi Arabia ($985), 
and the lowest in North and South Yemen ($464). 
Viewed from another point, variations in monthly wages by type of 
economic activity are significant. The highest monthly wages are earned 
in the medical and engineering professions, amounted to $1480 and $1185 
respectively, while the lowýýst were paid to workers (skilled and 
semi-skilled) and teachers, $548 and $890 respectively. Simultaneously, 
the same results can be concluded if the analysis is done separately 
within each country, except in North and South Yemen (see Table 7.13). 
Earnings from teaching there were $480 per month compared with $450 for 
medical and engineering professions. This phenomenon can be explained by 
the fact that wages paid to workers who have an external contract are 
higher than those paid to employees who have an internal contract of work. 
Significantly, earnings form abroad constitute a vital source of 
funds for the Gazan economy. For instance, remittances from relatives 
working abroad accounted for a third of the gross domestic product of the 
Gaza Strip in 1980 (Lesch, 1985). Furthermore, the overall monthly income 
calculated for the 1985 sampled migrant workers (excluding workers 
classified under the category of other countries) amounted to about 
$527,277. Considering the poor infrastructure of the Gaza Strip economy, 
this sum will have contributed substantially to its prosperity. 
It should be noted that the intention to return among Gazan migrants 
makes them more inclined to save and send a higher proportion of their 
earnings to their relatives in the Gaza Strip. Also, it is important to 
report that remittances have found their way to all Gazan societies 
including urban, rural and refugee peoples since migrnat workers have 
migrated from all of them. 
Most of the money which is brought into the Strip is either hoarded or 
spent on education, on building a house, or on consumer durables. So far, 
building houses and apartments seems to be the most common use of remittances. 
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As a consequence of the Iraq-Iran war placing the whole of the Gulf 
in jeopardy and of the recent deterioration in oil prices, government 
expenditure has been sharply reduced and projects frozen or stopped. 
Consequently., thousands of migrant workers have been sacked. At the same 
time, most of the oil-rich states in general and the Gulf states in 
particular have introduced systematic efforts to reduce the numbers of 
foreign labourers in their countries as much as possible. Hence, if Gazan 
migrant workers in the Gulf States are sacked, it represents a disaster 
for the Gazan people and Gaza's fragile economy. "For Palestinians, 
including Gazans of course, the Gulf states represented the chance of a 
new start, and for prosperity and the opportunity to sustain relatives 
still in Palestine through remitýances of their salaries (rAnority Rights 
Group, 1984). 
Moreover, the average monthly salaries of those workers employed 
abroad were about six times those of workers employed inside Israel , 
amounting to $1012 against $181.3. 
To sum up, earnings from work in Israel are more likely to be spent 
on day-to-day needs and on consumer goods, while those remitted from 
abroad are employed in improving living conditions of Gaza's people. 
Graham-Brown (1984a) pinpointed this clearly when she concluded that 
whatever the conscious manupulative aims of the Israeli authorities in the 
occupied territories,, the social changes they have made in this way are 
minor compared with those that have resulted from economic factors, most 
importantly those brought about by migrant labour and remittances, coming 
both from workers inside Israel and from emigrants abroad. 
7.8 Summary 
The analysis of employment structure shows that the Gaza Strip is 
distinguished by a very low labour participation rate, resulting from the 
large proportion of young people in the population, the high rate of 
school attendance, and the low labour participation rate among Gazan 
women. The cultural constraints are the major obstacles parlyzing women's 
employment. 
As a consequence of the Israeli occupation, restructuring of the Gaza 
Strip labour force occurred primarily since work in Israel was permitted 
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to Gaza's people. Prior to 1967, all the Gazan workforce were employed 
domestically except a very small fraction employed in the Gulf states, 
estimated to be below 1%. In contrast, by 1985, over half of Gaza's 
workforce were employed in jobs either in Israel or in the Arab and 
non-Arab states, and earnings from these jobs have improved substantially 
the conditions of life of the Gazan people. 
Apparently, the Gaza Strip constitutes a large labour camp,, fuelling 
the Israeli economy with a reservoir of cheap unskilled and semi-skilled 
labourers, doing manual jobs usually rejected by their Israeli 
counterparts. 
Furthermore, the study reveals that the occupational structure of the 
Gazan labour force is widely varied according to their place of work. In 
the Strip, services were the largest employment branch for them, 
construction for those employed in Israel, and teaching in the Arab and 
non-Arab countries. Additionally, most of the Gazan migrants abroad were 
employed in the Gulf states, in service jobs, and they were highly 
educated, whereas the less educated workers were employed locally or 
inside Israel. 
Significantly, over half the Gazans employed in Israel were 
clandestine workers and this made it easy for them to be exploited by 
their employers. Consequently, they are subject to unequal treatment with 
their legal counterparts. Moreover, the Israeli published figures of 
unemployment in the Gaza Strip are misguided and the real figures are 
considerably higher than the official figures. The study indicates that 
in the last three years unemployment has risen in the Strip for both 
educated and less educated people. 
Finally, Gazan migrant workers in Israel had worse conditions of 
work, a very long return trip, low salaries, fewer chances of promotion, 
less job security, and inferior trade union protection than their Israeli 
counterparts. 
In a nutshell, it adds up to a picture of heavy dependence upon 
migratory labour in Israel and in the Arab countriess which means that the 
Gazan employment structure and economy are extremely fragile and reliant 
upon external economic conditions. 
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Part Three 
The Israeli OcSypatikrý Authorities- and the-Gaza Strip population 
When the Israelis occupied the Gaza Strip in June 1967, they were 
resisted by the Palestinian guerrillas who had established their bases, 
primarily, in the overcrowded refugee camps. As a consequence, several 
measures were taken by the Israelis against the Strip's population in 
general and the inhabitants of the refugee camps in particular, aiming 
partly to crush the Palestinian resistance movement, either by using their 
military forces or by removing the refugee population from their camps, 
and partly to achieve specific political goals of solving the problem of 
Palestinian refugees through resettlement in the Israeli -sponsored 
rehousing projects. 
Hence, in part three, an attempt will be made to analyse the impact 
of Israeli policy upon the population of the Gaza Strip; the socio- 
economic and socio-political situations and conditions under which Gazans 
have been living; the systematic Israeli efforts towards altering the 
status of the population and settlement patterns of the Strip; and the 
response of Gazan people towards these policies. The study will rely on 
available documents collected mainly from the UNRWA Office of Gaza, but 
most essentially on two pilot surveys carried out by the researcher in 
1985, in order to assist him in understanding the mobility of the 
overcrowded population and Israeli policy as well. The first survey 
concerns the Israeli -sponsored rehousing projects for Palestinian 
refugees, while the second concerns the housing problem in the refugee 
camps and Israeli policy toward them. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
The Effect of Israeli thý Residents of the Gaza Stri cy 1 ý _p 
As indicated in Table 8.1 , about 21 043 rooms, of which about half 
were built by UNRWA, housing nearly 9,319 families consisting of 57,123 
persons, have been demolished in the Gaza Strip refugee camps since the 
Israeli occupation of June 1967. The demolitions have been carried out 
under Israeli schemes aiming to eradicate the Strip's refugee camps as a 
reminder of the Palestine disaster. On the other hand, the inhabitants of 
Gazan cities and villages suffer from the same measures which have been 
practised against the inhabitants of the refugee camps, with the 
exceptions only of those demolitions which happened in the 1971 
road-widening and thinning-out plans, and refugee rehousing projects. But 
unfortunately data are unavailable for the Gaza Strip as a whole. 
Analysis by camp demonstrates that Rafah, Beach, Jabalya, and Khan 
Yunis camps were the worst affected camps by the Israeli schemes of 
systematic demolitions (see Figure 8.1), about 90% of the demolished roorls 
and affected persons being reported in those four camps (Table 8.1). 
Indeed, the demolitions of shelters have been carried out in the Gaza 
Strip on several grounds. Consequently, chapter eight aims to bring to 
light these measures which may help in understanding the population 
dynamics and the political situation in the teeming Gaza Strip. But it 
seems relevant to report here that about 1,020 rooms accommodating 465 
families of 3,435 persons had been destroyed in the eight refugee camps in 
the Gaza Strip as a result of the 1967 war (Table 8.2). 
So far, the Israeli authorities have rejected all UNRWA's requests to 
pay compensation for the demolition of rooms built, or assisted by the 
UNRWA, despite the fact that the demolished rooms were UNRWA's property. 
Consequently, a distinction between rooms has been made in Tables 8.1 and 
8.2, in order to display the number of UNRWA built-rooms and those 
built 
privately. 
8.1 Security___Roa. ds Plan 1971. 
In 1971 , an unusual military campaign was 
begun by the Israeli 
authorities against the population of Gazan refugee camps, as a result 
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Table 8.1 Demolished Shelters by Camp in the Gaza_Strip, 
June 1967 - 30 November 1985 
Affected Rooms built by: Total Total Total rooms, farq, of of of 
Camp and UNRWA UNRWA Ex-Army rooms families persons 
rs erý built assisted barracks Private 
Jabalya 2,883 385 2,036 5,304 2.052 12,773 
Beach 2,028 635 - 2,055 4,718 2,420 14,757 
Bureii 392 92 93 252 829 342 2,152 
Nuseirat 415 115 38 421 989 459 2,741 
Mughazi 124 45 16 117 302 102 661 
Deir el Balah 22 - - 48 70 28 
168 
Khan Yunis 1,602 117 1,148 2,867 1,396 8,198 
Rafah 2,923 260 - 2,781 5,964 
2,520 15,673 
Total 10,389 1,649 147 8,858 21,043 9,319 57,123 
Source: UNRWA Accommodation Office of Gaza, 1985 
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Table 8.2 Classification of Demolished Shelters in the Gazan Refuaee 
Camps by Cause of Demolition between June 1967 and 30 November 1985 
No. of affected t Rooms built by: Total Total Total 
om 1 rooms, famil- 1 of of of i d i 
of s es an Cause of ersons UNRWA UNRVIA Ex-army rooms 
famil iesý persons 
D mo liti emoli ion built assis- barr- Private 
ted acks 
Demol i shed by the 668 17 46 289 1,020 485 3,435 
1967 war 
The 1971 demolition 3,659 812 - 3,258 7,729 2,554 15,855 
(July-August 
thinning-out plan) 
Punitive cases 353 51 33 205 642 248 1,659 
Contravention - - - 87 87 
47 291 
The 1971 road 1,510 338 68 1,149 3,065 
1,387 8,212 
widening excluding 
the 1971 thinning- 
out demolition 
Town planning 489 37 534 
1,060 497 2,609 
Voluntary 3,430 385 2,732 6,547 3,802 23,157 
Border line 280 9 604 893 299 
1,905 
Total 10,389 1,649 147 8,858 21,043 9,319 
57,123 
Source : UNRWA Accommodation Office of Gaza, 
1985 
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of an increase in military resistance operations against the occupier's 
troops. Hence, "the Israelis' issued an order declaring all camps to be 
closed areas, entry into and exit out of which would be regulated" (United 
Nations, 1971). At the same time, in an attempt to overthrow the Gazan 
resistance, the Israeli government in Tel Aviv decided to thin out the 
population of the congested refugee camps (Brilliant, 1971). The plan was 
carried out under the supervision of Ariel Sharon (the Commander- i n-Ch i ef 
of the Southern Command at that time) , who ordered the army to plough 50 m 
wide roads through the camps to facilitate army patrols in their 
suppression of military resistance. 
An analysis of the 1971 demolition shows that shelters of 2,554 
families, comprising about 15,855 persons, were destroyed (Table 8.2). The 
demolitions were carried out in the three refugee camps of Jabalya, Beach, 
and Rafah under the July-August thinning-out plan. About 45.5% of the 
affected persons were from Jabalya, 30.5% from Beach, and 24% from Rafah. 
UNRWA claimed compensation for the demolitions from the Israeli 
authorities, who later replied to the effect that it was for them to 
determine what actions were warranted by security requirements and 
military operations (United Nations, 1972). 
It is relevant to mention here that the demolitions were carried out 
at short notice before new shelters could be built. But the Israelis 
claimed that demolition was an immediate necessity to stamp out the 
military resistance. As alternatives, the Israeli authorities offered the 
refugees the choice of moving to Al-Arish in north Sinai (outside the Gaza 
Strip), where the Israeli government would issue them houses of Egyptians 
who had fled in 1967; or to go to the West Bank; or to find their own 
lodging in the Gaza Strip (Metzger, Orth and Sterzing, 1983). 
The UNRWA records indicate that some 400 registered refugee families 
were displaced to Al-Arish in Sinai. About 130 families went back to the 
Strip soon after the initial move, 120 more have returned over the years 
and the remaining families vacated their accommodation and came back to 
the Strip in 1979, after the returning of Al-Arish city to Egypt according 
to the Camp David peace treaty (United Nations, 1979). In addition, some 
hundred families were resettled in the West Bank. UNRWA (1985) has shown 
that 4,616 registered refugees were living in the West Bank as at 30 
June 
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1985. The remaining families were housed in vacant UNRWA shelters or 
with their relatives in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, about 500 of these 
displaced families were shunted over the Egyptian border to Canada Camp 
(see Figure 4.1). 
Initially, in December 1971, the United Nations General Assembly 
called upon Israel to desist from further destruction of refugee shelters 
and from further removal of refugees from their present places of 
residence, and to take immediate and effective steps for the return of the 
refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed and to 
provide adequate shelters for their accommodation (United Nations, 19712). 
But Israel refused to return the displaced people, or to provide them with 
accommodation or compensation. 
Simultaneously, another security roads plan was taking place in all 
the Gazan refugee camps, except Deir el Balah, under the distinction of 
road widening. The plan was carried out jointly by the Israeli military 
authorities and UNRWA. Under this scheme shelters accommodating 1,387 
families, comprising 8,212 people, were destroyed (see Table 8.2). 
Approximately 32.1% of the affected people were from Nuseirat camp, 25.1% 
from Khan Yunis, 18.2% from Bureii, 17% from Rafah, and only 7.6% from the 
remaining camps of Mughazi, Beach, and Jabalya. 
To accommodate these homeless people, construction prograwles were 
set up by UNRWA in Nuseirat, Bureij, Mughazi and Khan Yunis refugee camps. 
These programmes were carried out against reimbursement by the Israeli 
authorities to replace only shelters removed by road widening in the camps 
for security purposes. At the same time, the homeless refugees of Khan 
Yunis and Rafah were given the option of purchasing housing in new housing 
projects constructed by the military authorities in the vicinity of the 
two camps. But those who were unwilling or unable to do so were offered 
the vacant Agency (UNRWA) shelters in their respective camps of other 
refugees who had opted for the new housing (United Nations, 1973). 
The 
so-called governmental rehousing projects are Shuqari in Khan Yunis and 
Canada in Rafah (see Figure 4.1). 
It is important to report that a certain compensation was paid to the 
homeless refugees by the Israeli authorities for the destruction of 
privately built roonis and additions only, while those demolished rooms 
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which were built by the UNRWA have not been compensated yet. 
To sum up, the 1971 security roads plan resulted in evacuating about 3,941 familiess amounting to some 24,067 persons. They represented about 12% of the total refugees living in camps in 1971. 
8.2 Collective Punishment 
"The demolition of houses is a punitive measure actively applied 
inside the Gaza Strip. According to this measure, the homes of security 
offenders are either destroyed or sealed, leaving the families of those 
individuals with nowhere to live and with no right of compensation (Roy, 
1986). Up to November 1985,642 rooms, housing 248 families of 1,659 
members in the Gazan refugee camps, have been blown up by the Israeli 
authorities as punitive measures (Table 8.2). In the Strip as a whole, 
some 1,259 houses were demolished as deterrent or punitive actions (see 
Plates 8.1 and 8.2). In many cases these destructions also caused damage 
to adjacent shelters, which could be rebuilt only at the expense of their 
residents with no right to claim compensation. 
From the Israeli viewpoint, the demolition of Gazan shelters as a 
punitive measure is legal action, and they referred, in this context, to 
Regulation 191 of the Mandatory Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945. 
The aforesaid regulations permit an Israeli commander to order the 
demolition or sealing up of a building if there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the building has been fired from or where an inhabitant has 
committed or abetted the commission of a violent act prohibited under the 
Defence Regulations. In addition, Regulation 119(l) permits the 
destruction of buildings not used to commit acts prohibited by the 
Regulations; the building only has to be located in the same general area 
where a prohibited act has been committed (National Lawyers Guild, 1978). 
Moreover, in a 1968 radio interview, General Shlomo Gazit, the 
military administrator of the occupied territories, threw light on 
Israel's demolition programme when he said : the act of blowing up houses 
is essentially.... a deterrent action, a punishment which is supposed to 
deter others (National Lawyers Guild, 1978). As a consequent of the 
refugee camps being UNRWA property, UNWRA have strongly protested against 
the demolitions because collective punishment is meted out regardless of 
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Plate 8.1 : Shelter blown up in Jabalya refugee camp (1982). A Palestinian 
family living in this makeshift shelter of precariously 
stacked concreteblocks, sheeting and corrugated iron after the 
demolition of their home, under Israeli punitive and 
deterrent action. 
Photo : The author 
Plate 8.2 : Shelter blown up in Bureii refugee camp (1985). Demolished 
under Israeli punitive and deterrent action. 
Photo : The author 
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blame, so that innocent as well as the assumed guilty individuals are made to suffer (UNRWA, 1984). 
Furthermore, whatever the precise extent Of collective punishment or demolition of shelters carried out in the Gaza Strip, they appeared to be 
contrary to the provisions of Articles 33 and 53 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention of 1949, which Israel ratified, with regard to protection of 
civilian persons in time of war. Article 33 states that "No protected 
person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally 
commi tted. Collective penalties and likewise all measure of intimidation 
or of terrorism are prohibited. " On the other hand, Article 53 reads: 
"Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property 
belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the 
State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative 
organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered 
absolutely necessary by military operations (National Lawyers Guild, 
1978). 
8.3 Contravention and Town Plannj_ýq_Demolition 
An analysis of demolitions indicates that the shelters of 47 refugee 
families (291 persons) were destroyed as being built illegally. 
Additionally, some hundred refugee families were threatened by the 
Israelis that their shelters would be demolished. The Israeli authorities 
claimed that the constructions were built outside the boundaries of the 
camps,, on state-owned land. For instance, in July 1983,35 shelters at 
the northern edge of Beach camp were bulldozed to rubble by the Israeli 
army leaving their inhabitants homeless (Locke and Stewart, 1985 and 
United Nations, 1984). So far 28 families are living in temporary 
shelters they have built in boundary walls of corrugated iron. They built 
their houses on the same site, while the remaining families moved into 
shelters of nearby relatives, or left the site. 
Obviously, the demolitions have been carried out in order to 
encourage the refugees to move into the Israeli -sponsored rehousing 
projects. At the same time, the Israeli authorities reject this 
allegation, and claim that resettlement of refugees in the dwelling 
Pr'ujects is based on voluntary movement. This matter will be analysed in 
Chapter nine. 
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Similarly, town planning is reported to have been responsible for 
destroying some 1,060 rooms, accommodating 497 families of 2,609 people. 
The affected people have been compensated for privately built-rooms and 
they have been allowed to move into the rehousing projects. 
8.4 The Refugee 
_ýi 
Pro ects) 
8.4.1 Historical BackqrýyLd 
The initial idea of resettlement of Gazan refugees originated in 1951 
when the Egyptian Government agreed to resettle some 50,000 refugees in 
AI-Arish area (Sinai), according to the Baroukh project. But this 
so-called project was completely rejected by the Higher Arab Committee, 
which, instead, insisted on continuing efforts to repatriate the 
Palestinian refugees in their homeland (Salman, 1980). 
Moreover, in an attempt to reduce the concentration of Palestinian 
refugees in the Gaza Strip, a new plan was made jointly by UNRWA and the 
Government of Egypt in October 1953 to irrigate 52,000 acres in the Sinai 
Peninsula east of the Suez Canal. The project aimed to resettle some 
50,000 to 60,000 refugees from the Gaza Strip over five years, which 
represented about 25% of the Strip's refugee population. The project was 
to be financed chiefly from a fund of $30 million set aside by UNRWA 
specifically for Gaza refugees (Baster, 1954). Accordingly, Gazan 
refugees rejected the resettlement project, when mass demonstrations and 
violence broke out across the Strip, arguing that the Egyptian government 
and UNRWA should cease to implement such a project, and they affirmed that 
the only acceptable solution for their problem was to assist them to 
return to their homeland. Consequently, in 1955 the project was aborted 
when the Egyptian government cancelled the plan according to the 
Palestinian refugees desire. 
Furthermore, in 1965-66, a small resettlement camp (the Swedish 
village) was set up at the southwestern edge of the Gaza Strip, close 
to 
the Mediterranean coast (see Figure 4.1). The project was funded 
by the 
Swedish Minister of Social Welfare Mrs. Lindstrom, where 60 
four-room 
shelters were constructed, without a sewage disposal system, electricity 
or water supply. 
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8.4.2. The Isrýeli-SPqnsorýd Rehousing Projects 
"The visible reminder which the eight refugee camps provide of the dispossession of 1948 constitutes a thorny problem for the Israelis. As a focal point of Palestinian identity and militant resistance, the camps, as 
perceived by the Israelis, require constant army surveillance. Faced with 
this hostile and resentful population herded together, the Israelis have 
sought to break up their concentration, and in so doing to sever the 
refugees' link with their homeland and their desire to return to it. Yet 
in purely practical terms the rehousing of the refugees is an enormous 
task" (Locke and Stewart, 1985). It is perhaps important to report that 
worldwide, the effect of political factors upon population distribution 
grows in influence at all levels through their direct and indirect effects 
upon population growth and movement (Clarke, 1985). 
As mentioned earlier, the Israeli resettlement policies were first 
enacted in the early 1970's, particularly when the Israeli security roads 
plan took place. Obviously, in 1969, two resettlement plans were 
recommended for the Israel i-decision makers, aiming to make the refugee 
camps less congested. The first was planed in Rehovot Institute (Rehovot 
Plan) which aimed to mobilize groups of the inhabitants of Gazan refugee 
camps to the West Bank. The second plan (Weitz Plan) was designed by R. 
Weitz, Head of the Department of Settlement in the Jewish Agency, to 
resettle some 50,000 refugees at Al-Arish in Sinai (Abu Arafa, 1981). But 
the aforesaid plans have not been implemented yet. From 1973 on, attempts 
to rehouse Gazan refugees resulted in a series of government- sponsored 
rehousing projects nearby which continue to be in effect today, with 
perceptible intensification during 1975-80. 
To be eligible for a housing unit in the rehousing projects, refugees 
must demolish their camp shelters. Hence the Israeli authorities want to 
break up the camps, which are so densely populated that they are difficult 
to patrol and control "The new projects are built with security in 
mind - easy to control. They have not been designed with residents' needs 
in mind, but as a long-term solution to Israel's problems with the camps" 
(Cossali and Robson, 1986). 
Indeed, a similar policy was practised against the Algerian people by 
the French colonial authorities. During the Algerian war of independence, 
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1954-61 . the French army undertook a massive P01 icy of regroupment in 
order both to protect and to prevent the rural Population from actively 
assisting the guerrillas" (Sutton, 1978). 
During the Egyptian administrative period of 1948-67, the Gazan 
municipalities and village councils were legally under the authority of 
the Egyptian administration, which supervised and financed the councils' 
services and activities. At the same time, UNRWA was granted full 
responsibility by the Egyptian administration over the refugee camps, 
which were left separate from the municipalities and village councils' 
administrative systems. Hence, to implement the Israeli rehousing policy 
(officially known as refugee rehabilitation projects) and to circumvent 
legal requirements, in 1972, the Israeli military authorities extended the 
town limits of Gaza, Deir el Balah, Khan Yunis and Rafah to include their 
adjacent refugee camps. The aforesaid step permitted the Israeli 
authorities, directly or indirectly, to have special responsibility over 
the camps; through their responsibility over the municipal councils. This 
assisted the Israeli authorities in passing any legislation over the 
refugee camps through the municipalities (e. g. see Appendix 12). 
The Israeli resettlement scheme was a target of dispute in the United 
Nations General Assembly in November 1976, when an overwhelming vote 
called on Israel to halt refugee resettlement efforts in the Gaza Strip, 
and to permit the evacuated refugees to return to their former camps as 
soon as possible (Gross, 1976 and Farrell, 1076). So far the Israeli 
authorities have turned down all requests to desist from such evacuations. 
The latest scheme was unveiled by ex-minister Mordechai Ben Porat in 
November 1983, a refugee rehousing programme costing $1.5 billion to 
resettle the Gaza Strip and the West Bank Camps population over a 
five-year period. Ben Porat admitted he would like to get the money from 
the United States (Viorst, 1984). So far, no formal proposal has been 
presented. It is relevant to report that the plan has not been abandoned 
but put on the shelf, waiting an improvement in the Israeli economic 
situation. 
8.4.3 Aims of the Resettlenient.? r! ýjects 
Frequently, the Israelis claim that the government-sponsored 
resettlement schemes are fully humanitarian and voluntary, striving to 
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provide decent and comfortable housing in nearby areas, to replace the 
din shanty-towns in which Gazan refugees have been confined since the 
194 displacement. In his plan, Ben Porat contends that his proposal is 
humanitarian, not coercive and has no political motives (Viorst, 1984). 
Obviously, there is ample evidence to the contrary. Table 8.2 
indicates that 3802 families of 23,157 persons have moved to the rehousing 
projects voluntarily. In comparison, Table 8.3 gives the cumulative 
number of those families who have been rehoused in these projects as 6004, 
amounting to 37,023 persons, including of course Canada camp inhabitants. 
This means that only 63% of the resettled people have moved voluntarily, 
while the remaining share have moved compulsorily. Accordingly, this act 
of forcible transfers of Gaza camp refugees violates Article 49 (6) of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention which reads: "Individual or mass forcible 
transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied 
territories of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, 
occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive" (National 
Lawyers Guild, 1978). 
Gazan refugees have continually stressed that the resettlement scheme 
is a part of the Israeli plan to rid the Gaza Strip of refugee camps. 
Thi s allegation can be supported by several statements made by Israeli 
officials. In June 1973, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan brought to light 
the aim of the alternative housing policy when he said : "as long as the 
refugees remain in their camps their children will say they come 
from Jaffa or Haifa, if they move out of the camps, the hope is they will 
feel an attachment to their new land (National Lawyers Guild, 1978). 
Furthermore, in a televised interview with General Abraham Ben Yamin 
(the Israeli commander of the Strip's civil administration), he brought to 
light the aim of their resettlement scheme. He said that the main problem 
concentrates in Jabalya refugee camp, which according to his viewpoint 
represents the focal point of violence and security disturbances. He 
added that his aim is to evacuate between 600 to 800 families during 
1986 
(Akhbar Ghazza, 1985). 
8.4.4 ýýaýhicýý)_Distribution of the Resettlement 0CS - 
TI j. ýý 
Initially, to implement the Israeli policy of thinning the refugee 
camps, there are eight rehousing projects, excluding Canada camp, in the 
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Table 8.3 Cumulative Numbers of Housinq Units Allocated in the Israeli- 
_EroL 
ec §22onsorred RýeholyLsinncL Projects, Numbers of families and Their jj_ ts, Nýumbers ofýýamýilieý and Their 
Members who Moved from the Camps to be Rehoused in the 
Re 
_between 
1971 and 30 November 1985, and 
the Projects' Total Population as at the End of 1985 
Cumulative No. of houses, families and Rehousing projects Rehousing persons total population, project (1971 - 30 November 19851 end of 1985* 
location No. of NO. of No. of % of houses families persons persons No. % 
Jabalya 476 725 4,654 14.4 5,550 12.3 
Gaza 1,498 1,783 11,049 34.1 16,450 36.4 
Khan Yunis 1,121 1,219 7,360 22.7 9,750 21.6 
Rafah** 1,357 1,488 9,337 28.8 13,450 29.7 
Total 4,452 5,215 32,400 100.0 45,200 100.0 
Source : Calculated from Appendix 8. 
Data were gathered from the municipalities of Gaza, Khan Yunis, and 
Rafah, and Beit Lahiya village council. 
Excluding Canada rehousing project, located on the Egyptian side of 
the international border line. The project comprises 488 housing 
units, inhabited by 789 families of 4,623 persons (Appendix 1). 
The population of Canada camp are waiting to be resettled in 
Tal El Sultan project in Rafah (Fig. 4.1). 
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Strip now twinning camps and projects. For instance, Jabalya camp is to 
be absorbed by Beit Lahiya project, Beach camp by Sheikh Radwan, Khan 
Yunis camp by Al-Amal and Rafah camp by Tal el Sultan and Brazil projects 
(see Fig. 4.1). So far, the Israeli authorities still offer vacant plots 
of land in these projects which would be expanded in the future. In the 
remaining three projects there is no room for absorbing extra refugee 
families. 
As demonstrated in Table 8.3, the rehousing projects are located in 
the northern zone (in Jabalya and Gaza), and in the southern zone (Khan 
Yunis and Rafah). Up to November 1985, the cumulative number of resettled 
refugees shows that 48.5% were rehoused in the northern zone projects, and 
51.5% in the southern zone. Moreover, an estimation given by the 
municipalities and village councils shows that some 45,200 persons were 
living in the eight rehousing projects by the end of 1985. , 
8.4.5 The Influence of Resettlement Poljcy__y_pýLLhe 
_ýapys 
The impact of the Israeli evacuation policy of Gazan refugees from 
their camps can be interpreted from Table 8.4 and Figure 8.2. Between 
June 1974 and June 1985, the total refugee population increased from 
322,133 refugees to 427,892, by an annual growth rate of 2.58%. In 
' and 3.64% per contrast, camp and non-camp refugees increased by 1.8101C 
annum respectively during the same period. This means that the camp 
population reported a lower rate of growth : 0.77% lower than the refugees 
average as a whole. In contrast, the non-camp refugees increased by 1.06% 
more than the total refugee average growth rate. 
Furthermore, the proportion of refugees living in camps dropped from 
60.2% in June 1974 to some 55.3% in June 1985. Apparently, this trend can 
be seen in Beach, Khan Yunis, Jabalya and Rafah refugee camps 
(see Table 
8.4). The aforesaid camps, the largest refugee camps in the 
Gaza Strip, 
have been the main target of the Israeli evacuation policy from 
1971 
onwards, as they are located adjacent to the rehousing projects 
(see Fig. 
4.1). At the same time, the remaining four refugee camps are clearly 
less 
affected by the Israeli resettlement projects. 
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Tabl e 8.4 Size and Proportion of Camp and Non-Camp Refugees in the 
Gaza Strip as at 30 June 1974 and 30 June 1985 
30 June 1974 30 June 1985 
Area Camp 
In Not in % in In Not in % in 
camps camps camps camps camps camps 
Jabalya Jabalya 40,179 8,972 81.8 51,225 17,039 75.0 
Gaza Town - 43,504 0.0 - 56,166 0.0 
Rimal Beach 34,551 12,129 74.0 40,359 24,997 61.8 
Nuseirat Nuseirat 19,877 26,400 
6,947 82.0 8,012 84.1 
Bureii 11,783 16,057 
Deir el Balah Deir el 7,910 9,854 
Balah 
13,532 54.5 17,251 54.1 
Mughazi 8,288 10,506 
Khan Yunis Khan Yunis 29,295 26,747 52.3 33,269 41,954 44.2 
Rafah Rafah 42,012 16,407 71.9 48,816 25,987 65.3 
Total 193,895 128,238 60.2 236,486 191,406 55.3 
Source: UNRWA, 1974 and 1985. 
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8.5 Camp David Accords a_nd the Palestinians 
From the viewpoint of the Israeli and Egyptian governments, the Camp 
David Accords has officially terminated the hostility between the two 
countries, and introduced a peaceful settlement of their long warfare. In 
contrast, the Palestinians considered the Accords an additional source of 
suffering. This is not surprising if we know that one of its impacts on 
the population of the Gaza Strip led to the destruction of hundreds of 
shelters in Rafah refugee carrip and made their inhabitants homeless. 
Obviously, as a consequence of the re-establishment of the border 
between Egypt and the Israeli -occupied Gaza Strip in 1982, shelters 
accommodating about 299 families of 1905 people in Rafah camp were swept 
away (Table 8.2). Also, several houses and orchards in Rafah town were 
bulldozed too, under the pretext of establishing a security zone (see 
Plates 4.1 and 4.2). The homeless people were given less than a week to 
evacuate their shelters by the Israeli military governor of Rafah, who 
offered them compensation or forced eviction. As the destruction carried 
on, the homeless moved to the nearby Tal el Sultan project (Fig. 4.1) 
where a relocation camp was being built. Some families squatted on their 
bare plots, some had salvaged bricks and rebuilt their homes, other had 
lean - to shacks or tents and some sat, uncovered, under the sun (Al Fajr, 
1982a and 1982b). 
Moreover, a special problem has arisen in Canada camp, an Israeli- 
sponsored rehousing project. Since April 198.1, its people have been 
stranded on the Egyptian side and cut off from their work and relatives in 
the Strip (see Plate 4.2). The Egyptian government expects them to be 
rehoused into Gaza, as they are not Egyptian citizens. Since then, the 
Israeli government has delayed achieving an arrangement on resettlement 
terms and refused to permit the inhabitants to cross back into the Strip 
to continue their employment and schooling. 
Finally, after four years of negotiations, a relocation agreement was 
signed in April 1986 between Israel and Egypt. Relocation of Canada camp 
inhabitants is to take place gradually. The families will build houses on 
plots of land set aside at Tal el Sultan project in Rafah. To compensate 
the inhabitants, Egypt is offering cash grants to each family, amounting 
to US $8000. At the same time, Israel is to provide a similar value in 
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kind through the provision of land, municipal services, community 
facilities and subsidised construction materials (Al Fajr, 1986 and UNRWA, 
1986). This would be the second displacement of Canada camp refugees 
since the Israeli occupation of June 1967. 
8.6 Summary 
Obviously, the policy of removing people from their camps to place 
them in alternative accommodation has continued on several grounds. 
Between 1971 and November 1985, the Israelis have succeeded in evacuating 
some 57,123 refugees from their camps, equalling about 25% of the recent 
total camps population. Morover, the motives of systematic destruction of 
refugee shelters have altered over the years. In 1971, the destruction 
was carried out in order to achieve some security goals, while later on, 
it happened to implement purely political motives towards dealing with the 
refugee problem, particularly since the Israelis think that better, living 
standards can divert the Palestinian refugees from their nationalist 
goals. On the other hand, if the Israeli authorities complete their 
refugee resettlement operations,, they will be able to claim in the 
international arena that there is no longer a refugee problem in the area. 
More information about the Israeli rehousing projects will be discussed in 
the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Survey of Al-Amal Dwellin Project (Khan Yunis) 
9.1 Survey and Methods 
The prime purpose of this survey, which was conducted by the author 
in Al -Amal dwel 1i ng project between 10 November and I December 1985, was 
to gather relevant data on the Israeli-sponsored rehousing plan. The 
importance of this fieldwork stems from the fact that no specific data are 
available. The survey findings help in exploring the undisclosed goals of 
the Israeli resettlement policy, and in identifying the impact of 
resettlement policy upon the refugee population in general and upon camp 
inhabitants in particular. 
Al-Amal dwelling project, the third largest rehousing project for the 
resettlement of camp refugees in the Gaza Strip, is located adjacent to 
Khan Yunis refugee camp (see Fig. 9.1). The project covers an area of 
about 1150 dunums (1.15 sq. kms), and was populated by some 8500 
inhabitants as at the end of 1985, making a population density of over 
7390 persons per sq. km. 
The project is divided into 4 residential quarters, embracing some 
1000 dwellings in all. It also includes a governmental school, a clinic, 
a mosque, a kindergarten and a small central market (see Fig. 9.1). 
Al-Amal dwelling project was chosen as the sample survey spot because 
it is adjacent to the researcher's accommodation in Khan Yunis camp; in 
addition, the survey includes several sensitive questions particularly 
those concerning household income, as well as the policy of the 
resettlement scheme. These questions required the contacted respondents 
to co-operate positively with the interviewer in order to achieve 
reasonable outcomes. Hence, Al-Amal project was recommended to be the 
survey site, since the author has extensive personal knowledge of its 
inhabitants, and the procedures for obtaining accommodation in it. 
9.1 .1 The S amp 1 eCov erae 
The sample survey includes all those households selected from various 
residential blocks of Al-Amal dwelling project in Khan Yunis. 150 
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FIG-9-1- AL-AMAL DWELLING PROJECT ADJACENT TO KHAN YUNIS 
REFUGEE CAMP, ITSELF DIVIDED INTO 15 RESIDENTIAL BLOCKS. 
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households were taken as a sample in this study, encompassing 1687 
persons. The sample represented 15% of the stock of accommodation in the 
project, and some 19.85% of the population living in it. So that the 
sample appeared to be a good representation of the inhabitants of Al-Amal 
rehousing project. 
9.1.2 The Questionnaire 
The questionnaire comprised 37 questions (Appendix 7) which may be 
classified as: 
a) questions employed to set up a profile of the socio-economic 
characteristics of the dwellers of the Israeli -sponsored rehousing 
project; 
b) questions designed to pinpoint the previous places of residence of 
Gazan refugees before moving to the rehousing project; 
C) questions designed to identify the procedures for getting a house 
built or a plot of land in the rehousing project; such procedures can be 
used as a base for exploring the goals of the Israeli rehousing projects; 
d) questions outlined to identify possible improvements in the housing 
conditions of the projects' inhabitants, and whether any such improvements 
happened as a consequence of Israeli assistance or resulted only from the 
inhabitants own efforts; and 
e) questions designed to examine the Israeli rehousing policy as a whole 
and the response of the project's inhabitants to it. 
9.1.3 The Sample Selection 
To ensure a wide representation of Al-Amal 's population, 150 
households were sampled by a systematic method, and the eligible 
respondents were questioned individually. The author divided the project 
into 16 clusters and thus the interviewing process was carried out by 
questioning one household out of seven. Also, it is perhaps important to 
say that the number of contacted respondents varied from 5 to 15 in each 
cluster a ccording to the proportion of the total. 
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9.1.4 
.In 
te rv i ewi 9_9_ 
Since the subject of refugee resettlement was sensitive and 
confidential, it needed more care to be taken during the question ing 
process, so as to collect accurate and reasonable data, therefore the 
author restricted the number of interviewers to three persons only, 
including of course the author. Hence, interviews were conducted between 
5 p. m. and 11 p. m. each evening,, and began earlier on Fridays and 
Saturdays,, particularly to ensure that the heads of households were at 
home at the time of survey. It must be taken into account that each 
interviewer operated in different residential blocks as allocated to them 
by the author. 
The questionnaire was addressed to the heads of households, who 
answered solely on the basis of their previous housing conditions, when 
they lived outside the dwelling project, as well as their recent 
conditions. Although some 82% of the population of Al-Amal resettled in 
the dwelling project seven years ago, their memories concerning their 
previous camp life remained vivid and responses to all questions were 
excellent. 
Obviously, when the people surveyed were asked to answer the last 11 
questions (Appendix 7), a basic problem occurred, as a group of 
respondents refused to answer them. These questions included the value of 
their monthly income, number of contributors to the household monthly 
income, aims of the Israeli -sponsored resettlement scheme, and their 
attitudes toward this scheme. Hence, from the inhabitants viewpoint, 
answers for these questions might have caused problems with the Israeli 
authorities, particularly if their names were reported. But when a 
guarantee was provided to the contacted households that their names and 
the numbers of their houses would not be registered, the problem was 
successfully cleared up. Nevertheless, 3 respondents refused to 
co-operate with the interviewers. Consequently they were replaced by 
their neighbours. 
Although theýe were few failures to respond, considerable inaccuracy 
had been noted. A group of Al-Amal residents seemed to interpret income 
value questions as having some vague relation to future tax payment, and 
hence tended to underestimate their income. Fortunately,, their estimates 
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can be checked against the detailed property characteristics (house size, 
number of storeys, apartments and rooms), a check which indicates, for 
instance, that 3 cases with houses of 3 storeys gave average income values 
of $617 per month, which would appear to be a gross underestimate in view 
of their exceptional housing condition (see Plate 9.1). 
In a nutshell, most of the sampled population were co-operatively 
interviewed, and the 150 questionnaires were answered correctly and 
completely. 
9.2 Sample Analysis 
9.2.1 Characteristics of the Sampled Population 
---------- 
Tables 9.1 and 9.2 provide a detailed record of the socio-economic 
characteristics of the population of Al-Amal dwelling project. Table 9.1 
indicates that 32% of the heads of households were highly educated, and 
had graduated from higher institutes or universities, compared with 20.7% 
who were found illiterate. 
The occupational status of the sample revealed that 3.4% of 
household-heads practised medical jobs. UNRWA and government school 
teachers combined represented 23.5%. Classification of schools teachers 
by their employers aims to display the large gap between their households' 
monthly earnings, which will be seen later on. Moreover, merchants, 
shopowners and transport and service workers account for a modest 
proportion of 13.8%, while both technical workshops and industry and 
manufacturing occupations absorb 9.6%. Simultaneously, construction 
workers make up 26.9%, and occupations classified as not mentioned above 
constitute 22.8%. 
Classification of the household-heads by employment status reveals 
that 83.4% were employed, either on a self-employed basis or by other 
institutions and individuals, 3.3% were retired and 13.3% were unemployed. 
This unemployment rate is comparable with the Gaza Strip unemployment rate 
of 12.2%, which w6s concluded earlier in chapter seven. 
Furthermore, 99.3% of the surveyed population were refugees, compared 
with only 0.7% indigenous folk. The negligible proportion of indigenous 
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Table 9.1 Socio-Economic Characteristics of the 1985 Sample for the 
Population of Al-Amal Dwelling Project in Khan Yunis 
Characteristics I Household-heads 
No. I 
Number of Cases 1 150 1 100 
Level of education of household-heads 
Illiterate 31 20.7 
Elementary 26 17.3 
Preparatory 19 12.7 
Secondary 26 17.3 
Technical and teachers institutes 23 15.3 
University 25 16.7 
Occupation* of workers 
Doctor or nurse 5 3.4 
UNRWA school teacher 23 15.9 
Governmental school teacher 11 7.6 
Merchant and shopowner 17 11.7 
Transport and service worker 3 2.1 
Technical workshops 8 5.5 
Construction worker 39 26.9 
Industry and manufacturing 6 4.1 
Not mentioned above 33 22.8 
Employment status 
Employed 112 74.7 
Unemployed 20 13.3 
Retired 5 3.3 
Se If -emp 1 oyed 13 8.7 
Status of inhabitants 
Refugee 149 99.3 
Indigenous 
I11 
00.7 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey 
* There were 5 cases classified as retired 
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Table 9.2 Al-Amal Dwelling Project : Household Monthly Income bythe 
Occupation of-Household-Head, 1985 
Occupation of household-heads 
I Doctor, chemistand nurse* 
IUNRWA school teacher 
lGovernmental school teacher 
IMerchant and shopowner 
ITransport and service worker 
Technical workshops 
Construction worker 
lIndustry and manufacturing 
lNot mentioned above 
I Reti red** 
I Average of the total 
Average monthly income in US$ per 
household 
510.0 
698.0 
377.3 
397.0 
450.0 
287.5 
01 321 .8 
400.0 
4UI .5 
650.0 
430.7 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey 
Average monthly income of households with doctor (physician) as 
household-heads were $850, $350 for chemist, and $250 for nurse. 
Income earned by other household members (i. e. not the 
head) 
who were working inside the Strip, Israel, or abroad. 
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people is attributable to the fact that the resettlement scheme is 
designed for rehousing camp refugees only. 
The principal areas of employment for Al-Amal inhabitants were 
located inside the Gaza Strip; work in the Strip absorbed 62% of the heads 
of the surveyed households. In contrast, work in Israel and abroad had 
attracted 29.3% and 2.7% respectively. The remaining 6% were classified 
as retired and aged heads of households. Also the survey shows that 41.9% 
of the locally employed heads of households were involved in white collar 
jobs in medicine and teaching. On the other hand, out of the 44 
household-heads who were employed in Israel, 33 (75%) were recruited in 
the construction sector. 
Viewed from another point, the average monthly income per household 
was $430.7. The highest monthly earnings were paid to household-heads who 
were physicians or UNRWA school teachers, amounting to $850 and $698 
respectively, while the lowest paid were in technical workshop occupations 
(see Table 9.2). 
9.2.2 Origins of Households before Moving into the_Resettle. ment Project 
In view of the 1985 survey, 119 households (79.3%) of the sample had 
moved into Al-Amal dwelling project from the adjacent Khan Yunis camp, 
5 (3.30/11) from Khan Yunis city and 26 (17.3%) from the Egyptian city of 
Al -Ari sh. 
At Khan Yuniz camp level of analysis, there has been a very marked 
spatial differentiation in the extent of household losses according to 
block of residence (see Figure 9.2). The survey shows that the highest 
rates of movement were reported in blocks G, F and H, amounting to 38.7/", 
14.3% and 10.9% respectively, while the lowest were 0.8% in each of block 
D and J. 
Significantly, 69.2% out of the 26 resettled households from Al-Arish 
had been previously driven out by the Israeli authorities from Jabalya 
camp, 15.4% from Beach camp, and 15.4% from Nuseirat, Deir el Balah, Khan 
Yunis, and Rafah camps combined (see Figure 9.3). 
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FIG-9-2- PROPORTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF KHAN YUNIS CAMP 
REFUGEES RESETTLED IN AL-AMAL DWELLING PROJECT 
ACCORDING TO THEIR PREVIOUS CAMP BLOCK OF RESIDENCE 
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The rate of movement into the project has varied greatly: 
approximately 82% of the sampled households were rehoused in Al-Amal 
project during 1976-79,10.7% in 1980-81, and only 7.3% between 1982 and 
1985 (see Figure 9.4). This decline of movement may be attributed either 
to the economic difficulties in the Strip, resulting from increasing 
unemployment rates and economic depression; or to the shortage of vacant 
plots of land, which could be used in expanding the resettlement project. 
indeed all the surrounding lands have been sealed up and have been granted 
to neighbouring Israeli colonies for their future expansion. 
9.2.3 Resettlement Procedures 
In their efforts to raze Gazan camps, the Israeli authorities push 
the inhabitants of refugee camps to move into the Israeli-called refugee 
rehabilitation projects. Indeed, "Israel has experienced good national 
planning programmes of settlement, aiming to implement population 
dispersal and integration. It has also described how housing policy has 
been formulated within a framework of new-town development to promote both 
goals" (Vliet, 1985). Consequently, the Israelis put their experience 
into practice so as to disperse the refugee camps, and to reallocate their 
refugees in new resettlement projects. 
Resettlement schemes began in 1974 and refugee movements were taking 
place in late 1975 and in the beginning of 1976. In 1976, after sewerage, 
water and electricity had been brought to the Sheikh Radwan project in 
Gaza city (see Figure 4.1), 16 housing units of two storeys were 
constructed (see Appendix 8). These model homes were shown to journalists 
and refugees to raise interest in the project, but no more houses were 
built on this model (Locke and Stewart, 1985). 
To be eligible for accommodation in one of the rehousing projects, 
refugees must have shelters inside the refugee camps, which will have to 
be destroyed as a pre-condition for their new houses. After that the 
refugee is required to hand an application form to the Refugee 
Rehabilitation Branch in his area of living, requesting a housing unit 
after completing the necessary requirements (Appendix 9). So, a housing 
unit can be allocated accordingly (Appendix 10). 
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The registration fee for providing the infrastructure for each 
housing unit was $100, accepted on condition that the camp shelter would 
be destroyed within 12 months of the agreement (Locke and Stewart, 1985). 
The Israeli authorities require such demolition under claims that 
materials from demolished houses can be used by the refugees in new 
construction, and congestion in the camps is also relieved. The UNRWA 
opposes such demolitions and believes they add to the acute housing crisis 
in the Gaza Strip, as the rooms thus demolished are not available to 
rehouse other poor families living in overcrowded conditions (United 
Nations, 1985). 
In the early stage of the resettlement scheme, two-room houses built 
on 250 sq. m plots were offered on 99 year leases, and each housing unit 
1076 and Locke and Stewart, 1985). But was sold for about $4000 (Farrell, . 
in 1978, the policy changed, and refugees were offered 125 sq. m plots on 
which they could build their homes. It seems that the refugees who are 
able financially to assume all the costs of construction are given the 
opportunity of having vacant tracts of land in the rehousing projects. On 
the other hand, the Israeli authorities supply certain loan schemes to 
refugees to assist or supplement the cost of construction. The refugees 
in question must sign bills of exchange, in the presence of two witnesses, 
on the value of the postponable loan; which should be cancelled after 10 
years (see Appendix 11) after repaying the postponable loan with an 
interest rate of 4% per year. 
Obviously, out of the 150 surveyed housholds of Al-Amal dwelling 
project, 73.3% had demolished their camp shelters as quid pro quo for a 
new housing unit in the project (see Plate 9.2). Also, to ensure that 
such demolitions would actually happen, the Israelis require refugees to 
sign bills of exchange concerning the compensation value of the demolished 
camp shelters, which could be cancelled when the camp shelters are 
destroyed (see Appendix 11). 
Indeed, the demolished camp shelters are assessed by the Israeli 
authorities and refugees are given the assessed value which usually 
comprises a very small percentage of the cost of a new housing unit (Roy, 
1986). Based on the 1985 survey, 142 (94.7%) households admitted 
receiving compensation 'from the Israeli authorities on the value of their 
previous shelters. At the same time, shelters of 5 (3.3%) households were 
I 
Plate 9.1 : Al-Amal rehousing project : Wealthy inhabitants (either 
self-financing or financed by remittances from relatives 
abroad) look down from their multi-storey residences which 
they have rebuilt themselves, on to the two-roomed dwellings 
of the less well-off. 
Photo : The author 
Plate 9.2 : Shelters in Beach camp demolished by their inhabitants as 
quid pro quo for a new housing unit in the Israeli- 
sponsored rehousing projects. Rebuilding or extensions 
upon the demolished sites, which would solve cramped housing 
conditions for the neighbouring residents, are prohibited 
under Israeli regulations. Ruins and rubble add to the 
decay and infestation in the camp. 
Photo : The author 
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demolished in Khan Yunis camp, and they were offered alternative 
accommodation in Al-Amal project without compensation, because they were 
built illegally. The remaining 3 (2%) households were living in rented 
accommodation. 
Moreover, 73.9% of the compensated households had had compensation 
below 5% of the value of their previous shelters, 12.7% of households 
between 5% and 10%, and 13.4% of households between 10% and 30%. In terms 
of money, 93.7% of compensated households confirmed having compensation 
below $500,4.9% between $500 and $1000, and only 1.4% between $1500 and 
$2000. 
The 1985 survey shows that 5.3% of households moved into Al-Amal 
project after buying camp shelters from refugees and then destroying them. 
The Israeli officials confirmed this fact., as in 1976 Major Cheshin said 
"we find out that refugees who long ago left the camps are buying rooms in 
shelters inside the camps just to be eligible for the new projects" 
(Farrell, 1976). This statement reveals the real goals of the 
resettlement projects, which aim to raze the camps in Gaza rather than 
improving the housing conditions of the Gazan refugees. 
However, 17.3% of households received their housing units directly 
from the Refugee Rehabilitation Branch, and they did not destroy shelters 
in the refugee camps. This category includes the rehoused refugees from 
Al-Arish city who had squatted in Al-Amal project, and had constructed 
houses similar to those already existing in the refugee camps. But it is 
relevant , to report here that the camp shelters of these families in their 
various original camps were removed in the 1971 Israeli roads plan 
demolitions, which were analysed in chapter eight. 
Moreover, of the households surveyed in 1985,2% were living in 
accommodation rented from the owner. Additionally, 2% were living in 
housing units which they had bought from the owner. In fact buying or 
selling houses in the resettlement projects is prohibited according to the 
conditions of the contract of tenancy. Item 21(A) of the contract 
provides the landlord (the Israeli authorities) the right of regaining the 
housing unit from the tenant if he does not begin and complete the 
construction in the giv en time, or if he transfers his right in the land 
to any other person without having previous permission from the landlord. 
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The 1985 survey reports that 70.7% of the sample received built 
houses, and 29.3% vacant plots of land. Together the 150 households 
involved in the sample had obtained a total of 187 housing units, of which 
76.7% households had had one housing unit. In constrast, 22% had received 
two housing units and only 1.3% had had three housing units. Also, 
alongside the changing policy of resettlement, 112 (74.7%) households had 
received housing units with an area of 250 sq. m,, contrasted with 38 
(25.3%) households receiving 125 sq. m housing units. 
9.2.4 Housin Conditions 
This section aims to throw light on analysing the previous and 
present housing conditions of the dwellers of Al-Amal resettlement 
project, as well as to identify whether there has been any significant 
improvement in housing standards. Indeed, "the average numbers of persons 
per room, sometimes termed room densities, are useful indices of density 
of occupation as well as housing conditions. Unfortunately, they ignore 
the sizes of rooms, an important factor when one considers that rooms are 
often smallest where room densities are highest, as in tenements" (Clarke, 
1975). So, during the preparation of the questionnaire,, care was taken to 
consider the above points. 
As demonstrated in Table 9.3,, the housing conditions of Al-Amal 
dwellers have greatly improved in terms of housing quality and housing 
dens i ty. Before they moved into Al-Amal, 44% of households surveyed lived 
in dwellings of two rooms or less, whereas after the move only 8.6% lived 
in such circumstances. Similarly, the percentage of households living in 
dwellings of five rooms and over increased from 5.4% to 42.7% after 
resettlement. Also, the survey reveals that 10.7% of resettled households 
lived in dwellings of eight rooms and over compared with zero in the 
previous accommodation. Furthermore, previously 18% of households had 
lived in one-room dwellings but after resettlement this percentage dropped 
to zero. It can be calculated from Tables 9.3 and 9.5 that the average 
number of roorris per dwelling increased from 2.7 rooms in the former 
dwellings to 4.72 rooms in the rehousing project. 
Put a different way, housing density decreased by one person per room 
from 3.38 persons per room in the former dwellings to 2.39 in Al-Amal 
rehousing project (see Table 9.3). 
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Overcrowding has been defined in different ways. For example, in 
relation to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Abu Kishk (1980) and Abu Kishk 
and Ghurani (1980) mention that experts on housing agree that families who 
live in houses with an average of three or more individuals per room are 
suffering from inadequate housing. But in the case of western societies 
the index of overcrowding is lower - for instance, in the 1961 census 
of Britain, the average density of 1.5 persons per room was accepted as 
the lower level of overcrowding in England, Wales and Scotland (Clarke, 
1975) - and in developing societies it would be higher. 
As illustrated in Table 9.3, the previous and current accommodation 
of Al-Amal population has been classified according to the number of rooms 
in each dwelling and then housing density has been calculated accordingly. 
So, it becomes clear that overcrowding has substantially decreased for 
most of Al-Amal households. For instance, approximately 29.3% of the 
households surveyed were living in rooms with more than three persons as 
against 79.3% in the former dwellings. Only 24.7% of resettled households 
were accommodated in housing densities above Al-Amal's average density. 
However, it becomes evident that the reduction in room occupancy ratios 
has occurred in all groups of dwellings, with the exception of the 
three-room dwellings category where the ratio remains constant (see Table 
9.3). 
Housing density was calculated for all the surveyed households and 
showed a significant reduction in overcrowding (Table 9.4). The median 
housing density has declined from3.26 persons per room in the former 
dwellings to 2.42 in the recent ones. Also, the percentage of households 
living in a room density below two persons per room has increased from 
14.67% in the former dwellings to 21.34% in the present ones. But the 
most dramatic improvement in housing density has occurred in the category 
of 2.0 - 2.99 persons per room, where the proportion has increased from 
20.67% to 47.33% to the benefit of Al-Amal households. The percentage of 
households living in overcrowded conditions, three persons per room or 
more, has more than halved from 64.66% in the former dwellings to 31.33% 
in the current ones. 
The 1985 sample survey reveals that the total area of inhabited rooms 
is 8,906 sq. m with a population of 1692 persons, giving an occupancy 
ratio of 5.26 sq. m per person (Tables 9.3 and 9.5). 
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Table 9.4 Households, by Housing Density in the Previous and Present 
Dwellings of the Inhabitants of Al-Amal Rehousing Project 
Persons per room Previous dwellings Present dwellings (1985) 
less than 1 0.67 0.67 
1.0 - 1.99 14.00 20.67 
2.0 - 2.99 20.67 47.33 
3.0 - 3.99 22.00 22.67 
4+ 42.66 8.66 
Median housing density 3.26 2.42 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey 
Table 9.5 Sizes of Rooms in the Present Dwellings of Al-Amal Rehousing 
Project, 1985 
Area of room (sq. m) Frequency No. of rooms Total area (sq. m) 
9.0 5 15 135 
10.5 48 206 2163 
12.0 64 296 3552 
16.0 33 191 3056 
Total 150 708 8906 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey. 
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There are significant changes in the number of families per 
household. Table 9.6 demonstrates that the percentage of one-family 
households remained constant. In contrast, the proportion of two-family 
households dropped from 35.3% in the former dwellings to 26% in the 
present ones. But the most evident increase has been in three- and four- 
family households; from 12% in the previous dwellings to 22.66% in 
Al-Amal resettlement project. This increase in the number of families per 
household matches Gazan tradition where it is preferred that all family 
members are accommodated in one dwelling if possible. As a consequence, 
the average size of household has increased from 9.1 persons in the former 
dwellings to 11.28 in the recent ones. 
Table 9.6 Number of Families in the Previous and Present Households of 
the Inhabitants of Al-Amal Rehousing Project 
Number of Previous dwelling Present dwelling (1985) 
families in 
household Frequency % Frequency % 
One 79 52.7 77 51.33 
Two 53 35.3 39 26.00 
Three 14 9.3 23 15.33 
Four 4 2.7 11 7.33 
Total 150 100.0 150 99.99 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey. 
V 
From the above analysis, it can be concluded that in general it was 
people who were living in overcrowded conditions who moved into Al-Amal 
resettlement project. This is not surprising when we consider that the 
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housing for those refugees who are still living in Khan Yunis camp is less 
overcrowded. Based on the 1985 survey of the housing problem in Khan 
Yunis camp, several indices concerning housing conditions were derived, 
showing indices of 2.83 persons per room, 4.27 sq. m per person, 3.6 rooms 
per dwelling, and 1.78 families per household (see Chapter 10). 
Obviously, no significant improvements should be deduced from the 
above, as long as the economic and political situation, family size and 
traditions of Gazans remain as they are. Indeed, the Strip's society 
prefers large to small families (see Chapter 6). 
Another issue of resettlement is that, due to the acute economic 
difficulties in the Gaza Strip and the high cost of resettlement and 
construction, only very rich people and those people who receive 
remittances from relatives abroad are able to move into the resettlement 
project and construct a house of reasonable quality. Obviously, 
worldwide, remittances have had a major impact on changing the 
socio-economic structure of receiving societies. Through remittances 
personal and household income levels can be raised, even if income 
differentials between individuals and households are exaggerated, often 
increasing social differentation between families receiving remittance 
payments and those not. Remittances can, therefore, increase or 
accentuate inequalities within countries (Curson, 1981). 
There is no doubt that the people who moved into Al-Amal rehousing 
project have better economic conditions than those who are living in the 
refugee camps. Out of the 150 households surveyed, 56.7% had one 
contributor to household income, 28.7% had two contributors, and 14.6% had 
three contributors or more. Furthermore, 41 households declared having 54 
members contributing to household income from abroad through remittances. 
Of these households, 31 (75.6%) had one member, 8 (19.5%) had two members, 
and only 2 (4.9%) had between three and four members. The contributors 
were classified according to their kinship to the head of the household: 
46.3% sons and daughters, 41.5% brothers and sisters, 7.3% father, and 
4.9% other relatives. In essence, households with remittances from 
relatives abroad are living, in better housing conditions and lower levels 
of overcrowding (see Plate 9.1). 
-304- 
Many people moved into Al-Amal into two-room houses built by the 
Israeli authorities. These houses were so shoddy that few survived the 
first winter; most leaked and some developed major faults which 
necessitated complete rebuilding. A few residents were able to rebuild 
their houses from scratch, others had to make do with patchy repairs and 
prepare them for the next winter (Locke and Stewart, 1985). The two-room 
houses were inadequate for living as they had no basic facilities such as 
halls, kitchens and walls around the yard, but they provided the 
inhabitants with good opportunities for future expansion and improvement. 
Out of the 150 households sampled in 1985,144 (960/c') said they had 
made alterations to their houses in the project. This figure can be 
broken down into three categories: 68 (47.2%) households who added rooms, 
halls and kitchens to their housing units, 33 (22.2%) households who 
demolished their houses and rebuilt them from scratch on multi-storey 
styles, and 44 (30.6%) households classified as "others" in the 
questionnaire, who built their houses directly from the ground since they 
received vacant plots of land from the Israeli authorities. 
Analysis of vertical expansion of the 76 rebuilt houses (including 32 
rebuilt houses and 44 plots of land) indicates that 51 (67.1%) houses 
consisted of one storey, 22 (28.95%) of two stories and 3 (3.95%) of three 
stori es. Of these houses, 48 (63.2%) had one apartment, 20 (26.3%) had 
two apartments, and only 8 (10.5%) had between three to six apartments. 
9.3 The Pol_iqy and Response 
To help attract the camp refugees into the resettlement projects, the 
Israeli authorities publicized that these projects would be served with an 
underground sewage disposal system, uninterrupted supply of electricity 
and water, street lights, schools, health centres and other amenities 
including shopping areas (Ministry of Health of Israel, 1985). At the 
same time, UNRWA, which owns and administers the camps, acknowledges that 
the accommodation provided in the resettlement projects is superior to the 
shelters in which the refugees are living, and therefore supports 
voluntary moves (UNRWA, 1984). So, assurances have repeatedly been given 
by the Israeli authorities to UNRWA that no refugee family would be forced 
to move compulsorily, and that no family's shelter in the refugee camps 
should be destroyed. gut on the contrary, a significant proportion of 
resettled refugees were motivated to move by fear or pressure. 
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Turning back to 1976, when the first stage of construction (two-room 
built houses) in Al-Amal rehousing project was completed, the Israeli 
authorities had failed to convince the inhabitants of Khan Yunis camp to 
move into the project voluntarily. This failure resulted from popular 
campaigns still in practice today, which are mounted to emphasise the 
political implications of the resettlement schemes across the Strip 
(Cossali and Robson, 1986). Consequently, the Israeli authorities 
interpreted that the whole resettlement plan would be in danger if the 
refugees did not move into them. So, various types of pressure are 
applied to get refugees to agree to evacuate their camps and to be 
rehoused in Al-Amal project. For instance, the 1985 survey shows that 5 
shelters in Khan Yunis camp were demolished by the Israelis to force their 
inhabitants to move into the project. 
In the light of the 1985 survey, 69.3% of the household surveyed 
moved into Al-Amal voluntarily, including of course those households who 
were living in rented houses (2%) or in housing bought from the owner 
(2%). In contrast, 30.7% of resettled households admitted forcible 
resettlement. But it is relevant to report here that most of the surveyed 
households who moved voluntarily confirmed indirect coercion to move. 
Yet, having lived in the refugee camps since the 1950's, receiving few 
hours of water per day and an unpredictable supply of electricitgsenduring 
an acute problem of living space with no extensions to camp houses allowed 
(see Appendix 12), it must have been difficult for the financially 
eligible refugees to oppose moving into the rehousing projects. 
However, in order to expand Al-Amal rehousing project, the Israeli 
authorities are seeking additional land from Khan Yunis camp for that 
purpose. So. the project aims to encroach upon the adjacent blocks G, 0 
and F (see Fig. 9.2), and their inhabitants are being pressured into 
moving into the rehousing project by the Israeli authorities. Inded, 20% 
of the compulsorily resettled refugees come from block G alone. In 
January 1984,230 shelter from blocks G and 0 adjoining Al-Amal project 
were visited by represenfatives of the Refugee Rahabilitation Branch and 
the inhabitants were told that their homes were to be demolished (UNRWA, 
1984). But no destruction has yet taken place. 
Similarly, some 50 families living on the northern edge of Jabalya 
camp (in blocks X and S) adjacent to Beit Lahiya resettlement project were 
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threatened by the Israelis that their shelters would be demolished because 
they allegedly had been built illegally. In fact, 14 private rooms were demolished, and a number of boundary walls and grounds were bulldozed. 
This created apprehension, and several families took their cases to the 
Israeli High Court of Justice for injunctions to stop such destruction 
(Kana'na and Al-Madani, 1985 and United Nations, 1985). 
Moreover, to force Jabalya's refugees to accept resettlement into the 
Beit LahiYa project, the foundations of refugee shelters have been eroded 
by Israeli bulldozers which would eventually lead to the shelters' 
collapse (see Plate 9.3). Rebuilding of collapsed shelters is prohibited 
unless a rebuilding permit has been obtained. And, of course, there is 
always great difficulty in obtaining a building permit. In addition,, to 
punish the majority of Jabalya camp inhabitants who did riot take up the 
offer to resettle, the underground sewage system of Beit Lahiya project 
was allowed to flood the alleys of Jabalya camp adding more foul odour and 
disease to the infamous Abu Rashed pool (see Plate 10.2). Huge spots of 
smelly black waste are seen all over the camp, formed by leaking sewage 
pipes and unmaintained pits that were part of the rehousing project of 
Beit Lahiya (Al Fajr, 1986). 
Alongside responses to the resettlement policy, 36% of the households 
surveyed in Al-Amal project were satisfied with their housing conditions 
and they had advised other inhabitants of refugee camps to move into the 
Israeli -sponsored rehousing project if they are able to finance themseles. 
Some of them explained their stand as political and described it as a 
necessary movement in the land conflict between the Palestinians and the 
Jewish colonists. They believed that if the Palestinians refuse to be 
resettled in vacant land, it will be used for the expansion of Israeli 
colonies instead. Moreover, 34% supported such movement on condition that 
the housing quality and municipal services were improved. However 15.3% 
advised the camp refugees to cling to their camp shelters and to resist 
resettlement, while 14.7% revealed stronger reasons for staying in the 
refugee camps. 
Analysis of the services provided to the inhabitants shows that 98.7% 
of the project inhabitants had severe shortages of water supply, affecting 
not only Al-Amal residents but also the whole population of Khan Yunis. 
This problem will be analysed at length in the next chapter. Also, 95.3% 
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affirmed that they received poor sanitation service from Khan Yunis 
municipality, which takes responsiblity for Al-Amal project, and 38% were 
living in bad housing conditions and overcrowding. Amongst this category 
were those refugees who were resettled in the project from the Egyptian 
city of Al-Arish. Furthermore, 73.3% of the inhabitants had other 
problems mainly connected with the interruption of electricity supply. 
Furthermore, sewage disposal is considered a chronic problem 
confronting not only Al-Amal dwellers but also the whole population of the 
Gaza Strip. All Al-Amal inhabitants are suffering from an acute problem 
of disposing of their household waste water. Indeed, when the Israeli 
authorities constructed the resettlement project, an underground sewage 
disposal network was set up, but since then it has not been in use. It is 
planned to connect the Al-Amal sewage system with the sewage network of 
Khan Yunis city,, so wastes could be collected at the recomniended site of 
the sewage treatment units. 
However, after a plan had been completed by Khan Yunis municipality 
for connecting Khan Yunis city and its refugee camp to a new sewage 
network, work began in 1977 to install the sewage pipes and establish the 
central sewage pumping station. The central sewage pumping station was 
completed in 1978 and pipes were added in 1980 to carry the sewage to the 
site of the treatment units which, it was recommended, should be 11 km 2 
north of Al-Amal resettlement project. However, the neighbouring Jewish 
colonies refused to allow the establishment of the treatment units on the 
recommended site despite the Israeli authorities' permit. At the moment 
the project has been frozen since no site can be agreed on, despite having 
cost about $3 million, and the whole city including Al-Amal resettlement 
project is left without an underground sewage system. 
C 
As alternatives, Al-Amal inhabitants like the majority of Gazan 
people, have used cesspits for household sewage disposal and w aste water. 
But long intervals between collections have often caused overflows into 
the open, resulting in a detestable smell which is exaggerated during the 
hot summer months. 
This situation refutes the Israeli claims that the resettlement 
projects have been provided with modern sewage disposal systems, since we 
know that the underground sewage networks of Beit Lahiya and Tal el Sultan 
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(Rafah) rehousing projects flood into open pools, which add to the 
frustration of an ugly life in the overcrowded Gaza Strip (see Plates 9.4 
and 10.2). 
Viewed from another point, the conditions which are provided in the 
tenancy contract raise continuous disputes about the issue of refugee 
resettlement, and about ownership of the new houses in these projects. 
So, to deal with this subject, special care was paid to find clues which 
could help in understanding the whole matter of the resettlement scheme. 
Upon agreeing to resettle, the refugees are told to sign a multi-page 
document drafted in Hebrew, which most cannot read. As far as the 
refugees are concerned, they believe that this document may include 
clauses by which they give up every claim they have to their belongings or 
their right to reside in Palestine (Al Fajr, 1986). But documents 
available to the author contradict this. A total of 31 pages of contracts 
are required to be signed, including a quadruple seven-page contract 
written in Hebrew with a translation in Arabic, before receiving a new 
housing unit in the resettlement projects. However, nothing in these 
contracts concerns the resettled refugees' properties in Palestine, but 
they concentrate on organiz ing the relationship between the tenant and 
the landlord. 
The 1985 survey indicates that 144 (96%) of the sampled households 
had signed contracts with the Israeli authorities when they received their 
accommodation in Al-Amal project, while 6 (4%) households had no contracts 
as they were living in rented houses or they had bought them from the 
owner (the former owner had signed a contract with the Israeli 
authorities) . So, to know the 
dwellers acknowledgement of the conditions 
of this contract, 41.7% of resettled refugees with contracts responded 
positively to our question and they affirmed that they knew what was 
written in the contract, while the remaining 58.3% revealed ignorance of 
its conditions. 
Out of the 60 households who knew what their contracts included, 
13.3% confirmed that their refugee identity was confiscated since they had 
moved out from the refugee camp. Yet, "UNRWA has not been allowed to 
instal any of its services in the project so refugees are increasingly 
dependent on the government. They (the resettled refugees) are still 
F. 
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Plate 9.3 : Beit Lahiya rehousing project encroaching on the adjacent 
Jabalya camp whose residents are being pressured into moving 
into the rehousing project by Israeli bulldozers removing the 
sand and thus eroding the foundation of the shelters. Rebuilding 
of collapsed camp shelters is closely-regulated. 
Photo : The author 
4- Vg ---77ý77' A, 
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Plate 9.4 Household sewage water is collected (from Tal el Sultan 
resettlement project in Rafah) by an underground sewage 
disposal system to the treatment unit, which is overflowing 
making an open pool of sewage 50 metres south of the 
resettlement project. 
1. 
- 
Photo : The author 
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eligible for UNRWA schools and clinics, but often their distance precludes 
their using them. Separating the refugees from UNRWA is one aspect of the 
general strategy of removing their refugee identity and breaking their 
connection with the past" (Locke and Stewart, 1985). So. 25% had 
interpreted that the contract rescinded their rights to live in the 
refugee camp, or to rebuild their demolished camp shelter. These answers 
were derived from their response to the variable classified in the 
questionnaire as "others" (Appendix 7). 
Furthermore, all of the aforesaid households confirmed that the land 
of their houses is leased from the Israeli authorities for 99 years. In 
fact, no specific period of tenancy is mentioned in the contract except 
the term of "an agreement of development and long tenancy", which could be 
specified according to the landlord's desire. 
There can be no doubt that the conditions of the contract are 
outlined completely for the landlord's (the Israeli authorities') benefit, 
not for the tenant. For instance item 17 of the contract reads: "the 
tenant declares that he is in full cognizance that the presence of natural 
resources such as : petrol, gas, water sources, coal mines or all kinds of 
minerals, and marble or stones or sands or "Karkar" quarries or any other 
sorts of minerals and antiquities should be the property of the landlord 
and not the tenant's according to the conditions of the contract. 
Moreover, the tenant promises to grant the landlord the permit, according 
to the conditions decided by the landlord, to exploit or mine the natural 
resources and explore the antiquities from the ground; in addition, the 
landlord or anybody deputized by him has the right to enter the property 
at any time he sees fit in order to implement the aforementioned actions". 
Bearing in mind that the resettlement project is built on sands, the 
Israeli authorities can apply the aforesaid condition at any time and if 
the tenants refuse, they could be evicted from their houses legally. 
Viewed from another legal angle, one condition of the contract 
overrides the tenant's right of protection from the landlord, according to 
item 23 which reads: "the law of tenants protection or any other- 
legislations which could lead to protect the tenancy is invalid on this 
contract according to the rules of ordinance No. 253 (Gaza Strip and North 
Sinai) issued in 5729-1969, concerning the invalidity of the legislation 
of tenants protection in specific cases". 
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Indeed, the Gaza Strip is under the legal jurisdiction of the Israeli 
military and the management of daily affairs rests with the area military 
commander. So, since the occupation began, the area commanders of both 
territories (The West Bank and the Gaza Strip) have issued over 1200 
orders which govern all aspects of life in Gaza and the West Bank 
including legal, civil and political rights, land and water rights, 
licensing, taxation, services, security and social welfare (Roy, 1986). 
Despite the above-mentioned condition, and just in case of any 
dispute arising between the tenant and the landlord, Israeli legislations 
and jurisdiction are valid on the contract as appears in item 24 (A) which 
reads: "The legislations of the State of Israel are valid on this contract 
and the jurisdication court of Beer Sheva is the only court specializing 
in dealing with what is related to or results from this contract". But it 
is relevant to report here that the period of tenancy can be reduced and 
the validity of the contract can be cancelled, according to an 
authorisation which is given to the military area commander as mentioned 
in item 24 (B) which reads: "the aforesaid text in paragraph (A) does not 
detract from the tenant's duty in undergoing every text from the 
legislations of security, nor does that paragraph detract from the 
authority of the area commander in publishing instructions concerning the 
validity of the contracts and every thing regarding th, e rights or duties 
of the contractors". 
In practical legal terms, the contract is written in Hebrew despite 
its translation into Arabic, and few people know how the contract could be 
revoked in the future. Yet, item 25 confirms this conclusion which reads: 
"this contract has been written in the Hebrew language and the Hebrew text 
is the obligatory text, but its translation into Arabic language has just 
appeared for parties' convenience". 
Moreover, very few people know the conditions of their contract, and 
in what language it had been written. Based on the 1985 survey, only 3 
(2%) households knew that their contracts, from the legal viewpoint, are 
written in Hebrew in spite of the Arabic translation. In contrast, 55 
(36.7%) respondents confirned it was written in the Hebrew language, 18 
(122%) the Arabic language, and 71 (47.3%) respondents were confused by the 
Arabic translation of the contract and they responded that the contract 
is 
written in Hebrew and Arabic, and both texts are obligatory for the 
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contractors from the legal point of view. The remaining 2% were living in 
rented houses and they had no idea about the conditions of the contract. 
To sum up,, we can conclude that the resettled refugees have revealed 
wide ignorance about the conditions of their contracts, and on what kind 
of documents they added their signatures. Yet, having lived in 
overcrowded conditions and fear and pressure, the refugees have no other 
alternatives except to accept such reallocation and resettlement. 
9.4 Summary 
The Israeli -sponsored resettlement programme has provided those 
refugees who were eligible for it and financially fit, an opportunity to 
set up a higher standard of accommodation than generally exists inside the 
refugee camps. The analysis shows that most resettled refugees were 
highly educated people or wealthy, and a significant proportion have 
received remittances from relatives working abroad which helped them in 
building their most comfortable accommodation. 
Indeed, housing conditions and room occupancy ratios have shown 
significant improvement compared with the former accommodation as well as 
with the present housing conditions inside Khan Yunis camp. But it must 
be noted that the project residents are still living in overcrowded 
conditions with bad services despite the Israeli refutation in this 
matter. The inhabitants of Al-Amal project have confirmed suffering from 
severe shortage of water supply, interruptions of electricity, sewage 
disposal problems, bad sanitation and relatively bad housing. 
The Israeli allegation that the resettlement schemes have no 
political goals and are fully humanitarian and voluntary has been refuted. 
About one-third of the surveyed households have been resettled forcibly. 
Indeed, the Israeli authorities aim in the short run to make the refugee 
camps less congested, while their aim in the long run is to integrate the 
camp refugees with the indigenous population in order to break their 
connection with the past. Yet, the refugee camps have become considerably 
thinner and political implications more overt. 
The resettlement contract has been written for the benefit of the 
Israeli authorities giving them the power to override it at any time. On 
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the other hand, the tenant has no right to initiate court proceedings 
against thems particularly if the rescinding decision has been carried out 
on "security grounds". 
From the refugees' viewpoint, the Israeli authorities are an 
unreliable source to trust before signing a series of documents in Hebrew 
which can hardly be understood. As a consequence, suspicion of the 
population about the Israeli -sponsored resettlement has been increased, 
and reluctance of the population towards the resettlement policy has been 
widely intensified. 
Although the resettlement programme has resulted in improving the 
housing position for a small minority in terms of densities, it has led to 
ghettoizinq the majority of the camp refugees who are financially unfit to 
leave or unwilling to do so. Even inside the resettlement project, a 
significant proportion of the dwellers have been ghettoized in their new 
accommodation, and this can reflect the economic and social distinctions 
between the project inhabitants. Indeed, the 1985 survey shows that more 
than one-third of the Al-Amal resettled population were living in 
unsatisfactory housing conditions and most of this group were resettled 
forcibly either from Khan Yunis camp or from the Egyptian city of 
Al-Arish. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
jo ý sj rjý- of Khan Yunis Ref e anm 
10.1 Surva 
-and 
Methods 
Since there are no available data concerning housing conditions in 
the Gaza Strip refugee camps in particular, a sample survey has been 
corrducted in Khan Yunis camp by the author between 3 and 15 December 1985. 
The survey aimed to examine the housing situation in the camp, and to 
analyse the population's responses to the Israeli resettlement policy in 
the Strip. However, question number 11 has been inserted here for use in 
drawing overall conclusions for the thesis, particularly when the issue of 
Gazan refugee camps is analysed. In fact, results derived from the survey 
can be generalized to represent the housing conditions in the Strip 
refugee camps as a whole. 
Khan Yunis refugee camp, the fourth biggest camp in the Strip, 
recommended itself as the survey site partly because the researcher has 
extensive experience about the camp inhabitants as a resident, and partly 
because the camp has introduced a homogeneous socio-economic structure. 
The population of Khan Yunis camp as at 30 June 1985 was 33,269 
refugees, comprising 6,645 families (UNRWA, 1985). They were living on an 
estimated area of 3,000 dunums (3 sq. km), giving a population density of 
11,090 persons per sq. km which reflects a very high degree of 
overcrowding. Furthermore, the camp has been divided alphabetically by 
the UNRWA into 15 residential blocks (Figure 9.1), comprising tightly 
packed clusters of huts, with narrow networks of alleys. In general each 
hut accommodates one household and has from one room to more than seven 
rooms. Most of these rooms were built by the refugees as their family 
size grew over the years, and the two-room shelters built by UNRWA in the 
early 1950s are no longer sufficient for accommodating most families. 
10.1.1 The Sample Coveraqe 
The sample includes all those households chosen from the 15 
residential blocks in Khan Yunis camp : 220 households accommodating 391 
families of 2,245 persons have been successfully interviewed as the tool 
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of this study. This sample represented about 6.75% of the camp population 
and some 5.91, r', of the camp total number of families. 
10.1.2 The Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was designed with 13 questions attempting to 
pinpoint the housing problem and its causes in the refugee camps (Appendix 
13)-. In general the questions are of five kinds : 
a questions designed to estimate the proportion of private and 
UNRWA-built shelters in the camp; 
b) questions aimed at obtaining information about the magnitude of the 
housing problem in the refugee camp; 
C) questions designed to derive the attitude of the camp's population 
toward the Israeli -sponsored dwelling projects; 
d) questions designed to discover the acceptable solution for settling 
the Palestinian problem in general and the refugee problem in 
particular; and 
e) questions designed to acquire specific data about the conditions of 
living in the refugee camps, and the main basic problems facing the 
refugees. 
10.1.3 Sample Selection 
The same procedures which were mentioned earlier in Chapter five have 
been followed in interviewing respondents in order to obtain the necessary 
data on the housing problem and life conditions in the refugee camps. 
Consequently, it can be concluded that the sample was based on a random 
method. 
Therefore, a reasonable sample was taken fron, all blocks in the camp; 
44 clusters were selected from the camp, and each cluster included 5 
households, giving a total of 220 households. Also the number of sampled 
clusters varied from 8 clusters covering 40 households in block G to 1 
cluster encompassing just 5 households in block 0. 
Throughout the sample selection, caution was taken to ensure that the 
sampled population was made up entirely Of the refugees of Khan Yunis 
camp. As a consequence)the results should enable us to make conclusions 
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about the housing situation in the Gaza Strip refugee camps as a whole. 
10.1.4 Interviewing 
The same steps of questioning which were followed in chapter five 
have been practised here. As a result, the questionnaire was addressed to 
the head of househol. d who responded with full awareness and patience to 
the questions involved in the survey. 
The interviewing process was carried out in Khan Yunis camp between 5 
p. m. and 9 p. m. each evening. Eight interviewers participated (including 
the author) in the task, consisting of 4 groups and each one operating in 
a different residential block. Throughout the interviewing process, the 
sampled population revealed excellent co-operation., and response to the 
questionnaire filling-in was 100%. 
10.2 Housing Conditions in the Gaza and Refuqee Camps 
As indicated in Table 10.1 , housing has improved since 1972 with 
regard to number of rooms. The percentage of Gazan households living in 
dwellings of two rooms or less declined from 68.5% in 1972 to 50.3% in 
1984. In the same period,, the percentage living in dwellings of four 
rooms or more increased from 12% to 27%. Similarly, the percentage of 
camp households living in two rooms or less decreased from 63% in 1972 to 
56.5% in 1982- At the same time, the percentage of camp households with 
four rooms or more increased from 13.9% to 16.9% (Table 10.2). This shows 
that the increase in dwelling size has occurred more slowly in the camps 
than in the Strip as a whole. 
However, the above should notbe taken as an indicator of an 
improvement in housing conditions unless there has also been a significant 
reduction in room density. Table 10.3 shows that overcrowding decreased 
in the Gaza Strip as a whole. In 1972,52.1% were living in a room 
density of three persons or more compared with 37.8% in 1984. However, 
there has been no such improvement in the refugee camps, where 45.8% of 
households were living in three rooms or more in 1972, as against 42.2% in 
1982 (see Table 10.4). At the same time, the proportion of Gazan 
households living in a room density of less than two persons increased 
from 22.4% in 1972 to 31.9% in 1984, while in the refugee camps the 
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Table 10.1 Gaza Strip : Proportional Distribution of Households 
by Size of Dwelling, 1972 - 1984 
Rooms in dwelling 1972 1975 1980 1982 1984 
One 25.0 17.1 16.4 17.3 19.6 
Two 43.5 38.3 36.6 31 .2 30.7 
Three 19.5 22.6 23.4 25.2 22.7 
Four 8.4 14.0 15.0 17.2 17.8 
Five and more 3.6 8.0 8.6 9.1 9.2 
Source : Central Bureau of Statistics, 1973,76,83 and 1985. 
Table 10.2 Proportional Distribution of Households by Size of 
Dwelling in the Gazan Refugee Camps, 1972-1982 and 
in Khan Yunis Refugee Camp, 1985 
Rooms in dwelling 1972 1975 1978 1982 1985* 
One 18.8 19.6 19.2 23.6 4.1 
Two 44.2 38.8 32.9 32.9 14.6 
Three 23.1 24.5 27.2 26.6 31.8 
Four 9.6 11.4 13.0 12.0 26.8 
Five and more 4.3 5.7 7.7 4.9 22.7 
Source : Central Bureau of Statistics , 1973,76,79 and 
1983 
* Percentages derived from the 1985 Sample Survey 
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Table 10.3 
Persons per room 1972 1975 1980 1982 1984 
Less than 1 3.8 3.9 3.4 4.6 6.3 
1 .0-1 . 99 18.6 19.9 22.3 24.1 25.6 
2.0 - 2.99 25.5 28.7 30.9 32.3 30.3 
3.0 - 3.99 25.4 21 .9 21 .6 19.4 19.6 
4+ 26.7 25.6 21 .8 19.6 18.2 
Median housing density 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.5 
Source : Central Bureau of Statistics, 1973,76,83 and 1985. 
I 
Table 10.4 
Gaza Strip : Households, by Housing Density, 1972-1984 
Households, by Housing Density in Gaza 's Refugee Camps, 
1972-1982, and in Khan Yunis Refugee Camp, 1985 
Persons per room 1972 1975 1978 1982 1985* 
Less than 1 3.8 3.3 4.2 3.7 1.8 
1.0 -1 . 99 
20.8 18.7 20.9 22.6 13.2 
2.0 - 2.99 29.6 30.2 31 .7 31 .5 38.6 
3.0 - 3.99 24.8 22.7 22.0 21 .9 29.1 
4+ 21 .0 25.1 21 .2 
20.3 17.3 
Median housing density 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.65 
Source : Central Bureau of Statistics, 1973,76,79, and 1983 
* Percentages derived from the 1985 Sample Survey 
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proportion crept from 24.6% in 1972 to 26.3% in 1982. 
In a nutshell, housing conditions have improved but to a lesser 
degree in the refugee camps than in the Gaza Strip as a whole. This 
disparity is a reflection of Israeli policy towards the refugee camps, 
which will be examined latter. 
10.3 Khan Yunis qamp. -. tu(oy, in Housipig Conditions 
Officially all shelters in Khan Yunis camp, as in all Gaza's camps, 
were built by UNRWA. However, with the growing population, some refugees 
constructed their own shelters inside the camp boundaries. The 1985 
survey of Khan Yunis camp reveals that 199 (90.45%) households were living 
in UNRWA-built shelters, while 21 (9.55%) households were living in 
shelters they had built themselves. These later shelters were all built 
before the 1967 occupation. 
Table 10.2 illustrates that shelters, in terms of their number of 
rooms, in Khan Yunis camp are better than in all the Gaza Strip refugee 
camps taken together. Based on the 1985 survey, approximately 18.7% of 
households sampled in Khan Yunis camp were living in shelters of two rooms 
or less as against 56.5% for the Strip's camps as a whole, reported in 
1982. At the same time, 49.5% of all the sampled households were living 
in shelters of four rooms or more compared with only 16.9% in all Gaza's 
camps. Furthermore, the average numbers of rooms per shelter is 3.6 
(calculated from Table 10.6). This figure is higher than the figure of 
2.7 rooms which was reported in the former dwellings of the resettled 
refugees of Al-Amal (see Chapter 9). 
Although the refugees of Khan Yunis camp are living in larger 
shelters compared with Gazan camps as a whole, overcrowding in the camp 
is 
higher than that reported for all the Gazan camps in 1982. Table 10.4 
demonstrates that 15% of the households surveyed in Khan Yunis camp were 
living in a room density of two persons or less compared with 
26.3% in all 
the Gazan camps in 1982. Also, 46.4% of Khan Yunis camp households were 
living with three persons per room or more, as against 42.2% 
in Gazan 
camps as a whole in 1982. In general, 50% of Khan Yunis camp residents 
live in shelters where the occupancy ratio is over the median value of 
2.65 persons per room. But it must be noted that housing 
density in Khan 
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Yunis camp is moderate compared with some other camps. For instance in 
jabalya camp an average of six persons living in each room was reported 
(Al Fajr, 1985). 
The disparity in shelter size between Khan Yunis camp and the Strip's 
camp as a whole can be attributed to the fact that refugee households 
living in small shelters moved into Al-Amal project, while those living in 
large shelters remained in the camp (e. g. see Chapter 9). Furthermore, to 
accommodate a growing population, additional rooms were built by refugees 
inside the yards of their shelters. 
A breakdown of dwellings by number of rooms has been illustrated in 
Table 10.5 and housing density has been separately computed for each 
category. A negative relationship between housing density and the number 
of rooms in each dwelling has been clearly noted. For example, 
overcrowding is found in dwellings consisting of two rooms or less while 
in the remaining categories of dwellings people live in less overcrowded 
conditions. However, the average housing density in Khan Yunis camp is 
2.83 persons per room. 
Viewed from another point, the total area of the inhabited rooms in 
the sample is 9584.5 sq. m. and they have a population of 2,, 245 persons, 
giving a housing density of 4.27 sq. m per person (calculated from Tables 
10.5 and 10.6). 
As a consequence of the economic and political situation in the Gaza 
Strip, several families are crammed into one dwelling. Table 10.7 
summarizes that 47.7% of housholds surveyed in Khan Yunis camp consisted 
of one family, 30.3% two families, 14.5% three families, and 7.7% four 
families or more. Also, the analysis shows that Khan Yunis families and 
households are distinguished, as in all Gaza's localities, as being large; 
the average number of persons per family was 5.6, and 10.2 persons per 
household. Similar results were discovered earlier in chapter 9 for the 
Al-Amal rehousing project. 
The previous discussion reveals that housing is a major problem 
confronting the camp refugees since there has been no real planning to 
take account of natural increase upon the number of refugees. Yet, the 
shelters which were erected by UNRWA in the early 1950s to accommodate 
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Table 10.5 Housinq Density of Khan Yunis Refug ee Camp by Number 
of Rooms in Dwellings, 1985 
Rooms in 
dwelling 
Household Total of 
inhabit- 
Density 
persons per 
No. % ants room 
One 9 4.1 50 5.56 
Two 32 14.5 230 3.59 
Three 70 31.8 616 2.93 
Four 59 26.8 611 2.59 
Five 29 13.2 386 2.66 
Six 17 7.7 283 2.77 
Seven and 4 1.8 69 2.46 
more 
Total 220 100.0 2,245 2.83 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey. 
Table 10.6 Sizes of Rooms in Dwellings of Khan Yunis Refugee 
Camp, 1985 
Area of room 
(sq. m) 
Frequency No. of rooms Area (m') 
9 53 171 1539.0 
10.5 58 215 2257.5 
12.0 52 185 2220.0 
16.0 57 223 3568.0 
Total 220 794 9584.5 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey. 
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Table 10.7 Number of Families in Households of Khan Yunis Refugee Camp, 
1985 
No. of families in household Frequency M 
One 105 47.7 
Two 66 30.3 
Three 32 14.5 
Four 17 7.7 
Total 220 100.0 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey. 
refugees temporarily continue to serve the new generations (see Plate 
10.1). So most of the refugees shelters are now crammed with three 
generations, making life unbearable. 
10.4 Khan Yunis Pa! nL. - A Study__qLPublic Services 
Indeed, all services provided in the Gaza Strip in general and the 
refugee camps in particular are inadequate. The 1985 Survey concentrated 
in quantifying this problem in the refugee camp of Khan Yunis. 
10.4.1 Sewage Problem 
Based on the 1985 survey, 96.8% of the all sampled households in Khan 
Yunis camp were suffering from an acute problem of sewage disposal, while 
the remaining proportion were satisfied with using cesspits as a 
resolution of the problem. Indeed, cesspits and septic tanks have been 
utilized as a temporary solution to the sewage disposal problem not only 
in Khan Yunis camp but in all Gazan localities, but inadequate collections 
-325- 
have led to the discharge of raw sewage onto the roads and public areas, 
creating a sanitary nuisance and posing a very severe hazard to public 
health. 
Sewage disposal is considered the biggest problem confronting the 
infrastructure in the Gaza Strip. So far only Gaza, Jabalya and Rafah 
provide sewerage service for 50%, 30%, and 10% of their populations 
respectively. The remaining proportions utilize cesspits (Roy, 1986). 
Unfortunatelys sewage from Jabalya and Rafah finally discharges into large 
open pools either inside the refugee camps (see Plate 10.2) or a few 
metres away from them (see Plate 9.4). 
The situation in the refugee camps is worse than in the Strip's 
localities. Waste water is disposed of into open alleys between shelters, 
causing a major health hazard (see Plates 10.3 a and b). To reduce the 
effect of the problem, in 1983 open concrete channels and drains for waste 
water were built in some parts of the camps by the refugees, either at 
their own expense or with materials and technical supervision provided by 
UNRWA (see Plates 10.3 a and b). So far, no additional channels are 
allowed to be built by the Israeli authorities. For instance, after the 
construction of open drains had been carried out in blocks A and B in Khan 
Yunis camp (see Figure 9.1), the Israelis ordered UNRWA to stop such 
construction in the remaining residential blocks of the camp. 
Predictably, any efforts to improve the conditions of life in the 
camps are met by Israeli objections. In 1980, plans by the Community 
Development Foundation, an American aid agency, to build sewers in Rafah 
camp were rejected by the Israelis (Locke and Stewart, 1985). 
Obviously, the open sewage channels which lie parallel to the refugee 
shelters and roads are a source of disease and insects. Also, flooding of 
the sewage drains often forms pools inside the camps or near to them. For 
instance, in Jabalya a large pool has been formed (Abu Rashed pool) over 
many years, which has become a significant mark of the camp (see Plate 
10.2). However, in winter, it becomes larger as the rain discharges into 
it, making it a danger threatening the surrounding neighbourhood. So far, 
nothing has been done to drain it. Also, in Rafah camp, joint work 
between UNRWA and the municipality of Rafah was carried out to drain a 
similar pool but it continues to exist (Al Fajr, 1985 and WHO, 1984). 
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Plate 10.1 : Deir el Balah: Three generations are now crammed into a 
camp shelter, causing severe overcrowding. The corrugated 
iron extension in the foreground is used as a kitchen and 
was added to the shelter to free space for sleeping. Such 
extensions are common in all Gazan refugee camps. 
.-eý 
lk - :. lw. 1,4 
Plate 10.2 : Jabalya refugee camp: Sewage runs in open drains between 
shelters and finally collects in a large open pool at a low 
point in the camp (Abu Rashed pool). Here it is joined by the 
underground sewage of Beit Lahiya resettlement project which 
floods the camp adding more foul odour and disease. The photo 
was taken in the summer, when the pool is at its lowest level. 
Photo: The author 
Photo: The author 
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10.4.2 Limited Water SupLly 
4 
When the refugee shelters were erected by UNRWA in the 1950s, public 
water taps were provided in different residential blocks (see Plate 4.2). 
Camp inhabitants drew water from these points and carried it in containers 
to their homes. But in the 1970's and 1980's the majority of Gaza's 
refugee camps were connected either to the municipal and village council 
water system or to "Mekorot", the Israeli National Water Company, which 
has drilled tens of wells along the coast of the Gaza Strip. However, 
most of the camp refugees complain that the water supply is inadequate and 
still runs for only a short time daily. 
The 1985 sample survey reveals that 77.7% of households surveyed in 
Khan Yunis refugee camp were suffering from a severe shortage of water 
supply. The problem is aggravated in the summer months when most families 
in the camp are supplied with water for less than 2 hours a day. Al 1 
households indicated a shortage of water supply during the summer months, 
40.35% in autumn, 40.35% in spring, and 21.1% in winter. 
Groundwater is the only water source in the Gaza Strip and it is 
accessed by drilling wells down to the water table. So far, there are six 
water wells in Khan Yunis used as a source of domestic water supply to the 
city, refugee camp and Al-Amal rehousing project. One of the wells is 
owned and operated 8 hours a day by UNRWA, while the remaining five are 
owned and operated by the municipality of Khan Yunis 16 hours a day except 
one (the eastern well ) which is operated 8 hours a day as its water 
salinity is too high. 
Water salinity ranges in most wells between 100 and 400 mg chlorides 
per litre while in the eastern well it is considerably higher and exceeds 
600 mg. chlorides per litre (Tushia, 1974). The quality of drinking water 
in Khan Yunis is not up to the standards recommended by the World Health 
Organization which sets a permissible limit of 200 mg. chlorides per 
litre 
and an excessive limit of 600 mg. chlorides per litre 
(Todd, 1970). 
Unable to cope satisfactorily with the demand for water, Khan 
Yunis 
municipality is forced to use the eastern well and gets round the salinity 
problem by mixing water from this well with water from the other 
four 
wells owned by the municipality. 
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In the early 1970's the average daily water consumption was estimated 
at 85-100 litres per capita for city-dwellers and about 30 litres per 
capita in the refugee camp. The total volume of water consumer amounted 
to 4000 cubic metres a day, giving a daily water consumption of 71.43 
litres per capita (Tushia, 1974). By comparison, in 1985 the water 
capacity amounted to about 5,780 cubic metres a day and, with the loss 
ratio of 5%. the actual capacity was 5,491 cubic metres a day (Water 
Department of Khan Yunis Municipality, 1986), giving a daily water 
consumption of 67 litres per capita. Hence, it can be concluded that per 
capita domestic water consumption in 1985 was less than in the 1970's. 
The per capita domestic water consumption in the Gaza Strip is about 
one-týird of that in the Iraqi cities where consumption amounted to 200 
litres in 1978 (Al-Bahrani, 1980). 
The low water consumption in Khan Yunis is attributable to Israeli 
water policy for the Gaza Strip. No new wells can be drilled without 
prior permission, which has not been forthcoming to the Palestinians in 
the Gaza Strip. For instance Khan Yunis municipality has frequently 
unsuccessfully requested permission to drill new wells to meet the demand 
for water. The Israelis even refused to allow the municipality to use its 
own well, drilled before the 1967 occupation, since the well is situated 
200 metres away from wells under Mekorot's franchise. Use of the 
municipality well would decrease the amount of water available to Israeli 
colonies connected to the Mekorot wells. 
The high salinity of water and the inadequate water supplies are not 
only problems in Khan Yunis but also problems in the Gaza Strip as a 
whole. The WHO (1984) reported that the salinity of water and the 
insufficient water supplies in Gaza Strip are worrying the municipalities, 
which would like to use their own budget to dig wells but are refused 
permission to do so by the Israeli authorities. 
The restrictions on water consumption applied to Palestinians do not 
apply to the Israeli settlements inside the Strip, where 35-40 new wells 
have been drilled in recent years (Roy, 1986). Similarly water 
consumption by Israeli colonists far exceeds that of Gazans. In 1984 
colonists living inside the Gaza Strip consumed between 14,218 - 28,436 
cubic metres of water per capita a year compared with only 200 cubic 
metres per capita a year for Palestinians. These figures refer to all 
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water consumption, not only domestic but also agricultural , industrial 
etc. as well (Kana'na and Al-Madani, 1985). 
The water problem in Khan Yunis will grow worse unless new wells are 
dri 1 led. According to a study prepared for the municipality of Khan 
Yunis, the expected domestic water consumption will be 12,000 cubic metres 
per day on a peak day in 1990 (Tushia, 1974). 
10.4.3 Inadequate EleLýri_o_ýy 
Electricity, which is bought from the Israeli Regional Company, is 
insufficient. Camp refugees complain that they have been supplied by an 
interrupted and weak supply of electricity. In fact, about 78.2% of the 
households sampled in Khan Yunis camp said that they have received 
inadequate electricity. The reasons, according to employees in the 
Department of Electricity in Khan Yunis municipality, are the high number 
of consumers, the weakness of the transformers and some faults in the 
electricity network itself. 
However, insufficient supply of electricity is a distinguishing 
problem of the refugee camps, since the situation in other types of 
localities is much better. In 1981,83.9% of refugee shelters had access 
to some form of electricity (Roy, 1986). 
10.4.4 The Problem of Rats 
The spread of rats constitutes a thorny problem for the Gazan 
population as a whole and the residents of refugee camps in particular. 
Since the early 1980s, an annual campaign has been carried out in the city 
of Gaza and Beach camp by the municipality of Gaza and UNRWA. UNRWA 
contributed with cash to purchase rodenticides. The campaign shows 
encouraging results which should support the extension of the programme to 
cover the entire Gaza Strip (UNRWA, 1985). So far, no further programmes 
have been implemented. 
The 1985 survey indicates that 96.8% of all sampled households 
in 
Khan Yunis camp were infested with the widespread rat population. 
No 
doubt bad sanitary conditions and bad housing in the camp 
have exacerbated 
the problem. The corrugated iron extensions to the refugee shelters 
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produce a suitable environment for rat propagation (see Plate 10.1 ). 
Also,, another situation must be considered; when some refugees demolish 
their camp shelters as quid pro quo for resettlement in the rehousing 
projects, huge stacks of rubble are left on the ground where rats can 
build their nests and thrive (see Plate 9.2). This situation makes life 
for the camp refugees even. more miserable. However, neither the Israeli 
authorities nor the UNRWA,, nor the municipalities have made real efforts 
to cope satisfactorily with the problem despite the population's concern. 
10.4.5 Other Problems 
There are several problems facing the inhabitants of refugee camps, 
but the biggest and most serious one is the lack of environmental 
sanitation. Yet, since the establishment of the refugee camps, UNRWA has 
been responsible for providing camp refugees with adequate environmental 
sanitation. This includes water supply (about 20 litres per capita'a 
day), garbage collection, insect and rodent control and waste disposal 
(UNRWA, 1983a and 1986). As concluded earlier, most camp inhabitants now 
have access to some water supply either from the municipalities and local 
councils or from Mekorot. For instance, in 1982 about 40% and 80% of the 
inhabitants of Bureij and Nuseirat refugee camps respectively were 
supplied with water from Mekorot (UNRWA, 1983a). 
The sanitary conditions in the camps are appalling. Refuse 
collection does not keep pace with what is thrown away so that there are 
always piles of rubbish festering in the street (Locke and Stewart, 1985). 
The 1985 sample survey emphasized the above conclusion, where 82.7% of the 
households surveyed in Khan Yunis camp said that the sanitation service 
provided by UNRWA is inadequate. However, in terms of figures, the 
sanitary situation in Khan Yunis camp is better than the other camps. For 
instance, in 1985, the camp refugees as a whole had one sanitation worker 
for some 970 inhabitants compared with about 890 per a worker in Khan 
Yunis camp. Taking into consideration the miserable environmental 
situation in the Strip, the numbers of these workers are insufficient and 
must be increased to achieve a satisfactory sanitary situation. UNRWA 
officials in Gaza rec6gnize this fact, but they attribute the problem to 
financial constraints. 
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As the problem has been aggravated, the refugees have participated by 
taking an interest in the improvement of their own environmental health 
conditions in camps and are cooperating, as best they can, in the 
implementation of aided self-help programmes (UNRWA, 1985). In the 
refugee camps, popular committees have formed, mounting publicity 
campaigns to raise refugees interest to clean up their camps through joint 
wo rk. But these committees no longer exist, since their work is forbidden 
by the Israeli authorities claiming that they have political motives. 
Obviously, garbage collection in the camps remains old-fashioned and 
present methods of collection leave much to be desired. However financial 
restrictions continue to discourage the introduction of modern machinery 
and methods (UNRWA, 1983b). So, the UNRWA plans to gradually replace all 
its slow-moving tractor-trailer units with more efficient equipment 
because the disposal places are now further from the camps (United 
Nations, 1985 and UNRWA, 1985). 
It must be noted that the problem of bad sanitation is not restricted 
to the refugee camps but it has become a serious problem in the Gaza Strip 
as a whole. It is not surprising to know that the WHO sent a short-term 
consultant to review the sanitation programme in the Gaza Strip, and his 
findings and recommendations for upgrading the services are under 
consideration (United Nations, 1985). 
Indeed, life in the refugee camps is difficult since most of the 
roads are unpaved, the majority of shelters are not fit for human 
habitation, and rain pools are everywhere. Sometimes heavy rains cause 
serious damage to the refugee shelters. For example, in December 1985, 
serious damage happened to some 30 shelters in Khan Yunis camp as a 
consequence of heavy rains. In addition tens of shelters flooded in the 
low-lying parts of the camp. No significant efforts have been made to 
solve this chronic problem in the camps. 
In conclusion, the inadequacy of services which are provided to the 
camp refugees has been aggravated because the Israelis have prevented 
UNRWA from carrying out new construction or repairs in the refugee camps. 
This prevention has arisen by invoking local legislation of 1960, related 
to the clearance of construction projects (see Appendix 12). The UNRWA 
has argued that this legislation is not applicable to it, a position 
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explicitly confirmed by the government of Egypt, which introduced it. 
Also this legislation acts contrary to the undertakings of the Israeli 
government under the Michelmore-Comay Agreement of 1967. So far the 
question of principle has not been resolved and Israeli interference in 
UNRWA activities has continued (United Nations, 1983 and 1984). 
10.5 Refugee At itudes toward Resettlement 
As shown in Table 10.8, only 26.4% of households sampled wished to 
move into the Israeli -sponsored resettlement projects, 65.5% rejected the 
idea and 8.2% were not sure. There is a correlation between roor density 
and response to resettlement. People who approved of resettlement live in 
overcrowded situations while those who rejected resettlement live in less 
overcrowded situations (Table 10.8). 
Different reasons were given for approving of resettlement. Table 
10.9 shows that 86.2% of households sampled who approved of resettlement 
said it would solve their housing problem, because they lived in 
overcrowded conditions of a room density of 3.26 persons. These 
conditions have arisen because the camp population has expanded without a 
corresponding expansion of accommodation. The housing problem was 
exacerbated after December 1982 when the Israelis issued an order stating 
: "it is forbidden to construct any buildings or constructions, and to add 
to or extend the existing shelters, or to demolish the existing shelters 
so as to set up a new one, or to make any other construction in the 
refugee camps area without obtaining a permit from the Director of Welfare 
Affairs and Refugees or from his authorized deputy (see Appendix 12). 
However the Israelis rarely grant permits for new construction or even 
renovation, but under pressure of necessity people dare to make repairs to 
old shelters or try to make changes without a permit (Al Fajr, 1985a). 
This is one forTn of pressure which the Israeli authorities use to try to 
force camp refugees to move into the resettlement projects. 
In fact 43.1% of households surveyed gave pressure from the Israeli 
authorities as a reason for approving resettlement. It is not surprising, 
since the above-mentioned order issued by the Israeli Director of Welfare 
Affairs and Refugees prohibits selling, buying, renting, mortgaging, 
renovating, rebuilding, or transferring shelters in refugee camps, or 
moving without prior per-r, iissior from one camp to another. The order 
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Table 10.8 Khan Yunis Camp : Refugees Reaction to the Question : "Do You 
Want to Move into the Resettlemert Project? " 
Response No. of 
cases 
% Total of 
inhabit- 
ants 
No. of rooms 
in dwell- 
ing 
Room 
density 
Yes 58 26.4 686 210 3.26 
No 144 65.5 1381 519 2.66 
Not sure 18 8.2 180 65 2.77 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey. 
continues : "whoever may violate these orders is required to remove the 
building at his own expense, otherwise the building is taken from him, or 
he will pay a fine in cash or be imprisoned, or he may be subject to both 
penalities. Besides, the building should be removed at the expense of the 
violators (see Appendix 12). 
Indeed, the Egyptian ordinance No. 4 of 1960 prohibits construction 
inside the camp without a perri-jit from the authorities and makes unlicensed 
construction an offence punishable by a fine or prison term. It also 
permits the authorities to demolish unlicensed structures in certain 
circumstances (Al Fajr, 1985b). The ordinance was issued to regulate the 
unplanned expansion of the camps, but restricted demolition of expansions 
and houses to cases in which builditigs endangered the safety or routine 
operation in the camps. The Egyptians never interfered in camp affairs 
unless a request was made by UNRWA to deal with such infractions. 
Consequently, "up to 1967, the Egyptian authorities did not demolish a 
single illegally built house and made do with levying fines" (Al Fajr, 
1985b). 
Unlike the Egyptian orders, the Israeli orders of 1982 are of a 
punitive and repressive nature within an overall political aim (Locke and 
Stewart, 1985). Yet the Israelis have issued the orders without 
consulting UNRWA, and recently they have had effective control of the 
refugee camps. 
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Obviously, 31.0% of the households sampled who supported the idea of 
resettlement did so because they expected to receive better facilities and 
services than those provided to camp inhabitants. However, most of the 
Al-Amal project inhabitants revealed dissatisfaction with the services 
which they receive (see Chapter 9), although they are considerably better 
than those in-the refugee camps. 
Furthermore, 48.3% households who approved resettlement did so 
because they thought they would gain the right to future expansion of 
their houses. Indeed, the Israeli authorities allow the residents of the 
rehousing projects to expand their houses and to build them in 
multi-storey building styles after a proper permit is obtained. This 
situation will help the project inhabitants to solve their housing 
problems in the future. In contrast, the camp refugees are not allowed to 
do so, and a building permit is rarely granted. In addition, 5.2% 
households who favoured resettlement did not give any specific reasons 
(Table 10.9). 
Viewed from another angle, 144 of households surveyed refused 
resettlement in the Israeli -sponsored rehousing schemes, but these 
households were living in less overcrowded housing conditions, with a room 
density of 2.66 persons (Table 10.8). Several reasons were identified for 
disapproving of resettlement : 41% of the households sampled did so 
because they were financially unable to cover the cost of construction and 
26.4% because of the insufficiency of Israeli compensations for their 
demolished camp shelters. Indeed, a conclusion was reached in chapter 9 
showing that the assessed values of the demolished shelters in the camps 
comprise a very small proportion of their real values. 
The major reason for opposing the issue of resettlement is that most 
camp refugees are worried about losing their refugee identity if they move 
out of the camps, and hence their right of repatriation will vanish. 
Indeed 79.2% of households sampled who rejected resettlement 
supported the above conclusion, revealing their determination to live in 
the camps in order to preserve their refugee identity and to keep their 
problem alive. However, this viewpoint was rejected by the former UNRWA 
Director in Gaza, Peter Hawkins, who commented : "the Israelis are 
offering then) (refugees) decent standards of accomniodation here in Gaza. 
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Table 10.9 Attitudes of Khan Yunis Camp Refugees toward Resettlement 
in the Israeli-Sponsored Rehousinq Projects 
A) In favour of the resettlement scheme 
Reason for approval Frequency % 
Solve the housing problem 50 86.2 
Pressure from Israeli authorities 25 43.1 
Better facilities and services 18 31.0 
Gaining right to future 
expansion of the house 28 48.3 
Other reasons 3 5.2 
B) Not in favour of the resettlement scheme 
Reason of disapproval Frequency % 
Financial problems 59 41.0 
Preserve refugee identity 114 79.2 
Insufficient governmental 38 26.4 
compensation 
Other reasons 11 7.6 
Source : The 1985 Sample Survey 
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Accepting would enable theni to get out of the camps, with all the 
psychological implications of camp life. But they are all worried what it 
will do to their Palestinian identity. In my judgment it will do nothing" 
(Viorst, 1984). Logically, this comment is unacceptable as it conflicts 
with several statements made by Israeli officials, revealing the real aims 
of the resettlement projects for camp refugees (see for example chapter 
8). Indeed, there is no doubt that the Palestinian identity of the camp 
refugees is the main target of the Israeli -designed resettlement policy. 
By destroying the camps the moral motive for repatriating the Palestinian 
refugees will be removed. 
. Obviously, 7.6% of households surveyed who rejected resettlement in 
the Israeli -sponsored projects did not reveal reasons for their attitudes. 
Dealing with the issue of resettlement from another point, 215 
(97.7%) of the households questioned in this study refused to be resettled 
in the West Bank dwelling projects if they were implemented. In contrast, 
only 5 (2.3%) households responded in favour of the plan. In fact, the 
issue of resettling Gazan refugees in the West Bank is not new and it 
returns to the early stage of the Israeli occupation of the Strip in 1967 
(see chapter 8). But when the Ben Porat plan was unveiled in 1983, the 
file of resettlement was reopened, and Gaza refugees expected rehousing in 
the Jericho refugee camps (see Figure 1.1), which were evacuated when the 
majority of their inhabitants fled to Jordan during the 1967 war. 
Quantifying the refugees' desire to replace their camp shelters with 
multi-storey buildings shows that 46.8% of households sampled wished to 
have a proper permit to do so, 42.3% rejected the idea and 10.9% were not 
sure. Most of those households which rejected the idea were either living 
in small shelters or in the long run they would be financially unable to 
rebuild their shelters. However, no building permits can be granted to 
camp refugees. 
10.6 Summary 
Obviously, the Gazan population in general and the camp refugees in 
particular have suffered severely from a housing dilemma of great 
magnitude. Approximately half of the population are living in overcrowded 
conditions with a room density of three persons or more. In fact, the 
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housing crisis is exacerbated, particularly in the refugee camps as 
additional construction or expansions are not permitted, resulting from 
new restrictions issued by the Israeli occupation authorities. As a 
consequence, camp refugees are not alloweý even to renovate their 
shelters, and even UNRWA is prevented from carrying out new construction 
in the camps, or from repairing the existing ones. 
There is no doubt that overcrowding has some 
camp inhabitants, since three generations are now 
This situation introduces social conflict between 
desire to develop their conditions of life, and t 
want to cling to social traditions and to possess 
household members. 
social impact on the 
crammed into a shelter. 
the new generation who 
he old generation who 
authority over all 
The previous analysis shows that camp refugees are living in an 
unhealthy environment - water shortage, non-existence of sewage disposal 
systems, inadequate supply of electricity, bad sanitation and the spread 
of rats are major characteristics of life inside the refugee camps. 
UNRWA, as an administrative body for the refugee camps, is unable to 
provide adequate services partly because of its financial crisis and 
partly because of Israeli interferences with its activities. 
The Israeli policy toward the camps aims to aggravate the housing 
crisis and to roake worse the environmental health situation in the refugee 
camps. By increasing the housing crisis, resistance to the Israeli 
resettlement policy will be reduced and refugees will be willing to accept 
the Israeli rehousing plan. So far, the camp refugees have rejected 
co-operation with the Israelis. 
However, if family size remains at its present levels and social 
traditions continue to require the accommodation of all household members 
in one dwelling, in the absence of a national government to plan and 
guide, the housing dilemma will grow. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
Conclusion 
11.1 Future Proýpýýcts for the Gaza Strjk_ý_qp_ylation 
Historically, the Gaza Strip is a new territorial unit which emerged 
in 1948, when the Israelis occupied Palestine and uprooted its Palestinian 
population from their homeland. Consequently, from 1948 onward, the 
characteristics of Gaza's population have been dramatically affected by 
military and political aspects of the Israeli-Arab conflict. These 
effects can be directly related to the population growth, population 
distribution, patterns of settlement, migration, population structure, 
refugee resettlement, housing conditions and public services. 
The 1948 and 1967 wars substantially re-orientated the population 
dynamics of the Gaza Strip. Although the Gaza Strip experienced heavy 
population gains as a result of the influx of refugees into it in 1948, 
the area reported massive population losses as the result of the 1967 war 
(see Chapter Two). As a consequence of the 1967 out-migration, the normal 
age-sex structure of the population was distorted and a heavy economic 
burden was added upon the economically active population, since population 
losses were concentrated predominantly in the male age-groups of 20-44 
years. However, as the Gaza Strip is characterized by high rates of 
natural increase, averaging 34.1% during 1968-84, the age-sex structure of 
the Gazan population had balanced out by 1985. 
This study reveals that the Strip is distinguished by high fertility 
(CBR of 48.3 per thousand in 1984) and low mortality (CDR of 8 per 
thousand in 1984), raising the rate of natural increase in the area. It 
is worth noting here that there were no indications that a transition 
toward lower rates of natural increase is in progress in the Strip. At 
the same time, the significant findings of the thesis indicate that 
fertility remains high and subject to annual fluctuations from which a 
possible decline is hard to predict. However, the outstanding demographic 
success in the Gaza Strip is the radical reduction in mortality in general 
and infant and childhood mortality in particular. 
From 1968 onward, the Strip has experienced lower rates of 
out-migration, because several social, psychological and political factors 
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have paralyzed such migration. The population's determination to 
challenge the Israeli threat of annexing their lands, the population 
status of Gazans as stateless people lacking passports, the travelling 
restrictions imposed upon the population by the Israelis and the decline 
in the economy of the oil-rich Arab states are major reasons reducing the 
level of out-migration from the Strip. So, it is predicted that the 
decline in emigration, coupled with the fact that over 68% of the Gazan 
population are less than 24 years old, may increase future fertility 
rates. 
In a wider view, the population/area relationship indicates that the 
Strip has severely suffered from heavy population concentration upon its 
limited area of 364 sq. kms, giving a population density of 1,450 persons 
per sq. km in 1985. As a consequence, the Strip is ranked as the third 
most densely populated entity in the world after Hong Kong and Singapore, 
but it is distinguished from them by its very poor economic 
infrastructure. 
Considering the latest population growth of 3.4% (1982-84) as an 
average annual rate of increase, the population of the Gaza Strip will 
double after about 20 years and their numbers will exceed one million 
people by 2005. Consequently, the current poor socio-economic standards 
of Gazan people will be exacerbated; keeping the present miserable 
standards of living would require a doubling in the existing 
infrastructure at all levels. 
This pessimistic picture shows that the population growth of the Gaza 
Strip must be reduced in order to cope satisfactorily with the 
overpopulation problem. But a fundamental question must be asked : how 
can the high population growth be reduced? 
In examining the demographic transition of small countries, Clarke 
(1982) concluded that "demographic transition takes place in association 
with a number of social and economic changes and there can be little doubt 
that population size of a country is no more than a contributory factor. 
" 
Theoretically, it is expected that any socio-economic development in the 
Strip could correspond positively with a reduction in fertility rates, 
but 
in the case of Gaza Strip political and religious factors have greater 
influences upon orientating fertility behaviour of the Gazan people. 
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Moreover, although it is widely acknowledged that illiteracy in general 
and illiteracy of women in particular correspond positively with high 
fertility, the experience of the Gaza Strip conflicts with this rule. The 
illiteracy for both sexes amounted to only 17.4% of the total sampled 
population aged 12 years and over (derived from the 1985 survey of 
population structure), one of the lowest rates in the Middle East. 
Graham-Brown (1984) concluded that the overall enrolment of female 
students in the Gaza Strip is surprisingly better than in the West Bank. 
She attributed that to the insecurities of camp life where education seems 
to be more desirable for both boys and girls than in the rural areas of 
the West Bank. So why are the fertility rates in the Strip still high? 
The 1985 survey concluded that fertility behaviour among Gaza's 
couples is a reflection of groups of complex socio-economic, political and 
religious factors, paralyzing any future reduction in fertility rates and 
opposing any efforts of widening plans for family planning. Indeed, 
family planning in the Strip is a new idea and overall contraceptive 
practice among married women in all reproductive ages is very low. The 
majority of contraceptive users are not interested in reducing their 
reproductivity substantially. Obviously, Gazan people perceive that high 
fertility is an important source of human fuel for continuing their 
national struggle toward an independent Palestinian state. So an earlier 
recommendation of using contraception in order to reduce fertility rates 
would be understood as a conspiracy against their national interests. 
Although there is no indication of willingness toward fertility 
reduction in the foreseeable future, the major findings are very useful 
for anyone who wants to adopt a population policy for the Gaza Strip in 
the future. 
In a nutshell, the high fertility rates coupled with low mortality 
rates have affected the population structure of the Gaza Strip. The main 
findings of the 1985 survey reveal that the Gazan population in general 
and camp inhabitants in particular were very young, as 46.6% and 48.2% of 
their respective reSidents were below 15 years of age. Population 
juvenility coupled with very low participation rate in the labour force 
have increased the economic burden upon the economically active 
population. 
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With regard to the employment structure of the Gaza Strip population, 
the study shows that overall participation rates in the labour force are 
very low (see Chapter 7). At the same time, Gaza's labour force was 
fragmented into three groups according to their place of work. The first 
are employed locally, the second commute to work inside Israel, while the 
third are employed abroad mainly in the Arab states. Over 50% of the Gaza 
labour force were employed either in Israel or abroad, indicating a 
fragile economy reliant upon migratory labour. However, this situation 
has sustained the Strip's poor economy through remittances- 
Viewed from another point, the Israeli employment policy, which 
permits Gazans to seek work in Israel either legally or illegally, has 
resulted in significant changes in the composition and distribution of the 
Gazan workforce by economic activity. Taking the limited employment 
opportunities available locally into account and the non-competitive wages 
offered inside Israel, large numbers of Gazan workers are recruited to do 
unskilled and semi-skilled work in Israel, in jobs which Israelis are 
unwilling to do (see Chapter 7). 
The study indicates that Israel has succeeded in fuelling itself with 
a large labour force (46.1% of Gazan workforce in 1984) who were employed 
on a day-to-day basis. So they are the first to be fired when there are 
slowdowns. An Israeli journalist emphasized that, "an Arab worker is 
extremely movable, one can fire him at any moment and transfer him from 
one place to another; he does not strike and he has no "claims" as the 
Israeli worker has. In short, in any economic respects, the workers from 
the territories are a treasure for the Israeli economy" (National Lawyers 
Guild, 1978). 
Measuring the unemployment rates of the Gazan workforce indicates 
that the Israeli definition is defective at best and misleading at worst. 
The official figures gave unemployment rates below 1% during 1973-84, 
while the 1985 survey of population structure revealed an unemployment 
rate of 12.2%. Similarly, the 1985 survey of Al-Amal dwelling project 
indicated that 13.3% of the active household-heads were unemployed. 
Moreover, the tough policy imposed against the Gazan people by the 
Israelis has pressured university graduates, who are unable to find 
employment in the Strip or unable to travel abroad, into working in Israel 
as unskilled labourers. 
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However, work in Israel and abroad has absorbed a large proportion of the 
Gazan labour force, reducing substantially the dilemma of unemployment in 
an area which suffers from overpopulation and a poor infrastructure base. 
Today, concern is increased as most of the Arab states have introduced 
programmes to reduce the value of non-national labour on their soils. So, 
if Gazan migrant workers (between 20,000 and 40,000 including their 
families) are fired from their jobs and come back, the employment 
situation in the Strip will deteriorate and the housing problem will be 
i nf 1 amed. 
Although Gazans have benefited from work in Israel , significant 
social problems have occurred which threaten Gazan society. The first 
problem is that work in Israel encourages teenage males to drop out of 
school to work in Israel under the pressure of needs. "In 1981, UNRWA 
records show that 4,000 (5%) out of some 80,000 students in both cycles 
(elementary and preparatory) dropped out and 198,2- was not much better" 
(Graham-Brown, 1984). So, if this drain continues, illiteracy will grow. 
The second problem is that Gazan workers who travel to work daily, or 
those who travel weekly have not enough time to look after their children 
and to strengthen their social ties with relatives. This situation might 
be weakening family ties and creating unpleasant family atmospheres. 
In this study particular attention is concentrated on analysing the 
housing conditions in the Strip. The findings summarize that the high 
growth rate of the Gazan population, the poor economic infrastructure, the 
huge concentration of Palestinian refugees, the limited area available for 
housing, the absence of a national authority to guide and plan and the 
severe restrictions of Israeli policy against the Gazan people have 
introduced an enormous housing shortage in the Strip. it is concluded 
that approximately 40% of the Gazan population as a whole and about 50% of 
the inhabitants of refugee camps were living in overcrowded housing 
conditions with a room density of three persons or more. 
Moreover, the basic human needs of public services are insufficient 
and even non-existent. Limited water supply, non-existence of sewage 
disposal systems, weak and interrupted electric supply, bad sanitation and 
widespread rat infestation are the main elements of life in the Gaza 
Strip. It is worth reporting here that the Israeli policy in the Strip 
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has aggravated the above problems, aiming to force people to emigrate 
under the bitter conditions of life. 
Finally, analysis of the Gazan population by their status shows that 
more than 70% of them, including their descendants of course, are 
registered refugees with UNRWA. Additionally, about 48% of Gaza's 
population are still living in refugee camps, while the remaining 
percentage are living either in cities, villages or small localities. 
11.2 Changes in the Settlement Patterns 
Prior to 1948, the settlement geography of the area which later 
became the Gaza Strip experienced two types of settlement, namely towns 
and villages. As a consequence of the first Israeli-Arab war of 1948, a 
huge influx of Palestinian refugees huddled into the Strip and nearly 
quadrupled the population. So a new type of settlement emerged when eight 
refugee camps were constructed by UNRWA, replacing the pre-existing nine 
tent camps. When the Strip was occupied by the Israelis after the third 
Israeli-Arab war of 1967, Israeli colonies and refugee rehousing projects 
were added to the existing ones. 
Dahlan (1988) has identified that the transformation of Gaza's 
geography of settlement is the outcome of both war and politics which 
continue to be in effect today. Indeed, the Israelis are actively working 
to change the human landscape in the Gaza Strip by planting more Israeli 
colonies and destroying the existing Palestinian refugee camps. 
Provided that the Israeli occupation continues, the camps will remain 
a target of systematic Israeli destruction, aiming in the end to replace 
the camps with Israeli-sponsored resettlement projects. There is no doubt 
that the Israelis hate to see the refugee camps on the Gaza Strip map of 
settlement because they embarrass them. So it is predicted that the 
settlement geography of the Gaza Strip will remain changeable. 
Moreover, radical changes in the status of settlements have occurred 
since the Israeli occupation of 1967. Some villages have developed into 
urban centres, raising their numbers from two to five and expanding their 
limits to include the adjacent refugee camps. Furtherynore, some small 
localities have been officially transformed into villages or local 
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comiittees, providing their inhabitants with basic public services as 
independent bodies. 
Alterations in the status of settlement, expansion of settlements as 
a consequence of the influx of Palestinian refugees, the legalized 
attachment of refugee camps to their adjoining urban centres, and the high 
natural increase have resulted in changing the ratio of urbanization in 
the Gaza Strip from 70% in 1945 to about 90% in July 1984, giving the 
Strip one of the highest urbanization ratios in the Middle East. 
11.3 Prospects for the Palestinian Refuq. ýý.. ýa. ýIp5 
As long as the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip remains, their 
plans to destroy the refugee camps will continue, aiming in the long term 
to raze the refugee camps and relocate their inhabitants elsewhere. 
Indeed, since the 1970s, the Israeli -sponsored resettlement scheme has 
been continuing, motivated no doubt with full political awareness of the 
implications concerning the problem of Palestine refugees. They hope to 
complete their plan within a few years. 
By razing Gazan refugee camps, the Israelis will achieve four 
fundamental goals: 
Firstly, the symbolism of the refugee camps as a witness to the 
Palestinian exile will disappear. Indeed, the international community, 
particularly before 1974, has always been inclined to regard the 
Palestinian dilemma as a refugee problem rather than a national one. So, 
if the refugee camps are erased and their inhabitants resettled, Israel 
will be able to claim that the problem has been solved, and it will be 
entitled to request the Arab states who host Palestinian refugees that 
they do the same and integrate the Palestinians into their societies. 
For a long time, Israel has claimed that the refugees are maintained 
in camps to embarrass it. It has also brought about an ambivalent 
assimilation policy. In fact, Zionism calls on Jews not to be assimilated 
in their host-societies, yet it requires that the Palestinians be absorbed 
in theirs (Barakat, 1973). 
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Secondly, the new situation would qualify Israel to prevent UNRWA 
from providing services in the Strip. In fact, UNRWA was set up as a 
temporary relief agency to rehabilitate the Palestinian refugees as long 
as their problem existed. From the outset, UNRWA gradually altered from a 
short-term emergency relief body to an agency with quasi -governmental 
responsibility. Its mandate is regularly renewed by the UN General 
Assembly since there are no signs of an end of the Palestinian problem. 
For refugees, UNRWA represents an ambiguous symbol. It enshrines the 
refugee status of Palestinians in the face of the constant attempts of the 
Israelis to deny it. For instance, in 1969 the former Israeli Prime 
Minister Golda Meir made her famous remark saying there is no such thing 
as a "Palestinian people" (Forsythe, 1983 and Flapan, 1985). 
Furthermore, the existence of UNRWA is an embarrassment to the 
Israelis. They hate that word "refugee" because people ask, "a refugee 
from where? " They also hate seeing the UNRWA report being discussed in 
the UN General Assembly and UNRWA's mandate being extended year by year 
(Cossali and Robson, 1986). 
Thirdly, the refugees' connection with the past can be destroyed by 
demolishing their camps. Obviously, when the refugee camps were 
established, refugees from the same village, city and tribe stuck together 
so that even today the camps have strong and distinguished village, city 
and tribal identities, maintaining, through oral history, the refugees' 
desire to return to their homeland. In fact, refugees in Gaza, as 
elsewhere, are attached to their homes in occupied Palestine rather than 
to their present homes in the Gaza Strip. 
The above conclusion shocked the Israeli soldiers who overran some 
refugee camps in the 1967 war. Amos Elon (an Israeli writer) reported: 
"Many Israeli soldiers were surprised, and some were deeply disturbed, to 
discover among the refugees a form of "Arab Zionism". The living memory 
of a lost homeland, to which they were passionately attached as the Jews 
had remained attached to Zion, in the lands of their dispersion ... . Upon 
entering a refugee camp one young soldier discovered that the inmates were 
still organized into and dwelled as small clans or neighbourhood units 
according to the village, town, and even the street they had lived in 
prior to their dispersion in 1948" (Barakat, 1973). 
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Finally, by removing the camps, particularly those situated on the 
coast (see Plate 11.1), the Israelis will be able, in the long run, to 
develop the area for Israeli tourism. In addition, the new situation will 
sustain the colonists' willingness to inhabit the Gaza Strip since the 
squalid camps will no longer exist. 
However,, it is appropriate to ask whether the Palestinian refugees 
welcome the Israeli resettlement scheme? The 1985 survey of the housing 
problem in Khan Yunis camp shows that about a quarter of the households 
sampled were in favour of the scheme. Nevertheless, when Ben-Porat 
unveiled his plan in 1983 to resettle all camp refugees, the Palestinian 
opposed his plan overwhelmingly. 
"An opponent to the Ben-Porat plan accused Israel of trying to create 
"Bantustans", referring to the South African entities for preserving 
apartheid. Another opponent said on Israel radio, "the Israelis think 
that the camps are what is left of the Palestinian problem, and if they 
destroy them the problem will be forgotten, " and he continued, "but even 
if they move us to palaces, the real historical, political, national 
problems will remain" (Viorst, 1984). Also, there was an international 
reaction to the Ben-Porat plan displayed in the UN General Assembly 
resolution which called on Israel to abandon any plans to destroy the 
camps. The resolution charged "that measures to resettle Palestine 
refugees in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip away from their homes and 
property from which they were displaced constitutes a violation of their 
inalienable right of return" (Viorst, 1984). 
Given the Palestinian people's 39-years of exile, they are 
continuously opposing any attempt at resettlement outside their homeland 
even if it would be to their immediate benefit. They are also steadfastly 
resisting integration within their host-Arab societies and even within the 
indigenous Palestinian population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
The refugees do believe that such resettlement or integration may 
jeopardize their right to return. Consequently, one may ask why the 
Palestinian refugees resist absorption and resettlement into the Arab 
states. The answer is simply, because their problem is not an economic 
one, but is one of social, cultural, political and national uprootedness. 
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So, a fundamental question can be asked : what kind of solutions do 
the Palestinian refugees seek? For the refugees, their repatriation is 
clearly the ideal solution. The 1985 survey of the housing problem in 
Khan Yunis camp reveals that 209 (95%) of the households surveyed 
emphasised their demand for a return to their homes in Palestine. 
Nonetheless, 9 (5%) households accepted resettlement in the 
Israeli -sponsored dwelling projects on condition that financial 
compensation on the value of their properties in Palestine should be paid. 
The above demand for repatriation has been a fixed position of the 
Palestinian refugees over the years. All previous surveys have discovered 
such deep feelings and a desire for return. "In 1949, S. C. Thicknesse 
surveyed resettlement possibilities among the Palestinian refugees and 
came to the conclusion that "quite unquestionably the wish of the great 
mass of the refugees is to return to their old homes". Similarly, Mezerik 
discovered that "the refugees have a strong desire to return to their old 
homes. They regard Palestine as their homeland and refuse to accept 
anything other than repatriation as a solution" (Barakat, 1973). 
Furthermore, in a survey conducted by the Israelis for the Shiloah Centre 
of Tel Aviv University in Jalazun camp near Ramallah on the West Bank (see 
Fig. 1.1)5 88.7% of the sample demanded repatriation as a solution to 
their problem (Shamir, 1974). 
11.4 Territorial and Dý22qraThic Conflict 
The previous analysis of the Israeli colonial strategy in the Strip 
and the West Bank indicates that the traditional processes of colonization 
which were practised elsewhere before the creation of Israel in 1948 have 
been applied here. Most of the Israeli colonies in the Strip reveal a 
strong paramilitary, political and religious orientation (see Plate 4.5) 
and are ideologically constructed to create a permanent Jewish presence in 
the Gaza Strip. 
From the outset, the role of colonization as a means of ensuring 
control has been an inherent part of Zionist policy and its implementation 
over the past 100 years (Newman, 1985). This is, indeed, the major factor 
which guides the Israeli decision-makers in establishing territorial 
control and sovereignty over Palestine through acquisition of the 
Palestinian lands and changing the human and physical landscape by 
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allowing the Israelis to reside in any new occupied lands, either 
Palestinian lands (the Gaza Strip and the West Bank) or other Arab lands 
(the Syrian Golan Heights and Sinai before its return to Egyptian 
sovereignty in 1982). 
Up to 1978, the Strip had low priority in the Israeli colonial 
campaign. Only six colonies had been established since the 1967 
occupation. As a consequence of the Israeli -Egyptian peace agreement 
which promised the removal of all Israeli colonies from Sinai, thus 
terminating the buffer zone surrounding the Strip, a new policy was 
adopted to intensify the colonial process in the Strip instead. So, by 
the end of 1985, the number of Israeli colonies grew to 21 of which 2 
sites are now under construction (see Fig. 4.1). 
It is worth noting that all the Israeli colonies in the Strip 
severely lack the economic ability to survive and have no stable 
population. As a consequence they rely on financial assistance and 
governmental subsidies which have been invested for purely political and 
ideological reasons. For instance, since the economic infrastructure of 
these colonies is based mainly on agriculture, in order to support them 
economically, "the Israeli vegetable marketing board, Agrexco, stopped 
marketing Arab-produced vegetables from the occupied territories and 
concentrated on those produced by Israeli settlements only" (Roy, 1986). 
Demographically, can Israel achieve a population majority in the 
Strip? The analysis reveals that there is no possibility of reaching this 
majority at all (see Chapter 4). In 1985, the demographic balance between 
the Gazan population and the Israeli colonists was incomparable; the 
total population of the Israeli colonies was about 2150, ranging from 
30-350 persons in each colony (Roy, 1986), while the Gazan population was 
525,500 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1986), giving the Israeli colonists 
0.41% of the Gazan population. 
Territorially, the Israeli position is much better, because more than 
one-third of Gaza's total area is now under Israeli control. Roy (1986) 
reported that in 1985, the Israeli government claimed possession of 
100,000 dunums of land in the Strip. Of this number, 20,000 dunums were 
leased to the Jewish Agency and an additional 7,000 were leased to Hof 
Gaza, a regional settlerient council. At the same time, the existing 
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Israeli colonies occupy a known figure of 22,250 dunums. This means that 
by 1985, there were 122,250 (122.2,5 sq. kms) dunums out of the total 
Gaza's area of 364 sq. kms controlled either by the Israeli occupation 
authorities or by the Israeli colonists. 
From 1967 onward, the Israeli colonial policy of creeping annexation 
has been practised in the occupied territories through creating permanent 
"facts". Indeed, "the Israeli government statements make it clear that 
the government views the settlements as creating the basis for eventual 
annexation of the West Bank and Gaza into Israel" (National Lawyers Guild, 
1978). It is relevant to point out that the Israeli dream of occupying 
the Strip is not new. In March 1955, David Ben Gurion, the first Prime 
Minister of Israel, urged the Israeli cabinet to attack and occupy the 
Gaza Strip (Lesch, 1984a). Obviously, when Israel occupied the Strip in 
19671, it declared that the Strip was never part of Egypt and will never 
again be returned to Egyptian control. "In 1971, the former Israeli 
Information Minister Israel Galili said that the Gaza region definitely 
will remain under Israeli sovereignty and will never be separated from the 
State of Israel (National Lawyers Guild, 1978). Indeed, this position was 
put into practice when Egypt regained Sinai in 1982 and left the Strip 
under Israeli occupation. 
When Israel captured the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1967, 
Israeli officials declared that Israel would annex both territories and 
they described them as lands liberated from Egypt and Jordan. In July 
1980, in an official statement, Israel annexed Arab East Jerusalem (with a 
population of 134,200 persons in 1985), while in December 1981 it annexed 
the Syrian Golan Heights (with a population of 13,700 persons in 1985). 
The populations of the two annexed territories were granted Israeli 
citizenship and Israeli law has since applied to them. 
The historical and religious importance of Jerusalem and the 
strategic importance of the Golan Heights encouraged Israel to annex these 
territories. Therefore, a fundamental question must be asked: Is Israel 
capable of annexing the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to its territory? 
The answer is no, simply because the annexed population, as a consequence, 
would be eligible for Israeli citizenship, and this would lead to a 
radical change in the demographic structure of Israel. 
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Based on the 1985 population statistics published by the Israeli 
Central Bureau of Statistics in 1986, the total population of Israel was 
4,266,200 persons of which 749,000 persons were classified as non-Jews. 
The non-Jewish population comprised 13,700 Syrians and 735,300 
Palestinians residing in what is called Israel including those living in 
annexed Arab East Jerusalem. At the same time, the total populations of 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were 813,400 and 525,500 respectively. 
So, if Israel annexed both territories, the total Palestinian population 
under its control would be 2,074,200 persons as against 3,530,900 Israeli 
Jews. In other words, Israel would find some 37% of its total population 
were Palestinians with a higher rate of natural increase. Hence, the 
Jewish character of the state would be changed and its political future 
would not be clear. 
Israel looks to this problem seriously. In May, 1986, the Israeli 
Cabinet held a two-hour debate concerned with the demographic problem. 
They discussed a report prepared by Professor Reberto Bachi of the Hebrew 
University and an established specialist on the Israeli demographic issue. 
The report came to the conclusion that by the end of this century the Arab 
population will grow to 3.1 million (43%) persons compared with 4.1 
million Israeli Jews. Hence, the Israeli Communications Minister Amnon 
Rubenstein argued for reaching a broad political compromise and ruled out 
any idea of annexing the occupied territories. In contrast, Shimon Peres 
(the former Prime Minister and currently the Foreign Minister), asked 
Israeli women to consider it their national duty to have 4 children or 
more (Murray, 1986). 
In fact, Peres' appeal was an echo of David Ben-Gurion's sentiments 
which were voiced more than 40 years ago, when he called on Jewish parents 
to fulfil their demographic duty toward the nation and regarded the issue 
as one of the highest importance. He argued that the ideal number of 
children should be 3 to 4 and even more (Friedlander, 1974). 
The overpopulation in the Gaza Strip represents a thorny problem to 
the Israelis. "Amos Elon calls his people "blind in Gaza,,; he chides 
them for being blind to the poverty, density and explosiveness theres and 
blind to the implication of retaining it within the borders of Israel, 
where it is fast becoming "the Soweto of Israel". He continues, this will 
have a profound effect on the prospects for peace and risks of war 
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throughout the Middle East" (Lesch, 1984b). This demographic factor had 
encouraged a Palestinian scholar from the West Bank University of Bir Zeit 
to argue in favour of the acquisition of Israeli citizenship as a means of 
attaining a Palestinian democratic and secular state" (Murray, 1986). But 
Israel is aware to this situation. 
There is no doubt that Israel desires to annex the Strip and the West 
Bank but the problem is how the demographic dilemma can be solved? From 
the Israeli point of view, out-migration from the occupied territories 
toward Jordan might take place. For instance, in 1973, the former Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin was quoted as saying: "Israel hopes that a natural 
migration toward Jordan must take place within the next 10 years .... The 
problem of the refugees in the Gaza Strip should not be solved in Gaza or 
in Al-Arish but rather chiefly in East Jordan" (Metzger, Orth and 
Sterzing, 1983). Furthermore, the Israelis believe that the Palestinian 
population in the occupied territories must somehow be reduced, and it has 
been alleged that the former Defense Minister Ariel Sharon hopes to evict 
all Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza and drive them into Jordan 
(Chomsky, 1983). 
In fact, Israel is incapable of annexing the occupied territories for 
reasons already discussed, nor is it capable of evicting all the 
Palestinians so as to keep the land alone. So, Israel has adopted a tough 
policy in the occupied territories and it has increased the colonization 
drive, in order to pressure the population to emigrate and to weaken their 
optimism for a future independent state. 
One important aspect of the territorial and resources conflict 
between the Palestinians and the Israelis in Gaza can be deduced from the 
significant location of the Israeli colonies in the Strip. The majority 
of these colonies are situated along the coast, where the groundwater 
basins are likely to be found, giving these colonies full control over 
Gazan water resources. Although Gazans have long suffered from shortages 
of water supply and are not allowed to dig additional new wells, these 
colonies have been permitted to dig several wells in the past few years. 
Moreover, it is clear that the Israeli colonies in the Strip have 
been designed to surround the existing Palestinian settlements, and to 
ghettoize Gaza's population. In addition, they isolate the Palestinian 
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settlements from each other and make it more difficult to build a 
Palestinian state in the future (Dahlan, 1988). 
Aiming to aggravate the housing problem in order to pressure the 
residents to emigrate, the policy of destroying Gazan dwellings is going 
on. For instance, in January 1987, sixty families living in Block 67 
south of Khan Yunis city were informed by the Israeli authorities that 
their dwellings will be destroyed, as they were built illegally. These 
dwellings were constructed in the early 1970s and the families in question 
possess legal documentation pertinent to their ownership of the lands. 
The area where these houses are situated will be annexed to the Jewish 
colonies of Atsmona and Nahal Morag (Al Fajr, 1987). Similar problems are 
reported north of Beit Lahiya village where hundreds of dwellings are 
threatened with demolition for the expansion of the Israeli colonies of 
Nisanit and Eli-Sinai (see Fig. 4.1). 
Furthermore, in 1982, the Israeli authorities tried to demolish the 
Swedish village (see Figure 4.1) and to settle its inhabitants into Tal 
el Sultan project. The Israelis want to rid the coast of any presence of 
Arab localities in order to develop these areas into tourist centres for 
the Israeli colonies. Consequently, the inhabitants appealed to the 
Swedish Embassy to interfere and stop such demolitions, since the Swedish 
had sponsored the village. So, the Swedish Embassy appealed to the 
Israeli High Court and obtained an injunction to stop such demolition. 
But Israel continues to pressure the inhabitants to move out, as no piped 
water and electricity are allowed to be delivered to them. Indeed, the 
future of the coastal Arab localities is uncertain (See Figure 4.1 and 
Plate 11.1). 
Given the 39 years of bitter suffering in exile, the Palestinians 
cling to their lands and realize that their only challenge to the Israeli 
threat is by remaining in the Gaza Strip (and the West Bank). 
Significantly, they are aware that they must not be drawn into the trap of 
seeking refuge for the second or third time. Externally, the Arab 
countries realize the importance of the demographic factor in the 
Israeli-Arab conflict. So, "in the Ninth Summit Conference held in 
Baghdad in 1978, an Arab institution (The Joint Jordanian-Palestinian 
Committee) was created to support the steadfastness of the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip, and to preserve the national identify of the Arab 
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Palestinian people in all its political, economic, cultural 9 psychological 
and ideological aspects. As a consequence financial assistance was 
provided to eligible institutions in the occupied territories (Kossaifi 
, 
1985). 
In summary, Jewish demographic superiority in the Strip cannot be 
achieved despite the increasing efforts of colonization. Nevertheless, as 
concluded earlier a strong element of territorial control is ensured which 
already imposes actual control and sovereignty upon the population and 
resources in the Gaza Strip. 
11.5 SUggested Solutions 
The Gaza Strip population phenomenon is considered as a unique one in 
the Middle East and even in the world as a whole. It has neither a 
national authority to initiate a population policy nor a recognized 
territorial unit to apply this policy upon. So, when somebody deals with 
the population problems of the Gaza Strip, the above individuality should 
be taken into consideration. There is no doubt that the Strip has 
severely suffered from heavy population pressure upon a very limited and 
economically poor area. However, solutions to the population problems can 
be achieved in two stages: 
11.5.1 Temporary Solution 
It is assumed that, in the short term,, the heavy population 
concentration and gloomy housing conditions in the Gaza Strip can be 
alleviated by improving the socio-economic characteristics of the Gazan 
population, particularly those related to employment, environmental 
health, housing and public services. There is no doubt that a new 
situation would encourage people to take more interest in reducing the 
high rates of natural increase through a reduction in births. 
Improving housing conditions and public services can be achieved by 
adopting a master plan for the areas of Gazan refugee camps in particular 
and the Strip as a whole in general. Following this step, refugees who 
are financially able and willing to rebuild their shelters as multi-storey 
dwellings must be allowed to do so. At the same time, guided 
by the 
financial incapability of the majority of Gazan refugees, financial 
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assistance might be secured to help them in replacing their shelters by 
more comfortable ones. Consequently, the question may be asked - who will finance such a plan? 
Obviously, the Israeli authorities can take part in this plan through 
providing the residents with infrastructural assistance such as preparing 
the lands, building roads ... etc., and by giving them long financial 
loans with low interest rates. However, the plan must depend on foreign 
financial aid from the U. S. A., international aid organizations and the 
Arab oil-rich states. Currently, several small projects are carried out 
in the Gaza Strip through outside financial assistance: in higher 
education (The Islamic University of Gaza), teacher training, building 
classes and laboratories in schools, and some other infrastructure. But 
such small projects are insufficient to cope satisfactorily with the 
explosive population in the Strip. Indeed, the Strip needs an exclusive 
population strategy to save it from heading to disaster. 
It is reported that Saudi Arabia announced its willingness to finance 
a sewage system for Gaza's Jabalya camp which will cost US$l million. 
Also, the United Nations Development Programme will pay for a more 
extensive sewage system for northern Gaza costing US$3.5 million. Foreign 
aid will reportedly pay for several planned projects in Gaza, including a 
new school, an ice factory, a fish market, a new shopping centre, and a 
fishermen's wharf (Al Fajr, 1986). However, these projects cannot be 
carried out unless Israeli approval is granted; some were planned in the 
early 1980s and are still awaiting Israeli approval. Indeed, several 
projects to improve housing conditions and public services in the Strip 
were paralyzed or aborted by the Israeli authorities, for example, the 
sewage disposal system of Khan Yunis city (see Chapter 9). The Israelis 
are unwilling to improve the quality of life of the Gazan population, 
because that would contradict their policy of pressuring the Gazan 
population to emigrate. 
Furthermore, voluntary resettlement of refugees in the 
Israeli -sponsored rehousing projects could be continued, only 
in the 
interests of the population concerned, since the 1985 survey concludes 
that a significant proportion of the households sampled were willing to be 
resettled. Also, resettlenient in the West Bank could take place under the 
sane conditions. 
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11.5.2 Permanent Solution 
The second stage is outlined for a long term Population policy which 
could reduce the population concentration in the Gaza Strip and control 
population growth as well (see Figure 11.1). The starting point in this 
stage begins at achieving a final settlement of the Palestinian problem, 
which might solve all of its national, political, social and economic 
roots. However, from the Palestinian point of view such a settlement must 
result in creating an independent Palestinian state governed by a national 
authority. Simultaneously, the chronic problem of the Palestinian 
refugees must be solved on the basis of the UN General Assembly Resolution 
302(4) of December, 8th 1949. The resolution made it clear that the 
refugees should be permitted to return to their homes, and compensation 
paid to those who choose not to return. Consequently, if the above three 
conditions come to exist, a successful national population policy could 
apply for the Gaza Strip within the territory of the new state. 
In fact, the population problems in the Gaza Strip cannot be solved 
as long as the Palestine question remains unsolved and the Palestinians 
are fragmented in the world. Yet, "Gaza is a microcosm of the tangled and 
anguished Israeli - Palestinian dilemma" (Lesch, 1984a). 
Assuming a final settlement of the Palestinian question, and based on 
the right of return of the uprooted population, the Palestinian refugees 
must be allowed to return to their homeland if they want to do so. 
Obviously, from the outset, "refugee repatriation represents the most 
crucial issue in the Palestinian refugee question. The Arab states have 
steadfastly maintained the right of repatriation of these refugees, while 
Israel has refused even to discuss the issue" (Peretz, 1955). So far, 
numerous resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly since 1948 have 
called on Israel to take steps toward the repatriation of the Palestinian 
refugees, while Israel has let no one return. 
Nevertheless, it is relevant to examine the concept of the word 
refugee" in quantifying the number of Palestinian refugees. The word 
refugee" has an immediacy suggesting an emergency status or at least a 
short-term problem. However, the historical indications are that, almost 
inevitably, a proportion of refugees will become semi-permanent exiles. 
The most extreme and unique case of the long-term ill-consequence of 
ca. 
S- 4. ) 
. 
153 
0 
0 
i5i 
E 
CA 
id 
j 
'-I 
1I 
m 0 S. 
Ol 
C 
a 
ýj Sý 
CL a 
C3 
W 
=W 
C, 
. 61 a 
tA 
c 
0 
. 
19 
L 
0 
'4- 
C 
.2E 4-' a) 4-' 
o -' 
0 
> 
-c 
'-a) 
o 4' 
E 
a) 
L. 
0 
4 
C 
0 
42) CL) 
c= 
to 41 
E 
Q) 0. 
Z (A 
CL) 
fe cu m 
a). o 
m cu -0 m 
41 M j; S- 
0 
4- 
r_ 0 
41 0) 1&- (0 
oM 
M 41 
- CL m 10 j2 
CLO 
4, E 
41 c 
4j 
Ln LA 
-361- 
r_ 
IV x 4- 
9> 0) 0M 
tA 
tA 
41 
to N 
*0 1& PC 
:1 Cu 
4ý .04. ) 
41) v 
a 1- 0) 
. -0, --) 
c0 CL 
41 *j CA 
43) m0 
tA 
0 4) 
m -Z 4A 
LA w 
.0 Aj 10 
LAJ 
ca 
Q) 
0c 0) c 'o 
E (D 0 
:3A, 0 
I*- m 
0 a). - C 
10 4J 
41 
'A 
CL 0 L) 
L 
s- 
0 
M 
CL 
0 
0 
9 
'; 21 
c L. 0 0 43 u 0 (A 
v. 
0'V 0 
r- 
de 
000 
1-. L. L. 
CL CL 06 
EEE 
III 
c0 
41 
4j 
CL 
CL Cz 
-9 41 
L, (L) 
M L) 
. Z, r- 
, r. 0.9 
41 41 
41 
al 
tA 
tu 0. 
c0 
, Iv 
ge 
m 
CL) 41 
65 
C 
C 
c 
0. 
I->' 
0". - 
OE 
. 4- 
41 
CL 
to 
L. 
Im 
A 
0 
I- 
Z 
0 
CL 
4J 
r_ 
0 
U 
-362- 
political upheaval is represented by the Palestinian refugees (D'Souza and 
Crisp, 1985). 
Furthermore, what is the definition of a refugee? The United Nations 
Convention of 1951 and the Protocol of 1967 Relating to Refugee Status 
define a refugee as someone who leaves or remains outside their own 
country owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reason of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion. This definition has been widened by the Organization 
of African Unity to include any individual who, owing to external 
aggression, occupation or foreign domination, or events seriously 
disturbing public order, is compelled to leave his habitual place of 
residence (Salt, 1986). 
Based on the previous definitions of a refugee, a major question to 
be asked is how many Palestinians are refugees? As demonstrated in Table 
1.1, there were about 3.5 million Palestinians with their descendants 
classified as refugees in 1982- This figure includes all Palestinians who 
were living outside the so-called state of Israel, and about 39% and 70% 
of the total population of the West Bank (including Arab East Jerusalem) 
and the Gaza Strip respectively, who were registered as refugees with 
UNRWA. In contrast, by June 1982, there were only 1,925,726 registered 
Palestinian refugees with UNRWA living in its area of operations (Gaza 
Strip, the West Bank, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon). The difference in the 
number of refugees resulted from the differences in the definitions, since 
the UNRWA definition is a purely economic one (see Chapter 2). So, it can 
be concluded that the number of Palestinian refugees is much higher than 
those reported by UNRWA, and any future settlement to their problem must 
consider this fact. 
To sum up, solutions for the Gazan population problems are complex 
and with no guarantee of success. The political and economic uncertainty 
in the Strip confronts any attempt of adopting population policy for the 
future. 
11.6 Overview 
Today, about four decades have passed since the Palestinian exodus of 
1948, with no indications of achieving a final and lasting political 
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settlement to this tragedy. However, all people involved in the politics 
of the Middle East ask why do all initiatives to solve the Israeli-Arab 
conflict fail? The answer is that they have failed to pinpoint and treat 
the core of the conflict, which is "the Palestinian dilemma. " 
Consequently, it is important to conclude the thesis by a short overview, 
showing future prospects for the Palestinian problem. 
Up to 1973, the international community treated the Palestinians as 
refugees rather than a nation, and the Middle East conflict as a 
territorial dispute between Israel and its neighbouring Arab countries. 
However, "in October 1974 a substantial transition in the Palestine 
question occurred when the Arab League recognized a rejuvenated PLO as 
"the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people on any 
liberated territory" (Forsythe, 1983). In addition, "in November 1974, 
the UN General Assembly recognized the PLO as an observer organization, 
and endorsed the "inalienable right of the Palestinians to 
self-determination. " This endorsement was to be repeated yearly 
thereafter" (Forsythe, 1983 and United Nations, 1984). 
Furthermore, the nine countries of the European Council called for 
the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people (Venice 
Declaration of 13 June 1980). They called for a just solution to the 
Palestine problem, which is not simply one of refugees. The declarants 
continued : "The Palestinian people, which are conscious of existing as 
such, must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined 
within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise 
fully their right to self-determination" (Laqueur and Rubin, 1984). 
Similarly, the 1983 Geneva Declaration on Palestine (which was an 
outcome of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine 
convened by the UN General Assembly to heighten awareness of the causes of 
the Palestinian problem) accentuated the attainment by the Palestinian 
people of their legitimate inalienable rights, including the right to 
return, the right to sel f-determi nation, the right to establish their own 
independent state in Palestine, and the right of the PLO to participate on 
an equal footing with other parties in all efforts,, deliberations and 
conferences on the Middle East. This conference was attended by 
representatives of 137 states, of which 117 were full participants and 
20 
were observers (United Nations, 1984). 
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From the above account, it becomes clear that the Palestinians, with 
the help of the Arab countries, have succeeded through diplomacy in the UN 
in transforming their tragedy from a refugee problem into one about 
self-determination. It is now accepted as the core of the Israeli-Arab 
conflict. Hence, from 1974 onward, the Palestine question has become a 
regular feature of the UN General Assembly after an absence of more than 
20 years from its agenda. As a consequence of this achievement, all 
parties involved in the conflict, including Israel, have realized the 
importance of the Palestinian problem in Middle East policy. So, what is 
the Israeli view toward solving the problem and what solution would the 
Palestinians accept? 
As a pre-condition to talks with the Palestinians, Israel and the USA 
require the Palestinians to recognize Israel's right to exist, and to 
recognize the UN Security Council Resolution 242 (see Appendix 14), while 
the Palestinians require Israel and the USA to recognize their right of 
sel f-detern-ii nation, their right to an independent Palestinian state, and 
their right to be treated as a nation. At the same time, the Palestinians 
reject resolution 242 because it deals with their problem as a border 
conflict between Israel and the Arab states, regarding it as simply a 
refugee problem, with no indication of the rights of self-determination. 
From the Israeli point of view, a Palestinian state already exists 
Jordan, where over half of the population are Palestinians. Therefore, 
the Palestinian problem must be solved through some particular arrangement 
with Jordan. However, there is a division between the largest two parties 
in Israel, Labour and Likud, as to how such an arrangement might work in 
practice. "While Likud sees that overall Gaza and the West Bank might 
remain under Israeli control and their Palestinian population might be 
resettled in Jordan, Labour has called for "territorial compromise", 
entitling Israel to annex a large part of the Strip and the West Bank and 
to demilitarize the rest and transfer it to Jordan (Amitay, 1982). 
However, quantifying the response of the Gazan population towards 
resettlement in Jordan no one from the households sampled in Khan Yunis 
camp approved such action, which means that the Jordanian option is 
unacceptable to the Gazan people in particular. 
Nevertheless, "both Israeli parties have one thing in common: no part 
of Palestinian territory is to be released to an independent Palestinian 
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sta+e. The following account is mainly based on a document published in 
April, 1982, by the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at 
the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The document was compiled after a 
two-year seminar on the subject in which a number of Israeli academics and 
politicans took part" (Rowley, 1987). 
From the Palestinians side, a Palestinian state in the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip would be accepted. But to many in Israel , it remains a 
question whether this would be a final or dangerous intermediate solution 
(Forsythe, 1983). Also, Gazans adhere to their aspiration for an 
independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. The new state might even 
choose to federate with Jordan, but this step could be considered only 
after its independence was assured (Lesch, 1984b). 
The Palestinians and the Arabs see that the only possible solution to 
the Israeli-Arab conflict is through holding an international peace 
conference on the Middle East. The peace conference should be convened 
under the auspices of the UN with the participation of the permanent 
members of the Security Council, including all parties involved in the 
conflict, aiming to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting solution. 
In contrast, Israel rejects the initiative and demands direct negotiations 
with the Arab states without prior conditions. This position would enable 
Israel to evade discussion of the Palestinian problem since it knows that 
the international community supports the Palestinian right to 
self-determination and to an independent state. 
The Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir has rejected the idea of 
convening an international Middle East conference. He said such a 
conference will not bring peace to Israel, but will isolate it, because 
the conference will demand an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 border 
and the establishment of a Palestinian state (The Jerusalem Post, 1987). 
Therefore, with such a contradiction in the viewpoints, a solution to the 
Palestinian problem is hard to discern in the forseeable future. 
Consequently, Gazan population problems will remain and grow. 
Arriving at the Gaza Strip from the north, there is a permanent 
roadblock guarded by Israeli troops. Every vehicle going in or out is 
searched and the identity cards of the passengers are checked. There are 
Israeli troops everywhere, patrolling the cities, villages and even the 
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alleys of the refugee camps. The Strip is surrounded by barbed wire and 
guarded by soldiers frofit the north, the east and the south, and from the 
sea with Israeli military beachtowers. 
Inside the teeming Gaza Strip, the Gazan people like most of the 
Palestinians are looking and waiting, with their eyes on their homeland, 
on the fragmentation of the continuity of their settlements by the Israeli 
colonies, on the continuous confiscation of their land, on the paralysis 
of peace initiatives, on the prisons and fear of being imprisoned, and on 
the disappointing performance of the Arab states and the international 
community. Thirty-nine years of statelessness and uprootedness have not 
weakened the dream to return and to start their Palestinian lives again. 
N 
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APPENDIX 1 
Gaza Strip : Index of Population Concentration, 1982. 
Locality 
% of total 
area 
x 
% of total 
population 
Y 
The positive 
difference 
(X - Y) 
Nuseirat 0.7 4.7 4.0 
Bureij 1.2 2.7 1.5 
Gaza city and Beach camp 26.0 37.9 11.9 
JabalYa-Nazla and Jabalya camp 7.9 10.5 2.6 
Khan Yunis city and Khan Yunis camp 11.9 15.5 3.6 
Mughazi 1.7 1.9 0.2 
Rafah city and Rafah camp 10.9 12.3 1.4 
Abasan el Saghira 0.9 0.7 0.2 
Deir el Balah and Deir el Balah camp 8.7 5.3 3.4 
Beit Lahiya 5.2 2.3 2.9 
Abasan el Kabira 3.0 1.3 1.7 
Bani Suheila 4.7 1.9 2.8 
Beit Hanun 8.6 1.9 6.7 
Ikhza'a 3.0 0.6 2.4 
Zawaida 5.4 0.5 4.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 50.2 
Index of population concentration 
Xy 
2 
50.2 
= 25.1 per cent 
2 
When the index of population concentration is low it follows that the 
population distribution is more even and scattered. 
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APPENDIX 2 
U. N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION ON THE 
PARTITION OF PALESTINE 
29 November 1947 
[Resolution 181 (11)] 
Excerpts: 
The General Assembly, 
A 
00. 
Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for 
Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below; 
Requests that 
0.0 
(c) The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the 
Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this 
resolution; 
Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be 
necessary on their part to put this plan into effect; 
Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any 
action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these 
recommendations. .. 
PLAN OF PARTITION WITH 
ECONOMIC UNION 
3. Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International 
Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in part III of this plan, 
shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of 
the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case 
not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the 
Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described in parts 11 
and III below. 
4. The period between the adoption by the General Assembly of its 
recommendation on the question of Palestine and the establishment of the 
independence of the Arab and Jewish States shall be a transitional period. 
B. STEPS PREPARATORY TO INDEPENDENCE 
1. A Commission shall be set up consisting of one representative of 
each of five Member States. The Members represented on the Commission 
shall be elected by the General Assembly on as broad a basis, 
geographically and otherwise, as possible. 
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2. The administration of Palestine shall , as the mandatory Power withdraws its armed forces, be progressively turned over to the 
Commission, which shall act in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly, under the guidance of the Security Council . The mandatory Power shall to the fullest possible extent coordinate its plans for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to take over and 
administer areas which have been evacuated. 
3. On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to 
carry out measures for the establishment of the frontiers of the Arab and 
Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem in accordance with the general 
lines of the recommendations of the General Assembly on the partition of 
Palestine ... 
4. The Commission, after consultation with the democratic parties 
and other public organizations of the Arab and Jewish States, shall select 
and establish in each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council 
of Government. The activities of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional 
Councils of Government shall be carried out under the general direction of 
the Commission. 
6. The Provisional Council of Government of each State, acting 
under the Commission, shall progressively receive from the Commission full 
responsibility for the administration of that State in the period between 
the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the State's 
independence. 
10. The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic 
constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed 
the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission. The 
constitutions of the States shall embody chapters I and 2 of the 
Declaration provided for in section C below and include inter alia 
provisions for: 
(b) Settling all international disputes in which the State may be 
involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and 
security, and justice, are not endangered; 
(c) Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations; 
(e) Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and 
citizens of the other State in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem, 
subject to considerations of national security, provided that each 
State 
shall control residence within its borders. 
11. The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic commission 
of three members to make whatever arrangements are possible 
for economic 
cooperation, with a view to establishing, as soon as practicableg 
the 
Economic Union and the Joint Economic Board, as provided 
in section D 
below. 
-398- 
C. DECLARATION 
A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the provisional government of each proposed State before independence. It shall contain inter alia the following clauses: 
*0. 
Chapter 1 
Hold Places, religious buildings and sites 
1. Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired. 
2. In so far as Hold Places are concerned, the liberty of access, 
visit and transit shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizens of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality, 
subject to requirements of national security, public order and decorum. 
Chapter 4 
Miscellaneous provisions 
.. 0 
D. ECONOMIC UNION AND TRANSIT 
1. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall enter 
into an undertaking with respect to Economic Union and Transit. Thi s 
undertaking shall be drafted by the Commission provided for in section B, 
paragraph 1, utilizing to the greatest possible extent the advice and 
cooperation of representative organizations and bodies from each of the 
proposed States. It shall contain provisions to establish the Economic 
Union of Palestine and provide for other matters of common interest. If 
by I April 1948 the Provisional Councils of Government have not entered 
into the undertaking, the undertaking shall be put into force by the 
Commission. 
The Economic Union of Palestine 
2. The objectives of the Economic Union of Palestine shall be: 
(a) A customs union; 
(b) A joint currency system providing for a single foreign exchange 
rate; 
(c) Operation in the common interest on a non-discriminatory basis 
of railways; inter-State highways; postal, telephone and telegraphic 
services, and ports and airports involved in international trade and 
commerce; 
(d) Joint economic development, especially in respect of irrigation, 
land reclamation and soil conservation; 
(e) Access for both States and for the City of Jerusalem on a 
nondiscriminatory basis to water and power facilities. 
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APPENDIX 4 Questionnaire on Fertility, Mortality and Family Planning (Khan Yunis Area) 
CASE STUDY : KHAN YUNIS AREA 
Fertility, Mortality & Family Planning 
(Data refers to couples) 
Tick (6/ ) the correct answer: la-xal !,, LýVl FL. 1 (L4 1.31. 
Are you from: ý,. Q.. ý r J, % -I 
1. Khan Yunis Ci ty L:. Wj. * -1 2. Khan Yunis refugee camp CJU. -rS-- -T 3. Khan Yunis villages CJL: i. ill- U-P.; -r 
2. Are you (For the husband only) (I-Li rj c,. L r J. 6 jA.,, 
1. A refugee tr-. " 1 -1 2. An indigenous CJ. I-).. -T 
3. Level of education of the husband -r 
1. Illiterate 
-T 2. Elementary . 5. jj. Lt'I 3. Preparatory 
L: 4. Secondary 
5. Technical and teachers institutes 
Lj6. j le---s -wý% 
LA. & -0 
6. University . ., - 
L-ý, -"I 
4. Level of education of the wife 
I. IIIi terate 
2. Elementary 
3. Preparatory 
4. Secondary 
5. Technical and teachers 
6. University 
institutes 
5. Age of Husband when married 
L. Aýj aA Li" _0 
- V--xý 
Un'. 
-"I 
t1, %- C-1-AI -, - -0 
1 below 18 1A Lp', Ji 
f-i 
. 2. 18-19 )1 - IA -T 
3. 20-21 Ti - T- -r 
4. 22-23 Tr - TT -1 
5. 24-25 1 TO - Tf -0 
6. 26-27 TY - TI -1 
7. 28 years and over TA -. -S 
I 
-Y 
6. Age of Wife when married 
1. below 16 1-: - 1 -1 Ji r 
2. 16-17 iY - V1 -T 
3. 18-19 11 - IA -r 
4. 20-21 T) - T. -1 
5. 22-23 Tr - TT -0 
6. 24-25 To - Tf -1 
7. 26-27 TY - TI -Y 
, -. s 
r 
-A TAc . 8. 28 years and over _ r 
7. Duration of marriage J-ý_j I -Y 
Le 
I. below 5 ears 10 -T 
2. 5-9 
3. 10-14 
4. 16-19 T( - T. -0 
5. 20-24 Ti To -1 6. 25-29 ', L- r--,. 
%I 
-Y 
7. 30 years and over 
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For women only 
Wife occupational status 
1. Employed 
2. Not employed 
g. Number of children born 
throughout your marriage 
1.1 
2.2 
3.2 
4.4 
5.5 
6.6 
7.7 
8.8 
9.9 
10.10 
11.11 
12.12 
13.13 children and over 
P 
10. Number of whom dead 
1.1 
2.2 
3.3 
4.4 persons and over 
. 1. " 51-.. II 
'iJL-JI 
T 
Jý6 
-4 
-T JL_i6l 14.3L _r 
" JLA61 _f 
-0 
j LAW 
-Y 
JU61 &,.:, L. 4. -A 
" juibi 
"j L-AI61 
" YU6 _rtx )"x 
I 
)U6 
j. 
4- W: -m -IT 
3U6 ILý. 31L : ro j: Sf -jr 
tz, I, ýLx -I- 
. Jub. 1j J£6 -1 
. jläh _T JL-ihl Ic. JL, 
j 16.29.2. ýM 
_4,91 
11. Number of whom still alive - 11 1 L... J I 
1 1 - u., I _9 
J-iJ6 -1 
2. 2 * C)_NLý _T 
3. 3 j LiJ61 
4. 4 
j 
5. 5 . J1 41 1-- _0 
6. 6 J1 --I 
7. 7 1 
L-jib 
-Y 
8. 8 JLILI 17e-:, L-L -A 
9. 9 J1 i. I 1-M.. -4 
10. 10 .jIiI 1ý, ý -I - 
11. 11 JA6 a-- I-II 
12. 12 L 
13. 13 persons and over 
12. Age when they died -IT 
1. below 1 year Le 
2. 14 f -T 
3. 59 4-0 
4. 10 14 if 
5. 15 years and over 10 
13. Place of Death OL. S.. -)r 
1. In the hospital ýý -I 
2. In the house , -i -T 
3. Elsewhere ý6 L.:.. 
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14. Have you heard about J-j I j-, L-j ct- contraceptive methods: 
1. Not heard 
2. Heard and not used fJj -T 3. Heard and used 1--l -r 
15. If heard and not used please 5" .1 L-j mention why 
1. Islamic religion forbi ds 
2. Political reasons 
3. Harmful to health 
4. Your husband wants more children 
to improve his social standing 
5. Wants more children to prevent 
your husband from thinking 
about getting married again 
6. Help old age 
7. Others 
16. If heard and 'used), please clarify 
why? 
1. Family spacing 
2. Birth control 
3. Medical reasons 
4. Others 
17. Do you think that you would use 
contraceptive methods in the 
future? 
1. Yes 
2. Not sure 
3. No 
. %,.. 0 j1 -),. b 1 -, r 
it -- ýri -0 
. L& ! tll ý%-- &Z-LC -. 1 j: ý 0. " -. 1i I 
ýI :ý L-. j . ... ýI--.. -- Ij- -)'I 
" k)--' f.: ' - 
" II -T 
" 
-r "5_) 
jib 
-ly 
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APPENDIX 5 Questionnaire on Gazan Workers Employed in Israel 
FOR WORKERS IN ISRAEL ONLY 
Tick (, /) the correct answer: 
1. Are you from: 
1. Northern zone 
2. Central zone 
3. Southern zone 
Are you: 
1. A refugee 
2. An indigenous R 
3. Sex 
1. Male 
2. Female R 
4. Marital Status 
1. Single 
2. Married 
3. Widowed 
4. Divorced 
l.. Lol rL. 1 
C. ý jib 
VAL. - 11 
.. C.. ý I ja -T 
0 4ell -i 
061 
. 
-** -T 
6,. *W _T 
L&Z.. - -ii 
. J'. J JXIA 
5. Age 
1. Below 15 
2. 15-19 
3. 20-24 
4. 25-29 
5. 30-34 
6. 35-39 
7. 40-44 
8. 45-49 
9. 50-54 
10. 55-59 R 11. 60 and over 
6. Level of Education 
1. Illiterate 
2. Elementary 
3. Preparatory 
4. Secondary 
5. Technical and 
teachers Institutes 
6. University 
F-I 
Place of work 
1. Ashqelon and Qiryat Gat 
area 
2. Qiryat Malakhi area 
3. Ashdod 
4. Netivot and Beer sheva 
regiors 
5. Besor area 
6. Rishon Le Ziyyon, Rehovot 
and Yavne 
7. Ramla and Lod area 
8. Tel Aviv, Yafa and Petah 
Tiqwa 
9. Kefar Sava, Netanya and 
Hadera 
10. Others E] 
. -P&. RJ 
10 
io 
To -1 
'rf - r. 
i 
--a 
ri - 'ro -1 
I. -Y 
-A 
oi Do 
_>! ýs 
Li " -1 - 
, zu -1 x& Lta -. o 
Sf 
J. _, 
JI l- -v 
(&? JUJ) L, J. eJt i'- _ 
Leý I=*. . -T 
ul 
6". Oj I -v 
LAA:; tI JZ -A 
IjL. W,.;, ".:, - t.. e L. j "S -1 
1 j6 "A -I - 
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8. Types of work: . J--. &-J I &9-L A 
1. Construction(Building and public is L& i L-i. - r., 
works) 
2. Industry (Mining and Manufacturing) UL.:. * -T 3. Restaurants, coffee places hotels 
and shops 
4. Agriculture '. A) 5. Transport, storage and communication Cp.. 
6. Public and community services 
7. Others r--;. I -Y 
9. Are you employed by the Labour Office -. J--Jl 1. zll &_ý6 jaaz Jj% -j 
1. Yes 
2. No f R 
10. If no, why? T IJL&J, --'UQ4q-1 131 1. Because can earn more privately _.. 
I 1 
2. Do not want to pay tax f. LIJ -T 3. Do not want work throughout the year f-L-i -r 4. Other reasons -1 
11. Distance from home to work: J. 4.0. J I U& L'J I J.:, "j I Cps 
1. Less than 50 km. Ji 2. 
3. 
50- 69km. 
70 - 89 km. 
4. 90-109 kin t-S Aq Y. -r 
5. . 110 km and mo re 
q- I 
12. Do you travel to work j--&j6j 1 L,. J 
1. Dai ly 
2. Weekly 
3. Less often OA 
13. If answer ý or 3 in the former -I question, please clarify. How do . 
Jijl rTc;. * 
you stay there 
J. L.. 'a 
1. With permission O. ILe 
2. Without permission CU. L.! 14. Net income per month (in American 
dollars) 
1. less than S100 
2. $100 - 199 3. $200 - 299 
4. S300 - 399 
5. $400 - 499 
6. S500 or more 
Aj 
j.. 
15. Number of days worked per month 
I. Less than 10 days 
2. 10 - 14 
3. 15 - 19 
4. 20 - 24 
5. 25 - 29 
L.. "0 j_*.: J. &. jL. J L 
I AA ju I 
i- -T 
TI T- -f 
L----j 
Tq- To -0 
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APPENDIX 6: Questionnaire on Gazan Migrant Workers Employed Abroad 
PEOPLE WORKING IN THE ARAB AND NON-ARAB COUNTRIES 
Tick () the correct answer 
I. Sex 
Ma 1e 
2. Fena 1e 
11 
2. Marital Status 
Single 
Married 
3. Wi dowed 
4. Divorced 
If ilarried, accompanied by family 
I. Yes 
2. No 
11 
4. Place of work 
1. Saudi Arabia 
2. United Arab Emirates 
3. Kuwait 
4. Qatar 
5. North and South Yemen 
6. Libya 
7. Algeria 
8 Other counLries 
S 
6. 
l> 1 lotell et. 41 .. ( *-", ) eb 
- ". Ji - 
J_s -i 
-T 
LJL,. J ... y 
-T 
J-jT 
-1 
JA LS 1 . 
11 
-Ir 
ol 
e. 
-I 
L6.31 
Types of work 
ofte -I 1. Teaching 
2. Medical professions 
3. Construction & Engineering 
4. I. -Jorkers (skilled & semi 
skilled) 
5. Other professions 
Number of family members(For married) 
1.1 -2 
2.3 -. 4 
E 
3.5 6 
4.7 8 
5.9 10 persons 
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APPENDIX 7 Questionnaire on Israeli -Sponsored Rehousing Projects for 
Gazan Refugees (Al-Amal Project) 
CASE STUDY : REFUGEE DWELLING PROJECTS 
For Al Amal Refugee Dwelling Project only 
Number of square : eI eji 
Household Head - level of Education J, - Lai 
1. Illiterate 
2. Elementary %: Lf I 
3. Preparatory ; 5J II 
4. Secondary I *, t. 1 
5. Technical and teachers institutes A& LA& 
6. University V--. " L? - 
2. occupation 
L A-4j I-T 
I. Doctor or Nurse A'--" it ý'- "'- -1 
2. UNRWA School Teacher Lj L4_14 I _-. j I %. Vj 'rj. L. 3. Governmental School Teacher 6"J 1 %. &. J I V6 6". J. La 
4. Merchant, Shopowner e Le - j-- LZ 
5. Transport, service worker C's--a I J. & 
6. Technical workshops d *- b 4;, Jj 
7. Construction worker -L& 
8. Industry and manufacturing 
LA&j L. " A 
9. Not mentioned above 
3. Place of work 
1. In the Gaza Strip 
2. In Israel 
4. Employment Status 
I &---i wI 
1. Employed N! -1 
2. Unemployed j - 
3. Retired 
4. Self-employed 
5. Are you 
A refugee 
2. An indigenous 
6. Position before moving in the 
Dwelling projects 
1. Khan Yunis Refugee Camp 
2. Khan Yunis City 
3. Al Arish City 
4. Others 
7. If from Khan Yunis Refugee Camp, 
please mention your block number 
1. Block A 
2. B 
3. C 
4. D 
5. E 
6. F 
7. G 
8. H 
9.1 
10.1 
J64_jl 
JL 
C) L-"'- o., Q-:. 
s 131 
- 
jeýýl fjj 
-)Ss 
I 
A 
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11 . Block K K J, J1 12. L L iT 
13. M M Ir 14. N N It 
15. 0 0 io 
8. If from Al Arish City, please f L'eu CP& Q.. Z IaI 
men tion your previous camp 
1. Jabalya w 
Low 
2. Beach V--b L: -J I 3. Buriej 
4. Nusirat 11 
5. Maghazi 
6. Deir el Balah 
7. Khan Yunis L4. 
8. Rafah A.., 
9. How did you get your 
accommodation? 
1. After the demolition of your 
camp shelter 
2. Buying from the owner 
3. Buying a camp shelter and 
demolishing it 
4. Rent 
5. Directly from the 
accommodation office 
6. Others 
10. Date of moving to the Refugee 
Dwelling projects 
1.1976-77 
2.1978-79 
3.1980-81 
4.1982-83 
5.1984-85 
Di d you recei ve 
1. A built house 
2. A plot of land 
- I, cJ 
ýýA fib %A,, -i 
vI III JJL&JI Cjo aojl_t, 6 -T Ej. 
is CPS 
J. ).: " "...: - 
-C ej-4, oil it %---Il 
I%VV - IM - 
Mi - MA - 
IW - IqA- - 'r 
IAAT - IqAT - 
Me - IW - 
Ie.. 
r -" -T 
12. How many housing units did 
your household receive? 
1. One unit 
2. Two units 
3. Three units 
4. Over three units 
13. Area of each Housing Unit 
1.250 sq. m. 
2.125 sq. m. 
14. Number of rooms in the 
previous shelter 
1.1 
2.2 
3.3 
4.4 
5.5 
6. over 5 
I1 1. - 
j4s 
1 
JS L-%L. 4 - IT 
Too 
IT* 
L-i I J>". it JI-ii I it 
Ij &-JýjA 
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15. Number of families in the (A-"J I J>ý-, ) & t-J I J. >. %&J t Y-b Q-U 
previous shelter 
1.1 LLS LA 2.2 - I& LA 3.3 L& 4. over 3 L& d, 3L: 0.4 1 
16. Number of persons in the 
previous shelter 
I. Male 
2. Female 
17. Did you make alterations to the 
new house? 
Iy 
1. Yes 
2. No 
18. If yes: 
1. Adding rooms, halls, 
kitchens 
2. Demolishing the house, and 
rebuilding as multi-storey 
3. Others 
I . 9. Number of rooms in your new 
ac commo da ti on 
1. 1 
2. 2 
3. 2 
4. 4 
5. 5 
6. 6 
7. 7 
8. 8 
9. 9 
10. 10 
11 . over 10 
20. Area of rooms (Average) 
1.3 x3 (9 sq. m) 
2.3j x 7j (10.5 sq. m) 
3.3 x4 (12 sq. m) 
4.4 x4 (16 sq. m) 
21. Number of stores in your 
new house 
1.1 
2.2 
3.3 
4. over 3 
22. Number of apartments 
1.1 
2.2 
3.3 
4.4 
5.5 
6.6 
7. over 6 
IA 
UL& i c-l La , JýpA Ll Lb I II 
JI 
F] 
. L? 
j du. >! A 0j- Iq 
m----! &-j I 
CPO 
. 41 -. AJ I To 
Tfq= 'r x 'r -i 
I -. Jd) = I'jo x rjo 
iT xT 
VI xI 
Ej 
_Oki I 
--Iil J-) 
j L6 L6 
-910 
r'-ju Coa 
- 
. a) 
-T 
-1 
-t 
TT 
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2ý. Number of families presently 
living there 
1.1 
2.2 
3.3 
4.4 
5. over 4 
24. Number of persons 
1. Male 
2. Female 
25. The percentage of compensation 
for your previous camp shelter was 
1. below 5% of its value 
2.5 - 9% 
3.10- 19 
4.20 - 29 
5.30 - 39 
6. over 40% 
26. The compensation was 
(In American Dollars) 
1. below 500 
2. 500 999 
3. 1000 - 1499 
4. 1500 - 1999 
5. 2000 2499 
6. 2500 and more 
27. The net income per month 
1. below $300 
2. $300 -399 
3. $400 -499 
4. $500 -599 
5. $600 -699 
6. $700 -799 
7. $800 and more 
28. Number of household members con- 
tributing to household income 
1.1 
2.2 
3.3 
4. four members and more 
J; '-*" tv-'! J t 4=, 3L* 
LoLJ I jis 
- yr 
--9,1 Lo 
La 
ZL. - t-J t J>i-J t ZPO uii... -eazu 1-r0 JY") 
0/6 je - 14 -T 
r-i 
ýz-LAe-QLaj, - Tl 
iee - o-- -T 
IM - 1--- -T 
1M - lo-. -9 
YM - T-4- -0 
-)IJJ 
Too* C). -. & -,. -IS 
I- 'I 
JJL--&,:., Ls-*:. Jt V-hto - TY 
J-3 I 
yqq Y. - 
A- - 0- -4-St -y 
I-- TA 
Itju 
29. Number of family members con- LLIL&J t )Ijj1 TA 
tributing to household income ij. 11t J V-b 
from outside the Gaza Strip 
1.1 
2.2 
3.3 
4. four members and more 
-410- 
30. If you answer positively quesLion 29, 
what is the relationship between Lhe 
contributor and the head of Lhe 
household. The contributor is his: 
1. Father 
2. Son 
3. Brother 
4. Sister 
5. Daughter 
6. Others 
31. Have you moved 
1. Voluntarily 
2. Compulsorily 
3. Others 
32. Do you suffer from 
1. Shortage of water supply 
2. Sewerage problem 
3. Bad sanitation 
4. Bad housing 
5. Others 
I -4. i . r, L.?.. I .fJI..:, TIj 
r __ "1 -T 
___ -r 
___ .T- 
-o 
V. Jj ... - jj, - ri 
-I 
(SJtjI - 
__________ -T 
___ -1 -r 
tA 1-- 4? 3 zp. -i 
uu. J t 
33. Would you advise the residents of 
refugee camps to move into the refugee 
Dwelling projects? 
1. Yes 
2. Maybe 
3. No 
4. Certainly not 
34. Did you sign any contract when you 
obtained your accommodation? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
I 
35. If yes, did you know what this 
contract included? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
36. If Yes , did 
it include 
I C) e&; z Jib - Ir r 
f 0" -1 
i 11 zr--. o -T 
%JA L'I't %-. iuj 
Jib rI 
I J.;, " L, -Lr. 
r 
"" - 
-T 
1. Jb - 1-ý. 1 lit - 
ro 
-T 
Lr1 i c.. II-1 
Losing your refugee identity L&.. ý> 
2. Renting your house for 99 year sqq 
3. Others 
37. In what language was the contract 
written 
1. Hebrew 
2. Arabic 
3. Hebrew & Arabic 
4. Others 
I '. .-14a Le -r 
1] .: j-'-1 a. i. IJL. - 
I_J _= -T 
--1 
:j- 
a -i 
THE END 
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APPENDIX 9: Instructions to Applicants for Purchasing Housing Units in 
the Israeli-Sponsored Rehousing Projects 
THE MILITARY AUTHORITY OF THE GAZA STRIP REGION 
REFUGEE_REHABILITATION BRANCH 
To the applicant: . .......................... Identity Card No . .......... 
Identity Card No . .......... 
Identity Card No . .......... 
Identity Card No . .......... 
Pl ot no . ............ Project ............... Locality 
From the Department of Surveying, Housing Section: 
Information about the plot: - 
The requirements which must be ippjemented before receivl_pg_ the p)Rt: - 
1- The applicant should obtain a licence from the municipality or the 
council, and it is necessary to mark the intended initial part of the 
building which should be identified on tracing paper. 
A- General and specific sketch of the site. 
B- It should be designated by the horizontal plan of each floor. 
2- The building which is to be implemented in the first stage must be 
marked in green colour on the map draft, and it must be built within six 
months of receiving the plot (land). 
3- The postponed part of the building should be mentioned on the tracing 
map. 
4- The plot can be obtained, when the aforesaid conditions are 
implemented. 
Surveyor's Signature. 
Original copy in Arabic 
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APPENDIX 10 : Legal Procedures Required for Purchasing Housing Units in the Israeli-Sponsored Rehousing Projects. 
THE MILITARY AUTHORITY OF THE GAZA STRIP 
REFUGEE REHABILITATION BRANCH 
POPULATION REGISTRATION - AUTHORITY ........................... 
Municipality ........................ 
Subject: Housing unit. ... 0 0.0 
1.................................................... 
Name: ............................................. 
. ................................................... 
1- The aforesaid has bought housing unit no . ......... neighbourhood ... 
2- It is hoped to implement the application form according to the law 
000*00***090*000.00*00. *. 0.......... 0 
THE MILITARY AUTHORITY OF THE GAZA STRIP 
REFUGEE REHABILITATION BRANCH 
POPULATION REGISTRATION - AUTHORITY ........................... 
Municipality ........................ 
Subject: Housing unit ................................ 
I.................................................... 
2- Name: ............................................. 
. ................................................... 
1- The aforesaid has bought housing unit no . ......... neighbourhood ... 
4000.. 00.. 00.00.. *60*.. *.. 60.............. 
0--00.. 4 
2- It is hoped to implement the application form according to the law 
"""....................... ".. "" ................ S*. Ie"I"""""""""""""""""SS" 
Original copy in A rabic and Hebrew 
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APPENDIX 11 : Bills of Exchange Required to be Signed for Purchasing 
Housing Units in the Israeli -Sponsored Rehousing Projects 
Bill of Exchange 
On the Value of Compensation 
0 
Shekel Agorat 
S- 
. r- 
4-1 
r- Only ................................. and paid accordingly. 
In effect ................. I will pay according to this bill of 
exchange to ...................... the above-mentioned sum which 
amounts to ..................................................... 
The value: The compensation value of the house no . ............ 
block ................ camp ...................... 
This bill of exchange is cancelled after the (0 (0 
destruction of the above-mentioned house. 
Signature, 
_C) -0 
S. - S. - (0 (0 
-i-) 
-0 73 
W--4 >--4 
(ö (0 
Bill of Exchange 
On the Value of Compensation 
Shekel Agorat 
.. 4............. 
Only and paid accordingly. 
In effect ................. I will pay according 
to this bill of 
exchange to ...................... the above-mentioned sum which 
amounts to ..................................................... 
The value: The value of the postponable loan. 
This bill of exchange is cancelled after 10 years. 
Signature, 
Original copy in Arabic 
Continued/ 
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I, the signatory below, confirm and recognize that I am in full 
cognizance that I have guaranteed Mr: 
1........................................ 
. ....................................... 
On the value of the house compensation no. ............... 0 
block .................. in the refugee camp, Area ....................... 
and this is ffy signature to that effect. 
Signature, 
I, the signatory below, confirm and recognize that I am in full 
cognizance that I have guaranteed Mr: 
1........................................ 
. ....................................... 
On the value of the house compensation no . .......................... 
block .................. in the refugee camp, 
Area ....................... 
and this is my signature to that effect. 
Signature, 
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APPENDIX 12 : Israeli Building Regulations in the Refugee Camps of the Gaza Strip 
The Civil Administration of the Gaza Strip 
-Announcement for the Public- 
To: 
Address: 
In execution of the competence authorized to me as the Director of 
Welfare Affairs and Refugees, in accordance with ordinance No. 4 of 1960. 
It has to be made known to the public the substance of resolutions 
relating to organizing the constructions and building affairs in the 
refugee camps; and according to what has been provided in the minutes 
issued by the officials for refugee affairs on the 3rd May 1958 and the 
lst June 1960, we issue the below mentioned regulations: - 
One: If anyone may try to sell , buy, rent, mortgage, or transfer his place 
of living to another person in the camps area, shelter should be withdrawn 
completely from the two parties without having the right to claim any 
compensation. 
Two: It is forbidden to construct any buildings or constructions, and to 
add to or extend the existing shelters, or to demolish the existing 
shelters so as to set up a new one, or to make any other construction in 
the refugee camps area without obtaining a permit from the Director of 
Welfare Affairs and Refugees or from his authorized deputy. 
Three: Whoever has the desire to relinquish his shelter in the refugee 
camps area must submit an application form to the refugee rehabilitation 
office in order to implement the procedures. 
Four: It is forbidden to move from one camp to another without a 
pre-permit granted by the authorities in accordance with legal 
requirements. 
Five: Whoever may violate these orders is required to remove the building 
at his own expense, otherwise the building is taken from him, or he will 
pay a fine in cash or be imprisoned, or he may be subject to both 
penalties. Besides, the building should be removed at the expense of the 
violators (completely and administratively). 
Ravi Sadeeh 
Head of Refugee Rehabilitation Branch 
Director of Welfare Affairs and Refugees 
Date: 29/12/1982 Original copy in Arabic 
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APPENDIX 13 : Questionnaire on the Housing Problem of Khan Yunis Refugee Camp 
CASE STUDY : HOUSING PROBLEM 
(Data refer to households). 
For Khan Yunis refugee camp only 
Tick the correct answer: I L, ei. 
1. S-helter construction by J>"Jl 
1. UNRWA shelter 
2. Private 
3. Others 
2. Number of rooms jý. "-iJ I . 34--A _T 
&4p-lj LAýýA -I 1. I 
-T 2.2 
3.3 
4 4 
. 
5.5 Jj. -A 6.6 
7. seven rooms and more 
Jj. --A E-. -V 
3. Area of rooms (Average) LJJ-ii I L. Lý. 
1.3 x3 (9 sq. m) 
Tq= 'rXr -i 
(10.5 sq. m) 2.3J x3 
Tfi*. J6 T-)o X rjo -T J 
3.3 x4 12 sq. m) iT Ix 'r -T 
4.4 x4 (16 sq. m) IX( -( 
4. Number of families LAJ I ii-A 
1.1 
2. 
3.3 
4. four families and more U 
5. Number of persons 
1. Male 
2. Female 
6. Do you wish to move to the C) 
Jib 
.j 
LI&LJ IJ UZ 
refugee dwelling projects 
1. Yes 
No 2 
. 
3. Not sure 
7. If yes, why? 
1 .1 L-'J 
1. Solve the housing problem 
A. 
2. Pressure from Israeli authority 
jp-ýAAJ 
L-: J L 3. Better facilities and services A. .. 'r, 
4. To gain the right to future 
expansion of the house 
5. Others 
-418- 
8. If no, why? 
-1., 1 131 
1. Financial problems ILA is L1, 
2. Preserve your refugee identity '. 6 11 3. Government compensations are I k-, "e I A.. LAS f . %AJ 
not sufficient 
4. Others 
9. Would you like to get permission to C--. JAZ LV-6 J-*"J I VA -A-V-- i1b 
replace your camp shelter with a 1.3 CA- Js-. A 4--u kz" 
multi-storey building? I Jb. J I 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Not sure A 9tz" -,, A 
10. Would you agree to move to the West E---) L: - L'J 11 U-6 jJ '. ýz Jb 
Bank dwelling projects if they L-3 131 1 W. J I ý. J 
were implemented T LaA 
1. Yes 
2. No 
11. The best solution for the refugee II JAXI I J. -J, 
camp inhabitants 
1. Resettlement in the refugee jzJ I L) La I 
dwelling projects 49.1 L 
2. Repatriation ( awda) 
3. Financial compensation 
4. Resettlement in Jordan CP-6-*zJ' IJLAI 
5. Others I 
12. Do you suffer from Vý JA 
1. Shortage of water supply %rb 'Pý -i 
2. Sewerage problem LL&44 -T 
3. Inadequate electricity Lezi I VJ j--i -T 
4. Rats I -f 
5. Other problems ±. -0 
13. If you suffer from shortage of L-., * VJ Cp3L 0-a Vý LAZ CZ 131 
water supply, is there 
Jib I 
1. Shortage in summer "'. 
b 
2. autumn O-A-ýJ 
3. winter 
4. spring JI%., b LPAýj 1 -1 
THE END 
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APPENDIX 14 
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 
(November 22,, 1967) 
THE SECURITY COUNCIL, 
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the 
Middle East, 
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition Of territory by 
war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state 
in the area can live in security. 
Emphasizing further that all member states in their acceptance of the 
Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in 
accordance with Article 2 of the Charter, 
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the 
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should 
include the application of both of the following principles: 
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories of recent 
conf 1i ct; 
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect 
for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence of every state in the area and their right to live 
in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts 
of force; 
2. Affirms further the necessity 
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international 
waterways in the area; 
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; 
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviclability and political 
independence of every state in the area, through measures including the 
establishment of demilitarized zones; 
3. Requests the Secretary General to designate a special 
representive to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain 
contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and 
assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance 
with the provisions and principles in this resolution. 
4. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council 
on the progress of the efforts of the special representative as soon as 
possible. 
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APPENDIX 15 : Selected Equations Used in the Research 
In this research the following equations have been used: 
Net migration by using: 
M=I- (Pt - PO) - (B - D) 
Where: F1 is the net migration to or from the area 
I is in-migration 
0 is out-migration 
Pt is the population at the end of the period 
PO is the population at the beginning of the period 
B is births 
D is deaths 
Population change by using: 
Pn 
r 
log ( TyO- 
n ioge 
Where: r is the rate of population change 
Pn is the population at the end of the period 
Po is the population at the beginning of the period 
n is the time interval between Pn and Po 
e is equal to 2.71828 
Population projection by using: 
Pn = Po e rt 
Where: Pn stands for projected population 
Po stands for existing population 
e is equal to 2.71828 
r is the annual rate of increase 
t is the time interval between Pn and Po 
Time required for population to double by using: 
lin 2 
r 
Where: t is the required doubling time 
lin 2 is the natural Log. of 2 which equals 0.69315 
r is the annual rate of increase 
